

SKETCHES

OF THE

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

NATHANAEAL GREENE,

MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

In the War of the Revolution.

COMPILED CHIEFLY FROM ORIGINAL MATERIALS.

BY WILLIAM JOHNSON,

OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH-CAROLINA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL II.


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
District of South-Carolina.

 BE it Remembered, that on the twentieth day of November, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, and in the forty-sixth year of the Independence of the United States of America, the Honorable WILLIAM JOHNSON, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, deposited in this Office, the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as author and proprietor, in the words following, to wit :

“ Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies of the United States, in the War of the Revolution, compiled chiefly from original materials. By William Johnson, of Charleston, South-Carolina.”

In conformity to the Act of Congress of the United States, entitled “ An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,” and also, to the act entitled “ An Act supplementary to an act entitled, ‘ An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned,’ and extending the benefits thereof to the art of designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints.”


JAMES JERVEY, *
District Clerk, South-Carolina District.



The Seat of War
OF THE
REVOLUTION
IN THE
Southern States;
Shewing the principal movements of the
HOSTILE ARMIES.

Engraved for Johnson's Sketches of the Life & Correspondence of
MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

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 - D^r D^r Genl Morgan
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MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

CHAPTER XI.

Battle of Guilford—Greene retreats over the Haw—Lord Cornwallis retreats over the Deep River, then to Wilmington—Greene pursues—descent into South Carolina.

THE action of Guilford Court-House, was fought on the 15th of March, 1781, a little to the north and west of the village, now known by the name of Martin's Ville, the county town of Guilford. The battle first commenced on the great road leading to Salisbury, and was terminated in the angle lying between that road and the road leading to the upper Saura Towns. Like most other interesting battles, the descriptions handed down to us are very confused, and although all the incidents may be gathered from a careful examination of the several accounts, the connexion and dependence of the several incidents, are involved in much obscurity. This is the necessary result of the manner in which such narratives are collected and transmitted. Each party publishes an account most favourable to himself; these are taken up by writers, under the influence of opposite partialities, and seldom collated by those who follow, with the patience necessary for the attainment of truth. Nor is it always practicable, for the most laborious investigation to detect the errors or impositions practised upon the public; since it is very much in the power of the parties interested to conceal material facts, at least from the existing generation; and as to motives, by a comparison with which

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CHAP. alone, can a fair estimate of the merits, talents and success of the parties
 XL be formed, they may lie forever concealed in the bosoms that conceived them. Yet this battle was fought so much in detail, that there is no insuperable difficulty in presenting an accurate account of it; and its effects were too conspicuous to admit of much doubt as to the injuries sustained in it by the parties combatant.

With regard to the relative strength of the two armies, we can only present the opposite accounts, and the reasons for giving credit to either.

Lord Cornwallis asserts, that when he resolved to attack the American army, he understood their numbers to amount to 9 or 10,000. This was indeed an act of intrepidity to be boasted of. He afterwards concludes, from all the information he could collect, that they amounted to at least 7000. Colonel Tarleton and some others make them six thousand. Colonel Lee reduces them to double the number of the enemy. This last estimate is near the truth. The returns of that day, give 4213 infantry—of which 2753 were militia, and 1490 regular soldiers. Of these there was one regiment of Marylanders, and part of another that had been in battle. The rest were all recruits that had joined the army since General Greene assumed the command. Many of them however, had seen service under previous enlistments.

The continental troops were distributed into four regiments. Two of Maryland under Colonels Gunby and Ford. Two of Virginia under Colonels Greene and Hawes; the latter of whom, commanded in the absence of Colonel Buford. The detachment recently arrived under colonel Campbell, had been distributed through the ranks of the Virginia regiments constituting the Virginia brigade of 778 men, under command of General Huger. The two other regiments constituted the Maryland brigade, composed of Marylanders and Delawares, 630 strong, under the command of Colonel Williams. The artillery of the army, consisted of four six-pounders under command of Lieutenants Singleton and Finley, with about sixty matrosses of Virginia and Maryland. The cavalry was composed of the legionary horse, under Lieutenant Colonel Lee, not exceeding 75 men, and of four small companies under Washington, which in the whole did not amount to 90 more.* The infantry of the legion, already reduced by severe service and desertion, to 82, made up the total of the enlisted troops. The militia were distributed into four brigades, two of Virginians, and two of North Carolinians, and two

* See returns.

rifle corps. The North Carolina brigades, of about 500 men each, were commanded by Generals Eaton and Butler; and those of Virginia, of about 600 men each, were commanded by Generals Lawson and Stevens; the rifle corps of about 200 men each, composed of about 340 Virginians, and 60 North Carolinians, were commanded by Colonels Lynch and Campbell, both from Virginia. This was the whole American force brought into action. A few of Armand's legion joined the army the day before the action; but they appear to have been employed in patrolling.

In the quality of the militia, the diversity was very great. The wretched policy of North Carolina, in making the defence of the country a punishment for offences, and forcing the disaffected into service, had planted a mortal disease in the constitution of their brigades. A great many of the quota furnished by that state, are asserted to have been of those descriptions. It is only wonderful, that they found officers of such respectable standing to command them. The Virginia brigades, were quite a different body. About 5 or 600 of Steven's volunteers were still with him, and had partaken largely of his discipline and spirit; the rest were mostly substitutes or drafted men.

The riflemen who joined the army under Lynch, were all volunteers; and even the substitutes who served on such occasions, possessed all the advantages over drafted men, justly ascribable to volunteers. In some respects, they are better adapted to military service; they claim fewer privileges and indulgences—are subjected more easily to the restraints of discipline—and are generally of a class of men better able to sustain the privations of a camp. We have seen how the men of this description distinguished themselves on the day of the Cowpens. In common with them, many of the militia who served on this occasion, were discharged soldiers. When the advocates for militia requisitions, quote the conduct of those men at the battle of Guilford, these facts ought to be recollected.

It is no easy undertaking to determine the number of men brought by the enemy into the battle of Guilford. The assertion of Lord Cornwallis, that they amounted to only 1360, is sneered at by Sir Henry Clinton, and not even contended for by the British historians. It is an unfortunate fact for the support of this assertion, that he admits a loss of more than 500 killed and wounded, and yet admits a total on the 1st of April, of 1723. Deduct from this number, Hamilton's loyal regiment, which does not appear to have been in the action, and there will still remain more than 2000, exclusive of the artillery. It is also observable, that Colonel Tarleton admits his cavalry to have amounted to 200, and yet the whole legionary corps is set down, in Cornwallis' account, at 174. By the army returns of the 1st of March, it appears,

CHAP. XI. that his total was 2213, which will leave 2000, after deducting Hamilton's regiment. Sir Henry Clinton supposes, that Lord Cornwallis ought to have had with him, after the affair of the Cowpens, 3000 men, exclusive of cavalry and militia; and General Greene constantly insists, that his force, when at Hillsborough, as ascertained from his daily rations, and other means usually resorted to by military men, exceeded 2500, and approached 3000. No author that we recollect, ventures to state it at less than 2000.

When General Greene advanced to Guilford, Lord Cornwallis had changed his position, and lay encamped at the New Garden settlement, or the Quaker Meeting-House, about twelve miles distant from Guilford Court-House. To advance within that distance of an enemy, is a military challenge.

Very early on the morning of the 15th, accordingly, Cornwallis, knowing that his enemy meant, at length, to meet him, sent off his baggage to his former position at Bell's Mill, under guard of Colonel Hamilton's regiment of loyalists, and a few infantry and cavalry; and with the remainder of his army, moved directly forward towards Greene's encampment, by the route which intersects the road to Salisbury a few miles below Guilford Court-House.

Early on the same morning, Colonel Lee, with his legion, and a detachment of riflemen, had been advanced upon the Salisbury road to observe the movements of the enemy. With this view, taking down the road that turns off from the main Salisbury road to New Garden, he encountered the British cavalry, led by Colonel Tarleton. A short but severe skirmish ensued, in which, as usual, both parties claim the advantage. Lee, it appears, was decidedly successful in the first onset, and made some prisoners; but, pressing on, in hopes of some more important achievement, he unexpectedly encountered the enemy's advance, in such force, as to oblige him to retreat precipitately.





It was now clear that the British army was at hand; and intelligence dispatched to head-quarters, produced immediate preparation for battle. Every arrangement had been previously made, and very little time was necessary for each corps to march to the position which had been assigned it in general orders, and carefully pointed out and explained to the respective commanders. So much care had been bestowed upon this subject, that during the whole of this hard-fought day, there was no one instance of doubt or difficulty felt by any officer, as to the post or duty assigned him.

About half-past one o'clock, the head of the British column made its appearance, and the battle commenced by a cannonading on both sides.

The course of the road from Salisbury to Guilford, is nearly north east. In approaching the latter place, and when at the distance of about a mile and

BATTLE of GUILFORD.

5 Views shewing the successive changes of the Battle.



REFERENCES.

- A.A. British Line.
- B.B. North Carolina militia.
- C.C. Virginia militia.
- D.D. American 3 Line or Reserve of Continentals.
- British Corps.
- b. Light Infantry of the Guards.
- c. Yagers.
- d. 33rd Regiment.
- e. 23rd D^o.
- f. 71st D^o.
- g. Regiment of Horse.
- h. Grenadiers of the Guards.
- i. 2nd Bat. of the Guards.
- k. 1st D^o.
- l. Turlton's Dragoons.
- m. British Artillery.
- American Corps.
- n. Delawares.
- o. Lynch's Riflemen.
- p. Washington's Cavalry.
- q. American Artillery—Singleton.
- r. Campbell's Riflemen.
- s. Infantry of the Legion.
- t. Cavalry of D^o.
- u. Green's Regiment of Virginia Regulars.
- v. Buford's D^o under Hawes.
- y. 1st Maryland D^o Gunby.
- z. 2nd D^o.....D^o Font.

a half from it, the road winds between thick coverts of copse-wood, leaving a defile of only a few rods between them. The thickets then trend off to the right and left, and the ground ascends gradually, and with some undulations until you reach the court-house. On the first stage of this ascending ground, and at a small distance from where the road emerges from the copse-wood, the land had been cleared and cultivated on both sides the road, and the fences of the fields were still standing. Beyond these fields, a thick wood extended to the right and left, an unascertained distance, and for about half a mile in depth along the road; there, the wood terminated on the borders of the cultivated grounds adjacent to the court-house. These grounds lie to the south and west of the eminence on which the court-house is erected. Near to the left of the road, as you approach the court-house from the south west, that eminence terminates, presenting a rising ground of an elliptical outline, and looking obliquely to the road—its front being nearly due south. This was clear of wood, having only the usual growth of shrubbery, or small saplings, found in old fields. Alongside the road also, in the lane between the fields, there was a growth of saplings which overtopped the fences.

If the reader will now place himself in the great Salisbury road, where it crosses the skirts of the eminence on which the court-house is erected, and direct his eye towards the advance of the enemy, we shall be able to present him with a panorama of the battle.

The first object that meets his view, is the Maryland line commanded by Colonel Williams, drawn up on his right, fronting the south west. His eye ranges the whole rear of this line, and falls upon the rear of the Virginia line drawn up beyond it, conformably to the face of the hill, and facing south eastwardly; this is under General Huger; and between the right of the one line, and the left of the other; the angle is filled up with two pieces of artillery. Below the eminence on which these troops are drawn up, extends a plain intersected, at irregular intervals, by ravines or hollows, (as they are termed in vernacular language) and terminating in a rising ground, at the edge of the wood which bounds the cleared land, and to the west of the road—this wood is about two hundred yards distant, in front of the position of the Maryland and Virginia brigades. About one hundred yards farther advanced, and altogether in the wood, are drawn up the two brigades of Virginia militia, nearly at right angles with and crossing the road—the right commanded by General Lawson—the left by General Stevens.* Three hundred yards farther in

* General Greene to General Washington, 16th March.

CHAP. advance is seen the North Carolina militia, drawn up also at right angles with
 XI. the road. Their position is in the skirt of this wood, close behind the north fence of the fields in their front, and having those fields open before them for about two hundred yards—General Eaton commands their right—General Butler their left. A small division only, of this line, did not possess the covering of the fence, because there was an interval of open woods between the fields extending to the south of the road. In the road, in advance of this line, and at short range from the defile, are placed two six-pounders under command of Captain Singleton. On the right of the line, a covering party commanded by Colonel Washington, and consisting of Kirkwood's Delawares, about 80 in number, and a battalion of riflemen under Colonel Lynch, of about 200, are extended behind the east side of the fields, obliquely towards the swamp, whilst the cavalry is drawn up at a little distance in the wood, in the rear of the angle formed between the covering party and the right of the front line. On the left of this line also, is another covering party under command of Colonel Lee, similarly situated, but close to the fence that bounded the field to the south*—this consisted of the legion-infantry and a detachment of riflemen under Colonel Campbell, about 250 in all. The cavalry of the legion, like those under Washington, were posted at the point where the covering party formed the angle with the lines, and under cover of the wood. It is obvious, that in running his eye over these objects, the reader must assist his sight by the aid of imagination, as the woods before him covered those in advance from his point of view. Conformably to military language, we must denominate the line most in advance the first line, and the others numerically in succession. If the reader will then recur to the second line, he will observe in the rear of Steven's brigade, a line of sentinels extending from right to left, at about twenty yards distance from the line. These were chosen confidential men, selected by General Stevens on personal knowledge, and posted there with orders to shoot down any individual who broke from the ranks. This may appear to have been a strong measure; but it is one which, with irregular troops, or troops composed of diversified materials, ought never to be omitted. It is due to the safety and worth of those who, if not abandoned by the cowardly, will do their duty. The good effects of it will be presently seen, and whence this, as well as some other material parts of the order of the battle originated will be discovered, when the reader is at leisure to peruse the subjoined note.†

* Letter to Morgan, March 20th 1781.

† *General Morgan to General Greene, 20th February, 1781.*—"I have been doctoring these

If the reader will now run his eye over the whole field of battle, he will be struck with observing, that the army is all in lines—that there is no corps set apart as a reserve—and this will lead him to penetrate the views which directed the whole arrangement, and governed many of the events of the battle. The regular troops are so stationed, as to serve as a reserve to the whole army. There were two avenues of retreat—the one leading to Boyd's Mill on the Reedy Fork—the other to an upper pass over the same stream to the Iron Works on Troublesome Creek, the north branch of the Reedy Fork. The continental troops are drawn up with a view to secure the choice of these routes, according to the point to which the enemy should direct his attack. If pressed upon the right wing, the avenue by the left could be resorted to; if pressed on the left, that by the right would answer the object in view. The resolution which governed every movement of the American general was, in no event, to hazard the destruction of the regular troops. To cripple the enemy by his militia and light troops, and insure their retreat under protection of his regulars, was his motive. If, in pursuit of these objects, fortune should prove

several days, thinking to be able to take the field, but I find I get worse. My pains are now accompanied with a fever every day. I expect Lord Cornwallis will push you until you are obliged to fight him, on which much will depend. You'll have, from what I see, a great number of militia; if they fight you'll beat Cornwallis, if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces; which will be losing all your hopes. I am informed, among the militia, will be a number of old soldiers. I think it would be advisable to select them from the militia, and put them in the ranks with the regulars. *Select the riflemen also, and fight them on the flanks under enterprising officers who are acquainted with that kind of fighting, and put the remainder of the militia in the centre with some picked troops in their rear, with orders to shoot down the first man that runs.* If any thing will succeed, a disposition of this kind will. I hope you will not look upon this as dictating, but as my opinion in a matter that I am much concerned in."

This advice was obviously followed, both in the constitution of the flanking parties, and in the disposition of the second line. The regulars could not, in justice to Stevens and Lawson, be withdrawn from their brigades; nor did it comport with other arrangements and views, to place the militia in the centre of his line. If Morgan meant the middle line, when speaking of the centre (which appears highly probable) then was his advice in this particular literally pursued. We affect not to arrogate to General Greene, the originating of measures conceived by others. We think it more creditable to a commander, to rise superior to the low jealousy, which rejects the advice of an inferior, or regards with envy the well earned fame, of a brave competitor. Greene respected Morgan's understanding and experience; the advice was good, and was adapted. It was an emanation from the same bold and original genius, which soared so far above ordinary views and measures, on the day of the Cowpens.

This brave man had not enjoyed the advantages of education. This letter is in his own hand writing, and every word of the language original: the grammar and orthography are corrected.

CHAP. propitious, there was ample preparation made for availing himself of the
 XI. event. The cavalry and rifle corps, besides covering the wings of his own line, would be at hand to strike at the exposed flanks of a retreating enemy.

The dispositions of the enemy for the attack were, of course, regulated by those previously made by his adversary, and not only in the commencement, but in every part of the action, were they distinguished by every thing that could be expected of valour, genius, experience or discipline.

The fire of Singleton was promptly answered by the British artillery from a little swell of the ground, which commanded the road over the heads of his own column. And, watching the intervals of the fire of his adversary's pieces, Lord Cornwallis pushed his sections across the defile, under the smoke of his own, with very little loss. To the right and left as they passed the defile, they displayed under cover of the wood, according to the order of battle prescribed to the respective corps.

Their right wing was commanded by General Leslie, the left by Colonel Webster. The corps forming the line ranged from right to left, in the following order: The regiment of Boze, the 71st, the 23d, and the 33d regiments in succession. The 1st battalion of the brigade of guards, was drawn up in the rear of the right, to act as a support to that wing. The second battalion and the grenadiers of the same corps, acted as a support to the left, under the command of Brigadier General O'Hara. The yagers and light infantry of the guards, remained in the wood abreast of the artillery, until the line was ready to move on, when they attached themselves to the 33d regiment. The cavalry under Colonel Tarleton, was held in reserve, with orders to move under cover of the woods on the road side, waiting on the artillery, which, from the nature of the country, could move only on the road.

About half past 1 o'clock, all the enemy's preparations for battle being completed, their line advanced into the open ground and proceeded steadily to the attack. But they found no enemy to receive them. Let us hasten over the conduct of the North Carolina militia. They were condemned to a punishment, or a repulsive duty, and they fled from it. There were no riflemen placed in their rear, to confine them to their ranks. It is said, that some fired once—that there were those who fired twice; but, of one fact, there can be no doubt, most of them threw away their arms loaded—knapsacks, and even canteens, followed. Yet, let no national imputation follow from this unhappy incident. North Carolina contains as stout hearts and sinewy arms as any other state can boast of. Panics are among the unaccountable incidents of battle. Like a flash of the Egis, they may come from

no mortal hand. All agree, that the conduct of the officers was unexceptionable. CHAP.
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It is amusing to read the parade of prowess with which the English writers paint this first advantage. A burst of shouts and huzzas spoke the exultation of their army as they pressed forward with the bayonet, to overtake their winged adversaries. But, a flight of balls on both their flanks soon convinced them, that the flight of the line had not shaken the firmness of either of the flanking parties. A halt was instantly ordered—the regiment of Boze half wheeled to the right, and the 33d regiment, with the light infantry and yaugers, did the same to the left, so as to present fronts to an enemy that would not be despised. This movement left a vacancy in each wing, which was immediately filled up by the advance of the two covering parties into line. In the mean time, Singleton retired with his artillery, and conformably to orders, took post on the left of the Marylanders, on an eminence that commanded the road. Washington and Lee also gradually retired, the infantry keeping up a destructive fire, and only retreating before the bayonet, from tree to tree. This brought them soon into the same position with regard to the American second line, as they had occupied relatively to the first.

The British lost no time in advancing upon the second line, except what was necessarily consumed in preserving order, whilst galled on the wings by the fire of the light corps. The air of confidence which their march exhibited, expressed the anticipation of another bloodless triumph. But, the delusion soon vanished. The Virginians stood firm, notwithstanding the abject example set them; and, opening their files, passed the retreating troops into the rear, with taunts and ridicule.

The opposition which the British army now experienced, soon produced a considerable derangement in their line. The fire of the Americans was very destructive, as this line was well armed with about equal proportions of muskets and rifles. Yet, these fine troops, worthy of a better cause, never faltered in their progress, but sustained the conflict with the coolest valour. But, the opposition on their right, was obviously much stronger than that on their left; and the latter, pressing with great ardour on the American right, Lawson's brigade, began to yield; yet, still such was their adherence to order, that the American left and the British right became, respectively, the pivots on which the two lines appeared to wheel. Washington, faithful to the charge of covering his wing, necessarily followed the circle made by the right of the American line; and this, at length, brought both his command, and that of Colonel Webster, upon the high road; and when the retreat of Lawson's wing became general and determinate, Colonel Webster with the 33d, the yaugers

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and infantry of the guards, found themselves on the road, and far advanced towards the open ground in front of the position of the continentals. The infantry of Washington's covering party, now finding that the retreat of the line was irretrievable, separated from it, and made the best of their way to the line of continentals, taking post on the right of the Marylanders. This left Webster at liberty to turn his attention that way; and in evil hour he advanced upon that point of the third line which could be first reached. It proved to be the 10th legion of the American army, the 1st regiment of Marylanders, the same who, under Howard, had already so pre-eminently distinguished themselves at the Cowpens. Colonel Gunby, who had hitherto been employed as deputy quarter master at Hillsborough, now commanded them. With the most perfect composure they awaited the conflict; and when the enemy had approached within close shot, poured in such a fire upon them, as produced a general recoil; then, fearlessly descending into the plain, they followed up the blow with such effect, as to produce a complete rout. Had either corps of cavalry been present at this time, the battle would probably have terminated here, for the 33d regiment, and the two light companies attending it, could not have numbered less than 400 men, considerably above the strength of the Maryland regiment; and the loss of so large a portion of his army, at this period, must have compelled the British commander to sound a retreat. There was still another method left of improving this advantage, and this was, by pressing forward another regiment to its aid, and pushing Webster from the field; and this was, perhaps, the most trying moment of General Greene's military life. Such a measure might end in the defeat of his adversary; but it might also expose him to a close action with the whole British army on the plain, stripped of all the advantages of his present position. Could he have reposed the same confidence in all the other corps, as he did in this Maryland regiment, he would not have hesitated long; but, no other of his regiments had ever been in action, and subsequent events prove how judicious the decision was, to adhere to his original design, and recall the regiment before it advanced beyond support.

Although discomfited, Webster did not lose his recollection; and, although grievously wounded, with great ability he drew off his men beyond a ravine, in the edge of the wood, and waited the support of the other British regiments.

During the contest between these two parties, the artillery under Lieutenant McLeod, had reached the cleared fields, and taken an excellent position on the rising ground at the edge of the wood. This was an event which ultimately proved of infinite importance, and to it, in a great measure, was attributable the final issue of the battle.

The battle still raged between the Virginians and the remaining force of the enemy : fearful of the sabres of the cavalry, the former clung to the woods, and were winding their way round the cleared ground, to pass over beyond the upper fences, in order to get under protection of the line of continentals. When the fire became animated between Gunby and Webster, and evidently approached the left of the British army, General O'Hara, who, it will be recollected, had brought the 2d battalion and grenadiers of the guards into line, next to the right of the 33d, now hastened to its assistance, and crossing the field in a direction between the combatants and the court-house, advanced upon the 2d regiment of Marylanders under Colonel Ford. This direction of his march, threw the thicket of saplings on the road side, between him and the 1st Maryland regiment, (now under command of Howard, Gunby being unhorsed) so as to conceal from Howard its near approach to his flank, as he was returning to resume his position in the line. It happened also, that the ranks of the Virginia militia were now so much reduced by the parties that had moved off through the wood, that General Leslie concluded to draw off the 23d and 71st regiments, and leave the contest on the right in the hands of the 1st battalion of the guards, and the regiment of Boze. These two regiments, therefore, the 23d and 71st, were in the rear of General O'Hara, and advancing, at the same time, upon the Maryland brigade. As soon as Colonel Washington perceived that the Virginians of the second line were now out of danger, and that the three British parties were marching upon the left of the third line, he, with most consummate judgment, moved off also in a gallop to the same point. In doing this, he passed ahead of the 71st and 23d, and approached in the rear of the 1st battalion of guards, just at the crisis when the 2d Maryland regiment began to give way. That regiment behaved very badly, notwithstanding the brilliant example so recently set them by the 1st. The firm port and brilliant appearance of the guards, struck them with such terror, that they performed nothing worthy of the high character of their line. Their officers did every thing that men could do to keep them steady, but they soon broke entirely. This, of course, put Singleton's two pieces of artillery into the enemy's possession ; and they, too much occupied with the victors before them, to notice the danger approaching their flank, rushed on as the Maryland regiment gave way, with loud shouts of victory. In five minutes, those shouts were swallowed up in the groans of death. Their ranks soon became very much disordered, and Washington's cavalry burst through them from the rear, with a force that bore down all resistance. At the same instant, Howard, hitherto equally unseen and unseen, rushed upon them from the left, and the battle was literally

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fought hand to hand. It was a contest not only for victory, but reputation ; both these corps were elated with the pride of character acquired in many a bloody field, and were, in fact, each a national boast—officers and soldiers equally valued themselves as the Jovians and Herculians of the two armies ; nor, were the incidents of it destitute of the features of chivalry and romance. Two combatants particularly attracted the attention of those around them. These were Colonel Stuart of the guards ; and Captain John Smith of the Marylanders—both men conspicuous for nerve and sinew. They had also met before on some occasion, and had vowed that their next meeting should end in blood. Regardless of the bayonets that were clashing around them, they rushed at each other with a fury that admitted but of one result. The quick pass of Stuart's small sword was skilfully put by with the left hand, whilst the heavy sabre of his antagonist cleft the Britain to the spine. In one moment, the American was prostrate on the lifeless body of his enemy ; and in the next, was pressed beneath the weight of the soldier who had brought him to the ground. These are not imaginary incidents—they are related on the best authority. A ball, discharged at Smith's head as his sword descended on that of Stuart, had grazed it and brought him to the ground, at the instant that the bayonet of a favorite soldier, who always sought the side of his captain in the hour of danger, pierced the heart of one who appears to have been equally watchful over the safety of the British colonel. This incident, it will be found in the sequel of these sketches, was productive of some interesting consequences.

But, much greater consequences were now on the eve of resulting from the present conflict. It attracted the solicitous attention of both the commanders. It was obvious, that the victory now hung on a thread. Could this body, which, with the grenadiers, was 350 strong, and the flower of the British army, be annihilated, the victory was decided. Both the commanders, anxious to provide for the event, and regardless of personal safety, hastened up to the scene of action. Washington perceived Lord Cornwallis near him, and completely within his reach, and whilst he waved his sword for some of his officers to follow him, the string that bound on his cap, by passing beneath his chin, broke, and the cap fell from his head. It was like the blow of Apollo on the shoulder of Patroclus. The fall of his cap obliging him to dismount, gave time to the British general to provide for his safety, without perhaps having noticed his danger. For it was not with a view to his own safety that he had, at that instant, hurried away ; it was to put in execution one of those dreadful expedients to which the exigences of war sometimes impel a commander. He had ascertained, that the rout of the guards was irre-

trievable, and hurried to the post occupied by the artillery, to require M'Leod CHAP.
XL to repel the progress of the cavalry by volleys of grape poured through the ranks of the retreating guards. O'Hara, then bleeding fast from a grievous wound, was compelled to turn his back upon the afflicting spectacle, and submit to the painful sacrifice, after remonstrating in vain, against it. The expedient succeeded, but this battalion was half destroyed.

In the meantime General Greene, whose anxiety for the fate of the troops engaged in the woods, had drawn his attention that way, was attracted also to the place of these interesting occurrences. The 71st and 23d regiment, had now reached the open ground, and the British commander was again forming his line, whilst the 33d was advancing from its covert, to resume its place on the left, and the remains of the rallied guards were already up. Such also had been the apprehensions entertained for the consequences of the defeat of the 2d battalion of the guards, that the 1st battalion had been ordered up from the left, and had reached the road on which Greene was anxiously observing the progress of events. The brush on the road side, had so effectually concealed the advance of this corps from view, that General Greene had approached within a few paces of them, when they were discovered by one of his aids* and pointed out to him. He had the presence of mind, to retire in a walk; a precipitate movement would probably have drawn upon him a volley of musketry.

An awful pause now ensued, interrupted only by the mutual cannonade, and occasional volleys of musketry. The British army was once more in line, with the exception of the regiment of Boze, which was still warmly engaged in the skirts of the woods on the American left. On the other hand the 2d Maryland regiment, was irretrievably broken, notwithstanding the desperate efforts of every officer to rally it. Its defection was in some measure compensated for, by the presence of Kirkwood and Lynch with the infantry of Washington's covering party. But still, notwithstanding the firing was kept up, neither advanced, but both parties appeared to be waiting the issue of the contest on the left. Unfortunately that was too soon decided for the American cause.

Soon after the left of the Virginia militia began to give ground, General Stevens unfortunately received a ball through the thigh, which caused him to be borne from the field. This greatly discouraged the volunteers who

* General Lee has asserted, this was Captain Pendleton. We are in possession of an original letter, written to Mrs. Greene, the day after the battle, in which the General says it was Major Morris.

CHAP. XI. fought under him, and had much effect in hastening the retirement of the whole line. Still, however, the reputation of Campbell, the discipline of the legionary-infantry, and the protection of Lee's broadswords, induced a number of Stevens' brigade, to unite themselves to Lee's covering party, under Campbell, and continue the conflict; firing and retiring when approached by the British bayonet. So slow was the progress of the British regiments, and such the superiority of the American fire, that the light troops had greatly the advantage in this kind of warfare. Still, however, the men were dropping off, leaving the ground in small parties, after discharging their pieces.* Yet even at the time when the guards were recalled from the right, there were enough of them present to follow the enemy in their march; and a number of their wounded, both officers and privates were picked up and made prisoners. Unfortunately, upon the departure of the guards, Colonel Lee gave orders first to his cavalry, and afterwards to the infantry of his legion to retire,† and as he says, "take post on the left of the continentals, and there to act until they received further orders." Whatever may have been the intent of this order, it was so executed, that though they did take post on the American left, it was so remote from it, that their presence was neither known or felt. And that it was not intended to connect this movement with that of the main army, is proved by its having been preparatory to a retreat by a different route, from that by which the army moved off;‡ to wit, first up the road to Boyd's Mill, and then across the country to that on which the main army retreated. The fate of his corps was not known until its arrival at the rendezvous the next morning.

In the meantime, the regiment of Boze was still completely occupied by the marksmen, who remained under Campbell; || so much so as to induce Lord Cornwallis to order up Colonel Tarleton, to extricate it and bring it off. Whether at that time the British commander knew of the departure of Lee's cavalry or not, we are not informed; but, had it been present at the time of Tarleton's arrival,§ it ought not to have been a work of perfect security for Tarleton to make the charge upon the militia, which recovered the prisoners they had made, and brought off the regiment of Boze.

When the firing ceased on the left, and the regiment of Boze accompanied by Tarleton's dragoons, appeared advancing on his exposed wing, General Greene, having heard nothing of the fate of the party, that had been engaged with it, and apprehending the worst ;** knowing also that the North Carolina

* Tarleton. † Lee's Memoirs vol. 1, p. 349. ‡ Ibid, p. 352. || Ibid.

§ Tarleton, 275, 276. ** Lee's Memoirs, 351.

and Virginia militia, had generally gained his rear, and were proceeding to the rendezvous, ordered Colonel Greene to advance with his regiment, and cover the retreat. The direction that the battle had taken, having led the enemy to the American left, this regiment had never been engaged, and remained fresh and entire. When the preparations for retreat were discovered, the enemy's line advanced; and the firing was for some time kept up with great spirit and some execution. The firm countenance of Greene's regiment, and the crippled state of the enemy, prevented him from pursuing far; and the American army, after halting some hours at the distance of three miles, to collect stragglers and make arrangements for the care of the wounded, proceeded unmolested beyond the Reedy Fork, and took post at the Iron Works on Troublesome Creek.

Thus terminated this long and obstinate contest. In it were exhibited, the opposite extremes of human bravery and human cowardice; of wild irregularity and indissoluble order. The scales of victory hung long in equipoise—discipline alone gave preponderance to that of the enemy. General Greene had not in his army above five hundred men, who had ever seen service. The British commander was at the head of two thousand of the finest troops in the world. The effect of this advantage does not depend upon theory—it was exhibited in several conspicuous occurrences during the battle. When the 33d regiment, with its attendant companies, was chased from the field, it did not disperse, but rallied under cover of the wood, and returned with confidence into action. When the 1st battalion and grenadiers of the guards were routed, their officers all killed or wounded, and half their number prostrated, the scattered remains soon congregated under the influence of discipline, and were led to resume their place in the line. But, when the Maryland regiment on the left was only forced from its ground for a few minutes, the disorder became irretrievable. The sudden prostration of the enemy they fled from, could not banish their alarm. Excepting the infantry of the legion, and Kirkwood's little corps of Delawares, the 1st regiment of Marylanders was the only body of men in the American army, who could be compared to the enemy in discipline and experience; and it is with confidence, that we challenge the modern world to produce an instance of better service performed by the same number of men in the same time. They did not exceed 285 in number. Yet, unassisted, they drove from the field, in the first instance, the 33d regiment, 322 strong, supported by the yeagers and light infantry of the guards. Before they had yet breathed from the performance of this service, they pierced the flank of the 1st battalion of the guards, and aided by the cavalry of Washington, dissipated a corps, far exceeding their own in num-

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ber, and the very best of the British nation. Volleys of grape shot poured through their own ranks by the enemy, and the near approach of two British regiments on their left flank, arrested them in the pursuit; but they calmly, and in perfect order, returned to their possession and exhibited a spirit that seemed only to covet more arduous service. The pertinacity with which the Virginia militia maintained a long and arduous contest against the whole British line, exhibits a brilliant instance of undisciplined valour; but the push of the bayonet, was not the service for which such troops were calculated. Nothing but the absolute subjection of every human feeling to the restraints of discipline, can dissipate the real or imagined terrors of such a conflict. The good conduct of the covering parties was highly conspicuous. The perfect recollection with which they maintained the desultory warfare assigned them, the coolness with which that on the right retired from line to line, and the perseverance with which the contest was kept up by that on the left, merit the highest commendations. Why, when the latter was extricated from the guards and the regiment of Boze, and found leisure to retire unmolested to the rear of the American left, it was not brought up to the ground, then vacant by the flight of the 2d Maryland regiment, must ever remain a subject of speculation. Colonel Lee, who alone could have answered the inquiry, is now no more. By this movement, it would again have faced the corps which it had so long held at bay, and by covering the American flank in its most vulnerable point, it might have done much towards producing a drawn battle. Or even had it fallen into the line of retreat of the main army, it might have obviated many of the inconveniences necessarily resulting from the absence of light troops on such an occasion. Perhaps the artillery might have been saved. The services rendered by the two corps of cavalry on the day of the battle of Guilford, were of very different natures. No language can do justice to the gallantry, with which Washington conducted himself; he was every where, where duty called, and indefatigable in searching for opportunities of service. There cannot be a doubt, that the cavalry of the legion, would have displayed equal intrepidity, had they been called upon at any period to engage in the pending conflict. But, the only opportunity that the events of the day presented on the part of the field where they acted, was snatched from them by their removal, before the infantry retired. Had they remained, they must have measured swords with the dragoons of Tarleton. As it was, they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves.*

* One opportunity occurred, which is thus related by the late venerable patriot, General Davie.
 "You have no doubt observed, that Campbell's regiment of riflemen acted with Lee, on the left

Although General Greene was compelled to relinquish the field to his adversary, could he have retired without the loss of his artillery, he would have gained all he had promised himself, though not all he had hoped for. Admitting his object to have been, as expressed to Mr. Jefferson, to incumber his enemy with a number of wounded men—he had succeeded beyond his expectation. One fourth of the British army was put *hors de combat*; and among them, all their distinguished officers except Cornwallis and Leslie; the former, we have seen, escaped unhurt almost miraculously, when the sabre was brandished over him; he had two horses shot under him. He was present every where, where the action grew hot, and exhibited through the whole affair, a perfect conviction, that he must conquer or surrender. Greater bravery or talents have seldom been exhibited by a military commander.

The enemy acknowledge a loss in killed, wounded and missing, amounting to 531. General Greene, however, asserts, that from undoubted authority it amounted to 633. Of these, one colonel and four commissioned officers were killed on the field; and Colonel Webster, Captains Schultz, Maynard, Goodrich, and several others died of their wounds. General O'Hara was so severely wounded, that his recovery was long in doubt; and the service not long after, lost General Leslie, whose health sunk under exposure and fatigue, and obliged him to retire, for some time, from his duty. Colonel Tarleton was slightly wounded, as also a General Howard, who volunteered on this day. Twenty other commissioned officers were among the wounded.

The American killed and wounded could never be ascertained with any precision. The returns of the day could furnish no correct ideas on the subject; for one half of the North Carolina militia, and a large number of the Virginians, never halted after separating from their officers, but pushed on to their own homes. Neither do those returns exhibit a correct view of the loss sustained in the regular troops, for they are dated on the 17th; and a number

flank of the army. After the main body of the army had been pushed off the field, these troops remained engaged with the yeagers of the regiment of Baze, near the court-house, some of them covered by the houses, others by a skirt of thick wood. In this situation they were charged by the British cavalry, and some of them were cut down. Lee's cavalry was drawn up on the edge of the open ground above the court-house, about two hundred yards off, and as Colonel Campbell asserted, moved as this charge was made on his riflemen. On the day after the action, Campbell was extremely indignant at this movement, and spoke freely of Lee's conduct. Lee was, however, sent the same day, to watch the enemy's movements, and Campbell's regiment were soon after discharged, as we heard no more of it.—*Letter to the author.* General Davie seems only to have mistaken the time and place of Tarleton's charge.

CHAP. of those who are marked missing, afterwards rejoined their corps. This
 XI. inference is drawn from a return now before us, made two days after, in which the Virginia brigade is set down at 752, and the Maryland brigade at 550. Admitting that those two corps went into battle with 1490 men, this will reduce their loss to 138, instead of 261, as represented in the returns of the 17th. This error was to be expected from the confusion in which the 2d Maryland regiment abandoned the field. Reducing the whole loss in the same proportion, it will barely exceed 200. The difference in the loss sustained by the two armies is easily accounted for, by considering the advantages of the rifle over the musket, in the contest so long kept up in the wood; and the free use of the bayonet against the 1st battalion of guards. Nor must we forget the sacrifice of so many of this ill-fated corps, made by the fire of the British artillery to the safety of the whole army. To the British artillery is to be ascribed, a great part of the loss sustained by the American regulars. The fire from the hill occupied by M'Leod, was galling and destructive, and painfully tested the passive valour of the American army. There were but two officers of the American regulars who fell this day; but one of them was Major Anderson of the 1st Maryland regiment, the same who so eminently distinguished himself at Gates' defeat. In him, the service truly sustained a loss. General Huger sustained a slight wound in the hand, and about a dozen other officers were wounded.

The loss of the militia brigades and rifle corps, were surprisingly small, not exceeding in the whole eighty men, killed and wounded. Among the former were several excellent officers, but no one above the rank of captain. Among the wounded, the whole army regretted, that General Stevens' services must necessarily be withdrawn from its support.

But, these corps were reduced by desertion to one half the numbers they reckoned before the battle. The Virginians now amounted to only 1021, including Lynch's riflemen—and the North Carolinians to 556. The whole army, including men of all arms, amounted on the 19th, to 3115.

With regard to the merits of the American commander, on the day of Guilford, there never has been entertained but one opinion. Both friends and foes agreed in acknowledging, that the ground was chosen with judgment; the troops disposed so as to improve its advantages to the utmost; and every thing conducted with coolness, precision and effect. The eye of the American commander was, indeed, every where; and throughout the action, the *sang froid* with which he often exposed himself to the hottest fire, when observing passing events, and issuing orders, or making dispositions to counteract those of the enemy, is spoken of by his aids with awe.

With regard to the issue of the battle, it is unquestionably attributable to the unmilitary conduct of the North Carolina militia, and of the 2d regiment of Marylanders. But for the last, the American general need not have feared the return of the regiment of Boze into action; and but for the first, the fall of officers that must have ensued from a few deliberate discharges of marksmen so very advantageously posted, would have introduced the most fatal confusion into the British ranks, in the multifarious contests in which they were afterwards engaged. How far the conduct of Colonel Lee, in withdrawing from the contest with the regiment of Boze, contributed to the issue of the battle, must ever rest in conjecture. It is certain, that the fire of that regiment on the rear of the Virginia line, through the opening made by the flight of the 2d Marylanders, gave the *coup de grace* to the hopes of the American commander. His letter of the 16th declares it, and all historians concur in it. But for this, that day might have terminated in a repulse: The next, might have eventuated in a surrender of his adversary.

Colonel Tarleton has made one critique upon the conduct of the American general, that bears strong marks of sagacity and sound judgment. It is this: "One opportunity being overlooked by General Greene, towards the close of the action, gave that advantage which was long doubtful to the disciplined perseverance of the king's troops. If one brigade of continentals, after the repulse of the 2d battalion and grenadier company of the guards, had taken possession of, and remained at the eminence on the edge of the wood, from whence the three-pounders afterwards fired upon them, they would effectually have broken, &c."

There can be little doubt, that the measure here suggested may have been productive of the most important consequences. But, how could the American commander venture with untried troops, upon so hazardous an enterprise? If it succeeded, victory would certainly follow; but, if it failed, his own destruction was certain. This was a misfortune, he was resolved no prospect of advantage should induce him to expose himself to. His firm adherence to this resolution, as well at this point of time as on the repulse of Webster, is not the least honorable trait of character exhibited on this memorable day. "He that governeth his own spirit, is more honorable, than he that taketh a city." Had the American force consisted of such materials as constituted the Maryland 1st regiment, or of such as composed the British army, it is not to be doubted, that the repulse of Webster would have been improved to the very purpose suggested by Colonel Tarleton; and, at that time, the British artillery being unsupported, must have fallen into the American hands. But, a bloody contest must have followed, in which, if Greene's

CHAP. XI raw regiments had shrunk from the test of the bayonet, (as the 2d Maryland actually did under more favourable circumstances) all would have been irretrievably lost, and the enemy would have marched over their necks in safety to the Chesapeake.

Colonel Lee has observed, that—"Had General Greene known how severely his enemy was crippled, and that the corps under Lee had fought their way to his continental line, he would certainly have continued the conflict; and, in all probability, would have made it a drawn day, if not have secured to himself the victory."*

Why was General Greene not informed on those two points? Colonel Lee could not have foreseen the weight of responsibility which this observation casts on himself. The first would soon have been discovered by the general, had time been allowed to make the necessary observations; and this time was denied by the rapid approach of the regiment of Boze on his exposed wing. Had Colonel Lee, therefore, continued to occupy the regiment of Boze, by means of the light corps, it would have allowed the American commander the time and leisure necessary to reconnoitre the remaining strength of the enemy. And as to the second point, from whom ought the information to have come, but Colonel Lee himself? There was no want of time on his part, for he informs us, that his cavalry and infantry had both been sent off before the movement of Colonel Tarleton to that quarter; and even the riflemen of Campbell, who seem to have been left to shift for themselves, would most probably have reached the vicinity of the American left sooner than the extricated regiment of Hessians.† The cavalry and Colonel Lee himself, certainly did reach the rear of the American left, before the regiment of Boze; and this important piece of information could have been communicated, either by a message, or more properly, by a junction with the left of the American army. That this was not done, is acknowledged by Colonel Lee, and could be proved, if necessary, by other evidence; and its not being done, certainly leaves Colonel Lee exposed to the charge, which he attributes to the want of intelligence in the American commander. Nay, the acknowledged, and otherwise well known fact, of his‡ having retreated by another route, leaves him also exposed to the charge of separating himself from the possible fate of the army, and thereby adding to its difficulties and exposure.

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 351.

† Ibid, p. 349.

‡ Ibid, p. 352.

The only trophies which the American general left in the hands of the enemy, were his artillery, two ammunition waggons, and some of his wounded. As to prisoners, those made by the Americans exceeded those who fell into the hands of the enemy. There was no point of time in which the enemy had leisure or opportunity to make prisoners; and only a few fugitive stragglers, nearly all wounded, fell into their hands. At the time of the rout of the guards, a number of prisoners were made and secured by the Americans; and the muse of Mr. St. George Tucker, who shared in the honours of this field, has recorded a fact, which proves that more might have been made, had the American army had time to distinguish the real dead from those, who, like Shakespeare's fat knight, thought discretion the better part of valour.* The relinquishment of the artillery was a sacrifice to the sparing of human life. When the retreat was ordered, the horses were reported to be nearly all killed. The remaining alternative was, to move them off by the drag-rope. At that time, the commander thought himself stripped of his light troops. The movement of Tarleton to the left had not escaped him—the firing in that quarter, soon after ceased—the regiment of Boze emerged from the wood, and the horse of Tarleton followed. The inference naturally was, that the party engaged with them had been cut up or dissipated. To have moved off the artillery, under any circumstances by the drag-rope, must have been attended with delay and exposure of the covering party. To have done it with an army deprived of half its light troops, could not fail to add much to its embarrassment. The general, therefore, determined to render them unfit for service, and abandon them.

It was about half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the retreat was ordered. The army had been under arms from an early hour, and toiling through many a scene of death and danger, calculated to fatigue both body and spirit. But, still a place of safety must be reached, before it could have a respite from its toils. At first the enemy exhibited a disposition to pursue, but it was not persisted in, and at three miles distance, the army halted, unmolested, whilst it collected its stragglers, and sought rest and refreshment preparatory to a further movement. A day of peril, was soon succeeded by a night

* This was in the case of a Captain Lovell of the guards, from whose *job* a Maryland soldier found leisure on the field of battle, to take a very handsome watch. Washington purchased the watch of the soldier, and Lovell being neither returned as killed or wounded, the conclusion was obvious. It afforded mirth to the American army, but is said to have compelled him to retire from service.

CHAP. XI. of suffering. The weather had been clear and cool, but as the sun declined, the clouds gathered over the horizon, and a cold driving rain ensued. Many, as had been the anxious and sleepless nights of the American commander, few had ever brought with them, a keener sensation of anguish than this. Many brave men still lay exposed on the field of battle, suffering the complicated miseries of pain, cold, and hunger. To afford them present relief, was impossible, and the usages of war as well as natural feeling, would postpone their claims on the humanity of the enemy, to those of his own wounded. Nor was it on their account alone, that cause was afforded for painful reflection. The time has long since gone by, and it is not easy now to realize the feelings which such things are calculated to give present exercise to, but let the reader contemplate the naked, barefooted soldier—one too of the 1st Maryland regiment, toiling through the deep roads and driving rains of that night, and he will not envy the feelings of a commander, retiring through the inclemencies of such weather, before a victorious enemy—himself and all his aids exhausted with fatigue, but sharing in the common exposure, and maintaining a position in the line of march, best calculated to provide for the security of the whole. The following extract of a letter addressed to his lady, the day after this battle, will furnish some idea of the fatigues and feelings which crowded into those moments. “Our fatigue has been excessive. I have not had my cloths off for upwards of six weeks. Poor Major Burnet is sick, and in a situation worse, than you would think tolerable for one of your negroes. Morris too is not well, indeed my whole family are almost worn out. The force coming to the southward, and the situation of General Arnold in Virginia, opens to us more flattering prospects. But, how uncertain are human affairs. I should be extremely happy, if the war had an honourable close, and I were on a farm with my little family about me. God grant the day may not be far distant, when peace with all her train of blessings, shall diffuse universal joy through America.” It is in this letter that he mentions his narrow escape during the action. We cannot return it to our files without giving the passage to the reader. “The action was long, bloody and severe, many fell, but none of your particular friends. Colonel Williams, who is adjutant general, was very active and greatly exposed. I had not the honour of being wounded, but was very near being taken, having rode in the heat of the action full-tilt, directly into the midst of the enemy; but by Colonel Morris’ calling to me, and advertising me of my situation, I had just time to retire.”

The depth of the road, and the precautions indispensable on a retreat, protracted the march until the approach of morning. The distance from the

field of battle to the iron works, on Troublesome Creek, is estimated at ten miles, yet the army did not reach this place until near daylight. Scarcely had they halted, when every heart was relieved by the arrival of the flanking party, commanded by Colonel Lee. By pursuing the route to the High Rock Ford, until he fell into a road which struck across to the Iron Works, he had been the whole night but a short distance from the army, though no intelligence had reached them of his approach. And, as if fortune was not yet fatigued with persecuting the American army, his arrival was attended with a ludicrous event, followed by a very serious misfortune. The cavalry of the legion were furnished with short red cloaks. The rain had, of course, brought these comfortable garments into requisition. It happened that a corps of about three hundred militia, who had arrived in advance of the army, had established their camp, and kindled their fires in the quarter by which the legion approached. Seeing these red cloaks through the woods, the militiamen thinking the whole British army was upon them, broke away and returned no more.

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It was an agreeable surprise to the General in the morning, to find his loss so small comparatively, and his men in the finest spirits. The Virginia militia, proud of the stand they had made, professed their willingness to march immediately to battle. The remains of the North Carolinians, crest fallen at their loss of reputation, declared they would not quit the field, without retrieving their character. The 2d Maryland regiment could not look their comrades in the face, and the Virginia regulars expressed nothing but regret, at not having had an opportunity of rivalling Gunby's regiment. In fact the whole army had been witnesses to the fact, that in both attempts made on the third line, the British had been repulsed and routed, and this too, by a regiment much their inferior in numbers; and such was the happy disposition manifested by the whole, that orders were directly given to prepare for battle. They were obeyed with alacrity, and after a day's rest, the American army was withheld from advancing upon the enemy, only by the hope that the enemy would again give them the choice of ground, by advancing upon *them*.

In the course of the day after the battle, General Greene received satisfactory intelligence, of the state of the British army. His mind was also relieved on the subject of his wounded. The utmost attention that circumstances would admit of, had been shown towards them, by the British commander. And indeed, the American wounded, suffered less than those of the enemy. For the wounded of the American regulars, had fallen in the vicinity of the court-house, and were soon collected; and those of the militia, had generally been consigned by their comrades to the humane care of the neighbouring farmers. This gave occasion to that passage in Lord Cornwallis' official ac-

count of the battle, in which he says, "that the surrounding farm-houses, for many miles, are full of their wounded." Still many were the victims that breathed their last that night.

The first act of the general, after alighting from his horse, was to send surgeons with a flag into the enemy's camp, to attend the American wounded; and along with them were forwarded, provisions and every article of comfort or necessity, that the slender resources of the American army could furnish. The next care was, to write the innumerable letters, both private and official, which the occurrences of the day rendered indispensable. In all these, he uniformly expresses the most thorough conviction, that the victory would have been his, had the North Carolina militia done their duty; a confident hope, that, "although his adversary had gained his cause, he was ruined by the expense of it;" and a fixed resolution to meet him and fight him once more.

From the innumerable letters before us on this subject, we shall give an extract from one only, addressed to General Morgan, and written on the 26th. The writer had then had time to look about him, to collect intelligence, and write with the greater confidence on the several points which it touches upon. "The battle was fought a little west of Guilford Court-House. It began about 12 o'clock, and lasted upwards of two hours. The conflict was bloody and severe; and had the North Carolina militia done their duty, the victory would have been certain and easy. But, they deserted the most advantageous post I ever saw, without scarcely firing a gun. The Virginia militia behaved with great gallantry, and the fate of the day was long doubtful. But, finally, we were obliged to give up the ground; and, as all our artillery horses were killed before the retreat began, we were obliged to leave our artillery on the ground.

"The enemy's loss is very great—not less than between 6 and 700 men, and perhaps more. Our loss is much less, though considerable. The greatest part fell upon the regular troops. We retreated in good order three miles, and there halted and collected all our stragglers; after which, we retired about ten miles from the place of action, where we have remained ever since. The enemy are now retiring from us, and have left us 70 or 80 of their wounded. They are moving towards Bell's Mills. We shall follow them immediately, with a determination for another touch. I have not time to be more particular. God bless you with better health."

Next to the approbation of one's own conscience, that of those whom we honour and esteem, is the legitimate consolation of the ingenuous, in the hour of humiliation. Although General Greene had nothing to reproach himself with in the affair of Guilford, and had succeeded almost to the utmost of what

he had suffered his hopes to aspire to, it was natural for him to covet the solace of the wise and the good. His letters to several of his most valued friends, breathed the language of a spirit unsubdued, hopes undiminished, and something of a proud consciousness that would brave, rather than deprecate censure. But, the answers are full of affection, and the most encouraging reflections. We will give but one extract, and that from him, whose approbation was ever a primary object of the actions of General Greene's life, and infinitely more grateful to him than popular applause. This was General Washington. It is dated April 18th, 1781. "Your private letter of the 18th ultimo, came safe to hand. Although the honours of the field did not fall to your lot, I am convinced you deserved them. The chances of war are various, and the best concerted measures, and the most flattering prospects may, and often do, deceive us, especially while we are in the power of militia. The motives which induced you to seek an action with Lord Cornwallis, are supported upon the best military principle; and the consequence, if you can prevent the dissipation of your troops, will no doubt be fortunate. Every support that is in my power to give you from this army, shall cheerfully be afforded; but, if I part with any more troops, I must accompany them, or have none to command, as there is not at this moment more than a garrison for West Point, nor can I tell when there will be.

"I am truly sensible of the merits and fortitude of the veteran bands under your command, and wish the sentiments I entertain of their worth, could be communicated with the warmth I feel.

"I have the pleasure to tell you, that as far as I am acquainted with the opinion of Congress, with respect to your conduct, it is much in your favour. That this is the sentiment of all the southern delegates. I have great reason to believe, because I have it declared to me, in explicit terms, by some of them. That success, equal to your merits and wishes, may attend you, is the ardent desire of, dear sir, your affectionate friend and obedient humble servant, George Washington." "Since writing the above, I have received a letter from Mr. Curtis, dated the 29th ultimo, in which are these words—"General Greene has, by his conduct, gained universal esteem; and possesses, in the fullest degree, the confidence of all ranks of people."—He had then just returned from the assembly at Richmond."

To have abandoned an advantageous post, and sought the enemy on his own ground, whilst there was a hope of luring him to the attack, would have been not less unmilitary, than inconsistent with the cautious policy which General Greene had resolved to pursue. With every preparation, therefore, for immediate action, he lay four days at the Speedwell Iron Works, anxiously

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On the 18th, the enemy commenced his retreat, but still he availed himself of a device, which placed his future views in much uncertainty.* Although he left all the wounded of the Americans who fell into his hands,† about 80 in number, at Guilford Court-House, his own were transported in waggons and litters as far as New Garden Meeting-House. Incumbered with this retinue, it seemed impossible that he could meditate a retreat; and while it served to mask his intentions, it removed his men to a more friendly and abundant settlement; but, the immediate advance of the American commander, left him no time to deliberate or to manœuvre. Leaving about 70 of the worst of his wounded at New Garden, he immediately pressed forward across the Deep River, in a direction towards Salisbury. This movement was also calculated to keep his adversary in doubt; for, as it looked towards a return into South Carolina, a measure recommended by many considerations, it might have induced a less wary commander to take the direct route from Guilford to Camden, in hopes to intercept his retreat to that place. But, Greene was on his guard, and still paused until his adversary, by recrossing the Deep River, and marching down its east bank, left no doubt as to his real intentions. The American army was then pressed forward by the direct route from the Spredwell Iron Works to Cross Creek, by Buffaloe Creek, and Ramsay's Mill; leaving the British army but very little advantage with regard to distance, from the latter place.

The choice of a route seems to have been suggested to the British commander, from reflecting on the previous movements of his adversary. The advantages of the double corner gained by the American army when it crossed the Dan, were obviously in view, in this movement of the British com-

* Letter to G. Lillington, March 26, 1781. † Letter to Colonel Baker, 30th March, 1781.

mander; and they were successfully and skilfully improved upon. Pressing forward a party of pioneers, he commenced preparation for throwing a bridge across the Deep River, at Ramsay's Mill, near its confluence with the Haw. This indicated an intention to cross at that place, and was calculated to direct the march of the American army down the opposite bank by crossing above him; but his adversary was not to be outwitted. He saw, that the consequence of pursuing that route would be, that the British army would cross the Haw, and securely descend on the east side of the Cape Fear. Yet, so well planned was this measure of retreat, that there was no counteracting it. A movement directly forward, would only force the enemy across his bridge; and breaking that down, and removing the boats in the river, would leave the American army no alternative, but to ascend to the fords of the Deep River, or to cross the Haw and descend on the eastern bank. In either case, there was time and advantage gained.—Suspended between admiration of his enemy's ingenuity, and vexation at the utter impracticability of effectually obviating its effect, the American general could only resort to a *coup de main*, the success of which had nearly corresponded to his hopes. Twelve miles above the bridge, there was a ford called Rigden's; to this he directed his march, and for one day the two armies lay watching each other's movements, each suspended on that which should be first made by his adversary. Had Greene crossed the Deep, Cornwallis would have crossed the Haw. If the former descended directly upon his adversary, his adversary was prepared to throw his army across the Deep River, and by destroying his bridge, suspend the pursuit until it could be rebuilt, or until the army could remount the stream to Rigden's, and there renew the pursuit. This would have secured two entire days. But, very early on the 28th, the American commander, resolving to make a rapid push at his adversary, pressed forward his light troops, with orders to reach and engage the enemy, until the army could overtake and attack it. But, his enemy was vigilant, and had taken such precaution to gain the earliest intelligence of every movement of the American army, that he was apprized of his danger in time to pass the bridge. Yet, so hot was the pursuit, that he had not time to break it down effectually, or even to bury the bodies of some of his wounded, who had that night fallen victims, as many others had done before, to the exposure and fatigues of this march. Such was the eagerness with which the pursuit was pressed this day,* that many of the American troops exerted themselves beyond their strength, and fainted upon the road. They did not even halt to refresh themselves, but urged forward by an animated desire to reach the

* Letter to President of Congress, 30th March, 1781.

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The enemy was now permitted to pursue his painful journey unmolested. Indeed the sufferings to which the British army was now subjected, could almost have moved an enemy to suffer them to proceed unpursued. New graves, marking every step of their progress, proved the baneful effect of this rapid journey, on the health of their numerous wounded; and among the many victims of their present exposure and necessities, were some of the most valuable officers of the army. Colonel Webster was one, and Captains Schultz, Maynard, and some others shared his fate.†

As soon as it was ascertained, that the enemy would descend the right bank of the Cape Fear; couriers were despatched to General Lillington, and Captain Henderson, who were below with their commands of militia. There were still stores of the American army, at Cross Creek, to be removed out of the enemy's way, and a stroke at General Lillington's force, might have been thought an object worthy of an effort of Colonel Tarleton's dragoons. By removing the stores across the river, and destroying the boats for many miles, above and below, safety was extended to both stores and detach-

* Letter to Baron Steuben, April 2, 1781.

† Tarleton's Camp. p. 250.

ments, while the privations of the retreating army, were not a little increased; and by securing the command of the left bank of the river, it became wholly impracticable for the British commander to use the river for transporting his baggage or his wounded. CHAP.
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It was exceedingly unfortunate for General Greene, that before the battle of Guilford, he had been obliged to deprive himself of the only means which could have insured a successful pursuit of the British army. This was by sending away the horses of his militia, and thus depriving himself of a mounted infantry, which could have supported his cavalry in pressing upon the rear of the retreating enemy. There was then no choice left; nor would it have been possible now to retain them in service. The British army had swept the whole country before it, and the British feelings of the inhabitants of the country through which the two armies were now passing, concealed what little forage and provision still remained. Nor was this the only inconvenience attending the march through this nest of loyalists. The American army was continually watched by them.* Intelligence assiduously communicated to the enemy; as zealously withheld from the pursuing army; and the expresses, and even reconnoitering parties of the latter shot down from every fence and thicket. This country was at that point of time, in one of the most deplorable conditions that can be imagined. On the approach of the British army, the whigs had been persecuted, and driven out of the settlements, their houses destroyed, their families insulted, and many of them waylaid and put to death. The advance of the American army was the signal for their return, and they now exhibited a spirit of retaliation which disgraced them. General Greene in his letters frequently exclaims, "if this carnage between whig and tory is continued, this country must be depopulated." The consequence of this state of things, was, that the inhabitants were all in the woods, and the opportunities and inducements of hostility to the American army, many and tempting.

There was another embarrassment encountered by the American commander, which had previously compelled him to make an absolute halt in the very heat of pursuit; and exposed him to the tantalizing state, in which he was placed, when embarrassed by the "dilemma of the bridge."

When the army had advanced as far as Buffalo Creek, so flattering was the prospect of overtaking the enemy, that it became necessary to make that inspection of arms and ammunition, which ever ought to precede the hour of

* Letter to President of Congress, 30th March, 1781,

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battle. What was the chagrine and vexation of the general, at receiving the report, that there was an absolute deficiency of cartridges and rifle balls? Such had been the wanton unauthorized expenditure of these articles by the irregular troops, that a supply, thought a few days before to be ample, was now reduced to a state altogether inadequate to the exigencies of a battle. Powder and lead had been found the best article for procuring bread and meat.

A halt became indispensable; while expresses were hurried back to the baggage (which to facilitate the advance, had been left in the rear) not only for cartridges, but for moulds and lead to manufacture balls. Thus was a day lost to the American army, which could never be retrieved. The march of that day gained by the enemy, was decisive of the route of the pursuit. Lord Cornwallis was enabled to reach Ramsay's Mill, and plant his bridge, and place his adversary in the state of doubt, which preceded the day of his reaching the same place.

The pursuit had been kept up with spirit for about sixty miles, but Lord Cornwallis had still to retreat near one hundred and fifty before he could reach a place of refreshment and repose. Could the American general have prosecuted the pursuit, incumbered as the British army was with their wounded, and obliged, from the poverty of the country, to transport provisions on their march, it is scarcely to be doubted that he must have been overtaken. A severe conflict must have ensued, in which the enemy would have possessed the vast advantage of seven pieces of artillery; but, destitute as he was of officers, reduced in numbers, and dispirited by fatigue and sufferings, there cannot be much doubt entertained of the issue.

The departure of the militia, once more reduced the American commander to a decided inferiority, and it became necessary to cast about him and determine on the course next to be pursued. It only remained to ascertain, that the reduction of his numbers would not tempt the enemy to turn upon him, in order to make up his mind on the subject. He never doubted, that if the enemy continued to retreat, the interests of the service required, that he should move secretly and rapidly on the British posts at Camden and Ninety-Six; while a corps, lightly equipped, should be dispatched to pierce through the heart of the state, and aim a similar blow at the chain of minor posts which extended up the Santee and Savannah Rivers.

It is necessary here to go back to some events that had occurred in South Carolina, whilst Greene was retreating before the British army.

Great efforts, it will be recollected, were made to excite the militia in the enemy's rear, in order to alarm Lord Cornwallis for the safety of the posts

which he had left behind him. General Sumpter, although far from being recovered of his wound, resolved to take the field. At that time, many of his officers and bravest men were in captivity, after the unfortunate affair of Fishing Creek; and some of the former, having been parolled, were scattered over the country on their plantations. Of these, Colonel Wade Hampton was one. A confidential emissary was dispatched by General Sumpter into the country through which he meant to make a descent, to prepare the well-affected for his reception, and to collect the intelligence necessary to direct his movements. Some treachery betrayed this measure to the enemy; and, apprehensive of trusting Sumpter's officers at large, an order was issued for seizing them, and conveying them to Charleston.

A party of twelve men had taken off Colonel Hampton, and were transporting him to prison, when, by one of those extraordinary efforts which characterize the actions of men of that day, he succeeded in seizing the muskets of two of them; and, overawing the whole by his threats and his known character, he effected his escape, bearing with him the weapons that insured his safety. Hampton, now finding himself released from his parole, soon made his way good to join Sumpter, at the head of a little band of gallant followers; and Sumpter, having collected a body of about two hundred and fifty North Carolina men, made a rapid movement down to Fort Granby. Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the enemy at his sudden appearance. And such was the vigor with which he pressed the fort, then destitute of artillery, that his marksmen, mounted on a pile of rails, (then first used, but afterwards attributed to Colonel Maham) were on the point of compelling the garrison to surrender, when an unexpected enemy appeared on the opposite bank of the river. This was Lord Rawdon, who, bearing of Sumpter's incursion, and conjecturing what would be his object, had hurried over to Fort Granby with a force that Sumpter could not cope with. The alternative was, a precipitate retreat; and as the country above was too hostile to be penetrated, and that below presented both a prospect of service and of forming a junction with Marion, he moved off with celerity down the river.

Accident threw in his way a valuable prize. Orders had been left by Lord Cornwallis, for establishing a post at Motte's House, on the road from Charleston to McCord's Ferry, and a detachment of fifty regulars, with arms, provisions, clothing, ammunition, and every thing requisite for establishing such a post, was on its way to the place appointed. A well-directed shot from a vidette, arrested the return of the scout that had preceded this party with due military precaution; and Sumpter, by a judicious choice of a place of ambush, made the whole lay down their arms without bloodshed.

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How to escape with this valuable prize was now the question ; and for this purpose, no project appeared so plausible, as to place it in a boat, descend the river, and land it somewhere below, where the inhabitants were well-affected. A boat was easily procured on the river, and the whole being shipped, dropped down under the direction of a hypocritical guide, who proved himself a traitor.

It will be recollected, that there was a British post below at Fort Watson ; it was situated on the bank of an old bend of the river, that had been nearly abandoned by the current, which had found itself a shorter route. The present channel of the river would have conveyed the boat down in safety, but the guide steered her into that which carried her under the guns of the British garrison.

Sumpter, in the mean time, had crossed the river below, by swimming his horses and transporting his men in canoes. On hearing of the treachery which had robbed them of their prize, his men clamoured to be led on to recover it. But, the attempt was vain ; and although much bravery was exhibited, the Americans were repulsed by the party in the fort, who were securely covered and most advantageously posted.

Sumpter then sought shelter in the swamps of the north bank of the Santee, resolved to wait some opportunity of indemnity or service. But, it required all his firmness to prevent his North Carolina troops from deserting him. At the point of the bayonet they were detained a few days, and he then issued forth from his covert, made for the banks of the Black River, and availing himself of the friendly settlements on that route, once more moved up to the neighbourhood of Charlotte.

This expedition excited alarm among the enemy—sustained the sinking spirits of the well-affected—and, above all, secured a stock of intelligence, which was immediately transmitted to General Greene by Colonel Hampton.

The day after the battle of Guilford, Colonel Hampton arrived in the American camp ; and the view presented of the state of the British posts, by one whose intelligence could be so thoroughly depended upon, afforded General Greene the best grounds on which to decide upon his future measures. The project of penetrating into the country was revived ; and, in order to give it unerring effect, a letter was immediately addressed to Governor Jefferson, to order a detachment of 1500 militia to advance to Salisbury, as a support to the army in its intended movement to Camden.

Colonel Lee has represented this plan of operations, as the suggestion of some other mind, ingeniously pressed upon the general's consideration, while he was meditating another of a very different character. He does not ex-

pressly allege that the project was his own, but a subsequent writer, influenced by what he supposes an obvious inuendo, pointing to a fact only suppressed by the colonel's modesty, has ventured on the assertion, that it was a suggestion of Colonel Lee's own.

From the active part assigned to Colonel Lee, in the execution of the plan, his reputed intimacy with General Greene, and supposed participation in his secret councils, and above all, from the utter impossibility of admitting the supposition that Colonel Lee would pluck the wreath from the brow of his dead friend, to ornament his own, or that of any other with it, the authority of the colonel on this subject, is certainly respectable; and as the movement has ever been considered as the *chef d'œuvre* of our hero, it claims our serious attention to inquire, with whom it originated.

The first observation that presents itself on the account given of this event by Colonel Lee, is suggested by a comparison of dates. His words are, "no sooner had he decided, than he commenced operations. The legion of Lee with Captain Oldham's detachment was ordered to move on the subsequent morning, (6th of April) and the army was put in motion the following day."*

Although in ordinary cases, time is not material to the point in issue, yet whenever an historian attempts precision in dates, it is laying claim to a degree of authenticity not attributable to events related upon mere memory, or ordinary sources of information. In so minute a detail of the arguments used in a discussion as Colonel Lee furnishes, a positive reference to dates, is holding out the idea of resting on the authority of some written memorial of the transaction. But if, as Colonel Lee relates, this suggestion was not made until the 5th of April, we can confidently assure the reader that he is mistaken; or that it came too late; for we have letters before us to Generals Washington and Sumpter, of the date of the 29th and 30th of March, in which the resolution to pursue this plan of operations is distinctly communicated, and the reasons for adopting it as distinctly set forth. We will not deny, that the measure may have been recommended and the arguments used, and if so, no doubt they were silently and complacently listened to, but they had been previously considered and decided on, and it is not to be wondered at, that "the proposer" may have supposed that the measure was of his suggestion, since such was the profound secrecy observed on the subject, and so important was secrecy to its success, that there is great reason to believe that before the 3d it was communicated to none but the general officers, if even to them. So particular was General Greene

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 1. p. 40.

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on this point, that his communications appeared to have been timed according to the distance of the correspondent, so that it could not be divulged before it should be developed by his own movements. Thus, although he makes the communication to General Washington on the 29th, and to General Sumpter on the 30th March, he does not make it to Steuben or La Fayette until the 2d April, because the latter being in Virginia, would receive their letters earlier than the former. In the letter to General Sumpter he sedulously inculcates secrecy, and expressly requires that his views should be communicated to none but the generals. And although from the 30th of March to the 5th of April, he writes several letters to the governors of states, the boards of war, and even the president of congress, and to several military and other officers, requiring services, having in view this very movement, he cautiously avoids communicating his design to any one.

As the passage of the "Memoirs" on this subject is related with much minuteness and positiveness, it may well lead to the conclusion, that Colonel Lee could have furnished the name of "the proposer;" and, as he has not done so, it is not surprising that the idea should be suggested, that he was himself "the proposer," since there could exist no reason, otherwise, for suppressing the name. But, it is doing injustice to Colonel Lee's candour, to charge the design upon him, of thus ingeniously evading falsehood, yet leading into error; since, the orders under which he commenced his march, as appears from the official files, are actually dated the 3d of April; and that he was then absent from head-quarters, is proved by his letter, acknowledging the receipt of those orders, and thanking the general for honouring him with the command. And that he proceeded on his march on the 5th, is also proved by his own communication to General Greene. From the same source also, we derive the evidence, that Colonel Lee was no stranger to the fact, that General Greene had long meditated the descent upon South Carolina, whenever the state and position of the two armies would sanction it. We have before mentioned that this design had been communicated to General Marion in January, with a request to confer with no one upon it, except Colonel Lee. It appears, that the day after the date of this letter to Marion, the communication was also made to Colonel Lee; for, on the 30th January, he writes from Port's Ferry—
 "In your letter of the 26th, you suggest an idea of a very extensive movement, and intimate a desire for a correspondent movement in me at the proper moment, if practicable. My part of the game can be played; and, in my opinion, will be of the most durable and comprehensive services.

"I pray to hear from you fully, and beg you to cherish the movement suggested in your letter of the 26th.

The copy of this letter of the 26th, from what cause, or by what accident we know not, is not among the official files ; but, a subsequent letter from Colonel Lee, of the date of the 3d of February, sufficiently points out the leading features of the movements suggested to General Greene's communication of the 26th. This letter was written from Culp's Ferry on the Pee Dee, on the march to overtake the army then proceeding to join the troops under Morgan. The following passages are extracted from it :

"The invitation which the posture of affairs on the other side of the Santee and in the state of Georgia, held out to a proper attempt, was so pleasing, that I regret exceedingly my recall from that country. I regret it not only as a soldier anxious to acquire honour, but as a citizen.

"A party of horse and foot from your army, equal to breaking down all the out-posts on the two states, and confining the enemy to Charleston, Georgetown, Ninety-Six, Camden and Augusta, would increase daily ; from 300, they would grow to as many thousands."

He then goes on with a most brilliant anticipation of the services that might have been performed, extending even to the liberation of the continental troops then perishing in the prison ships.

It will be recollected, that at the date of the 26th of January, Lord Cornwallis was in motion, endeavouring to overtake Morgan, or cut him off from a junction with the main army. A calm review of all circumstances, rendered it not at all improbable, that he would succeed, at least in throwing himself between the two divisions of the American army. The plan of General Greene, it seems, was, in that case, to withdraw him from his views upon the states of North Carolina and Virginia, by advancing with the main army upon Camden, whilst Lee should cross the Santee, and ascending its right bank, form a junction with Morgan in the neighbourhood of Ninety-Six, or Augusta. The object to be answered, at the time we have now arrived to, was precisely the same, only with the addition of a prospect, from the remoteness of the British army, and the feeling of security which probably prevailed at the British posts, that by making a secret and rapid march, to effect that, which, for want of artillery, could not be effected in any other way—to wit, to reduce some or all of those posts, before the British army could return to their relief. And it appears from the communications of the British commander, that nothing but the successful deception practiced upon him by the American general,* by which, the latter gained a march of several days that could not be retrieved,

* See Lord Cornwallis' letter.

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prevented him from making the attempt to succour the posts at which the blow was levelled. General Greene, reasoning to what would be done, from a knowledge of what ought to have been done, was strongly of opinion, that Lord Cornwallis would return to South Carolina, upon the American army's penetrating into that state; and Lord Cornwallis avows, that in resolving to advance towards Virginia, he was influenced by the hope, that it would induce the American commander to retrace his steps, and fly to the relief of the latter state. But, Lord Cornwallis was not, at that time, in possession of the information then laid up in the bosom of his antagonist, of the preparation then in agitation, for inflicting the blow which awaited him on the shores of York River.

The identity of the views which influenced the measures of the American commander, in January and at the present time, must have been strongly brought to the notice of Colonel Lee, by one part of the letter of instructions of the 3d of this month. It is to this effect—"It will be of infinite importance, if it can be easily accomplished, to have all the boats and craft secured upon the Pee Dee, from the Great Bluff upwards. This may delay the enemy should they attempt to follow you or us, and will give time to effect our designs. You must also govern yourself by circumstances, in crossing the Santee. Should the enemy pursue us pretty close out of the state, it will not be adviseable for you to be separated from us." This letter contains the outline of Colonel Lee's expedition into South Carolina, as related by himself—it instructs him "to take the route towards Cross Creek, and pass the Pee Dee at Haley's Ferry, or higher or lower as he may think necessary, either for his own safety, or to effect a surprise upon the enemy's posts on the Santee." It then proceeds thus—"The post garrisoned by Watson's corps, is the only one which I think you will have a chance to strike at. I have detached Captain Oldham's company to join your legion, which, I hope, will enable you to accomplish the business. But, you must govern yourself by the intelligence you may get. You have only to remember, that our force is small, and that we cannot afford to waste men, without a valuable object in contemplation. I do not mean, that you should march far towards Cross Creek, but only such a distance as you may think necessary to mask our real designs. Remember, that you command men, and that their powers may not keep pace with your ambition."

There is another remark suggested, by the account that Colonel Lee gives of the discussions which preceded the adoption of the resolution which led to the descent into South Carolina, too obvious not to strike every reader. To have made such a measure the subject of general and protracted discussion, would have been wholly inconsistent with the secrecy which was indispen-

sable to its success. Yet, from the account we have of it from that author, one would suppose it to have been the "*pour parler en passant*" of the whole camp. The general, who is himself in the daily habit of using spies and evesdroppers, to collect intelligence, will naturally suppose himself surrounded by both; and if possessing the wariness which uniformly distinguished every movement of the American commander, will strongly be inclined to act upon the principle, that "every man's secrets are safest in his own bosom." In the case before us, it is notorious, that the question was not even submitted to a council of war; and a stronger proof could scarcely be required to prove both the anxiety of the commander to conceal his designs, and the absence of every doubt from his mind on its eligibility. In all the letters written on the subject, there is not a shadow of a doubt exhibited, as to the course he ought to pursue, nor the least anxiety expressed for the approbation of his friends. He confidently expresses his reasons for the measure, and uniformly writes upon the presumption, that no one can disapprove of it. We will transcribe the passage in which he makes the communication to General Washington.

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"Head-Quarters at Colonel Ramsay's, on Deep River, March 29th, 1781.

"In this critical and distressing situation, I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The enemy will be obliged to follow us, or give up his posts in that state. If the former takes place, it will draw the war out of this state, and give it an opportunity to raise its proportion of men. If they leave their posts to fall, they must lose more than they can gain here. If we continue in this state, the enemy will hold their possessions in both. All things considered, I think the movement is warranted by the soundest reasons, both political and military. The manœuvre will be critical and dangerous, and the troops exposed to every hardship. But, as I share it with them, I hope they will bear up under it with that magnanimity which has already supported them, and for which they deserve every thing of their country. I am persuaded the movement will be unexpected to the enemy, and I intend it shall be as little known as possible. Our baggage and stores, now with the army, I shall order by the route of the Sawra towns and Shallow Ford, to Charlotte. By having them in the open country, we shall always have a safe retreat; and from those inhabitants, we may expect the greatest support. I shall take every measure to avoid a misfortune, but necessity obliges me to commit myself to chance; and I trust my friends will do justice to my reputation if any accident attends me."

This letter, it will be recollected, bears date on the very day that it was ascertained that Lord Cornwallis could not be brought to action at Ramsay's Mill, or be pursued further; and it was conclusive to prove, that General Greene would not have hesitated, or consumed time in listening to debates to determine, what course he was next to pursue.

The letter to General Sumpter, written the day after that to General Washington, presents some further views of this expedition. "They," (the enemy) the writer observes, "are on the route to Cross Creek, and probably will fall down the country as low as Wilmington, but this is not certain. The greater part of our militia's term of service being out, will prevent our further pursuit; especially as the difficulty is very great in procuring provisions. Indeed it would be impossible to subsist the army in the pine barrens; and, as we are obliged to halt a day or two to collect provisions at this place, it will give the enemy such a start of us as to leave me no hope of overtaking them if they choose to continue their flight, nor can we fight them upon equal terms after our militia leave us. All these considerations have determined me to change my route, and push directly into South Carolina. This will oblige the enemy to give up their prospects in this State, or their posts in South Carolina; and if our army can be subsisted there, we can fight them upon as good terms with your aid, as we can here. I beg you will therefore give orders to Generals Pickens and Marion to collect all the militia they can to co-operate with us. But the object must *be secret to all except the generals*, otherwise the enemy will take measures to counteract us. I am in hopes that by sending forward our horse and some small detachments of light infantry to join your militia, you will be able to possess yourself of their little out-posts before the army arrives. I expect to be ready to march in about five days, and perhaps we may be in the neighbourhood of Camden by the 20th of next month or earlier. You will please to inform me of your prospects and the probable force I may expect to co-operate with us."

To Baron Steuben, to whom General Greene always appears to open his views with fullness and freedom, and with a view to drawing upon the funds of that veteran's great experience, he writes thus:—"From these considerations, I am determined to march immediately for South Carolina, being persuaded if I continue in this state, the enemy will hold their ground in the southern states and this also. Another advantage may result from it, which is, we shall live upon the resources the enemy have now at command, and the boldness of the manœuvre will make them think I have secret reasons which they cannot comprehend. If I can get supplies and secure a retreat, I fear no bad consequences."

To the Marquis La Fayette, then in command in Virginia, General Greene also assigns another reason for the movement, which serves further to develop his hopes and views. "For these reasons I have determined to carry the war into South Carolina, to prevent *Lord Cornwallis* from forming a junction with *Arnold*, and expect by that movement to draw him immediately out of the State, and if you follow on to support me, it is not impossible that we may give him a drubbing, especially if General Wayne comes up with the Pennsylvanians. But if you go immediately to the northward, Virginia will not be able to send us another man; and the dangerous and critical situation they will be left in, will prevent them from making the necessary exertions for raising the continental troops. It will be our interest to keep the enemy as much divided as possible, for many reasons. As our force is composed principally of militia, we can avail ourselves of a much greater number when they are divided than when they act collectively. We can also fight them to much more advantage divided than collected, as the force of the militia does not increase from the increase of numbers, in the same proportion as the force of regulars."

We have thus given the vindication of this celebrated movement of General Greene's in his own words, uniformly preferring this method wherever practicable, from a firm conviction of our incompetence to do the same justice to his military merit in language of our own. If further proof on the subject can be required, we can give it in a letter of General Greene to the president of congress, of the 22d April, in which he mentions, that from the time of the battle at Guilford, he had this movement into Carolina in contemplation; and the positive declaration of Captain Pendleton, that it never was surmised in the army—that it had proceeded from any other source than the general himself.

Many as have been the embarrassments under which we have been obliged to represent our hero thus far, it is curious to pause and survey the accumulated pressure heaped upon him at the very time that he adopted this brilliant resolution; a resolution, which was the second step towards the conclusion of the war, and the successful termination of this arduous struggle.

It has not fallen to our lot to present the reader with "a great man struggling with the storms of fate." But, struggles enough, God knows, he had to make against a feeble policy, divided sentiment, exhausted resources, and inveterate follies.

In the correspondence of this day, we read—"Virginia, from the unequal operation of the law for drafting, is not likely to get many soldiers.* Maryland, as late as the 13th, had not got a man; nor is there a man raised in North Carolina, or the least prospect of it." Another complains—"The short

* Letter to General Washington, 29th March, 1781.

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enlistments which this unhappy country still perseveres in, have made enlisting and deserting a kind of business. A man enlists himself for six or eight thousand pounds this spring, and deserts—He enlists in another part of the state for eight or ten thousand more—deserts—and at the next session, practices the same villainies over again in some other part of the country, &c. ;”* and a third is sent express to the general, informing him, that “one hundred of my men marched off this morning without my knowledge, and without officers,” &c.†

And all this at a time when the militia were all about to be discharged—no more coming in—the continentals reduced to about 1300—and 300 of these detached on the expedition under Colonel Lee.

Yet, these were but minor evils ; there were others of a more permanent and general nature, threatening to cut off every hope that the American general could entertain, of ever seeing a termination of his embarrassments.

Virginia was, at this time, all in a ferment ; and the situation of Steuben had become so embarrassing and unpleasant, that he begged to be permitted to relinquish his fruitless labours, and rejoin the army : While the British fleet, having regained an ascendancy in the Chesapeake, had driven off the French and released Arnold, just at the time that Greene amuses himself in a letter to a friend, in exclaiming—“Arnold, the traitor, must fall !—Oh, Lucifer ! how great will be thy fall.” Yet, under this accumulated mass of discouraging events, was it, that the daring resolution was adopted, of penetrating into South Carolina ; and, destitute of artillery, to attempt a *coup de main* against places strongly fortified, and garrisoned with numbers nearly equal to those of the American army.

The ferment prevailing at this time in Virginia, is the same before alluded to as having arisen out of the execution of the warrants furnished by Governor Jefferson for the impressment of horses. That gentleman appears to have shared largely in the popular odium excited on the occasion, and it cannot be supposed that either the American army, the American cause, or the American general could have escaped being visited with their due share. It is but an act of justice to all, to point out on whom the censure ought to have rested. So serious was the affair considered at the time, that it formed the subject of deliberation in the legislature, and of an official communication from the governor in council, to the commanding general of the southern department. “That you may form some idea,” says this note from the executive, “of the indiscre-

* Letter from Colonel Davies, April 16, 1781. † Letter from Colonel Lynch, April, 2, 1781.

tions which have occasioned a dissatisfaction with the impressers of horses, I enclose you copies of two papers lodged with me, against a Mr. Rudder employed in that business. Instead of soothing the minds of the people and softening the harsh act of taking their valuable horses by force, it has been frequently accompanied, as we are informed, by defiances of the civil power, and circumstances of personal irritation. As tedious as is the operation of reasoning with every individual on whom we are obliged to exercise disagreeable power, yet free people think they have a right to an explanation of the circumstances which give rise to the necessity under which they suffer. Such has been the general irritation under these impresses, that we have been obliged to authorize the county lieutenants to restrain them under the resolutions of assembly, I formerly enclosed you," &c.

This bears date the 5th of this month; but long before that day General Greene had taken steps to check the evil complained of, and to pacify a people on whose good will he had been for sometime so very dependant.

The truth is, these warrants had been very oppressively executed. A strong national feeling, as well as a favourite source of profit, amusement, and even individual distinction, had been imprudently invaded. The following extract of a letter to Colonel Lee of the date of the 17th July, will best explain both the nature of the injury complained of, and the prompt measures of the general to put a stop to it. "I am this moment informed that a number of the first covering horses have been impressed by Colonel Washington's officers, for the dragoon service, and such as will be valued at 800 or 1000 hard dollars. This is so contrary to my intention, as well as the public interest, that you are desired to give particular orders to your officers not to have those high prized covering horses taken. Get good horses and such as are suitable for dragoon service, but covering horses are not. This business must be conducted with great delicacy, though necessity may urge the measure. All the horses you impress you will keep a record of, and the names of the persons taken down, and also let the value of each horse be fixed against the owner's name. The officers must have particular directions to give proper certificates, otherwise the people will think they are plundered. I rely on your prudence in the execution of this business." There are but few injuries that a Virginian would not have borne with more temper than an attempt to wrest from him the pet that occupied the best stall in his stable. And it had never entered into General Greene's imagination that his officers would lay violent hands upon animals so unfit for his purposes, and so well calculated to array against him all the predilections and prejudices of a whole people. We fortunately have it in our power to refer to the original order issued on the subject, from which we cite these words. "In

CHAP. XI. the execution of this warrant, the officers must be instructed to treat the inhabitants with tenderness, to inform them of the expediency of the measure, and have the horses valued and give proper certificates for them."

The burst of complaint which this conduct of the cavalry officers excited, soon reached the general's ears; and, at the same time that the letter of the 17th was addressed to Colonel Lee, one of the same import was dispatched to Colonel Washington. The impressment of stud-horses was put an end to; but, the attempt left a deep and lasting impression on the minds of the people—furnished an argument to the disaffected—and a standing excuse to the lukewarm, or irresolute. It was not long after this occurrence, that the rapid movement of Colonel Tarleton put him in possession of the best horses in Virginia; and by enabling the enemy to mount entire regiments of infantry, facilitated the devastation of half the state. The same horses might have mounted cavalry for the enemy's destruction.

It would not be doing justice to the memory of the brave men who had been led into the commission of this offensive act, were we to withhold the only excuse they could ever urge in their behalf.

It will be readily conceived, that an order for impressing dragoon horses, must necessarily be executed with great secrecy and dispatch, or no dragoon horses would be found to be impressed. It seems, that the preparation for this purpose did not escape the quick eye of private interest, or was necessarily confided to too many subordinate agents, to remain secret. It is said, (but no doubt without authority) that the riding horses suddenly disappeared, and nothing but the supposed immunities of the steeds of the turf, secured their presence. That, in despair of mounting themselves otherwise, the troopers thought it expedient to impound the fleet Arabian, until his associate of the next stall should reappear and redeem him. But, the success of the expedient does not appear to have equalled expectation; or, if it did, it was attended with concomitant effects, which neutralized or counterbalanced every benefit.

It was with no small difficulty, that General Greene prevailed upon Steuben to continue his indefatigable and enlightened efforts, to collect and forward supplies and recruits from Virginia. Such were the frowns and checks he now met with, that his situation became scarcely tolerable. But, public duty, as well as private feeling, was forcibly pressed upon him, to pacify and detain him. Experience had rendered it unquestionable, that without his presence, every thing would again return to a state of derangement and suspension. All his zeal, experience and talents had been insufficient to effect much; but, without him, it was very obvious, that his commander must expect nothing. With very inadequate support, he had succeeded in forwarding two detachments to

the army at the most critical moments, at the same time that he held Arnold shut up in his strong hold, and kept various small establishments in action, in repairing arms, casting cannon, and furnishing cartridges, lead, &c. for the main army. Greene felt that his organizing head, comprehensive mind, and zeal, quickened by private affection, were of the utmost importance to him in the present state of his affairs. After urging, in several letters, the necessity of his remaining, mixed with the most unaffected regret at being deprived of his talents in camp, the general concludes with observing:—"However, my dear sir, when you consider the critical and disagreeable situation I am in—the little prospect I have of acquiring glory—and the almost certain disgrace that will accompany my manœuvres, (from the nature and constitution of our army, and from the many difficulties I have to encounter) and compare your situation with mine, you may think yourself happy, that you are not in as perplexing a state as I am. I wish both our prospects were better—but mine, of all men's, is most disagreeable. *Let us labour and faint not—haply we may get through the thorny path in due time, and by ways and means not very clear to either of us at present.*"*

Great as had been the chagrine of the American commander, when he found himself compelled to halt at Ramsay's Mill, the intelligence which he collected at that place, was calculated greatly to increase it. It was the first time since the battle of Guilford, that he had occupied the ground recently abandoned by the enemy; and here he was enabled to gather information relative to their distresses, which set it beyond a doubt, that they might have been overtaken, and must have been destroyed.† "I have it," says he, in a letter to the president of congress, "from good authority, that the enemy suffered in the battle of Guilford, a loss of 633, exclusive of officers—and most of their principal officers were killed or wounded. They have met with a defeat in a victory. On Monday, all the Virginia militia return home, and once more I shall be left with a handful of men, exposed to a superior force, and be obliged to seek safety in flight. These are some of the disagreeable effects of a temporary army. The greatest advantages are often lost by the troop's disbanding at the most critical moment. Never was an army in greater distress than the British. They were loaded with their wounded, and must have fallen a sacrifice, had not the tories given them support. Many have joined the enemy, and many have fallen off. Nothing but blood and slaughter has prevailed among the whigs and tories; and their inveteracy towards each other,

* April 6.

† March 30.

CHAP. XI. must, if it continues, depopulate the country. We have been exposed to incredible difficulties in subsisting the army, and the manner of doing it, has been distressing to many of the inhabitants.

"I hope, when the difficulties are taken into view, which I have had to encounter, it will appear I have done every thing which could be expected from one in my situation. *It will be impossible to support the southern war with militia.* The obstruction to business, and the waste attending the service, will soon put it out of the power of these states to make further exertions."

It was not until the 6th of April, that Greene received the intelligence that sanctioned the commencement of his projected operations.* On that day, he was informed that the enemy was in full march for Wilmington, and had descended forty miles below Cross Creek. The halt of the American army at Ramsay's Mill—the exertions made to collect provisions—and the advance of Colonel Lee on the route of Cornwallis' retreat, were well calculated to persuade the British commander, that the pursuit was not yet discontinued; and the prevalence of this opinion had been countenanced by the American general, with a view to hasten the retirement of the British army. But, independantly of the prospects which now opened in the south, Greene knew well, that Wilmington was too secure a post, for him to hope to succeed in an attempt at its reduction. Craig had fortified it. Its peninsular situation, rendered it easily defensible while the enemy retained the undisputed command of the communication with it by water.

Breaking up his camp at Ramsay's Mill on the 7th, the American commander sent off his heavy baggage and all the stores that could be spared from present demands, on the route by Salisbury to the head of the Catawba; and crossing the Deep River, he descended a day's march on the direct route of pursuit, then taking the first convenient road to the right, he advanced directly upon Camden. The route which he pursued, crosses the Pee Dee, below the mouth of Rocky River, and passing through Anson county in the state of North Carolina, and the eastern part of Lancaster in South Carolina, crosses the branches of Lynch's Creek some miles above their confluence. The distance to Camden was about 130 miles, the country poor, desert and exhausted, yet such was the perseverance with which this march was urged, that although delayed at the Pee Dee for want of boats full four days, on the 19th the American general made his appearance before Camden.

* Letter to Steuben, April 6.

High raised and flattering were the hopes with which he approached that place, he was sure that he had preceded all relief from the army of Cornwallis, and fondly imagined that his march was unknown and unsuspected by Rawdon, and the enemy's reinforcements cut off by Sumpter and Pickens. It was not so; the country from which he had marched, and that through which he had marched, were too much infested with loyalists to admit of his making a single movement unobserved. Runners from the tories had preceded him six days, and long enough to enable the commander of the garrison to summon to his aid a considerable body of loyalists and recruits under Major Frazier, from the banks of the Saluda and Broad Rivers; and to his great mortification, Greene found that the garrison of Camden was fully equal to the force that he had brought against it. Still, however, he advanced, bent on an attempt to carry it by assault, when, upon reconnoitering, he found that his force was wholly inadequate to the purpose.

The place is situated on a gentle elevation, extending from the Swamps on the Wateree River to Pine Tree Creek, and was covered to the south and west by those streams, while a chain of redoubts defended it on every open point, and strong stockaded lines in the rear of these redoubts, completed the defence.

Without battering cannon, to subdue it was hopeless; and nothing remained but to sit down before it and tempt the garrison from their strong hold. With this view, on the 20th, he took post on a small rising ground, within half a mile of the enemy's lines, at a place on the Waxsaw Road; and the enemy manifesting no intention to accept the challenge, he retired a mile and a quarter further, and took post on a rising ground of moderate elevation, on the same road, known by the name of Hobkirk's Hill, with his left covered by an impassable branch, and his right approaching a thicket almost impenetrable.

Here we must leave him for some days waiting and desiring the attack of the enemy, while we run over a few concurrent events connected with, and having an influence upon the subsequent movements of the southern army.

CHAPTER XII.

La Fayette detached to Virginia. General Philips' invasion. Lord Cornwallis moves from Wilmington for Petersburg. Forms a junction with Philips' Command. Advances upon La Fayette. The latter retreats across the Rappahannock. Forms a junction with Wayne. Tarleton and Simcoe's incursion. Cornwallis marches to support them. La Fayette throws himself in face of Lord Cornwallis. The latter retreats to Richmond, to Norfolk, and then takes post at York Town. La Fayette forms a junction with Steuben. Pursues Cornwallis. Fall of York Town. Re-enforcements ordered to the southern army. Lee's Movements. Capture of Fort Watson. Battle of Hobkirk's Hill. Correspondence.

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THE reader will recollect, that at the time General Greene was appointed to the southern department, we left the French fleet closely blockaded in the harbour of Newport. The superiority and vigilance of the British commander, precluded all attempt to escape until the last of January, 1781, when one of those tempests which so frequently occur on this coast at that season, dismasted, disabled, or wrecked the whole British fleet. It was this event which enabled the French admiral to dispatch the small squadron under De Tilly, whose sudden appearance in the Chesapeake, had given to the cause of the allies, a momentary ascendancy in the waters of Virginia. But, Admiral De Touches, (for De Tierney was then dead) well knew that this small force would soon be pursued by a superior fleet; and, therefore, gave those orders which occasioned the early retirement of the French, after effecting only the indecisive purposes of a *coup de main*.

In the mean time General Washington, ever watchful for the moment of enterprise, had arranged with the French minister and admiral, a joint expedition by land and water, against the British force under Arnold, now daily expecting to be reinforced by that ready to sail from New York under General Philips. For this purpose the Marquis La Fayette, who (ever bent on joining his friend, had now proceeded as far south as Petersburg) was recalled to take command of a detachment of 1200 men drawn from the Jersey and Massachusetts lines, and ordered on by the American commander, into Virginia. In the mean time, the French fleet, with 1100 troops on board, set sail on the 8th of March for the Chesapeake Bay. But such had been the expedition with which the British fleet was repaired, that in two days after the sailing of De Touches, Admiral Arbuthnot got under way in pursuit of him. Every sail was bent and every nautical expedient resorted to by the British commander, to anticipate his competitor. The object was as interesting, the situation of the contending parties as critical in this nautical race, as in either of those which we have recently been following with the eye, by land. At length the Capes of Virginia appeared in view, on his starboard bow, with the French fleet full in view, making for it from the south.

Never was the military maxim more completely verified, "that in war days are years." But a very few hours sooner, and the entrance of the French fleet into the Chesapeake must have effected a total change in the aspect of the southern war. La Fayette had crossed to the town of Annapolis, awaiting its arrival and prepared to descend by water and effect a junction with the French detachment; and the vigilant and intelligent Steuben had constructed forts on James River, to secure to the fleet a safe and commodious retreat. The French troops once landed, the Americans under La Fayette united with them, those scattered through Virginia collected, and the whole supported by the militia, the British fleet may have secured a retreat to Arnold, but nothing more. Virginia once disembarrassed of him, and this whole united force might have been turned against Cornwallis and produced that co-operation which it has been seen in a preceding page, Greene so anxiously wished from La Fayette.

But, all these exhilarating hopes were now dashed to the ground. An engagement took place between the two fleets—they parted with equal claims to victory—and the French admiral, instead of renewing the contest with a force not superior to his own, sailed away to re-occupy his snug corner at Newport.

Here again occurred one of those pranks of fortune which seem ever to have baffled all the operations of the French fleets in the war of the revolution. General Philips in the interim, had sailed from New York in the wake of

CHAP. XII. Arbutnot, and how the French fleet got back to Newport, without encountering and destroying this British detachment, must ever remain unexplained. Philips arrived in safety, and a junction of 2000 troops of the finest quality, with those under Arnold, soon bore down all opposition.

Before the departure of Philips from New York, the situation of the American army under Washington, was so reduced, and so critical, as to make it necessary for La Fayette to make a retrograde movement, so as to be ready, should Philips threaten the commander in chief, to fly immediately to his aid. It was on this occasion, that the mutinous conduct of the troops under his command, drew forth from this inestimable young soldier, that effort of benevolence and patriotism, which rendered him so very popular among the American soldiery. Scarcely had he succeeded in recrossing his troops from Annapolis to the head of Elk, when he was met by an express from the commander in chief, announcing the sailing of Philips, and bidding him to hasten his march and oppose his meditated descent upon Virginia, or junction with Cornwallis. The troops were immediately halted; and as the command of the bay by the British, rendered it hazardous to attempt once more the passage to Annapolis, the line of march was then taken up for Baltimore, ascending the east side of the bay.

It was in the early part of the month of April, and the north winds in that climate still blew keen. The half-naked soldiers became sullen and intractable. The states on whom the duty devolved, had neglected to clothe them; and the United States had neither money nor credit to supply the deficiency. But, La Fayette's purse was as open as his heart—his private credit soon procured the necessary materials, and every fair hand in Baltimore, was promptly set in motion, in preparing his purchases for immediate use. We will not detract from the merit of the action, by admitting the surmise, that the zeal of the American ladies, needed to be animated, by the presence of the interesting young commander. The services of the fair of Baltimore, not less than of every other part of the union, were ever ready when the wants of their country presented an opportunity for bestowing them.

It has been further added, that, on this occasion, the marquis resorted to a method of piquing the pride and awakening the soldierly feelings of his army,* by offering permission to retire, to any individual who was willing to accept it. We feel no inclination to detract from the marquis, the reputation of having successfully resorted to a measure so bold, and which has before, and

* Marshal's Life of Washington, vol. 4, p. 424.

since added so much to the celebrity of other commanders ; nor, from the American soldier, that of having blushed at the offer, and shrunk from it, as from a temptation to dishonour. But, we fear, that there would have been too much danger, under existing circumstances, in making the offer, lest the marquis should be involved in all the embarrassments, which would have attended a prompt acceptance ; and we would not willingly leave him under the imputation of an act of romantic indiscretion. It is not for us to deny the fact ; we can only say, that the following original accounts of this affair, from the marquis and Dr. M'Henry, then at the head of the board of war in Maryland, suggest the suspicion, that this was one of the unfounded or political rumours of that day.

James M'Henry to General Greene.

“ BALTIMORE, April 16th, 1781. [Extract.]

“ While I admire your policy, I have more than once pitied the marquis' situation. His troops passed here yesterday, discontented almost to general desertion ; destitute of shirts and proper equipments, and in most respects unprovided for a march. You know the marquis : He has been with us but two days ; but, in this time, he adopted an expedient to conciliate them to a degree, which no one but himself would have thought of. To-day, he signs a contract, binding himself to certain merchants of this place, for above two thousand guineas, to be disposed of in shirts, overalls, and hats, for the detachment. Without these the army could not proceed ; and with these, he has managed to reconcile them to the service. He is also bent upon trying the power of novelty on their minds, by giving to the march the air of a frolic. His troops will ride in waggons and carts, from Elkridge-landing to the limits of this state, and how much further he will continue this mode of movement, depends on Virginia.”

The letter from the marquis, is dated the day after that from Dr. M'Henry, and contains an interesting and exculpatory account of the sufferings of the poor fellows, whom he was obliged to punish with one hand, whilst he was relieving them with the other. Such had been the necessity for secrecy and dispatch, when they were ordered off from New Windsor, that they were hurried away under an impression, that they were proceeding on a march of a few days. The consequence was, that even the officers were destitute of

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money, clothing, and every thing that could contribute to cleanliness and comfort. Arrived at Trenton, they were crowded on board of shallops, and passing down to Newark, were landed and marched across the isthmus to the head of the Elk. Here they began to take a deliberate survey of their situation, and, at this time, their murmurs were suppressed only by the suggestion of a short and rapid expedition against Arnold. On their retrograde march, they were still contented, for they were approaching the depository of their wives, and of the few little comforts which their encampment had afforded them. Money had also been transmitted to head-quarters by the state of Massachusetts, for the pay of her troops; and present sufferings were forgotten under the enlivening prospects of approaching enjoyments. But, every hope was blighted when the countermanding orders arrested their progress. Without tents, (for many, even of the officers, slept in the open air)—their shoes worn out—their hats lost in their repeated voyages—in a state (as the marquis expresses it) “of shocking nakedness”—not the least particle of baggage attending their march—no provision made for a protracted absence from their wives and families, (many of whom had joined them, and been left at their winter quarters) murmuring at being thus hurried off, without notice to prepare for the service they were entering upon, reasonably fearing that their destination was, to serve in a climate which they dreaded, and supported by the general pity which their case excited—such was the temper of his army, that many of the officers assured the marquis, it would soon be reduced to one half by desertion. Facts supported the suggestion, for thirteen out of one company, deserted in a single day.

To add to the general state of distress, a nauseous and contagious disease, generally produced, and always aggravated by a want of cleanliness, had nearly overspread the whole camp; and, naked and exposed, and kept in motion as the soldiers were, the ordinary remedies could not be applied for their cure, with safety to their general health. Desertion cannot, for any cause, be pardoned in an army; but, it is impossible to view such a complication of distresses in a camp, without admiring the passive merit which could resist the impulse to desert.

After drawing this melancholy picture of the state of his army, the marquis proceeds:

“Now, my dear general, that I have given you an account of our situation, I beg leave to submit to you the measures that I have thought proper to take. My first object was to get the troops this side the Susquehannah, and request the militia officers to pick up deserters and send them to me immediately. I then made an address to the detachment which, enforced by the difficulty of crossing

the river, and the shame I endeavoured to throw on desertion, has almost entirely stopped it. The men are now on the other side of the Ridge Ferry, which is a new barrier: two deserters have been taken up, one of them *I will have hanged to-morrow*, and the other, as well as another soldier who behaved amiss, will be disgraced so far as to be dismissed from their corps. And as our brave and excellent men (for this detachment is exceedingly good) are shockingly destitute of linen, I have borrowed from the merchants of Baltimore a sum on my credit, which will amount to about two thousand pounds, and will procure a few hats, some shoes, some blankets and a pair of linen overalls to each man. I hope to set the Baltimore ladies at work for the shirts, which will be sent after me, and the overalls will be made by our tailors. I will use my influence to have the money added to the loan which the French court have made to the United States, and in case I cannot succeed, bind myself to the merchants for payment with interest in two years. M'Henry, now president of the Baltimore board of war, has given me a very important aid to bring about this arrangement."

Great and just was the eclat acquired by the marquis on this occasion. His cotemporaries appeared at a loss which most to admire, his ingenuity, magnanimity, decision or engaging urbanity. Yet, we shall have occasion, in the sequel of these sketches to bring to the view of the reader, an instance of exactly the same effort made by the commander of the southern department, which involved him in the most injurious suspicions, spread a gloom over the hours of his retirement, and had nearly brought his family to an alms-house.

Tranquillity and discipline were once more restored in the command of the marquis; and every waggon or cart that could be commanded, being put in requisition, the troops were rapidly hurried forward to Richmond. The novelty and relief pleased the soldiers, the increasing distance from their homes diminished the facility of desertion, the baggage and artillery were left to follow on, and the time thus gained was barely sufficient to check the advance of Philips. As La Fayette entered Richmond, the British army made its appearance at Manchester, on the opposite bank of James River.

Embarking about 2500 men at Portsmouth, General Philips had ascended James River in light vessels and landed below Petersburg, while Arnold, with all the troops that could be spared from the defence of Portsmouth, advanced up the west bank, with the view to joining Philips on the route to Richmond.

Steuben, who was posted with about 2000 militia below Petersburg, necessarily retreated across the Appomattox, and by destroying the bridge across that river, succeeded in delaying the march of the enemy, barely long enough to

CHAP. XII. secure the arrival of the marquis. At Richmond they formed a junction, and La Fayette being now at the head of about 1000 regulars, 2000 militia and 60 cavalry, found himself in condition to check the advance of the British general. La Fayette's artillery could not keep pace with him, but having brought on the matrosses attached to his command, he was enabled to man such artillery as the place afforded.

A singular coincidence now presented itself to the public eye. The commander who opposed General Philips was the son of one who had fallen at the battle of Minden, by a shot from the artillery commanded by that officer. This fact is noticed by La Fayette in a letter to General Greene, and is modestly followed by a solicitation to be continued in command against his present adversary, in these words:—"As to the love of command, newspaper paragraphs, &c. &c. you have so little ambition, my dear general, that you cannot conceive my wishes on those accounts, were it not from the knowledge you have been able to get from our intimacy. But those motives are to be out of the question where public good is interested, and whatever can be done with propriety, I know you would be glad to gratify me in. I will now only mention that General Philips' battery, at Minden, having killed my father, I should have no objection to contract the latitude of his plans."

This hint had become necessary from the following cause: As the command in Virginia had been delegated to Steuben, whilst La Fayette was designed for a command in the main army, the baron had expressed the most serious chagrine at being now superceded, at the very moment when an opportunity presented itself for active service. To give umbrage to either of two officers whom General Greene valued so highly, would have been to him the subject of the most serious regret. Yet, all his address was necessary to manage so as to continue La Fayette in command, without disgusting a man whose zeal and fidelity had rendered him such important services. But, Steuben had become unpopular in Virginia, and every thing was to be expected from the strong public partialities in favour of La Fayette, and the high opinion justly entertained of his capacity as a soldier. Greene addressed the baron as a friend, a man of understanding, and a zealous advocate of the cause; and the latter submitted with a magnanimity and self-denial, which furnish not the least of his claims on the gratitude of this country.

Philips, after consuming immense quantities of private, and some public property, and destroying or capturing all the American shipping on the river, retired towards the mouth of the Appomettox, and soon after, was joined by the detachment under Arnold. In this position, they awaited the approach of Lord Cornwallis, whilst La Fayette, on the opposite side of James River,

retired to a convenient distance for watching in security the movements of the enemy, and took post near the Chickahomony, waiting the arrival of his re-enforcements from the north. CHAP.
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The principal of the expected re-enforcements was the Pennsylvania line. This body of troops, whose celebrated revolt the preceding winter, shook the American cause to the very centre, was now on the march under Wayne, to re-enforce the southern army. Reduced, decrepid, and way-worn as was the force under Greene, he had not hesitated on hearing of the expedition under Philips, and the detaching of the troops, now under La Fayette, to issue orders to this re-enforcement to join the marquis, and act under his orders until the present danger was averted from Virginia. With the most opposite anticipations La Fayette now expected its approach. The object next his heart was, to enter upon aggressive operations; but, still he foresaw that the junction of these troops might prove to him the shirt of Nessus. It will be seen in the sequel, that they had nearly proved so to General Greene. Referring to the mutiny which he had recently quelled in his own command, he observes:—"From what had passed between the Jersey soldiers, and those of New England, I foresee some inconvenience to join them to the Pennsylvanians—the more so as the last, *because they have revolted, are well clad, and well paid.*"*

* This was literally true, and was one of those unhappy results which seldom fail to issue from a government's suffering itself to get in the wrong. The point on which the Pennsylvania line really grounded their revolt, was the same which has been more recently much agitated between the American government and its army. The soldiers were enlisted for a certain number of years, *or the war*. At the expiration of the term of years, they demanded their discharge; and after resisting this just claim, and sustaining all the terrors and real dangers of a revolt, which had communicated the contagion to other branches of the army, the government was obliged to acquiesce. *For so many years, or the war*, certainly meant for that time, if the war should so long last. Else, why specify a term of years, as enlistments for the war would have expressed the sense of the contracting parties? Yet, we have before us the opinions both of General Washington and of General Greene, in their private correspondence, that the mutiny was not a premeditated event, but the result of a sudden ebullition consequent upon the indiscretion, of suffering the soldiers to indulge themselves too freely with liquor on new year's day. To the personal influence of General Read and General Wayne, the country owed the quelling of the mutiny, without any very serious result. We are in possession of the official account of this event, communicated to General Greene in letters from various quarters, particularly from Mr. Madison, the late president; but, we cannot but suspect, that the account published was somewhat glossed over, since we have before us also a letter

But, they were no longer as when they revolted, a body of thirteen hundred men, with six field pieces. Their numbers were reduced to little more than one half; and the discipline of that half. La Fayette well knew, must have been seriously weakened by their triumph in the late revolt; for, not a man had been punished; and the triumph of revolt, whatever be the grounds of it, leaves nearly the same effect in all cases upon the sense of subordination in an army. Still, however, it was necessary to brave every thing from them, for he could do little or nothing without them; although in the march Wayne did not dare to trust them with cartridges.

From the first moment of General Greene's being appointed to the southern command, the friendly efforts of Governor Read and General Varnum, had been exerted to obtain this body of troops to re-enforce the southern army. But, it was not until after the battle of Guilford, that General Washington could spare them. Re-enforcements recently received from the eastward, and the reduction of the force in New York by the detachments sent to Charleston and Virginia, enabled him then to address congress on the subject, and obtain an order for detaching them to serve in the south. Their recent revolt, no doubt, recommended the measure from various considerations. It was not a popular service—they were the troops that could be best spared—and a removal to a distance might control their mutinous temper. Yet, they never got to Carolina until the war was over, and were scarcely at rest before their mutinous spirit reappeared. We shall have occasion to give an account of the decisive steps which were then used towards them. One of the sergeants who led them in the late revolt, there expiated on the gallows, an abortive repetition of his crime.

The advance of General Greene into South Carolina, appears to have been the subject of much surprise to Lord Cornwallis. Although he must have received unquestionable intelligence of it by the 18th, it was not until the 24th of April that he appears to have come to a resolution upon the counter measures that must be adopted. In a letter of that date to General Philips, he intimates his intention of directing his march towards Hillsborough,* in order to draw off the attention of the American commander to that point; and, if it

from General Varnum, in which he calls it, "a political account got up for the occasion, by your friend Read."

Certain it is, that all those who had served out the specified term of years, received their discharge; and the residue were, (as the marquis expresses it) *well clothed and well paid*, as the reward of mutiny.

* See Tarleton's Camp. and reply to the Narrative p. 56.

should fail to produce the desired effect, then, by inclining to his right, to effect a junction with Philips in the vicinity of Petersburg.

Feeble would have been his hopes of success from this measure, could he at that time have penetrated the secrets of Greene's portfolio. The American commander by this time was well satisfied that his rival could not escape the toils prepared for him, whether he returned into Carolina, continued where he was, or penetrated into Virginia. The approach of a powerful French fleet was now anticipated, a joint expedition to the Chesapeake had been resolved on, and could the army under Philips be defeated, that event would be immediately succeeded by the advance of the marquis on Cornwallis with an overwhelming force. Or should Cornwallis penetrate into Virginia, and effect a junction with Philips, Wayne was advancing with his Pennsylvanians, the Virginia militia might be collected, and La Fayette was prepared to amuse and detain him by the same game so recently played off by Greene himself, until the arrival of a French force which he could not escape from.

To avoid all future interruptions to the current of our narrative, we will follow the British commander to the close of his career, and exhibit the distressing influence of many events attending it, upon the wants and movements of the southern army.

Three weeks had elapsed after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Wilmington, before he found himself in a condition to put his army in motion. The check put on his advance at the Dan, and the wounds inflicted at Guilford, had put off his invasion of Virginia for two months, during which he would have met no enemy in that state that could have faced him in the field. Nor could the commander in chief have detached one, before his re-enforcements from the eastward had arrived. Even after the arrival of the marquis in Virginia, a junction, formed between Lord Cornwallis' troops and Philips', must have given the British commander the undivided command of the state.

The state of Virginia was at this time in a miserably defenceless condition. The fortunate arrival of the troops of Massachusetts and New Jersey, had checked the advance of Philips within gun-shot of her capital; but had he met no other forces in the field than those which Virginia had then on foot, he might have leisurely traversed the whole state. The few militia under Steuben, presented no obstacle to his march; and the few half naked troops in his depot, had neither clothes nor arms to take the field with. Yet, even at this time, she counted a militia of fifty thousand; thirteen thousand of whom inhabited the country adjacent to the seat of war.

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But her historians* assert that her troops had been marched away to re-enforce the southern army. This subject has been before considered, and no re-enforcements had reached the southern army since the detachment under Campbell. The Virginia line then under Greene, numbered about seven hundred, and there were about five hundred recruits in the depot at Chesterfield. Baron Steuben had written to General Greene that he could calculate on no more re-enforcements from that quarter: and no more ever joined him, not even the recruits then in depot, with the exception of about two hundred near the close of the war.

Whenever this subject shall be candidly investigated, we believe that the defenceless state of Virginia at this time, will be found, in a great measure, attributable to the derangements incident to passing from her system of enlistment to that of conscription. It is not in the midst of war and poverty that such radical changes are to be effected. A whole community is not easily impelled to an important change of habits or opinions. The one now contemplated, was peculiarly calculated to excite disgust, intrigue and opposition. However palpable to the legislative body, the policy and necessity of resorting to the conscriptive system, it was not easy to render palatable to the people a measure, under which they were to exchange voluntary for compulsive, temporary for perennial, and militia for mercenary service. But there were radical defects in the system adopted, that necessarily generated difficulty and delay. To divide fifty thousand men, scattered over such a territory, into two thousand nine hundred and four parts, with due reference to an equal distribution of wealth and numbers, was not the work of a day. If at all practicable, it required a detail of appointments, arrangements, inquiries, and estimates, that could not fail to call up a thousand intrigues and discontents, originating in selfishness, social habits, or territorial and family connexions. Yet, this project has been recommended in more modern times, instead of the more obvious and simple means of resorting at once to existing military distributions. If the imagination of man can suggest one method more prompt than all others, of raising an efficient and virtuous army, it is that of conscription. It would bear in its vitals the corrective of the dangers apprehended from a standing army. Hundreds of thousands could, in a very few months, be brought into the field in the United States, by pursuing this method. The adjutant general's office could, at all times, be made to furnish the means of defining the quota of every company in the United States: A few days would

* Marshall and Lee.

be sufficient to parade and draft them, and the individual, his substitute, or his ransom, could promptly be placed at the disposal of the government : that ransom must be adequate to the purchase of a substitute. And a judicious system for training our militia, would qualify our youth, ere they attained the age which qualifies them to participate in their country's sovereignty, to stand forth when called upon, as disciplined soldiers in their country's defence. Such are the youth of the only country in Europe, that owes its freedom to its own valour. But, such materials are too valuable to supply the mere mercenary of the times of peace. Ignorance, indolence, and vice, continually furnish a class of men, which a country must thus employ, to save them from the penitentiary.

It is confidently believed, that the conscriptive system of Virginia did not bring a single man into the field : an universal clamour against its unequal operation, contributed to paralyze all the subsequent measures of that state in the war : the executive arm was quite too feeble to carry it into effect. Even the spirit of volunteering seems to have sunk before it; and Virginia, from this time, owed her protection to the troops of other states. The same system, on a better plan, adopted at an earlier period, when the enthusiasm of the people was unabated, and steadily persisted in, might have made her indeed "the matrix of southern opposition."

The few troops collected at Chesterfield, were now so destitute of every thing, that Steuben asserts, they could scarcely be turned out on drill. Recruiting appeared to be altogether at a stand; and Steuben writes to his commander in absolute despair. It was in vain that he urged, solicited and remonstrated; he was no longer listened to; he state was fatigued, dispirited, and exhausted, or implicated in too many embarrassments from its new system, to attend to any other subject; and when Lord Cornwallis reached Petersburg, he appeared to have little else to do, but to step over the necks of a prostrate people.*

It was on the 25th of April, that Lord Cornwallis commenced his march from Wilmington. Pursuing his preconceived design, of making a movement that would excite his adversary's jealousy for his supplies and re-enforcements, and withdraw him from his designs in South Carolina, he first moved up the country on the route to Hillsborough. But, the feint was made in vain; for Greene's purposes were fixed, and he knew that Lord Cornwallis was still

* Lee's Memoirs, 2d vol. p. 10. Marshall, 4 vol. p. 433, 439.

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Lord Cornwallis prosecuted this route only until its nullity on his adversary's movements could be determined; when, deviating to his right, and dispatching Colonel Tarleton to secure the means of transportation at Halifax in North Carolina, he crossed the Roanoke at that place, and securely pursued his march to Petersburg.

General Philips was now dead, and Arnold had succeeded him. By the junction with his command, Lord Cornwallis now acknowledges himself to have been placed at the head of four thousand five hundred troops. But this account, if tested by the facts which soon after transpired at York Town—or by summing up the troops commanded by Arnold—those received under Philips—and those acknowledged by his lordship's official returns of the 1st of May, must be far below the reality. Yet, already greatly an overmatch for the marquis, his strength was, in a few days after, increased by an addition of three thousand troops, arrived under the command of General Leslie.

The arrival of this re-enforcement furnished Lord Cornwallis with the design for a brilliant *coup de main* attempted upon the marquis. Descending the right bank of James River, as if to form a junction with Leslie, he prepared measures for crossing suddenly below the marquis' position, with the intention to turn his left, and cut him off from a retreat to the north, and from a junction with Wayne. But, the boy (as he is said to have been tauntingly styled by the British commander) was watchful of his adversary's movements, and promptly detecting their object, fell back to the Pamunky, and deliberately retired as Lord Cornwallis advanced, still holding his magazines and re-enforcements in his rear, until he placed his army in security beyond the head waters of the Rapahannock. In a country full of hills and passes, his inferior force was not to be despised; and a junction now formed with Wayne, at the head of eight hundred disciplined troops, placed him in a condition that would sanction his entering upon a more daring course of operation.

No American ought to pass over the interesting occurrences of this period without reflecting, that the defence of this great state, and with it of all the states of the union, was conducted (and how ably and faithfully conducted!) by two foreigners, whom the voice of Providence had called to our aid from countries almost unknown to us, and from nations which, until now, we had regarded only with feelings of hostility.

The advance of the British army up the country, had excited in La Fayette and Steuben, a fortunate apprehension for two objects, which they justly conjectured must be held in view by the British commander. At least, two

thousand prisoners of war, it has been seen, were at this time deposited in the interior of Virginia, as in a place of the greatest security. The march of Lord Cornwallis would lead directly to this depot, and this number of men liberated, and armed from the laboratory at the Point of Fork, or other depots of stores or arms in the state, and what might not have been effected by the overwhelming force which would then have been placed under the British commander?

The provident care of our two foreign commanders was immediately directed to those objects. The prisoners were marched off to Winchester, by the orders of La Fayette, and the stores, arms, and every thing which their limited means of transportation would admit of, were carried up the north branch of James River, as high as Albemarle Old Court-House. Nor was the depot of recruits at Chesterfield neglected. They were armed from the laboratory, and equipped with every thing that the stores would furnish, and marched off, under the command of Steuben, as far as the Staunton River, on their way to join the southern army.

All the vigilance of the two commanders was barely sufficient to anticipate the hour of destruction. Lord Cornwallis was now in a condition to ravage the whole country north and west of him, without an enemy in that quarter to check his career; and had penetrated so high up the country as to be brought within striking distance of the objects, which he still supposed within his grasp, or which he wished to anticipate the effort to remove.

Very early in the campaign, General Greene had taken the greatest pains to impress upon the constituted authorities, both of North Carolina and Virginia, the necessity of removing the horses out of the way, wherever the enemy might direct his march; and in all the troublesome affair of the impressment of horses, he insists on the utility of the measure, even on the ground of its preserving them from the hands of the enemy. He well knew the terrifying effect of a body of cavalry in rapid motion through a country; its tendency to gather as it rolled, and the facilities it afforded, not only in collecting supplies for the one army, but in destroying those of the other. His warnings were uttered in vain, and his predictions sadly verified.

In the fine country that stretches along the banks of the Roanoake, and the middle counties of Virginia, Lord Cornwallis had, in his progress, collected horses enough to mount a formidable infantry. And, as if to mock the murmurs that had been raised against the impressments for the American army, had swept every horse of value before him. Many a noble animal that ought to have borne the defenders of the country, was now destined to give velocity and effect to the progress of its ravagers.

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Availing himself of his means of rapid invasion, Lord Cornwallis now mounted near one thousand of the elite of his troops, and dividing them into two nearly equal detachments, he placed one under the command of Colonel Simcoe and the other under that of Colonel Tarleton. With these detachments, those officers moved rapidly from the banks of the North Anna, on which the British army had halted from the pursuit of La Fayette, and penetrating the country to the westward, passed the upper waters of James River without encountering the least opposition. Every thing was as calm and tranquil on their course as if soothed by the wand of profound peace. But the inhabitants were awaked from their sleep by the devastations of the tornado. Tarleton pursued the direct route up the Rivanna to Charlottesville, where the Virginia legislature was then in session; while Simcoe moving to the left, aimed directly for the confluence of the Rivanna and Fluvanna, the site of Steuben's laboratory.

Colonel Tarleton failed in both his great objects, to wit, the release of the convention troops and other prisoners, and the capture of the Virginia legislature; the former we have seen had been pushed off by the provident care of La Fayette, but the design was bold and masterly, for the one detachment to extricate them, while the other seized the arms to be put into their hands. With regard to the escape of the officers of government, there appears to be some mystery hanging over that event; their own historians attribute it to accidental intelligence, whereas we find these words in La Fayette's communication on the subject:—"Colonel Tarleton's legion having pressed for Charlottesville, where the assembly were sitting, was disappointed in his purpose by proper information being given them. One hundred and fifty stand of arms, however, and a quantity of powder fell into the enemy's hands."

Of the success of the other detachment, the marquis writes:—"A detachment under Colonel Simcoe, said to be four hundred dragoons and mounted infantry, proceeded to the Point of Fork, of which the baron received notice. Both his men and stores were transported over the south branch when the baron marched to Staunton River. Simcoe threw over a few men who destroyed what stores had been left. He hazarded a great deal, but our loss was inconsiderable." The enemy's accounts represent the destruction of arms to have been very great; and there is reason to believe that the loss in crippled arms was much greater than the marquis had apprehended.

But a much more serious loss had well nigh followed in its train. At Staunton River, Steuben was met by an order from Greene not to withdraw his little detachment from the support of the marquis; an order issued under all the distresses which we shall find followed the battle of Camden, when the Virgi-

nía militia had been recalled, and not another hope of re-enforcement remained to him on earth. Steuben was now retracing his steps to the Point of Fork, supported by a portion of that militia which had been destined for the southern army; when Lord Cornwallis, apprehensive for the safety of Simcoe, recalled Colonel Tarleton to re-enforce his other detachment. The two united, so outnumbered Steuben, as to place him at this point of time in a most critical situation. But relief came from a quarter from which it was least expected.

Immediately after his detachments had moved off, Lord Cornwallis himself struck across the country to James River, with a view to their support, and to the further prosecution of his designs upon the stores removed to Albemarle. La Fayette, no less intent on saving them, and with a design of forming a junction with a body of militia advancing from the upper country, immediately re-crossed the Rapid Ann, and moving parallel with the line of march of the hostile army, reached the South Anna about the same time that the British army arrived opposite the confluence of the Rivanna and Fluvanna. But the British light troops had been advanced to the point of concurrence of the two roads by which the armies had proceeded; and La Fayette appeared to his adversary to be effectually cut off from the route by which alone he could reach the objects which he was hazarding every thing to secure.

Never was disappointment more complete than that of the British commander, when, on the morning of the 15th June, he found his youthful adversary in his front, strongly re-enforced, and occupying a position from which he could not easily be forced, and would not be tempted.

The following is the modest account given of this movement, by the author of it:

“In the mean time, the British army was moving to the Point of Fork, with intention to strike our magazines at Albemarle Old Court-House; our force was not equal to their defence; and a delay of our junction would have answered the views of the enemy. But, on the arrival of the Pennsylvanians, we made forced marches towards James River, and on our gaining the South Anna, we found Lord Cornwallis encamped some miles below the Point of Fork. A stolen march through a difficult road, gave us a position upon Meechum Creek, between the enemy and our stores, where, agreeably to appointment, we were joined by a body of riflemen.”

One of those freaks of fortune, by which she is ever mocking the “pomp and vanity” of human warfare, now delivered Virginia from this distressing inroad. All the world was at a balk to conjecture the motive of Lord Cornwallis when he suddenly called in his detachments, and with his still overwhelming superiority retraced his steps to Norfolk. But, the cause did not

CHAP. XII. escape the sagacious Steuben. In a letter of the 19th, he writes—"We are told, that the day before Cornwallis began to retire, he received despatches from New York; and we are also informed, that thirty-five sail of vessels are arrived. This, in some measure, seems to confirm the idea held up in the general's letter, of their being called back to defend New York."

The world are now in possession of the despatches then received by Cornwallis; and the fact is ascertained, that he was recalled to defend New York. The cause of his being recalled is also known, and some very curious historical incidents of this campaign are connected with it.

It is not among the least proofs of the overruling agency of a Providence in the affairs of man, that the most brilliant advantages result at times from supposed misfortunes; while plans of the deepest study, and, seemingly, of the most certain issue, eventuate in defeat and ruin. Two simultaneous and dependent incidents of this day illustrate the remark.

A plan of co-operation, it will be recollected, had, in the early part of the year, engaged the attention of General Washington and the French minister; in which it was proposed, that their forces should act in concert against the enemy. These negotiations were not brought to a conclusion until about this time, and the force in the Chesapeake, before the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, and detaching of Philips and Leslie, not being so considerable as to be made the object of this attack, New York was concluded on as the proposed point of co-operation. Despatches, containing the outlines of this expedition, under the hand of General Washington, were actually intercepted in the Jerseys; and immediately on the receipt of them, a fleet of transports was dispatched to the Chesapeake with an order to Lord Cornwallis, to detach a large proportion of his disposable force for the defence of New York. This order reached Lord Cornwallis the very day that he had been checked in his march by La Fayette's throwing himself in his front, and possibly saved the American army from dispersion; it certainly delivered Virginia from a distressing invasion, and prepared the way for the capture of Lord Cornwallis. So strongly are the British writers impressed with its influence on this last event, that they are lavish in their encomiums on the genius of the commander who conceived and executed this supposed *ruse de guerre*. Yet, nothing is more certain, than that General Washington considered it at the time, a serious misfortune; and that its occurrence was one of the chief causes for relinquishing the attempt on New York, for that which was afterwards crowned with such brilliant success at York Town. But, as soon as Washington, by his march across the Jerseys, developed his designs against the army in Virginia, Sir Henry Clinton, by countermanding his orders with some expressions

of irritation and reproach, so disgusted Lord Cornwallis, as to bring to light that correspondence to which we have so frequently had occasion to resort.

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But, consequences did not terminate here. There were, at that time, three Irish regiments on their passage from England for Charleston, and permission had been given to Lord Rawdon, to retain them on their arrival. No sooner was the intelligence received by Lord Cornwallis of the danger which threatened New York, than a dispatch boat was hurried off by him to Charleston, ordering the regiments immediately on their arrival, to proceed to New-York, without even landing in Charleston. An American cruiser had the *good fortune* to capture this express-boat, and the capture proved one of the most unhappy incidents that ever happened to the southern army. Had she arrived in safety, South Carolina would have been reconquered twelve months sooner; and the bloody affairs of Ninety-Six and the Eutaws, avoided. For these were the troops which, two months after, compelled General Greene to raise the siege of Ninety-Six—to retreat before Lord Rawdon, and finally, to relinquish the struggle for the country below the Santee, until compelled to risk every thing at the Eutaws, in an effort to co-operate with the grand army in the capture of Lord Cornwallis.

After Lord Cornwallis commenced his retreat to the sea-coast, La Fayette, still very inferior in actual strength, moved cautiously in pursuit; and Steuben, on the 19th, at the head of his four hundred and twenty recruits, marched securely up in his rear, and formed a junction with him near Richmond. It was at first doubted, whether the movement of the British commander was not a feint, to draw the wary La Fayette into some position favourable to striking a blow at his command. But, when his retreat became determinate, and began to be accelerated, the marquis abandoned his Fabian movements—became adventurous almost to temerity, hanging on the rear of the retreating enemy—and seizing every occasion to harass and detain him.

The movements of the American commanders from north to south, present at this time, a fine specimen of military combination. Whilst La Fayette was straining every nerve to occupy, retard, and harass the army under Cornwallis, fearful of his escape from the snare which he already knew to be preparing for him, Greene, to the south, we shall find, was toling to improve his absence and cut off his retreat in that direction; whilst Washington was then actually manœuvring to engage the attention of the British commander in chief in New York, and charm away all apprehension for the troops in the Chesapeake, at the very time that we was expecting De Grasse to hem them in, while he darted at them a blow which could neither be resisted or evaded.

The councils of the enemy, on the other hand, appear from their own representation, to have been greatly distracted, and to exhibit unusual symptoms of fluctuation and indecision. With a regular army of more than seven thousand men, Lord Cornwallis had retreated to the sea-coast before one of not more than two thousand three hundred regulars; had first crowded the transports with his troops, then disembarked, and finally breaking up from Portsmouth and Norfolk, had concentrated his whole force at York Town. In fine, they had acted from misconception of their enemy's views, and the oscillation of their measures, kept pace with their changes of opinion as to his designs.

But the movement to York Town, had in view a definite object. The situation of their fleet in the preceding winter in York harbour, when so much exposed by being frozen up, had made it a favourite object with the administration, the admiralty board, and the commander in chief, to have a secure and fortified station for their ships of war in the Chesapeake, in which they might lie in security, and from which they might issue with certainty at any season of the year; and for this purpose, the attention of Lord Cornwallis was directed to York Town.

But the British general could not leave the country without levelling one more blow at the resources which the southern army was supposed to draw from Virginia. As soon, therefore, as he had passed James River, Colonel Tarleton was again detached, with a strong command of cavalry and mounted infantry, to ascend the right bank of James River, to destroy the American magazines and stores, supposed to be accumulated in the country lying between James and Roanoake Rivers. Tarleton accordingly penetrated into the country as far as Otter Creek, on the Staunton, and in a route of four hundred miles saw not the face of an armed enemy.

This expedition was crowned with very little success; the depots had been previously exhausted, or the articles they contained removed nearer to the southern army, by the provident care of Steuben and Carrington. And even of horses, Colonel Tarleton acknowledges that he killed more by hard service than he was able to replace by plunder. The inhabitants, warned by what had happened elsewhere, had previously removed them.

But it was far otherwise, with regard to his excursion on the other side of the James River. Withering to the hopes of the southern commander, was his success in that quarter. Greene's naked troops had slumbered through the preceding winter, in anticipation of a large supply of clothing which had been expedited from Philadelphia. Such was the miserable state of the means of transportation, that after a length of time elapsed in the journey, it had now

just advanced far enough to be in Tarleton's reach. Twelve waggon loads of clothing were captured and consumed by the British detachment ; and it is not long after, that we read in General Greene's communications, "that hundreds of his men were as naked as they were born." Posterity will scarcely believe, that the bare loins of many of the brave men who carried death into the enemy's ranks at the Eutaw, were galled by their cartouch-boxes, while a folded rag or tuft of moss protected the shoulders from sustaining the same injury from the musket. Men of other times will inquire, by what magic was this army kept together ? by what supernatural power was it made to fight ?

Nor, was the loss at the Point of York by any means insignificant. Although none but crippled arms remained and were destroyed, there was not, until after the capture of Cornwallis, the least possibility of getting any others. And even when that event promised abundant supplies, many months elapsed before there could be obtained waggons to take them on to the southern army.

Nothing can be added to the many narratives extant of the occurrences at York Town.

Heaven smiled with singular propitiousness upon the combined operations of the allies. Not a wind appeared to blow, that did not favour their enterprizes ; and the striking coincidences were presented, of one fleet brought by a dispatch-boat from the West Indies, to arrive at the mouth of the Chesapeake, on the day that Washington's army reached its shores at the point of communication agreed upon—to wit, the head of the Elk ; while another, containing all the battering artillery, without which nothing could have been effected, leaving the port of New York under the eye of a superior fleet, directing its course to the south even as far as Bermuda, and evading a vigilant enemy, in the first instance by misleading pursuit, and in a second, by not arriving until the enemy was repulsed, or called off for another purpose.

Admiral Graves, on learning the sailing of the French fleet from Rhode Island, and the march of Washington for Virginia, instantly hastened to intercept the former at the mouth of the Chesapeake ; but, De Grasse had arrived before him ; and after a fruitless attempt upon a fleet much his superior, the British admiral retired to New York, as well to form a junction with reinforcements expected there, as to cover the transportation of all Clinton's disposable force, for the relief of the British army under Cornwallis.

The topmasts of their fleet rose above the southern horizon at the moment that the British flag sunk on the intrenchments of York Town, to rise no more on the shores of the union.

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The 19th of October was the day distinguished in the annals of this country by that memorable event. The hunted lion, roused from his lair on the west of the Catawba, alternately eluded and evaded, or goaded and pursued until he rested his panting sides on the shores of the Chesapeake, here finally covered to the American eagle; but, his expiring efforts were maintained with a noble constancy.

During the preparations, first to meet Philips, then to oppose Cornwallis, and finally to aid in the siege of York Town, all the resources of Virginia had been devoted to that purpose; and as well supplies as re-enforcements collected in that state for the southern army, were necessarily diverted from their original purpose, and applied and consumed in promoting the interesting operations going on at York Town.

But now, that these important measures were finally brought to the most happy issue, the attention of every one was directed to the southern army. Washington purposed immediately to dispatch two thousand men to the support of Greene; and the French admiral at first consented to transport or convoy them, but finally declared himself obliged, in compliance with his instructions to decline it. But the Pennsylvania line was once more set in motion for its southern destination, and a respectable brigade of Maryland and Delaware recruits, commanded by General Gist, was also dispatched under similar orders. La Fayette was once more arrested in his southern progress. Negotiations for peace soon furnished a cause for his repairing to Europe again, to lend to the American cause the aid of his industry and zeal. Apprehensions were entertained, that France was not ardent in her wishes for peace; and the influence and intelligence of the marquis, it was thought, would contribute to the support of the American negotiation.

Whilst the brigades of Wayne and Gist proceeded to the south, the French army, which had co-operated with Washington in the capture of Cornwallis, remained in Virginia; as well to cover that state from future danger, as to be at hand to support the southern commander in case of necessity. General Washington, in the mean time, hastened back to his position before New York; and the enemy, after the bloody, desolating, and un consequential expedition of Arnold against his native state, (Connecticut) remained shut up and quiet until the termination of the war.

Whilst all America hung with breathless anxiety over the eventful war raging in Virginia, a perilous and painful part was played by the commander of the southern department. With a handful of men, without artillery, and scarce a hope of re-enforcements, he had undertaken to drive from the country, or pen up in Charleston, an enemy whose united numbers trebled his own; an enemy

equipped with every thing that could give content and effect to an army, whilst his own was naked, hungry and penniless. It is a singular but incontrovertible fact, that for near two years this army never received one dollar of pay, and the great departments of it, without a dollar in the military chest, and drawing from the north, supplies too inconsiderable to be enumerated, were conducted on exactions uncertain in their productions, and calculated to render the army oppressive and unpopular. At this time, too, it was impossible for the general to conceal from himself, or from the army, that the only source from which they could hope for supplies was cut off, or the stream turned away. All that Virginia could command, and infinitely more, must be consumed at home; and should any thing be forwarded from the north, it would be arrested in its progress by the grand army, or perhaps by the enemy. Nought now remained for him but to turn to the best account the small resources actually on hand, and to draw from the states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia the inadequate aid to be afforded by an exhausted, conquered and divided country.

Before General Greene commenced his march from Deep River, he had adopted every possible measure for this purpose. To secure a retreat in the event of misfortune, was a duty which he never neglected, and for this purpose proper officers were dispatched to collect magazines up the banks of the Catawba, and measures adopted for establishing a considerable depot at Oliphant's Mill, on the head waters of that river. This important service was assigned to the talents and zeal of Colonel Davy. In order also to embody a militia force as a support in his rear, it has been noticed that he had at an early period made a requisition on the Governor of Virginia for fifteen hundred militia. As he was without artillery, Captain Singleton was despatched to Prince Edward Court-House in Virginia, to obtain whatever pieces could be procured in that quarter. And the most pressing letters were expedited in all directions, to hasten on to his army, whatever supplies and re-enforcements the country north of him, could afford. The industry of Captain Singleton, and the personal attention of Colonel Carrington, succeeded in removing from the reach of the enemy all those munitions which lay in the neighbourhood of the Dan and Roanoke, and these were already far on their way towards Camden, when Tarleton invaded that tract of country.

The legislature of North Carolina had been busily occupied this winter in discussing the means of contributing their due efforts to the common cause. So exceedingly difficult had the state found it to bring troops into the field, that a law was passed, imposing military service as a punishment for failing to perform militia duty, and for other offences against the government. In

order to collect, organize and discipline the soldiers thus to be raised, General Butler of North Carolina was left on Deep River, with orders to co-operate in this measure, and march on the new levies as soon as a regiment could be embodied. The troops thus collected and organized, were some of those who afterwards behaved so well at the battle of Eutaw. Good officers, rigid discipline, and some severe examples, triumphed over the inauspicious circumstances under which they were embodied.

It has been seen, that General Sumpter was the only officer in the southern country, to whom General Greene confided his intention of penetrating into South Carolina, prior to his actual movement. To him the communication was actually indispensable, as by him alone could have been rendered at the time, an important service connected with that enterprise.

It has been seen, that in the country between Ninety-Six and Camden, particularly that lying between the Broad and Saluda Rivers, there had always prevailed a great deal of disaffection. In this quarter had been established, a rendezvous for the enlistment of the young men of the country, and to this neighbourhood had fled for security, many of the disaffected from other parts of the state.

To intercept the re-enforcements from this country and from Ninety-Six which might be thrown into Camden, and perhaps to call away Lord Rawdon again to the defence of Fort Granby, was the important service which he hoped General Sumpter might be in condition to effect. It has been seen, that this was not done, and the strength derived from this quarter was that which now enabled Lord Rawdon to hold the American commander at bay. Had it not been for the re-enforcements thrown into Camden under Major Frazier, it must have fallen an easy prey to the American commander, for the conjuncture of the advance of the American army was peculiarly favourable. One half of Lord Rawdon's force was, at that time, detached on a distant service under Colonel Watson.

It will be recollected, that soon after the recall of Colonel Lee to follow the fortunes of the southern army on its march from Pee Dee to Guilford, Marion was compelled by a superior force, to retreat to his old fastnesses in the swamps of the Pee Dee. Feeble and precarious as was the force that he commanded, he managed with it to keep the loyalists in check, and finally obliged those on the north of the Pee Dee, to enter into a treaty of pacification—the observance of which was tolerably well enforced by his known energy of character. When the American army was retreating through North Carolina before the British, Marion did not neglect so favourable an opportunity for action, as the absence of British force presented him. His adventurous

followers were again convened, and terror and dismay were again carried into the settlements of the loyalists on both sides the Santee River. His excursions, and those of his enterprising officers, were extended as far as the confluence of the Congaree and Wateree, and down as low as Monk's Corner; thus breaking up the line of communication between Charleston and the grand army, and intercepting detachments and supplies sent from that place to the line of posts established across the country. Such insults and vexations were not to be borne; and Watson, an active and intelligent officer, was despatched with five hundred men, to hunt him up and destroy him.

Marion had no force to withstand this detachment; yet he dogged it and harassed it, and by throwing himself in its front and watching its movements, destroying bridges and obstructing roads, he was enabled to retard its march, until his friends could take measures for the safety of themselves and families. He then, by devious and rapid movements, in the course of which he dissipated various parties of the loyalists, took post with a small number of followers in the deep and unexplored swamps of Black River. Here he was found by the officer (Captain Conyers) who was despatched by General Greene from Ramsay's Mill on Deep River, to apprize him of the intended descent into South Carolina, and of the approach of Colonel Lee's detachment, to co-operate in an attempt upon the chain of British posts extending up the Santee and Congaree Rivers.

In an instant Marion was in motion; and his runners soon brought together near four hundred hardy and determined men, devoted to their leader, and breathing no wish but the liberation of their country. A guide was despatched to Colonel Lee, and by means of boats which Marion always kept secreted, his detachment was transported in safety across the Pee Dee, and effected a junction with Marion's party on the 14th of April.* From this time until the siege of Fort Mott, Colonel Lee acted under the command of General Marion.† The latter, in all his communications, expresses a strong sense of his talents and services, but the official correspondence is exclusively with Marion, as commander of the party. Colonel Lee often writes also to General Greene, but if answers were returned, they must have been considered as private, since no copies of such answers are to be found among the official papers.

Marion lost no time after the arrival of Lee in proceeding to action. In the letter in which Colonel Lee announces the junction, he says, "General Marion has determined on his route towards Santee. From hence we march to

* Marion's Letter, 23d April.

† Colonel Lee's Letter from Black River.

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Such was the rapidity with which their motions were characterized, that on the 15th, the day after their junction, they were already before Fort Watson. This was a stockade fort erected on one of the largest of those Indian mounds, which are frequently found on the low grounds of this river, in situations convenient either for planting or fishing, and which served as places of retreat from the floods which sometimes pass over the adjacent fertile country; while the alternate strata of ashes and of earth, prove them also to have been the deposits of the remains of the nations that inhabited its banks. This was elevated above thirty-five feet from the level of the plain, and far removed from any ground that could command it. Its garrison consisted of about eighty regular troops and forty loyalists, commanded by a brave man, Lieutenant M'Kay of the regular troops. Unprovided as Marion was with artillery, had this officer possessed a single wall piece, it would have been impregnable to the American force. As it was, its steep sides and strong palisades forbade an attempt at storming it, and the first effort to subdue it was made by cutting the garrison off from Scot's Lake, which supplied it with water. This was immediately counteracted by sinking a well within the stockade, below the level of the contiguous waters. And the attempt on the post, without artillery, must finally have been foiled, to the utter derangement of all the well digested plan for destroying the enemy's line of posts, had not the besiegers resorted to a mode of attack truly antique, the "*turribusque constitutis*" of Cæsar.

At a short distance from the fort there grew small wood in abundance, and by felling a quantity of this, and transporting it on the shoulders of the men, and piling it cross-wise through the night, in the morning, to the astonishment of the besieged, as soon as the light permitted the discrimination of an object, the fatal effects of a shower of rifle bullets announced to them, that their strong-hold was commanded by a superior work. Nothing now remained but to surrender, and a capitulation was immediately concluded. Yet, eight inestimable days had been consumed in this effort, a period of extreme anxiety both to the besiegers and besieged, for the hopes of both were suspended during that period, on the movements of Colonel Watson.

The expedition of Colonel Lee into South Carolina, was one, more replete with danger, than either he or his commander had, at the time, any idea of. Watson, prosecuting with vigour the service for which he was detached, had crossed the Great Pee Dee, and was penetrating the country which lies north east of that river. Had he been apprized of Lee's approach, nothing would

have been easier than to have driven him back to reascend the river, and pass it at some point very high up, and most probably to have prevented his effecting a junction with Marion. It was fortunate also that Marion could command the secret means of transporting Lee across the river, as a delay of a few days might have brought Watson upon him with a force which, alone he could not have resisted.

The junction of his force with that of Marion, does not appear to have been originally calculated on as a prerequisite to his entering upon action. By his orders of the 4th April, he is to proceed immediately to act upon Fort Watson with his own command. His junction with Marion was therefore indispensable to his own safety, as he could scarcely alone have kept the field against Watson, much less have ventured on any undertaking that would require delay. Watson's expedition was unknown to General Greene at the time Lee was detached; for the movements of both Greene and Marion, for some time previous, had been so active, so diversified, and embarrassed, that there had been no communication of intelligence between them.

Watson's position, at the time of the arrival of Lee, was such, that his most secure and certain route to rejoin Lord Rawdon, lay through Georgetown and up the south west bank of the Santee River. His taking that route, threw the river between him and Marion's command; and as the relief of Fort Watson, and a junction with Lord Rawdon must necessarily be the object of his movements, it became of infinite importance to Marion, to press the siege of Fort Watson, that he might occupy some position which would enable him to intercept Watson in his march to Camden. There were several points at which the Santee might be crossed above or below; and his resolution was to meet and fight Watson, as the American force was now sufficient to justify that measure.

Watson, on the other hand, was resolved to evade his adversary; for the intelligence of Greene's arrival before Camden, and Lee's junction with Marion, had now reached him, and he was determined rather to sacrifice the post attacked, than lose the opportunity of eluding Marion and flying to the support of Rawdon. Nor was the state of the force with him, when beyond Georgetown, sufficient to justify an attempt at forcing his way to Camden. He very peaceably, therefore, after crossing the Santee on the route from Georgetown, moved down by Monk's Corner, and added to his force the garrison of that place, and then cautiously advanced towards the Santee.—Marion, now disembarrassed of Fort Watson, and relieved by the supplies that it afforded, directed his attention to the object of intercepting this respectable re-enforcement. But, soon he perceived that, in his present

position, he could not hope to prevent his adversary's evasion; for it was as safe and direct for Watson to proceed up the opposite side of the Wateree, as by the route which the American detachment then commanded on the west side; and for Marion to divide his force would have been to sacrifice both divisions.

It was therefore necessary to take post at some point, from which all the roads that lead to Camden could be securely watched. With this view, he resolved to occupy a position on the High Hills of Santee, from which it would be practicable to throw himself before Watson, by whatever route he should advance. He therefore put his command in motion on the 23d, the day of the surrender of the fort, and advanced to Mr. William Richardson's; from which place he pushed forward his prisoners by the Black River road to the depot in the rear of the main army—a measure which some movements of General Greene, though then unknown to him, fortunately had rendered very secure.

Marion's advance towards Camden brought on the battle of Hobkirk's Hill.

This affair has been more misunderstood than any event of General Greene's life, and furnishes the only plausible ground on which censure has ever been cast, upon his military conduct in the southern war. A simple narrative of facts, founded on unquestionable authority, is all that is necessary to furnish his vindication. The English writers have boldly laid claim to the credit of a surprise in this affair; and this charge, more disgraceful to a commander than defeat, has been implicitly admitted, or feebly, perhaps affectedly repelled, by those of America. The untimely death of the subject of these pages, and the years of vexation and distress which preceded it, deprived him of an opportunity of vindicating his own fame in this, and some other important particulars. But, fortune relents from her persecutions after the fall of a great man; the tooth of time has spared abundant documents to rescue him from the imputation; and there still live actors in those eventful scenes, whose high characters repel even doubt, and whose testimony will be given to corroborate official evidence.*

That writers, who had not an opportunity of acquiring either official nor contemporaneous information on the subject, should have been ignorant of important explanatory facts, is not to be wondered at. But, that Colonel Lee, who was so near the scene of action, and so soon after joined the army, should have given so inaccurate an explanation of the conduct of his friend and

* This work was written before the death of General Davy.

commander, can only be accounted for from the failure of memory, for it is known that he had not access to the official papers of the department, and confidently affirmed by some who served with him, that he kept no journal of passing events. CHAP.
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One of this writer's critiques upon the battle of Camden is, "that hearing of the advance of Watson, his (General Greene's) artillery was sent in his rear, that he might be at liberty to make a rapid and vigorous movement against this formidable re-enforcement." Now it ought to have been recollected by Colonel Lee, that General Greene had confided the care of Watson altogether to Marion and Sumpter, that he never doubted the sufficiency of either to cope with him, and that the true cause of a separation from his artillery was an effort to equip Marion with artillery; a request for which, had been pressingly urged upon him, both by Marion and Colonel Lee himself, while they lay before Fort Watson, and at a time when they despaired of carrying the fort without it. Nor was the intelligence of Watson's advance, at that time, such as to create any serious alarm about his success in reaching Camden. He was still low down the country, near to Monk's Corner, and did not, in fact, cross the river Congaree until after twelve days after. Marion, General Greene knew could hold him in check on the east side of the Wateree, and flattered himself with the hope, that General Sumpter would do the same to the west; nor is there a doubt that it might have been done.

But a movement of General Greene's to the south of Camden, which no one could explain, has given rise to conjectures, explanations and imputations, all equally groundless.

It has been seen that on the 20th of April General Greene took post at Hobkirk's Hill, on the north of Camden, about a mile and a half in advance of the British redoubts. Here he lay on his arms that day and the next, reconnoitering the enemy's position, getting intelligence of his strength and hoping to tempt him into the field.

Marion lay at this time before Fort Watson, and apprehensive that he would not be able to carry it or succeed in his ulterior views without artillery, had written pressingly to the general to forward him a piece, however small its calibre. In this he was warmly seconded by Lee, and the general resolved at all hazards to comply with the request; as time was all important to the operations in that quarter, not only because of the immediate advantage of capturing the post, but to enable Marion to cross the Santee and meet Watson in the field. The latter he knew was provided with artillery, and without it the species of troops which Marion commanded, might have been exposed to alarm, or disadvantage in the open field.

Greene, it will be recollected, had lost his artillery at the battle of Guilford, and he had crossed the country to Camden without any. But order had been taken for procuring from Oliphant's Mill, at the head of the Catawba, two pieces that had been forwarded to that place for repair. One of these he resolved to forward to Marion; and he was rather induced to adopt this measure, as the ground he occupied left him little to fear from the artillery of the enemy, and he knew that Colonel Harrison was at this time on the march from Prince Edward Court-House with two pieces forwarded from that depot.

But how to forward the piece to Marion was the difficulty. The direct road to Fort Watson lay through the enemy's redoubts; and no other practicable route remained but by the Black River road. In order to strike into that road, it was necessary to ascend the main road nearly as high as Rugely's Mill, and as the course of the former was not far to the eastward of Camden, there was little doubt that Lord Rawdon would make an effort to arrest the piece in its progress, or, perhaps, endeavour to strike a blow at Marion and Lee before it could arrive. Nor could General Greene detach a sufficient force to obviate these contingencies, without so weakening his main body as to expose both to danger. Under these circumstances, he resolved to move the army down to the south east side of Camden, and thus mask or defend both the artillery and the operations at Fort Watson. But as there was no wagon road across Pine-Tree Creek, which stream he must necessarily pass in prosecution of these views, he found himself obliged to send back the artillery, the attirail of his army, his baggage, and every thing that could impede his movements. These were placed under the command of Colonel Carrington, with an escort of North Carolina militia, and with orders to proceed no farther than Rugely's Mill, whilst Captain Findley, with the artillery, descended the Black River road to join Marion. The cavalry of the American army was so disposed to the eastward of Pine-Tree Creek, as to watch any attempt that might have been made by the garrison, to annoy Carrington on his march, or in the position he was directed to take.

On the south east side of Camden, beyond Pine-Tree Creek, at a place called the South Quarter, General Greene remained *en bivouac*, until the 24th, when, hearing of the advance of Major Eaton with two hundred and twenty North Carolina levies, he resolved to place Findley under their protection, and march them also to re-enforce Marion; and despairing of tempting Rawdon from his strong holds, he sent orders to Marion to march up as soon as he should have gained the fort, and assist him to invest Camden. Then expediting orders to Carrington to move down and join him at Hobkirk's Hill, he re-passed Pine-Tree Creek and resumed his former position at Hobkirk's Hill.

An unfortunate measure that had been adopted by Colonel Carrington, now involved his commander in very embarrassing circumstances. The orders Carrington, had received ought to have detained him at Rugely's Mill; and Colonel Harrison, who had now joined him with his artillery, ought to have been halted at the same point. This being but ten miles distant, General Greene was confident of being joined by them on the evening of the 24th.

But Carrington, conceiving some apprehension for the safety of his detachment, had moved off eight miles further, to a place called Upton's Mills. This unfortunate movement, of which the general was unapprized, nearly doubled both the time it took the expresses to reach Carrington and the time necessary to comply with the orders to join him.

The consequences of this derangement exhibited themselves in that hurry in camp on the morning of the battle of the 25th, which has given rise to the charge of the general's having suffered a surprise. But the following extract from the orderly book, exhibits an army under arms waiting and hourly expecting an attack.

"CAMP BEFORE CAMDEN, NORTH QUARTER, *Tuesday, 24th April.*

"The general orders respecting passes are punctually to be observed. None are to be granted but by commandants of corps. The rolls are to be called at least three times a day, and all absentees reported and punished. Officers of every rank are to confine themselves to their respective duties. And every part of the army must be in readiness to stand at arms at a moment's warning."

A venerable patriot,* who was at the time with the army, has examined this affair with the critical eye of military science, and illuminated it with the remarks of a clear and discriminating mind; his judgment upon it we are in possession of, in these words:—"There is not one single circumstance attending this affair that marks it as a surprise."

Every measure that prudence could dictate, had been resorted to in order to insure to the army comfort and refreshment, on resuming their position at Hobkirk's Hill. Great was the chagrine of their commander, at finding that provisions had not arrived, and from their distance could not arrive that evening. Still greater the disappointment of the soldier, who was doomed to a

* General Davy.

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night of fasting after a day of fatigue. But, scarcely had the troops finished their morning's exercises on the 25th, when the wished-for convoy, the artillery and provisions, were announced, and after stacking their arms in their ranks, the men were dismissed to prepare their breakfasts and regale themselves with a gill each, of that welcome beverage, which circumstances so seldom permitted them to enjoy. The officers had of course retired to their morning's repast; and the general, whose board that morning afforded the luxury of a dish of coffee, was enjoying it in his tent with his aids, when a distant firing announced the approaching event.

Let the following view of the arrangement of his troops, at that moment, exhibit how far the attack could merit the epithet of a surprise:

The line of British redoubts, it will be recollected, extended north and west from Pine-Tree Creek. Hobkirk's Hill is on the main road which passed through the redoubts, and about a mile and three quarters distant from the town, as it then stood; the distance is at present much less. In front of the redoubts, for near half a mile in depth, except to within a few rods of the creek, the trees had been cut down, so as to expose the approach to the guns of the redoubts. Through all this space, the felled trees, intermingled with the under-wood, rendered the approach to the town scarcely practicable to horse or foot, except by the roads.


To the extent of this open belt was pushed the British line of centinels, supported by pickets, and the whole covered by the guns of the redoubts. Of necessity, the American line of centinels must be established at some distance from that of the enemy, or else have fought for the ground they occupied.

That the general looked for an attack precisely where it was made, is conspicuous from this consideration, that a strong support to his centinels was posted in that quarter. The country lying to his right was committed to the vigilance of his patrols, whilst two strong pickets, commanded by Captains Morgan and Benson, were in advance on his left; and at a convenient distance in their rear, was posted Captain Kirkwood of Delaware, with the remains of his celebrated command. It has been said, that he was advanced to support the pickets after the firing had commenced.* But, this is a mistake, for the position where he met the enemy, was assigned him in expectation of the attack, and he occupied it when the firing commenced. And the reason is obvious; being cut off from the probability of observing the enemy closely in that quarter, it was expected, (and every arrangement made for the event)


* Life of Washington, 4th vol. p. 510.

BATTLE of CAMDEN.

1st VIEW.
Order of Battle.




2nd VIEW
when Gunby's regiment broke.



REFERENCES.

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| A. Kirkwoods position. | 3. British Reserve. |
| B. Picket Guard. | 4. 4. Skirmishing Parties on their wings. |
| C. Camp. D. Cap. Smith. | 5. 6. 7. & American Line. 5. Campbell. |
| D. British Stockade. | 6. Haws. 7. Gunby. 8. Ford |
| E. E. E. E. E. British Redoubts. | 9. Capt. Smiths 2 nd Position. |
| F. L. Randens head quarters. | 10. Washingtons Cavalry. |
| 1. 1. Supports to the right & left wings | 11. North Carolina Militia, Col Reed. |
| of the British Army. | • American Videttes, |
| 2. 2. British Line. | + British D. |

Scale of Yards



that the approach of the enemy would be announced by the fire of the videttes. The position of the redoubts, and the nature of the country, rendered it impossible to be otherwise. CHAP.
XII.

But, the videttes in that quarter were near a mile distant from the encampment. The pickets behaved with the utmost coolness and recollection, and gathering in the videttes, retired deliberately, and formed in good order under Kirkwood. Here the contest was obstinately maintained; and what with the obstacles presented by the country, which was all in wood, and the cool resistance of the advanced parties, so much time was afforded to the American army, that after forming in order of battle, they had been permitted to sit down in their ranks, in military language, to ease their joints, and in that order awaited the approach of the enemy. The attack had been anticipated and courted; the spirits of the soldiers had been raised by repeated military insults offered to the enemy, and they appeared to await his approach in the finest temper imaginable. The beautiful example too, exhibited by Kirkwood, as he deliberately retired fighting, had contributed to produce upon the army, an effect from which every thing was to be hoped for. Certain it is, that the general's hopes had swelled into confidence—too often, in military affairs, the precursor of disappointment.

The whole regular infantry of the American army, at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, was eight hundred and forty-three present fit for duty. The approach to an enemy's garrison had, as usual, increased desertions: the Virginia line was continually fluctuating in numbers from the daily discharge of those whose time of service had expired; and this was partially the case, at this time, with the Maryland troops; and long marches, hard service, and great exposure, had sent many to the hospital, most of whom had necessarily been left in the rear, when the army crossed from the Cape Fear to Camden. The cavalry nominally consisted of two regiments, White and Washington's, but actually, it numbered only eighty-seven, and fifty-six only of these were mounted. The artillery also nominally constituted a regiment, and was commanded by Colonel Harrison in person; but actually, there were not men enough to fight three pieces: after detaching Findley, not above forty. The only militia force then with the army, consisted of two hundred and fifty-four North Carolinians. One hundred and fifty of these under Colonel Reid, had joined Greene soon after he recrossed the Dan, and had faithfully adhered to him from that time. They were volunteers, men of the first respectability, and much might have been expected of them in action. The rest had escorted the supplies sent to the army by Colonel Davy. Those authors who extend the American force beyond this estimate, must be led into some error, since

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General Greene repeatedly asserts, that the force of the combatants was nearly equal. That of Lord Rawdon is generally estimated at nine hundred. By some accident, the returns of this day have escaped from our files. We, therefore, take the estimate from Gordon, because we know that he had it from the adjutant general Colonel Williams. Ramsay reduces the number on the American side to seven hundred. It must be recollected, that in addition to the causes already referred to for reducing the American force, the infantry detached with Colonel Lee, under Captain Oldham, had been drafted from it, and one half of Washington's cavalry consisted of recruits lately obtained from the Virginia line. Besides which, it may be proper to remark, a light infantry company* had lately been detailed from the Maryland line, and placed under command of Captain John Smith, the same who had so gallantly distinguished himself at the battle of Guilford. This company may not have been included in Gordon's estimate. We think it was.

Hobkirk's Hill is a narrow sand-ridge of very little elevation, which separates the head-springs of two small branches, the one running into the Wateree, the other into Pine-Tree Creek. The latter, forms what is called Miry Branch, which winds south eastward into the principal stream, and with it forms a continued swamp into the rear of the enemy's post. From the British encampment, which was on the south side of the town, and near the swamp, a swelling-ground formed a covert communication from the camp, into the woods that bordered these streams and stretched round to the foot of Hobkirk's Hill. Thus, the movements of the British army were wholly imperceptible at any point beyond their advanced redoubt, until they approached within gun-shot of the American sentinels. But, to pursue this route, it was wholly impracticable for Lord Rawdon to have taken with him his artillery. He confidently believed, however, and upon the best grounds, that his adversary would, in this respect, have no advantage of him. This belief was founded upon intelligence from a deserter, who had found his way into Camden the night before; and this intelligence is known to have produced his resolution to attack; for, after the coming up of Marion then advancing on his rear, and that of Harrison with his artillery, he would have been too closely invested to have braved the attempt.

* The gallant conduct of this little band on this occasion, will sanction this justly merited national notice, that they were all Irishmen and not a man above thirty. The author had this from the captain, who was permitted to select them. It was a command destined to critical services, in the absence of the legion.

The American general did not think it necessary to change the order of his line from that in which their arms had been stacked after their morning's exercise: but, bringing up the artillery to his centre, he posted it on the road, and ordering Colonel Washington and Colonel Reid to hold themselves in reserve in his rear at the foot of the hill, he calmly awaited the appearance of the enemy. CHAP.
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Kirkwood and the pickets were now warmly engaged with the British right, and Captain Smith with his company, acting as camp guards, being posted a little in advance of the American right, was ready to receive the enemy's left.

The order in which Lord Rawdon advanced into action, was precisely that in which Lord Cornwallis had drawn up his army at the battle of Guilford. His troops in one line, the wings supported by some of his best companies in column, and the cavalry and new recruits in the rear, to act as a corps of observation. But, Lord Rawdon had taken a hint from Morgan, in the use of American marksmen; and flanking parties of loyalist riflemen, moving abreast of his wing among the trees, did but too much towards deciding the fate of the day. The fall of two of the best American officers, in the very commencement of the battle, was the acknowledged origin of the disorder which followed. Happy it is for man, since wars enter into the dispensations of Providence, that measures exceptionable in the eye of humanity, must ultimately recoil upon him who uses them. Under the consciousness of this truth, the advanced sentinel paces his ground with little apprehension, though he knows his life to be in his adversary's power; and under this consciousness, the soldier quenches his thirst with confidence, from the stream that flows by his enemy's feet.

Lord Rawdon's line was composed of the 63d regiment on the right, the New York volunteers in the centre, and the king's American regiment on the left. The right was supported by the volunteers of Ireland, and the left by a detachment under Captain Robertson. The regiment posted with the cavalry, was that raised in South Carolina, so that on this bloody day, the number of European troops engaged was comparatively small. Most of the British troops had been raised in America.

As nearly one half of Lord Rawdon's troops were posted in reserve, the front with which he advanced was comparatively small. That of the Americans presented their whole force. The two Virginia regiments under General Hager, on the right of the road, and the two Maryland under Colonel Williams, on the left. The first Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, was on the right of the whole; the second Maryland under Lieutenant Colonel

CHAP. Ford, on the left. The 2d Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel Hawes, and
XII. the 1st Maryland under Colonel Gunby, formed the centre.

Greene, conjecturing that the enemy was unapprized of the arrival of his artillery, had closed the two centre regiments upon the road, so that the artillery was completely masked. The effect may very well be imagined, when these two regiments suddenly retired to the right and left, and the artillery began to vomit showers of grape upon the compressed ranks of the enemy. The confusion and dismay were so conspicuous, that nothing more appeared to be necessary but to close upon their flanks with the regiments on the right and left, and cut off the flying troops from regaining their strong holds. The orders that followed were delivered in one breath—"Let the cavalry make for their rear, Colonel Campbell wheel upon their left, and Colonel Ford upon their right, and the whole centre charge with trailed arms." The aids flew with his orders, the rolling drum announced the tenor of them, and Washington, moving off in a gallop, soon disappeared among the trees.

The next moment, every towering hope was blasted. Greene had no common adversary to deal with in Lord Rawdon. With that promptness in conception and in action, which distinguishes genius combined with bravery, the British supporting columns were instantly protruded, and the American wings were quickly exposed to the very disadvantage which they hoped to impose upon their enemy:—they were out-flanked—their wings were enfiladed, and their rear threatened. Disorder necessarily followed; for the extreme right and left were necessarily checked and deflected. But, no permanent effect could have resulted from this state of things in the wings, had not other occurrences produced a state of things in the centre, which admitted of no remedy.

The 1st Maryland regiment, the tenth legion of the army, that to which all eyes were turned for example, the same which had conquered at the Cowpens, and fought half the battle at Guilford, had now shrunk away in a panic which was not to be overcome.

The first symptom of confusion was exhibited by the commencement of a firing contrary to orders. This was scarcely suppressed, when Captain Beatty, who led the right company of the 1st Maryland, and who was the delight of his command, fell, pierced to the heart. His fall caused those nearest him to check their progress, and the halt was rapidly communicated from right to left through two companies, before the cause was understood. Some hesitation being exhibited by the men when urged to regain the line, Colonel Gunby dispatched Colonel Howard, with orders to the remaining companies of the regiment, then still advancing with confidence, to halt, fall back,

and encourage the faltering companies to proceed. This retrograde movement soon produced a general panic in the regiment, which exhibited itself in a tendency to continue the retreat in some confusion. Nor did the evil end here. While Williams, Gunby and Howard were exhausting all their resources in a combined effort to rally this regiment, Colonel Ford, whilst gallantly executing his orders on the American left, fell from his horse, pierced with a mortal wound. His regiment, dispirited by the fall of its leader, and severed from the line by the retirement of the 1st Maryland, soon faltered, and could only be kept from absolute confusion by being permitted to halt; to be permitted to retire was the unavoidable consequence.

Nothing could exceed the surprise and disappointment of the commander at this instant. His favourite regiment, in whose courage and conduct he reposed with such confidence, now blasting all his fair hopes by a retreat, without making the smallest trial for victory! Conscious of the vital importance of rapidity in the movement of the wings, he had spurred his horse up to the extreme right, and was leading on Campbell's regiment in person, when he was called away by the hesitation and confusion manifested in his centre; he vainly tried the influence of his voice and presence to bring his panic-stricken soldiers once more into action. They heard him and they halted, but by this time they had reached the bottom of the hill, and his attention was now drawn away by the loud shouts of the enemy. Again urging his horse to the summit of the hill, the whole extent of his misfortune opened upon his view.

Hawes' regiment was the only one remaining entire; by the advance of that and the retreat of the other centre regiment, the artillery was left open and exposed on the summit of the hill. The loss of his artillery, besides the certain evidence of defeat, could not have been repaired. In the midst of the flight of bullets which then showered about him, for he was then almost alone upon the most exposed part of the hill, his orders were issued in a tone of perfect composure, to draw off the right and left regiments and form them on Gunby's regiment, which was now rallied; while Hawes, with the 2d Virginia, should cover their retreat. This order was well executed, and in the issue left the American commander the election of a renewal of the battle or a composed retreat. But during its execution, the artillery was exposed to the most imminent danger. He had issued orders to Captain Smith to repair immediately to the spot and secure it at all hazards. In the mean time the enemy with loud shouts was ascending the hill, and the British horse commanded by Captain Coffin, was making its way out of the wood to join in the pursuit. The matrosses were now quitting the drag-ropes, when Greene galloped up alone, (for his aids were dispensing his orders) and dismounting

and seizing the drag-ropes with one hand, whilst he held his horse with the other, exhibited an example which the most timid could not resist.—Smith soon arrived, and his men bearing their muskets in one hand, joined in the effort of dragging off the artillery with the other, until Coffin's corps approached on the hill, moving to the charge. In an instant, Smith's little band were formed in the rear of the artillery, and reserving their fire, poured it into Coffin's ranks with such destructive aim, that they recoiled and fled. Again and again did Coffin return to the charge, while Smith's men, in the intervals of time, assisted at the drag-ropes: and as often as he repeated his attempts was he foiled and driven back with loss. At length, the infantry joined in the pursuit: and scattered marksmen approaching amongst the trees, Smith's men began to fall fast. He was himself badly wounded also, but his resolution, not even his cheerfulness, ever flagged. His forty-five men were now reduced to fourteen: and some accident having caused them to deliver an irregular fire, Coffin succeeded in forcing them, and every man was killed or taken.

The artillery now seemed lost. The batmen had run the limbers into the woods, cut the horses out, and run off with them. At this crisis, Colonel Washington charged in upon the road, and put an end to the contest. The pursuers fled.

This officer had hastened back on the first discovery of confusion in the American line, and now made his appearance with a prisoner mounted behind each of his men. These consisted chiefly of the medical and other staff of the British army.

On perceiving the exposed state of the artillery, Washington threw off his prisoners and made that charge which finally extricated it from the most pressing danger. Then pursuing the British cavalry up the hill, he passed the place where the limbers had been run into the wood, and discovering them, brought them off. This gave rise to the assertions, that the artillery had been run down the hill, past unperceived by the enemy in the ardor of pursuit, and afterwards discovered and brought off by Washington.

There is no part of this day's affair in which the British and American accounts vary so much as in that which relates to the part acted by Colonel Washington. General Greene, in his official communication, asserts, that this officer penetrated into the enemy's rear, found them flying in confusion—and made two hundred prisoners. And it cannot be doubted that such was the report made to him, and made upon a thorough conviction of its reality. Yet, there is every reason to believe it was founded in error. There is no sufficient cause to conclude, that any one of the British corps' was ever broken entirely,

and the enemy's accounts admit, only of the capture of the medical staff, and a few soldiers left behind, to attend the wounded. CHAP.
XII.

The following original account of that part of the affair, is from the pen of an officer,* attached to the American army, and whose fidelity and opportunities of information, preclude all doubt.

"In turning the enemy's left, Washington made a circuit so large, as to bring him into the open commons, between Log Town and Camden; this space was filled with doctors, surgeons, quarter masters, commissaries, wagon masters, waiters, and all the loose trumpery of an army, who had pushed out to see the battle. The cavalry immediately charged this mixed multitude, and employed in taking, securing, and parolling a great number of these people, those precious moments which would have brought them in actual contact with the second line of the enemy, either before it moved up to extend the front, or while this manœuvre was performing; and in either case, the charge would have been decisive, and the battle would not have lasted fifteen minutes. But the charge was never made on the line of the enemy, the critical moment was lost, and in battles, minutes are hours. The British officers acknowledged the unfortunate effect of the clemency of our cavalry, in waiting to capture and parol prisoners, when they should have cut them out of their way without stopping, and charged the rear of the British line. They were in fact, so encumbered with prisoners, they could do nothing."

As soon as General Greene found his artillery, ammunition wagons, and other such trophies of victory, safe from the enemy, he halted only long enough to collect his wounded as far as circumstances would admit, and ordered a retreat. His men did not appear to exhibit sufficient confidence and composure to renew the battle.

The moment the chasm was made in the American line, Lord Rawdon had pressed up to seize the advantage, and on the retirement of the remaining regiments, had occupied the ground on which the American army had been drawn up. The contest to obtain this position had not been a bloodless one, for Hawes retired firing in perfect composure, and the other regiments repeatedly rallied and fired as they receded from the ground.

The enemy did not venture to pursue far, and Greene, after retiring between two and three miles, halted to recover his stragglers. Here he remained until after noon: and having refreshed his men, continued the retreat with his

* Colonel Davy.

CHAP. XVII. infantry and artillery as far as Saunders' Creek, about four miles from the field of battle, where he encamped.

Colonel Washington, with his cavalry, was ordered to reconnoitre the field of battle, to collect stragglers, make prisoners, and bring off the wounded, if any were to be found remaining.

Upon the first recommencement of the retreat, Lord Rawdon had also taken up the line of march for Camden, leaving Captain Coffin with his cavalry, and some mounted infantry on the field of battle. Upon receiving this intelligence, Colonel Washington resolved to endeavour to draw from it an advantage. Retiring with his cavalry into a thicket on the road-side, he pushed forward a small detachment, with orders to approach under covert until within a short distance of the enemy's position. The stratagem took effect; Colonel Coffin's whole troop pursued "*a bride abattue*," and having reached Washington's lurking place, the whole party were either cut to pieces, or compelled to save themselves by dispersion and flight. The consequence was, that the day terminated with the field of battle in possession of an American party.

It was a trifle in comparison with the principal event; but such trifles have often a wonderful effect in consoling the human mind. It certainly was not without its influence on the American army. The soldier, all-hardened and blood-stained as war presents him, thinks with feeling of his comrade left wounded on the field of battle. He must know him dead or taken care of, before he dismisses the recollection of him.

The whole of the 26th, and until the afternoon of the 27th, Greene remained at his position on Saunders' Creek; not without a hope that Rawdon, emboldered by his success, would reiterate the attack. But, his adversary had suffered too severely to think of again venturing in so hazardous an attempt; and seeing that there was no hope of tempting him so far from his stronghold, the American commander retired five miles further, to Rugely's Mill, the depot of his baggage and stores.

It is generally conceded, that the loss of the combatants in this action was nearly equal, about forty killed on each side, and about five times that number wounded and *missing*. One circumstance renders it probable, that the British loss in killed and wounded much exceeded that of the Americans. The former say they took about one hundred prisoners, the Americans took about fifty, and most of those of a description not to be noted in a return. The difference is easily accounted for from the effect of the artillery. Nor is it easy to conceive, how a conquering army should find any difficulty in separating its missing from its wounded. The Americans assert, that a number of those

rendered missing in their own returns, had made off on the artillery and other horses, for the rendezvous at Rugely's Mill, and afterwards joined the army. If this be the case, it goes far to corroborate the official return of the Americans, of eighteen killed and one hundred and eight wounded. Deduct the number of the wounded and prisoners, and of those who reappeared from the whole deficit, and the remainder may be conceded for the number. It may be less by the number, killed who never reappeared though not among the number who fell.

Eighteen killed, one hundred and eight wounded, and one hundred prisoners, would leave but thirty-eight for the missing who returned to the army. We will have occasion presently to corroborate this statement by some extracts of an original nature, more particularly relating to another point.

General Greene always attributed the loss of this battle exclusively to the mistaken orders issued by Colonel Gunby. The day after the battle, the following paragraph appeared in general orders :

" Though the action yesterday terminated unfavourably to the American arms, the general is happy to assure the troops that it is by no means decisive. The extraordinary exertions of the cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Washington, the gallant behaviour of the light infantry commanded by Captain Kirkwood, the firmness of the pickets under Captains Benson and Morgan, and the good conduct of the camp-guards, rendered the advantage expensive to the enemy, and highly merit the approbation of the general, and the imitation of the rest of the troops. The general presents his thanks to the artillery for the propriety of their conduct on the occasion. Our loss is so inconsiderable that it is only to be lamented, that the troops were not unanimous in a disposition to embrace so excellent an opportunity of gaining a victory."

Colonel Gunby was immediately called before a court of inquiry consisting of General Huger, Colonel Harrison and Lieutenant Colonel Washington, who were ordered to inquire into his conduct in the action of the 25th. On the 2d May the court sat, and the following entry of that day is copied from the orderly book :

" The court, whereof Brigadier General Huger is president, appointed to inquire into the conduct of Colonel Gunby in the action of the 25th ultimo, report as follows :

" It appears to the court, that Colonel Gunby received orders to advance with his regiment, and charge bayonet without firing. This order he immediately communicated to his regiment, which advanced cheerfully for some distance, when a firing began on the right of the regiment, and in a short time

CHAP. XII. became general through it. That soon after two companies on the right of the regiment gave way. That Colonel Gunby then gave Lieutenant Colonel Howard orders to bring off the other four companies, which appeared disposed to advance, except a few. That Lieutenant Colonel Howard brought off the four companies from the left, and joined Colonel Gunby at the foot of the hill, about sixty yards in the rear. That Lieutenant Colonel Howard there found Colonel Gunby actively exerting himself in rallying the two companies that broke from the right, which he effected, and the regiment was again formed and gave a fire or two at the enemy, who appeared on the hill in front. It also appears, from other testimony, that Colonel Gunby, at several other times, was active in rallying and forming his troops."

"It appears from the above report, that Colonel Gunby's spirit and activity, were unexceptionable. But his order for the regiment to retire, which broke the line, was extremely improper and unmilitary; and in all probability, the only cause, why we did not obtain a complete victory."

Thus, it appearing, that Gunby had only committed an error in judgment, but conducted himself in other respects, in a military manner; no other notice was taken of his conduct. He was employed in the rear of the army soon after, and did not rejoin it.

It is not always, however, that we are to look into the public communications of men, acting a conspicuous part in life, for a correct display of their feelings or opinions. Policy, necessity, accidental combinations, which no prudence or virtue can control, will sometimes force upon the most candid, firm and upright, a course of conduct adapted to particular exigencies.

The following extract of a letter from General Greene, to his friend Gov. Read,* will be read with that confidence, which we feel in opinions that appear to be extracted from the writer's heart. It was written at a time, when feeling had subsided, and opinion was confirmed by inquiry and reflection.

"If my account of the Camden action was different from that of Guilford, it was owing to the defeat's arising from another cause. The troops were not to blame in the Camden affair; Gunby was the sole cause of the defeat, and I found him much more blamable afterwards than I represented him in my public letters. The action of Camden, was much more bloody, according to the numbers engaged, than that of Guilford, on both sides. The enemy had more than one third of their whole force engaged, either killed or wounded; and we had not less than one quarter. Depend upon it, our actions have been bloody and severe, according to the force engaged; and we should have had

* 6th August, 1781.

Lord Rawdon and his whole command prisoners, in three minutes, if Colonel Gunby had not ordered his regiment to retire; the greater part of which were advancing rapidly at the time they were ordered off. I was almost frantic with vexation at the disappointment. Fortune has not been much our friend.”

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The following letter was written to the same correspondent, a few days after the action, and presents the fullest and most authentic view of the feelings and situation of the writer after that event.

May 4, 1781.

“I have been in this department near six months, and have written you several letters, without receiving a line of remembrance. Formerly, I used to flatter myself, that I held a place in your friendship, and my being sent to this unfortunate country, I hope has not lessened it; for I am sure, I never had more need of it in my life, either for consolation or support.

“The nature of the war, and the circumstances of the country, appear to be little known to the northward. The strength and resources of these states to support the war, have been greatly magnified and overrated; and those whose business and true interest it was to give a just state of the situation of things, have joined in the deception, and from a false principle of pride in having the country thought powerful, have led people to believe it was so. It is true, there were many inhabitants, but they were spread over a great extent of country, and nearly equally divided between the king's interest and ours. The majority is greatly in favour of the king's interest now, as great numbers of the whigs have left the country. The produce raised in it is difficult to collect, from the extent of the country, in the best of times; and utterly impossible to do it now, as all the horses and means of transportation are destroyed. The love of ease and want of zeal among many of those who are our friends, render their exertions very languid in support of our cause; and unless the northern states can give more efficient support, these states must fall; and what is worse, I am afraid their fall will afford the means to sap the foundation of the liberties of all the rest, for the enemy recruits with great facility in these states; and the service in this quarter, is so disagreeable to our soldiers from the scanty supplies, that many of them desert and enter their service.* The enemy have gained a much firmer footing in South Carolina and Georgia, than is generally believed. Camden, Ninety-Six, and Augusta, cover all the fertile parts of the state, and the enemy have laid waste the upper country in such a manner, that an army cannot subsist

* Of the one hundred and sixty men recaptured by Marion after Gates' defeat, Mr. Rutledge says

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XII.

in the neighbourhood of their posts, and this must secure them. Nothing but a superior army to the enemy's collective force, can give relief to this distressed country—the miseries of which exceed all belief. Nor do I believe any people ever suffered greater calamities; the whigs and the tories are butchering one another hourly. The war here is upon a very different scale from what it is to the northward. It is a plain business there. The Geography of the country reduces its operations to two or three points. But, here it is every where; and the country is so full of deep rivers and impassable creeks and swamps, that you are always liable to misfortunes of a capital nature. In collecting provisions and forage, we are obliged to send the same guards and escorts as if the country was avowedly our enemy's.

“Some of the states, when ruin approaches, exert themselves; but, the difficulties and dangers no sooner subside, than they sink down to their former sloth and inattention, and seem to be content with the merits of what they have done, without once considering what there is to do. This is the case with Virginia, who exerted herself greatly on the enemy's approach the last winter, but have left us to ourselves ever since. North Carolina did nothing at all, until she saw that we would not let the enemy possess the state quietly. There are many good whigs in that state, but I verily believe the tories are much the most numerous; and the whigs are so fond of ease, that they have but little relish for the rugged business of war. Government is so feeble that it is next to nothing; and the popular plan that influences their councils, greatly weakens the natural influence of the well-affected. The whigs will do nothing unless the tories are made to do equal duty; and this cannot be effected, as the tories are the stronger party; so neither aids the army. However, measures are now taking to raise men for a year, and I am in hopes some will take the field.

“Maryland has given no assistance to this army. Not a recruit has joined us from that state, and we are discharging her men daily, their time of service being expired.

“You frequently hear of great things from Generals Marion and Sumpter. These are brave, good officers; but the people who are with them just come and go as they please. These parties rather serve to keep the dispute alive, than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country. Don't be deceived in your expectations from this quarter; if greater support cannot be given for the recovery of these states, they must and will remain in the hands of the enemy.

“Our manœuvres have been various, and the conflict very unequal. We have been twice beaten, the last time by an unfortunate order of Colonel

Gunby's, who ordered the 1st Maryland regiment to retire when the enemy were fleeing before them, and in confusion in all quarters. Victory was certain, and the fall of Camden as certain, as I had taken measures to cut off their retreat. CHAP.
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"To induce them to sally was the object of our position, after finding that the works were too strong, and the garrison too numerous to storm with a prospect of succeeding. The event was the most unfortunate that can be imagined, not from the injury that we received, but the loss of the opportunity to take the place. Camden seems to have some evil genius about it. Whatever is attempted near that place, is unfortunate. War is a critical business, and the best concerted plans subject to disappointment from the most trivial incidents.

"The prospects here are so unpromising, and the difficulties so great, that I am almost sick of the service, and wish myself out of the department.—When I made this last movement, I expected two thousand Virginia militia to operate with us, and one thousand men with Sumpter; but, both have failed, and I am in the greatest distress. The tardiness of the people puts it out of my power to attempt any thing great. If our good ally, the French, cannot afford assistance to these southern states, in my opinion there will be no opposition on this side Virginia before the fall, and I expect the enemy will possess all the lower country of that state. The want of subsistence will prevent further operations in this country unless we can take post on the Congarees, where provisions are to be had in great plenty."

It was this letter, enforced by several others of a similar character, that finally produced the march of the Pennsylvania line for the southern army, and afforded that casual aid to La Fayette, which enabled him to arrest the progress of Lord Cornwallis and his detachments, and relieve Virginia from that distressing irruption, and the United States from the important consequences that might have followed from its further prosecution.

In the state of mind which the letters to Governor Read exhibit, General Greene also wrote to the Marquis De La Fayette, and the Chevalier de la Lizerne, with the latter of whom also, he was in the habit of communicating frequently by letter. In the most pressing manner, he urges upon them the necessity for France to turn her eye to what was going on in the southern states, and particularly to Virginia, against which it had now been ascertained, that the enemy meant to operate with vigour, as the best means of reducing the states south of it. Deprived of all hope of drawing any aid from the country north of him, whilst the enemy were in force in Virginia; and convinced that the command of the southern division of the United States drew after it the

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conquest of the whole, he urges the minister to direct the efforts of France to that quarter.

It is well known, that just at this time it was, that the French first began to exhibit any animation in their movements by land in the American war. It was the era of the concerted attack upon Cornwallis; and the following specimen of the courtly style of the duke's answer, will exhibit the man of the world and the diplomatist, adroitly flattering his correspondent, while he gives every reason to hope, yet skilfully evades a direct promise:—" *J'espere que ma lettre du deux Avril vous sera parvenue, aussi que mes sinceres compliments sur l'utile et glorieuse campagne de cet Hyver, elle vous acquiert a jamais l'estime et la confiance de vos bons citoyens et celle de vos allies. Je me flatte d'etre a portee de pouvoir vous faire part incessamment des arrangements efficaces que nous avons pris en France, pour le soutien de la cause commune. J'attends a chaque instant des nouvelles d'Europe. Aussitot que j'en aurai, je m'empresserai a vous les faire passer. Soyez en attendant bien persuade que S. M. croira ses troupes bien employees en co-operant avec un general qui a fait d'ussi grandes choses avec des moyens aussi mediocres.*"*

Nor must it be supposed, that the gloomy forboding expressed in General Greene's letters, was the result of the chagrin and mortification of defeat, or of any important change of situation produced by the battle of Camden. In a cooler moment, while lying before that place, and in anticipation of the battle which might soon take place, and of the personal exposure which the ground necessarily subjected him to, (for there was no secure point for him to view it from) he addressed the subjoined official letter to the president of congress. It is the counterpart of that which was written by Washington, under similar anticipations, the hour before he commenced his march for the attack of Trenton :

* "I hope that my letter of the 2d April has reached you, with my sincere congratulations on the efficient and glorious campaign of this winter. It has acquired for you for ever the esteem and confidence of your fellow-citizens and allies. I flatter myself that I shall have it in my power to communicate to you shortly the effectual arrangements that we have made in France for the support of the common cause. I am in hourly expectation of news from Europe. As soon as I shall have received it, I shall hasten to communicate it to you. In the mean time, rest assured that his majesty will think his troops well employed in co-operating with a general who has effected such great things with such inferior means."

“ CAMP BEFORE CAMDEN, *April 22, 1781.*

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“ SIR,

“ In my last I informed your excellency of Lord Cornwallis’ precipitate retreat from Deep River, of the situation of our army for want of provisions, and of the Virginia militia’s time of service having expired, which reduced my numbers greatly below that of the enemy. Finding that I had not a force to pursue them any further, and that our army could not be subsisted either on the route the enemy had taken, or in the lower country, I thought it most advisable to march directly into South Carolina to recover the expiring hopes of the people ; to divide with the enemy the supplies of the country, of which they had the entire command ; to break up their little post of communication, and, if possible, oblige Lord Cornwallis to return to the state for their protection. This last was the great object of the movement, and had we a force to prosecute the plan, I persuade myself it would take effect ; but, for want of which, the matter remains doubtful. Upwards of five months I have been in this department with nothing but the shattered remains of a routed army ; except the addition of Colonel Lee’s legion, and a couple of detachments from Virginia, amounting to little more than a regiment, and those without discipline, or even officers to command them. In this situation, with a temporary aid of the militia, we have been struggling with a very unequal force, under every possible disadvantage, and surrounded with every other kind of distress. We have run every hazard, and been exposed to every danger, not only of being beaten, but of being totally ruined. I have been anxiously waiting for succour, but the prospect appears to me to be remote, unless it be in militia, which is too precarious and uncertain a force to commence any serious offensive operations upon.

“ The more I inquire into the natural strength and resources of the states of North and South Carolina, either to form or support an army, the more I am persuaded they have been greatly overrated ; more of the inhabitants appear in the king’s interest than in ours, and the country is so extensive and thinly inhabited, that it is not easy either to draw any considerable force together or subsist them when collected. The militia in our interest, can do little more than keep the tories in subjection, and in many places not that. These states were in a much better condition to make exertions the last campaign than this.

“ The well-affected, that year, spent their time and their substance in friendly exertions, and finding themselves unequal to the contest, and their families being exposed and in distress, hundreds and hundreds of the best of whigs have left the country. Last year it was full of resources ; this, it is almost totally exhausted ; and the little produce that remains, lies so remote, and the

CHAP. means of transportation so difficult to command, that it is next to impossible to
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“The enemy have got a firmer footing in the southern states than is generally expected. Camden, Ninety Six and Augusta, cover all the fertile parts of South Carolina and Georgia, and they are laying waste the country above them, which will effectually secure those posts, as no army can be subsisted in the neighbourhood to operate against them. Below, they have a great many intermediate posts of communication, for the purpose of awing the country and preventing supplies. Nor can I perceive, how we are to reduce their capital posts but with a superior army in the field. I wish Congress not to be deceived, respecting the situation of things in the southern department, and therefore I hope they will excuse the freedom I take. If more effectual support cannot be given, than has been, or I can see a prospect of, I am very apprehensive the enemy will hold their ground, not only in the seaports, but in the interior country. The conflict may continue for some time longer; and Generals Sumpter and Marion, and many others, deserve great credit for their exertions and perseverance, but their endeavours rather serve to keep the contest alive than lay a foundation for the recovery of these states.

“We began our march from Deep River on the 7th, and arrived in the neighbourhood of Camden on the 19th. All the country through which we marched is disaffected, and the same guards and escorts were necessary to collect provisions and forage as if in an open and avowed enemy's country.

“On our arrival at Camden we took post at Log Town, about half a mile in front of their works, which, upon reconnoitering, were found to be much stronger than had been represented, and the garrison much larger. The town is upon a flat, covered on two sides by the river Wateree and Pine-Tree Creek, the other two sides by a chain of redoubts, all nearly of the same size, and independent of each other. Our force was too small either to invest the town or storm the works, which obliged us to take a position at a little distance from it.

“I have been greatly disappointed in the force I expected to operate with me. *Fifteen hundred back country Virginia militia were called for immediately after the battle of Guilford, having this present movement in contemplation at that time, and the state gave the order for a greater number than was required; but the busy season of the year, and the great distance they have to march, prevents their coming up to our assistance in time, if not in force. General Sumpter also engaged to have one thousand men in the field by the 18th, to operate with us, but the difficulty of collecting the militia, from the disagreeable situation of many of their families, has prevented their embodying yet in any considerable force. These disappointments lay us under many disadvantages, to say nothing worse.*

The country is extremely difficult to operate in, being much cut to pieces by deep creeks and impassable morasses. And many parts are covered with such heavy timber and thick underbrush as expose an army, and particularly detachments, frequently to surprise. CHAP.
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"The service has been so severe that it will be absolutely necessary to give the army some relaxation soon; and, therefore, I lament the delay which is occasioned at this time, for want of sufficient force to invest all the enemy's posts of communication. Our numbers are so reduced by the different actions and skirmishes which have happened, and by the fatigue and hardships of the service, *that we have but the shadow of an army remaining*, and this we are obliged to divide to push our operations to any effect, though it is attended with danger and may prove our ruin.

"I am extremely mortified at the disappointment which happened in Virginia, in the plan of co-operation against Portsmouth. Success there would have given us great relief here; and I am persuaded that nothing can recover *this country out of the hands of the enemy but a similar plan in these southern states*; at present the enemy have as full possession of Georgia, and almost the whole of South Carolina, as they can wish."

The following remarks from the pen of General Davy to the author, throw a blaze of light upon the incidents of the battle of Camden.

"As to the failure of the charge on the rear of the enemy's line by Washington, the thickness of the underwood, and the felled trees near the opening about Log Town, on the right of the road, obliged him to take such a circuit as brought him into the commons between Log Town and Camden; this threw him a considerable distance into the rear of the enemy's line. The capturing of such a multitude of prisoners, (said to be about two hundred,) not connected with the acting line of the enemy, was perfectly unexpected; American humanity and feeling, revolted from the cruelty of cutting to pieces men surrendering and begging for quarter. They were so numerous that he could neither act incumbered with them, nor retreat with them; he was obliged to dispose of them some way, and he adopted the humane mode of parolling them verbally, and when compelled to retreat was obliged to abandon the greatest part of them.

"You have observed that General Greene's plan was to strike the enemy in front, on both flanks, and in the rear at the same moment, and the correct rule was to have cut these people out of his way; but this was a principle upon which we had never acted, and Washington, who was as humane as he was brave, was therefore supposed to have done his duty, notwithstanding the constant example of the enemy's cavalry, who never gave quarters nor took a pri-

soner until the action was decided, as in Buford's defeat, Gates' defeat, Sumpter's defeat, &c.

"In the first order of battle, the two Virginia regiments, under Hawes and Campbell, formed the right wing, the two Maryland regiments formed the left. The artillery was in the centre of the line, placed in battery, in the road between the two brigades. Ford's regiment formed the extreme left, and Campbell's the extreme right of the line. When General Greene observed the enemy advance with a front so narrow that it did not exceed the extent of front made by Hawes and Gunby's regiments, he instantly ordered Campbell and Ford's regiments to wheel up respectively upon the flanks of the enemy; and Hawes and Gunby's regiments to move forward and charge the enemy with the bayonet without firing; it was at this moment also that he ordered Washington to charge the enemy in the rear: it was after this order was given, and during its awkward and abortive execution by the two flank regiments, that Lord Rawdon, perceiving his peril, had time to bring up his second line, into line with his first, and prevent his flanks being turned."

"I conversed with Colonel Ford, who was my intimate friend, soon after the action. He told me he was in the front of his regiment, endeavouring to execute the manœuvre ordered by the general, when he received his wound; that at that moment they were exposed only to a loose, scattering fire from some flank or light companies, which, however, drew a fire from his regiment, and which, together with his wound, prevented the execution of the order.

"You will observe that the general's second order or plan of battle was to make all the attacks on the front, on both flanks, and on the rear of the enemy, simultaneously; instantly seizing the advantage offered by the enemy's first formation, and promptly bringing into action the whole of his own means. The destruction of the enemy was inevitable, had the orders of General Greene been executed with the promptness of disciplined troops, supported even by common resolution.

"General Greene led up Campbell's regiment several times in person; but they were new troops, and although they could be rallied and formed again, even with precision, they could not be made to stand the enemy's fire; the soldiers of Ford's regiment were new also, and although commanded by excellent officers, soon fell into confusion after he was wounded. Had our cavalry charged the second line of the enemy before they were moved up, the flank regiments would have been but partially engaged, and he must have found this line in great confusion: under such advantages the conduct of our flank regiments would probably have been more prompt and spirited. If the charge had been made after this movement it would have brought our cavalry directly in the

rear of the troops engaged by Gunby's regiment, supposing the charge to have been made up the road, which was the only proper and practicable direction. CHAP.
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"General Greene exposed himself greatly in this action, especially with Campbell's regiment; so much so, that one of the officers observed to me, that his conduct during the action resembled more that of a captain of grenadiers, than that of a major-general. You will easily perceive, without any further observation, how an unfortunate species of success, put our cavalry, in point of fact, *hors de combat*, and that the critique of General Lee is perfectly unfounded. I had frequent conversations with General Greene on the strange result of this battle, and conversed with almost every officer in the army respecting their posts in it. Indeed it was a subject of constant discussion till we arrived before Ninety-Six, when we found other employment.

"There is not one single circumstance in this affair that marks it as a surprise; the position was taken for the express purpose of forcing Lord Rawdon to fight. The men had been under arms from day-light, and only dismissed for the express purpose of cooking, about one hour and a half before the attack on the picket. Men must cook and eat, and when they can, will be washing and mending their clothes—this is all of course. Every battalion was even resting in the line; the artillery in battery; and all the baggage moved off, before the enemy presented themselves before our line of battle; all was cheerfulness, confidence and tranquillity; no confusion or noise, and the whole line resembled a common parade."

This, reader, was "Greene's surprise" at Camden. The victory was sure, had the American commander been content with victory, but a vigorous effort was made to cut off also the enemy's to his fastnesses. The effort failed, but what would have been gained had he only been driven within his lines? General Greene had reason to believe Cornwallis was approaching on the one hand, when he knew that Watson was on the other. Time was precious, and time must have been consumed in starving Lord Rawdon into a surrender. Military men will, perhaps, decide that the movements made with these views put too much to hazard, that it was relinquishing too much of the advantage derived from his artillery; to charge from his centre, and giving up too much ground on his flanks to wheel them upon those of his enemy. But an officer must count upon the courage and promptness of his troops, and with these united, in carrying these movements into effect, they could scarcely have failed.

CHAPTER XIII.

Treatment of Captain Smith of the Maryland line. Executions for desertion. Movements of Marion, Sumpter and Pickens. Doyle and Watson get into Camden. Greene's movements beyond the Wateree. His increasing embarrassments. Marion offended. Offers to retire from service. Efforts to detain him. Lord Rawdon retreats from Camden. Greene moves to the Congaree. Fall of Fort Motte,—of the Fort at Orangeburgh. Sumpter hangs on the enemy's right. Fall of Fort Granby. Sumpter offended. Lee moves to Augusta. Greene sits down before Ninety-Six. Capture of Forts Galphin, Grierson and Cornwallis. Murder of Colonel Grierson.

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AN event that occurred soon after the battle of Camden, showed, that the destructive charge made by the Marylanders on the guards, at the battle of Guilford, had not been forgotten. And, although we should admit that the British officers were wholly blameless, some unknown individuals connected with the British army, are chargeable with a vindictive and barbarous outrage on the person of Captain Smith. This gallant man, who was so altogether the soldier, that his men were ever prodigal of their lives for him in the day of battle; while his frank, open and humane conduct secured to him the esteem of all who knew him, (it has been seen,) had sunk beneath the sabres of the enemy on Hobkirk's Hill, in the final charge made upon him while defending the artillery; and having sustained a severe contusion was made prisoner. Wounded as he was, he was refused his parole and immured in the provost. The charge against him (to quote the language in which it was commu-

nicated) was—"It having been reported to Lord Rawdon by several deserters, and some prisoners from the American army, that Captain Smith had inhumanly put to death an officer and three private men of the guards, who were prisoners and defenceless, after the action of Guilford."

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Smith, whose feelings were less outraged at the indignity offered to his rank, than at the crimes imputed to him, after four days solicitation, obtained permission to address a letter to General Greene on the treatment he was subjected to; and a letter from Lord Rawdon's brigade major, accompanied Smith's communication.

It was well known in the army, that Stewart had fallen at the battle of Guilford under the sabre of Smith, and it was also believed, that the latter had opened his way over the bodies of several soldiers to the person of their leader. But, it was also known, that with difficulty he had escaped with his own life, and that all passed in the very heat and bustle of the charge. For this he appealed to Washington, Howard, and some others who were present, and his enlargement soon followed the return of the messenger. General Greene was seriously offended, and every officer felt the indignity as an individual offence. The following is the language in which the general expresses himself in his reply:—"Nothing can be more foreign from the truth than the charge. I have only to observe upon it, that had such a charge been made against any of your officers whom the fortune of war had thrown into our hands, before I should have treated them with any particular marks of indignity, I should first have made inquiry, and had the fact better established. It is my wish that the war should be conducted upon the most liberal, rational and generous principles; but, I will never suffer an indignity or injury to be offered to our officers without retaliation." But, the spirit of vindictiveness is thought not to have exhausted itself in this effort. Smith was parolled to Charleston, and the next day, nearly penniless and on foot, his food and his handkerchief of clothes suspended on his shoulders, he had passed but a few miles beyond the British out-posts, when he was stopt by a party of men who issued from the woods. It was in vain that he exhibited his parol and passport; they stripped him, bound him, and inflicted on him a barbarous castigation on the bare back. If they were enemies, there was ingenuity in this revenge, for, to his feelings, such treatment made life tolerable only under the hope of vengeance. They called themselves whigs; but why should he have received such treatment from a party of friends?

It is not without feelings bordering on disapprobation or even disgust, that we read in the pages of Mr. Gordon—"That General Greene, whilst he lay

CHAP. in the neighbourhood of Camden, hanged in one day, eight soldiers who had
XIII deserted from his army and were afterwards taken prisoners."

The number executed was five, and all the particulars are stated *in extenso* in the orderly book of the day. Greene, who did not want decision, was known to be particularly tender of human life—he entertained on this subject some of the scruples cherished by the sect in which he had been educated. On his first taking command of the American army, he found much of that military demoralization prevailing, which soon finds its way into a routed army. Among the militia particularly, a loose practice prevailed of leaving camp, spending days at home, and joining the army again when they pleased. In mere volunteer service, noxious as this practice was, it could not be prevented; but, among the drafted militia, it became indispensable that an example should be made. Orders, remonstrances and threats were all found vain; nor did the militia believe him in earnest until one offender was arrested, tried and executed. From this time until the arrival before Camden, there were frequent convictions for the offence of desertion: but in no case was any punishment but whipping inflicted, except one, and that for the third offence in seven months. But, when he arrived before Camden, the facilities afforded by the near approach to the British garrisons, rendered desertions frequent, and it was indispensable that the evil should be checked.

Soon after the retreat to Rugely's Mills, the prisoners taken at Fort Watson arrived in camp, and among them were five men who had been taken in arms, and whose identity, as deserters, was unquestionable. These were brought before a court martial on the 30th April, convicted and condemned to death. The approbation of the general to this measure of severity is entered in these words: "The general approves the proceedings of the court. He would be extremely happy if the offences of these unfortunate men deserved a punishment less severe. But desertion is a crime so dangerous to an army, that policy has dictated the mode of correction. The indispensable necessity of giving some serious example, and the recent misfortunes the troops have suffered by the perfidy of some of their unworthy companions, forbid the exercise of lenity, and compel the general to admit the force of martial law. The criminals are to be executed, according to the sentence pronounced against them, at 4 of the clock to-morrow afternoon."

After this time we find capital convictions very numerous. For as the British garrisons successively fell, numbers of deserters were taken in them, and their offences could not pass unnoticed.

Let us here pause and consider the nature of the dilemma to which the general was exposed. To suffer desertion to pass unpunished would have been to disband his army. But on whom must he inflict the severities of a law, necessarily so sanguinary in its provisions? On men, some of whom had languished in prisonships amidst disease, death, suffocation, filth, and insult; and yielded finally to systematic oppression on the one hand, and solicitation and temptation on the other; others of whom had shared with himself a thousand perils and dangers, until, impatience at protracted fatigue and privation, irritation from a sense of injustice and ingratitude, indignation at observing the superior condition of their enemy, and the strong tendency of the human mind, conscious of positive evil, to hope every thing from a change, all co-operated to impel them to desertion.

From this time it is obvious that the general embraced every pretext for relieving himself from the necessity of executing martial law in its severity. He possessed the power of pardoning, and there was seldom a piece of good news received which did not save some wretch from the gallows. When that of the fall of Cornwallis was announced, the provost was thrown open, and a perfect jubilee, with all its oblivious effects, proclaimed through the camp. The death warrants executed are still in existence, and prove how few were the executions in proportion to the convictions; yet there was no room left for imputing to him that mistaken clemency, which loosens the bonds of society, to gratify solicitation, to acquire popularity or the reputation of extraordinary feeling, or to avoid a painful effort. He administered penal justice with true spirit, directing his views to the sole end of preventing crime by the least possible severity.

Colonel Lee, in the second volume of his Memoirs, has this passage.*

"General Greene, heretofore soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumpter, now deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of his favourite regiment, converting his splendid prospects into a renewal of toil and difficulty, of doubt and disgrace, became for a while discontented with his advance to the south. He sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel Lee to join him forthwith, and indicated, by other measures, a disposition to depart from his adopted system.

"As soon as the capitulation for the surrender of Fort Watson was signed, Lee, followed by his infantry, hastened to the cavalry still in front of Watson, and on the subsequent morning was joined by Brigadier Marion, who had been necessarily delayed until the prisoners and stores were disposed of," &c.

In these passages, as well as all the subsequent narrative of the causes which led to Watson's successful evasion, the official documents are before us to prove that Colonel Lee is altogether incorrect; not only as to the conduct and views of Sumpter and Greene, but even as to his own movements and those of Marion and Watson. We would not be thought to maintain the charge of wilful misrepresentation, but as Colonel Lee kept no journal of these events, had not the possession of the official correspondence, but rested upon his own memory and some remains of private correspondence for those events which could not be gathered from the publications that treat of them,—under such circumstances there is some apology for running into errors, which represent himself as actively keeping up the conflict, while his commander was meditating flight, or exhibiting an indecision which led to the most unfortunate consequences.

Equally incorrect is Colonel Lee* in the assertion "that General Greene was officially informed, on the 24th, of the surrender of Fort Watson, and in the course of the day the prisoners reached head quarters." The orderly book shows that intelligence of that event did not reach head quarters, nor did the prisoners arrive, until a day or two after the battle of Camden.

The official and detailed account of the surrender of the fort from the pen of General Marion, bears date on the 23d, and concludes thus—"I shall, without loss of time, demolish the fort, after which I shall proceed to the High Hills of Santee, and halt at Captain Richardson's plantation until further orders.

The dispatch of the 25th is dated at Captain William Richardson's, High Hills, and is in these words:

"I have just come here, and find the express sent by Captain Conyers to you is returned with the account of your moving from this side Camden, and that you have moved entirely from Camden; where, was not known. This is mysterious and conjectures various, so that we cannot tell what to conclude. I shall be happy to hear from you, and clear up my apprehensions of ill consequences.

"Lieutenant Colonel Lee's cavalry is here; his infantry I left last night ten miles below, and expect them up this morning. If I hear nothing from you by to-morrow evening, I shall make a sudden movement to prevent ill consequences."

The facts were as this letter represents. The express bearing the dispatches of the 23d, finding that General Greene had left the position on the

south side of Camden, got alarmed at the danger to which he was exposed, and returned with the embarrassing account to which Marion alludes. Being again sent forward with orders to find his way to the American army by turning the head of Pine-Tree Creek, he was deterred from advancing by the firing, which was then raging, and deviated far to the eastward towards Black River, in order to proceed in safety. There, unfortunately, he encountered Major Eaton, proceeding with his detachment to the aid of Marion, and that officer, having learnt the fall of Fort Watson, very improperly made a halt, under the supposition, that the end for which he had been detached was already attained.

Thus it happened, that although Lord Rawdon was apprized of the advance of Marion, Greene was ignorant of it on the day of the battle.

Marion had been apprized in a letter from General Greene of the 24th, when he lay to the south of Camden, of the advance of the re-enforcement under Eaton ; and the letter contains a passage which does too much credit to the characters of both commanders to be here omitted.

“ When I consider,” says General Greene, “ how much you have done and suffered, and under what disadvantages you have maintained your ground, I am at a loss which to admire most, your courage and fortitude, or your address and management. Certain it is, no man has a better claim to the public thanks, or is more generally admired than you. History affords no instance wherein, an officer has kept possession of a country under so many disadvantages as you have. Surrounded on every side with a superior force, hunted from every quarter with veteran troops, you have found means to elude all their attempts, and to keep alive the expiring hopes of an oppressed militia, when all succour seemed to be cut off. To fight an enemy with a prospect of victory is nothing ; but, to fight with intrepidity under the constant impression of a defeat, and inspire irregular troops to do it, is a talent peculiar to yourself. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to do justice to your merits, and I shall miss no opportunity of declaring to congress, to the commander in chief of the American army, and to the world, the great sense I have of your merit and services.

“ I thank you for the measures you have taken to furnish us with provisions and for the intelligence you communicate. A field-piece is coming to your assistance, which I hope will enable you and Colonel Lee to get possession of the fort. With the artillery you will receive one hundred pound of powder and four hundred pound of lead. I wish my present stock would enable me to forward you a larger supply ; but it will not, having sent you near half of what we have.”

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Being now apprized of the advance of Eaton's detachment and the retirement of Greene, Marion at once saw that both he and that detachment would be exposed to danger from an enterprising enemy. The sudden movement which in his letter of the 25th he proposes to make, was towards Black River, for the double purpose of covering and uniting with that detachment, and removing his own command beyond striking distance of Camden. He halted, however, on the ground at Captain Richardson's, until the 27th, when receiving no communication from Greene, (for the intervening country was then altogether the enemy's) he moved over to Black River, and there received the unwelcome tidings both of the battle of the 25th, and of the retrograde movement of Major Eaton.

We know not to what movements Colonel Lee alludes, as indicating a disposition in Greene "to depart from his adopted system." Had Colonel Lee pointed to the particular movement indicative of such a disposition, others might have judged how far his premises would have sustained his conclusion. That Greene had, in fact, no such design, is expressly declared by him in all the letters of the day; in which he uniformly writes, that the check he had received should make no change in his movements. Of these we will copy one, because more immediately connected with the movements which preceded Watson's escape and Marion's movements, and which must have been communicated to Colonel Lee.

Letter from General Greene to General Marion.

"CAMP AT RUGELY'S, April 27, 1781.

"DEAR SIR,

"Captain Conyers has just arrived in camp, and says, that reports are below that we were routed, and totally dispersed. You will take measures to have this account contradicted, and the public properly informed. By mistake we got a slight repulse. The injury is not great. The enemy suffered much more than we did. *What has happened will make no alteration in our plan of operations*, and therefore I wish you to pursue the same plan that you had in contemplation before.

"In my last I desired you to move up within seven miles of Camden, but Captain Conyers thinks, that by posting fifty men below, at the distance of fifteen or twenty miles, all the supplies can be as effectually cut off as if you were at a less distance; and that if you cross the Santee, you can take all the posts upon the Congaree, and those posts that lie between Camden and the

latter river. I have, therefore, sent Captain Conyers to conduct the artillery to you, which I was informed, this morning by express, was on its return, Major Eaton having heard of the reduction of the fort. CHAP.
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"You will cross the river Santee, or detach — and Colonel Lee, and direct your force, as information or circumstances may direct, either towards Georgetown or elsewhere, as shall appear to be necessary, keeping me always advised of your situation, and leaving a guard of about sixty men at or about the High Hills of Santee, to prevent supplies from going to Camden."

This letter needs no comment. It proves Colonel Lee's mistake as to General Greene's views, his error as to his own movements, and his subordination to Marion.

The immediate cause assigned, by Colonel Lee, for the evasion of Watson, was the execution of the order sent to him, "requiring him to join the army forthwith."* His account is, "that at the time of the surrender of the fort, his cavalry was in front of Colonel Watson;" "that, having brought up his infantry, Watson, by a stolen march, crossed to the south side of the Santee," but would "have been pursued, with the expectation of falling upon him, before he could make good the passage of the river, had not the general's orders, directing the junction of the corps under Lee, arrived; which necessarily arrested the proposed attempt upon Watson."

This account is wholly irreconcilable with time and place. For, when Watson crossed the Santee, at the lower ferry, Fort Watson had not yet surrendered; this was on the 21st; and it is on the 23d that the capitulation bears date. Nor would distance have admitted of the rapid movement necessary to throw the cavalry in front of Watson. Since the ferry at which the British Colonel crossed it is not less than sixty miles from the place where the American detachment lay.

It is unnecessary, however, to refer to circumstances to detect the error of Colonel Lee, since we have positive evidence that on the day after the surrender of the fort, Colonel Lee's cavalry was with Marion at the High Hills, and his infantry ten miles in their rear.† At this period Watson was on his march from Georgetown to Monk's Corner, (a post on the same road with that to Charleston,) and forty miles below Fort Watson. If any further evidence of the colonel's inaccuracy on this point be necessary, it is to be found in two letters from him, dated the day of the surrender, the one before, the other after that event: in one of which he says, "Watson is in Georgetown, and dare not venture towards

* Page 67, 68.

† Marion's letter of the 24th April, ante.

Camden," and in the other, "to-morrow we march for the High Hills of Santee." Nor is it easy to conceive on what day the order issued to Colonel Lee could have borne date: the presumption is, that it must have been of a date prior to that ordering Marion to cross the Santee himself, or detach Colonel Lee on that service, which was on the 27th. Now a letter on the files, from Colonel Lee, of the date of the 27th, proves that he had not, on that day, heard of the battle; and another of the day following, acknowledges that he had. But the latter letter contains a positive acknowledgment that he had then received no such order. The following is an extract from it.

"I am with General Marion, who has moved to this place, thirty miles from you, in consequence of your orders. I am ignorant whether you mean to comprehend me in your order or not. I have my hopes that you will order me and Major Eaton to pass the Santee, and to pursue the conquest of every post and detachment in that county. I think such a line of conduct necessary, or the storming of Camden unavoidable. If you prefer the latter I wish to be with you," &c.

That Colonel Lee marched with General Marion for the Hills, and that he there continued with him, until he received advice and orders from Greene, is, therefore, incontestable; and that he accompanied Marion to Black River, and remained there until the arrival of Eaton, is proved by his own letters, dated at Benbow's Ferry, where also, Marion's bear date. But letters of Colonel Lee's, of the 2d and 4th May, explain this mystery.

In a letter from General Greene of the 1st May, to General Marion, he is ordered, in case of Colonel Tarleton's crossing the country for Camden, immediately to detach Colonel Lee to the main army; and a letter from Colonel Lee, of the date of the 2d, acknowledges one communicating to him this order. On the 4th May, intelligence was received by General Greene, that Lord Cornwallis was actually advancing into South Carolina; and a letter of that date, contains an order for Colonel Lee immediately to join the main army. Colonel Lee's answer, however, shows that he received it when lying before Fort Motte; that Watson had then actually passed the Wateree, and that he never complied with it.

The real cause which produced Watson's successful evasion, was the retrograde movement of Major Eaton; who, after reaching Black River, returned within five miles of Rugely's mills. Had he pursued his orders, he must have joined Marion before the receipt of the letter of the 27th, ordering him across the Santee; and by immediately moving in compliance with that order, Marion must have intercepted Watson. Circumstances had now occurred, so much to reduce the force under Marion, that, without the reinforcement under Eaton,

he could not venture to throw himself in the way of Watson, whose force was estimated at six hundred men and four field pieces.* The time of the year, (being the height of planting,) the unfortunate affair of the 25th, the rising of the tories on the Peedee, and the detaching of eighty men, under Colonel Irvine, to Rafting Creek to cut off supplies from Camden, all had combined to cause a great reduction of Marion's force. As soon, however, as Major Eaton had joined him, which was on the evening of the 2d May, he lost no time in moving across the Santee. In a letter of the 3d he says, "Major Eaton's not coming up sooner has made me lose a great deal of precious time. I shall cross Santee at Wright's Bluff to-morrow."

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Marion accordingly lost no time in pressing across the Santee after his junction with Major Eaton ; but he came too late. The day before he reached the road which crosses the river above the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree, Colonel Watson had succeeded in passing him. In the meantime, Greene had thrown himself across the river also above Camden Ferry, to cut him off ; but Watson, skilfully eluded the main army by recrossing the Wateree some distance below Camden, and succeeded in throwing himself into that place on the 6th of the month.

Nor is Colonel Lee less incorrect in his charges alleged against Sumpter, than in those preferred against Greene.

In a previous page he asserts—"Brigadier Sumpter held off, much to the surprise, regret and dissatisfaction of the American general, and very much to the detriment of his plans and measures." This, taken in connexion with the passage before cited, makes out against General Sumpter, the charge of having neglected or refused to contribute towards the support of Greene, the re-enforcements which he had promised ; and, at first view, the charge would seem to be countenanced by some expressions in General Greene's letter to Mr. Read and to the president of congress, before quoted. But, if these letters be considered, they will not be found to have any such bearing ; they allege a *disappointment*, but contain no imputation or censure on General Sumpter, because of it. And the fact is, that officer had never received an order to join the southern commander, but expressly otherwise ; for in every communication from that of the 29th April, in which the descent was first announced, he is uniformly instructed to direct his operations against the country lying west of Camden, to cut off re-enforcements from that quarter, and endeavour to break up the communication between Ninety-Six and Cam-

* Marion, 30th April.

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den. The re-enforcements he was not able to cut off, but the other service he performed so effectually, that every effort of Lord Rawdon to communicate with the posts of Granby and Ninety-Six proved abortive; and at the period we have now arrived to, Pickens was in force, under Sumpter's orders, in the vicinity of Ninety-Six. The fort at Granby was closely invested by Colonel Thomas Taylor; and Sumpter, in person, was aiming a blow at the post at Orangeburgh. No cause operated more strongly in forcing Rawdon to abandon the upper country and release the American commander from his accumulating embarrassments, than the progress made by Sumpter in the middle country. Nor could Marion and Lee have securely carried on the cotemporaneous and protracted siege of Fort Motte, had not the posts and the country above them been kept in check by the parties brought into the field by Sumpter.

It is true that he was not able to take the field as early or with as many men as he flattered himself; and the disappointment was sensibly felt in the accession of strength to the garrison of Camden before Greene's arrival. But, the causes of this disappointment may have been beyond his control, and there did not exist the least ground for imputing to him a want of zeal or of candour.

The following detailed account of the progress of Sumpter, will exhibit the posture of affairs in the middle and western parts of the state, at the battle of Camden, and furnish a full vindication of that officer's conduct, from this charge of Colonel Lee. It is extracted altogether from the original documents existing among the files of the southern department.

The letter of the 29th March, which announced to General Sumpter the approach of General Greene, found the former still on the Catawba, not perfectly recovered of his wounds. But, the first moment he had been able to make sufficient exertions, they had been applied to an effort to enlist a body of men in the service of the state for ten months. The bounty of a prime negro per man, was the temptation held out to them to engage in that service. This project had been submitted to Governor Rutledge, and received his sanction; and to General Greene, every thing was welcome that could promise an accession of permanent troops. Sumpter's best officers were now actively and successfully engaged in procuring enlistments in both states, in the country contiguous to the Catawba.

The moment the order to take measures to co-operate with the commander of the southern department was received, Sumpter entered with zeal upon the execution of it. Trusty messengers were dispatched to Marion and Pickens, apprizing them of the communication, and desiring them to take the most

active measures to raise the whigs in their commands, and embody them for co-operation. Marion, as Greene had ordered, was instructed to collect his followers, take post on Black River, collect provisions, cut off the enemy's foraging parties, and be in readiness to form a junction with the advancing army. How his orders were executed, has already appeared. Pickens was not less prompt or energetic in acting the part assigned him. McCall, Purvis, Bratton, Brannon, and a number of the zealous whigs, were soon in motion; and although exposed to every inconvenience from the scattered residence of his men, and the great predominance of the royal cause in that country, Pickens very soon succeeded in breaking up the tory settlements so effectually, that they were obliged to take refuge under the guns of Ninety-Six, and embody themselves for mutual protection under the command of General Cunningham. Even here they were not permitted to rest, but were pursued and attacked by night; and but for the unfortunate mistake of a guide, would have been destroyed in the midst of fancied security. McCall, who possessed greatly the confidence of the Georgians, was joined by many of the whigs from that state, and falling upon a party commanded by a Major Dunlap, a tory officer, who had rendered himself infamous by his barbarity, succeeded in capturing the whole party. Clark, Twigs, Jackson, and a number of distinguished Georgians, now returned into action, and such a change was produced in the face of things, as to extort from Major Cruger the commander at Ninety-Six, in a letter to Colonel Balfour which was intercepted, the following exclamation:—"The exertions of the rebels have been very great—they have stolen most of our new-made subjects in Long-Cane, and many to the southward of us, whose treachery exceeds every idea I ever had of the most faithless of men.

"It will soon be a matter of very little consequence who has this part of the country, as nothing is like to be planted this season, every man being either in arms or hid in the swamps, and a very great consumption of last year's crops."

On the day that General Greene commenced his march from Deep River, he dispatched Major Hyrne across the country, to hold a personal conference with General Sumpter. On Hyrne's report, and a letter of Sumpter's, dated the 7th April, it was, that General Greene founded his expectation that Sumpter would be able to bring one thousand men into the field, to co-operate with him. On comparing the two documents, they are found to agree as to number, but in Sumpter's letter, four or five hundred of the one thousand are expressly made to consist of the men brought out under Marion, and six hundred of his own brigade. Hyrne's report says, "General Sumpter expects, by

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Monday, (the 18th,) to have upwards of two hundred ten months' men from South Carolina, and three hundred from North Carolina; these are immediately to join the militia, who will amount to about five hundred, and proceed down the country;" but makes no mention of the four or five hundred expected under Marion. It does not appear very clearly, therefore, whether Sumpter had held out the hope of bringing into the field one thousand men, exclusive of those under Marion; but, whatever was the number, he was at that time so environed with difficulties, that, after promising the most zealous co-operation, he does not express a hope that he will be able to take the field before the 20th. Major Hyrne had reported the 18th. Opposition, it seems, was made to his enlisting men in North Carolina; professedly, on the ground of its interfering with the draft then going on in that state, but really (as he asserts) because it raised the price of substitutes. And of his militia command he says, "three regiments are left without a field officer, and a number of other officers and men have been killed, taken, or parolled, by their imprudently going upon private and disgraceful business." This "private and disgraceful business" was the practice of private plunder; for men then took the law in their own hands, and sought indemnity by force of arms, as the courts of justice were now shut throughout this unhappy country. The practice disgraced the American cause, and furnished ground of reflection on their commander, who really wanted not inclination to suppress it, but who felt too sensibly his dependance on those who pursued it. Until he had a disciplined force to sustain and execute his orders, it was impossible to restrain the licentious habits of many who professed themselves whigs.

Greene was, no doubt, much distressed from not receiving earlier support from Sumpter; but we can find no suggestion of a suspicion, that it was not as sensibly felt by Sumpter as by himself.

The case was the same with regard to provisions. Sumpter had been particularly solicited to make an effort to procure supplies of food, and horses for its transportation. This he made every endeavour to do through those officers who commanded where provision could be procured; but he constantly declares, as was unquestionably the fact, that all the provisions on those rivers were within the enemy's posts.

Although disappointed greatly in the number of men, and the provisions and stores he expected to collect, Sumpter actually commenced operations by the time he promised. His first blow was aimed at a party collected in force on the Tiger River; but they fled before him, and, dividing his force into several detachments, he simultaneously struck at several of the disaffected settlements, whilst a party pushed down to the main army with the pittance of provisions

he was enabled to collect, about ten wagon loads. The country between the Broad and Saluda rivers, and the Broad and Wateree rivers, was soon swept over; and on the 2d May he sat down before Fort Motte and Fort Granby, on the south side of the Congaree. CHAP.
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It is not true that Sumpter ever was ordered to form a junction with Greene, prior to the affair of Camden. Every letter, on the contrary, directs him to devote his attention to the country in which he actually operated, only enjoining him to hold himself in readiness for a junction in case Lord Cornwallis should direct his march towards Camden. But after the American army had been forced to retreat, such an order was given, and the incidents attending it, probably, gave rise to the charge of disobedience to the commander of the southern department. But with what justice, let the following extract of a letter from the commander himself decide. "Major Hyrne returned this morning, and soon after Mr. Taylor arrived with your letter of the 29th. By the major's report, and your letter, I find you think it will be prejudicial to the public service for you to cross the Wateree and join us. Our situation required it, but as you press so many objections, and I am so desirous to rouse the people in that quarter, I have thought it most advisable to revoke the order, and leave you at liberty to prosecute your original plan. General Marion and Colonel Lee had orders to cross the Santee, and one or both undoubtedly will. If both should cross, I am afraid Watson, *who is now in Georgetown*, will throw himself into Camden. If they separate, I fear one party will be too weak to oppose him. You will keep yourself informed of both his and Major M'Arthur's movements; the latter of whom, with the Hessian horse, I fear got into Camden last evening. However, this is not certain. General Marion has a field-piece, but by what I can learn the fort at Congaree is too strong to be beat to pieces by field artillery.

"Push your operations with great vigour, as no opportunity can be more favourable; and you may rely upon it, the enemy will not be idle, and see themselves insulted on all sides. Much depends upon the present movement. Let me hear from you daily, and send me all the provisions you can, I mean of bread kind, beef we have in plenty."

Thus, it appears that Sumpter was not only released from the order to form a junction with his commander, at this time, but particularly charged with the execution of most important services. The punctuality with which they were executed, is attested by the numerous communications of this period, not only daily as required, but repeated as often as the occurrences of the day rendered it proper. Provisions were sent, the communications of the enemy assiduously

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watched, swamps explored to cut off the enemy's supplies, and particular attention paid to the approach to Camden by the west side of the Wateree.

Yet, Watson managed to elude all this preparation to cut him off. Major M'Arthur appears, on this occasion, to have exhibited the character of an active and intelligent soldier. He commanded a corps of indifferent cavalry, formed on a draft from the Hessian troops, at this time in Charleston. Scouring the country in the front of Watson, he appears to have completely masked his advance; and after throwing a detachment of twenty-five of his command under Colonel Doyle, into Camden, to have returned down to Fort Motte, and succeeded in throwing into that place a wall-piece, with the stores belonging to it.* But, Marion sat down before the fort with his six-pounder, before M'Pherson, who commanded the post, could adapt his gun to service, or the cavalry who had escorted it, could make good their retreat; hence they all shared the fate of that garrison.

No intelligence had reached Sumpter of the approach of Watson until the latter was discovered crossing the Wateree. Immediately as he was apprized of the fact, he dispatched two hundred and fifty of his mounted men, with orders to harass and detain him until he could advance with the infantry on his left, whilst Marion came up in his rear. But Watson, by a rapid and unremitted march, succeeded on crossing the ferry opposite to Statesburgh, and thus throwing the Wateree between himself and his enemy, proceeded in safety to the place of his destination. A more untoward incident, or one in which vigilance, forecast, and prudence were more completely baffled by the crosses of fortune, does not occur in the history of warfare. But for Lord Rawdon's judicious and successful attack, it could not have happened. Nor would it have happened, but for the time lost by Eaton's unfortunate retrograde movement, or if Marion, instead of pressing across the Santee, had resumed his station at the High Hills; for Greene was, at this time, encamped on the west of the Wateree, in a position which commanded the communication by Camden Ferry; and Marion could have moved up on the east side, so as with the aid of his detachment at Rafting Creek, to have commanded every other crossing place. But, the position would have exposed Marion to a blow from Camden, to which his commander was not willing to expose him. Lord Rawdon would not have seen Watson cut off under his eye without an effort to save him; for these reasons, he preferred ordering Marion across

* M'Pherson's intercepted Letter, 5th May.

the Santee, not then having a suspicion that Eaton had advanced so far in his retrograde movement, and the state of intelligence being, that as late as the 30th, Watson was still in Georgetown. As if no incident should be wanting to baffle the hopes and the measures of the American commander, Captain Conyers, who, from his intelligence and activity, had been particularly delegated to stop Eaton and hasten him back to Marion, actually lost his way in his anxiety to shorten it, and the loss of another day's march was the consequence.*

On the day that Watson succeeded in throwing himself into Camden, Greene lay encamped at Twenty-five Mile Creek, on the west side of the Wateree River. This movement had not been made solely, as has been asserted, with a view to co-operate against Watson, but expressly to guard against the consequences that might follow from his junction with Rawdon. On the 3d May, he had received intelligence of the delays which had attended Marion's movement to cut him off on the south of the Santee; and he foresaw that not a moment would be lost by Lord Rawdon in aiming a blow at the main army, should Watson by any casualty (and there are many such in war) succeed in reaching Camden. Information had also been received of the advance of the Virginia militia, and he resolved, until re-enforced, to remain in covert whilst his detachments were overrunning the state.

A position on the west side of the Wateree afforded every facility for supporting those detachments if necessary, while a succession of strong military positions in his rear, upon the road on which he was posted, presented the means of resisting a superior enemy, and both covered the country above him, and kept open a communication with his magazines at the head of the river. It also presented greater facility for supplies, since the whole country to his right, even down to the mouth of Congaree, was commanded by Sumpter's parties. The advantages to be expected from the provision that had been husbanded by the enemy in that fertile country, were not to be neglected. From these, in fact, he immediately began to draw supplies of meal, the great defect in the American camp.

An order of the 6th, that the roll be called every hour, was the consequence of the receipt of the mortifying intelligence of Watson's success. And another, of the 7th, "that the army shall march by the left in one hour,"† followed upon the news General Greene anticipated, that Lord Rawdon was preparing to advance upon him the moment Watson had arrived.

* Major Eaton's Letters.

† This is the military order for retreat.

Nine miles in the American rear, the road was crossed by Colonel's Creek, the north bank of which was commanding, and had been marked as the place where the enemy were to be met. But prudence dictated that his position should be changed late that afternoon; breaking up, therefore, upon an hour's notice, General Greene proceeded to a safe position, beyond an intermediate stream called Sarney's Creek, and encamped for the night. The next day, at an early hour, the retreat was resumed, and crossing Colonel's Creek, he drew up his army in order of battle.

Lord Rawdon soon after made his appearance,—drove in the pickets,—reconnoitred closely, deliberated for an hour, and drew off with all the military precautions which indicate respect for an enemy.

Hitherto the cares of Greene has exhibited almost one incessant struggle against every untoward incident that fortune could throw in his way. But though checked, baffled, and defeated, he has made considerable progress towards the attainment of his great end, the repossession of the country. The event was ever productive of more serious mortification to him than the successful evasion of Watson's detachment. Every precaution that human prudence could suggest, and his means admitted of, had been resorted to, and at the moment when he thought him in his toils, he had eluded the snares spread for him, and now had swelled the forces of his enemy to a magnitude which forbade his being met, except under decided advantages. One of the most mortifying circumstances attending it, was, that even in cavalry Rawdon had now the ascendancy.

In effective men Doyle rather outnumbered Washington, and his standing was high as a cavalry officer. It was a subject of the most serious chagrin, at this time, to the American commander, that more than one third of Washington's corps was dismounted; and horses were not to be procured.

As all the drafts made upon the states now, were for specific supplies, Virginia, at that time the great mart for good horses, had been pressingly called upon to furnish a number for the cavalry. But amongst the consequences which followed upon the impressments made in February, was a resolution of that state, fixing the maximum price at what horses might be purchased for the cavalry service, and fixing it so low as to preclude all possibility of purchasing horses fit for any thing but the plough. The hard services to which the cavalry had been exposed, in a country so infested with loyalists, and in which it was necessary to forage such a distance, there had been a great destruction among the cavalry horses. At the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, it will be recollected, that thirty-one out of eighty-seven dragoons could not be brought into service for

want of horses. The number was still increasing, and every effort made to repair the loss, terminated in disappointment, or more unhappy consequences. CHAP.
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The following spirited remonstrance, addressed to the governor of Virginia, bears date three days after the affair of Hobkirk's Hill; it presents a striking view of the feelings and situation of the southern commander, at that date.

"Since I wrote your excellency, in answer to the resolutions of your assembly, relative to the conduct of the cavalry officers, and the measures pointed out to supply this army in future with horses, I have been considering more fully the tendency and consequences of it.

"It is to be lamented that officers will not exercise more discretion and prudence when entrusted with the execution of an order which seems to invade the rights of a citizen, and not perfectly conformable to the laws and constitutions of the land. And it is equally to be lamented, that a legislature should, from resentment for the misconduct of a few individuals, bring upon an army, employed in their service, inevitable ruin, and upon the community disgrace and distress.

"I was very particular in giving my orders, to guard against the evils complained of, (a copy of which is enclosed;) and I have no wish to screen a single officer, who has wantonly invaded the property of the people, or offered an insult to the inhabitants; but I wish the improper conduct of a few officers may not be made to operate as a punishment upon the whole army.

"When we retired over the Dan, our force was too small to stop the progress of the enemy, or prescribe the limits of their approach. We appealed to the only means left to save your country, and prevent the destruction of a virtuous little army. Men were called for, they turned out with a spirit that did honour to themselves and their country. Horses were wanted to mount the dragoons, they could not be procured without impress-warrants. You were convinced of this fact, and therefore furnished me with the warrants for the purpose. I took the most advisable, and, as I thought, effectual means to have the business conducted with propriety; and I cannot but think the gentlemen, generally, who were entrusted with the execution of my orders, were governed entirely by a principle of public good. Some mistakes, and several abuses, appear to have happened in impressing stud horses instead of geldings. But those mistakes arose from the necessity of mounting our dragoons in such a manner as to give us an immediate superiority over the enemy, as well in the quality of the horses as their numbers. The people complained, I was willing to redress their grievances; some of the most valuable covering horses were returned, and I shall direct some others to be returned, notwithstanding the great inconvenience that must inevitably attend this army from it.

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"The assembly of the state appear to have taken up the matter from a principle, though acknowledged to be virtuous, yet, from its tendency, obviously impolitic. The rights of individuals are as dear to me as to any man; but the safety of a community I have ever considered as an object more valuable. In politics, as well as every thing else, a received and established axiom, is, that greater evils should, in every thing, give way to lesser misfortunes. In war it is often impossible to conform to all the ceremonies of law and equal justice; and to attempt it would be productive of greater misfortunes to the public from the delay, than all the inconveniences which individuals must suffer.

"Your excellency must be sensible of the inconveniences I have to labour under at this time, and the difficulties that still surround us. Nothing but light-horse can enable us, with the little army we have, to appear in the field; and nothing but a superiority in cavalry can prevent the enemy from cutting to pieces, every detachment coming to join the army, or employed in collecting supplies. From the open state of this country, their services are particularly necessary; and unless we can keep up the corps of cavalry, and constantly support a superiority, it will be out of my power to act, or to prevent the enemy from overrunning the country and commanding all its resources.

"The assembly, I fear, by their resolves, have destroyed all my hopes and expectations on that head. Under the law, as it at present stands, it is certain nothing can be done. By limiting dragoon horses to the narrow price of five hundred pounds, it amounts only to a prohibition, and cuts off the prospect of any future supplies. At this moment, the enemy are greatly superior to us, and unless Virginia will spring immediately to the most generous exertions, they will indubitably continue so. It is in vain to expect protection from an army which is not supported, or make feeble efforts upon narrow principles of prudence and economy. They only serve to protract the war, and tire out the patience of the people. Already have we experienced, in many instances, the ill-consequences, of neglecting the army when surrounded with difficulties and threatened with ruin. Great expense of blood and treasure have attended this policy; and to redress the grievances of a few individuals, when it will entail calamity upon the community, will be neither politic nor just.

"If horses are dearer to the inhabitants than the lives of subjects, or the liberties of the people, there will be no doubt of the assembly's persevering in their late resolution; otherwise I hope they will reconsider the matter and not oblige me to take a measure which cannot fail to bring ruin upon the army, and fresh misfortunes upon the country."

Without waiting, however, to try the influence of a letter extorted by the most painful anticipations, Greene had been pressing, but vainly calling

upon Sumpter, Marion, and every officer from whom assistance could possibly be derived, to procure him a supply of horses; while the most active officers were scouring every quarter of the country in search of this indispensable article of equipment. At length, an unfortunate communication of Colonel Lee's, inspired him with a belief, that he had been ill-used; and had nearly terminated in the loss of Marion's invaluable services. It was contained in a letter of the 23d May.

"General Marion, (says the Colonel) "can supply you if he will, with one hundred and fifty good dragoon horses, most of them impressed horses. He might, in my opinion, spare sixty, which would be a happy supply."

That Marion, knowing his necessities, and possessing the power to relieve them, though urgently pressed, should yet have withheld this supply, excited in Greene, sensations which there was no effort made to conceal or suppress, in his next communication.

But, Marion was too pure a man to fear reproach, and too firm a man to experience even the semblance of it, and dissemble his feelings. He repels the charge of ever having had it in his power to relieve the wants of Greene, and requests leave to resign; firmly but respectfully intimating his resolution to retire from service as soon as he shall have seen Fort Motte reduced, before which he was then lying. Greene perceived the mischief he had done, and by earnest and flattering solicitations, with difficulty succeeded in overcoming Marion's resolution. But, immediately as the fort surrendered he separated himself from Colonel Lee, and successfully renewed his operations in the eastern quarter of the state. From the letter which Greene addressed to Marion on that occasion, we transcribe the following passages—"I am sorry the militia are deserting because there is not greater support. If they were influenced by proper principles, and were impressed with a love of liberty and fear of slavery, they would not shrink at difficulties. If we had a force sufficient to recover the country, their aid would not be wanted; and they cannot be well acquainted with their true interests, to desert because they conceive our force unequal to the reduction of the country without their assistance. I shall always be happy to see you at head-quarters, but cannot think you seriously mean to solicit leave to go to Philadelphia. It is true your task has been disagreeable, but not more so than others. It is now going on seven years since the commencement of this war. I have never had leave of absence one hour, nor paid the least attention to my own private affairs. Your state is invaded, your all is at stake. What has been done will signify nothing, unless we persevere to the end. I left a family in distress, and every thing dear and valuable, to come and afford you all the assistance in my power, to promote

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the service. It must throw a damp upon the spirits of the army, to find that the first men in the state are retiring from the busy scene, to indulge themselves in more agreeable amusements.

"However, your reason for wishing to decline the command of the militia, and go to Philadelphia, may be more pressing than I imagine. I will, therefore, add nothing more on this subject till I see you.

"My reasons for writing so pressingly respecting the dragoon horses, was from the distress we were in. It is not my wish to take the horses from the militia, if it will injure the public service; the effects and consequences you can better judge of than I can.

"You have rendered important services to the public with the militia under your command, and done great honours to yourself; and I would not wish to render your situation less agreeable with them, unless it is to answer some very great purpose; and this, I persuade myself, you would agree to from a desire to promote the common good, &c."

Marion was pacified; turned the affair off upon grounds that proved his feelings tranquillized; and the answer to the above letter was accompanied with a fine horse for the general's own use. But, from that time he gave up the siege to the regular troops, co-operating more to cover their operations than to direct them, and his militia, taking the alarm at the idea of being dismounted, soon began to scatter, until his command was reduced to one hundred and fifty. With these, as soon as the fort surrendered, he struck down towards Monk's Corner, and hung upon the enemy during the whole of his retreat to that place.

Greene's cavalry still remained dismounted, and the inferiority of his numbers, rumours of the advance of Tarleton, and even of Cornwallis' whole army, filled him with most gloomy apprehensions, and compelled him to turn his mind to the repetition of the part he had recently acted, by retiring upon his re-enforcements, which were now announced as advancing.

The Pennsylvania line were on their march, the Virginia militia assembling at Salisbury, and the North Carolina draft slowly but steadily advancing. But, in the meantime, relief was remote, and Lord Rawdon possessed the acknowledged mastery of the field.

The following anecdote from the pen of General Davy, will best fill up the interval until the evacuation of Camden:

"This evening, (the 9th) the general sent for me earlier than usual; I found the map on the table, and he introduced the business of the night with the following striking observations:—"You see that we must again resume the partisan war. Rawdon has now a decided superiority of force—he has pushed

us to a sufficient distance to leave him free to act on any object within his reach. He will strike at Lee and Marion, re-enforce himself by all the troops that can be spared from the several garrisons, and push me back to the mountains. You acted in this quarter in the last campaign—I wish you to point out the military positions on both sides the river ascending it to the mountains, and give me the necessary information as to the prospect of subsistence. You observe our dangerous and critical situation. The regular troops are now reduced to a handful, and I am without militia to perform the convoy or detachment service, or any immediate prospect of receiving any re-enforcement

* * * * *
* * North-Carolina, dispirited by the loss of her regular troops in Charleston, stunned into a kind of stupor by the defeat of General Gates, and held in check by Major Craig and the loyalists, makes no effort of any kind. Congress seems to have lost sight of the southern states, and have abandoned them to their fate, so much so, that I am even as much distressed for ammunition as for men.

“We must always calculate on the maxim, “that your enemy will do what he ought to do.” We will dispute every inch of ground in the best manner we can, but Rawdon will push me back to the mountains. Lord Cornwallis will establish a chain of posts along James River, and the southern states thus cut off, will die like the tail of a snake.

“These are his very words—they made a deep and melancholy impression, and I shall never forget them.

“After expressing an anxious desire to remain as near as possible to cover the retreat of Lee from Fort Motte, we recurred again to the map, where I had it in my power to assure him, from personal knowledge, that the country abounded in strong military positions; and as to subsistence, there would be no difficulty, as we should be falling back on our depots or magazines in North Carolina; that if he was obliged to retreat further, he must permit me to resume my original plan, as I was morally certain a respectable force could be raised in the western districts of that state.

“The interview concluded by his informing me, that he would dispatch an express to Philadelphia the next morning, requesting me to write to members of congress with whom I was acquainted, painting in the strongest colours our situation and gloomy prospects.

“General Greene possessed, in an eminent degree, those high energies requisite to conquer appalling difficulties, united with that cool and moral courage, which resists the anguish of disappointment and the pressure of misfortune. I never observed his mind yield but at this gloomy moment, when he conceived

CHAP. XIII. himself not only abandoned by all the constituted authorities of the confederacy, but even by that portion of the population of the southern states who had every thing to hope from his success, and every thing to fear from his failure. I employed the whole night in writing, until an orderly serjeant summoned me to head quarters, about daylight. On entering the general's tent, I soon perceived some important change had taken place. I have sent for you, said he, with a countenance expressing the most lively pleasure, to inform you that Lord Rawdon is preparing to evacuate Camden—that place was the key of the enemy's line of posts, they will now all fall or be evacuated—all will now go well. Burn your letters, I shall march immediately to the Congaree. Arrange your convoys to follow us, and let me know what expresses and detachments you want."

Volumes of flames and smoke announced the meditated retreat of the British commander. Immense quantities of stores and baggage were committed to the fire, and the gaol, court-house, and even many private buildings shared the same fate. Camden was left a heap of ruins. If the intention of Lord Rawdon was to prevent his enemy from establishing himself in the place, this was doing little towards it whilst the fortifications remained entire. He must, too, greatly have misunderstood the policy of his adversary; for the moment it was abandoned, the most active means were adopted to raze the works to the ground. The open country, was the stage in which the American commander was called upon to operate.

The scene of devastation which Lord Rawdon left behind him, was a much more just ground of animadversion than the retreat itself. The measure, although it has been by some severely censured, and from its consequences appeared to be disastrous, was one of absolute necessity. Greene had always foreseen that nothing but the advance of Cornwallis to his relief could prevent his being compelled to retreat; and that, without the junction of Watson, he would want strength to effect it. It was not without sensations mingled with regret, that he now received the intelligence of the occurrences which indicated his resolution to attempt it. For it was ascertained that Cornwallis had taken the contrary direction; and had the Virginia militia been up at this time, he could have invested the town, and starved Rawdon into a surrender, whilst, by re-enforcing his detachments, all intermediate posts must have surrendered. Similar and nearly equal was the danger which threatened Lord Rawdon in the opposite quarter: for should Marion, Lee, Sumpter, and Pickens succeed in carrying the posts against which they were operating, their union before Camden must have been fatal to Rawdon. A fortnight might have effected all this: and Colonel Lee, in one of his letters, expresses a cordial wish that he might remain

but for that time. The garrison was at this time much straitened for provisions; its supplies had been for a fortnight nearly cut off, and the accession of force under Watson, though it increased his means for action, diminished his relative competence for a siege. Greene, in all the correspondence of this day, positively maintains, that had the Virginia militia come up prior to the evacuation, the garrison, with all its envied stores and resources, must have fallen into his hands.

Yet its evacuation actually relieved him from the most vexatious suspense. For, until the arrival of the Virginia militia, his adversary's superiority might have obliged him, in case of misfortune, to retreat up the river and leave all his detachments, now in such vigorous operation throughout the state, exposed not only to be driven back, but destroyed.

Great and sudden were the changes in the aspect of affairs between the 6th and 10th of May. While the prospect remained that Watson would be intercepted, every hope was suspended on that event; as soon as it was ascertained that he had escaped and entered Camden, the deepest gloom for a moment, overspread the public mind. But, sudden and great was the transition from fear to exultation, when Rawdon's retreat was announced. A scene the most busy and bustling imaginable immediately ensued.

Many things conspired to animate the revolutionary spirit at this period. In addition to the retreat of Lord Rawdon, the advance of the re-enforcements, and the retirement of Lord Cornwallis, parties of armed whigs, well mounted and commanded by popular leaders, were to be seen in every part of the state. In addition to those which were animated and directed by the immediate presence of Sumpter, Marion and Pickens, Major Harden had penetrated to the very gates of Charleston, producing alarm and discomfiture to the one party, while he presented a rallying point for the other, and revived their languishing and almost abandoned hopes.

Immediately as Marion received intelligence of the advance of Greene, he had detached this intelligent and enterprising officer with seventy select men, well mounted, to penetrate through the country, and crossing the enemy's lines of communication, to awaken the spirit of opposition in the country south-west of Charleston. Rapid in his movements, and altogether unexpected, Harden took the enemy at a surprise every where, and soon rendered himself the terror of the loyalists in that region of country. His force gathered as it rolled; many of the inhabitants sighed in secret under the British government, and in a little time he could muster two hundred active men. To pursue him was vain—to entrap him was impossible; and he soon extended his chastisements to the disaffected of both states, along the banks

CHAP. of the Savannah, and communicated with Pickens then operating against
XIII. Augusta and Ninety-Six.

Nothing now was wanting but the fall of the enemy's chain of posts, to complete the recovery of the whole country to within thirty miles of the sea coast.

The advantages of the American arms now followed in rapid succession. The 10th, 11th, 12th, and 15th of May, were distinguished by the fall of the posts of Camden, Orangeburgh, Fort Motte and Granby, in order of date. The evacuation of the first was announced at the American camp at 10 at night, and early the next day every thing was in motion to take advantage of the incident. Concluding that efforts would be made, to draw the garrison from the enemy's posts on the Congaree, and form a junction with them below the Santee, an express had been dispatched the evening before, with a caution to Marion and Sumpter to guard against those events ; and the general himself, ordering the army to proceed by the Camden road for the Congaree, took an escort of cavalry and moved down in person to Fort Motte, to reconnoitre the country, concert ulterior operations with Marion, and attend the issue of passing events. Halting at M'Cord's Ferry, he was at that place when the surrender of the fort was announced to him, and immediately ordering Colonel Lee as the van of the army, to march to Fort Granby, he proceeded himself to hasten on the army to that point. The quick reduction of that place was now a most interesting object, as from it he expected to draw supplies for more important operations ; and Pickens had written pressingly for support, to enable him to prevent the garrison of Ninety-Six from relieving that of Augusta, (now closely besieged) and to prevent both from effecting their escape down the Savannah River. An event which could not but be productive of the most serious disappointment, not only from the escape of the garrison, but the destruction of the valuable supply of arms and ammunition anticipated from the capture of those posts. The inhabitants were represented to be unanimous in the vicinity of the river, in favour of the American cause : but they had been stripped of arms and ammunition by the policy of the enemy. Pickens wanted not men, but equipments for war, to resist such an attempt ; but, the commander of the southern army was almost as destitute as the militia ; and could only, for the present, advise Pickens to take the arms from the aged, and place them in the hands of the young and active, until troops could be marched to his aid.

The orders given to Colonel Lee, on this occasion, are obviously calculated to operate on the fears of Maxwell, the commander at Fort Granby, who was represented as a notorious plunderer, and very naturally considered a poltroon.

They conclude with requesting him to announce to Maxwell, "that the army will be at or near the fort by 12 o'clock on the 15th, and if he shall obstinately persist in holding the post, he must abide the consequences, as he will never receive but one summons for its surrender."

Maxwell really took the alarm, and dreading the approaching storm, for the army had actually arrived on the opposite side of the river, surrendered on capitulation upon the first summons. But some circumstances attending this conquest, were productive of much embarrassment to the commander of the southern army.

Whilst the army lay encamped at Twenty-five Mile Creek, General Sumpter had solicited and obtained from General Green a six-pounder, to assist in the reduction of the places he had previously invested. When the piece arrived at Granby, Marion had already opened his trenches against Fort Motte, and Sumpter deeming the game secure at Granby, left Colonel Taylor in command of a strong party, to keep up the close investment of the post at that place, while he made a dash at that of Orangeburgh; not doubting but the sound of his cannon would produce the evacuation of the latter place. The effort was crowned with success; on the 11th the garrison surrendered, and some supplies, with a large stock of provisions, and near one hundred prisoners were the fruits of the victory.

On the 11th, Sumpter was in readiness to return to Orangeburgh, but, intercepting one of Rawdon's expresses, he received intelligence of his retreat from Camden, almost as early as the army that lay near it. Perceiving, immediately, that there was service to be performed in the communication between Camden and Charleston, which he could very soon reach from the situation he was in, he struck across the country towards Fort Motte, for the purpose of uniting with Marion and Lee, and throwing himself in front of Lord Rawdon, not doubting but with two field-pieces, and their united force, to embarrass him severely in the passage of the river at Nelson's Ferry, the south bank of which was defended by a small fort, which they might succeed in carrying before Rawdon could approach the river.

On arriving at Fort Motte, he found the place had fallen; that Marion had already proceeded upon the line of Rawdon's retreat, and Lee was advancing upon Fort Granby. There was still abundant time for Sumpter to have returned and harvested the laurels that he had anticipated from the fall that place. But, understanding that the commanding officer of the British post at Nelson's Ferry, had issued orders for the inhabitants to drive down their cattle, and bring up to the line of retreat to Charleston, all the means of transportation that they could command, and that the country was all in motion

for these purposes, he resolved to anticipate the views of the British commander, by deterring the inhabitants from moving the supplies out of the country; and seize upon the means of transportation, at the same time that he supplied the pressing wants of the army by procuring a reinforcement of horses. With these views he proceeded to scour all the country from Wassinasaw to Dorchester, and in two days returned to Orangeburgh. There he understood that Colonel Lee would anticipate him in the conquest of Fort Granby; and his letter to the commander plainly indicates his chagrin on the occasion. He proceeded to the Congaree, and when he obtained a knowledge of the great haste with which Colonel Lee had conducted the enterprise, and the very liberal terms granted to expedite it, he addressed a remonstrance to General Greene, in which he enclosed his commission.

Nor was *his* discontent, the only embarrassing occurrence to General Greene arising from this event. Colonel Lee represents the militia as loudly complaining against the conditions of the capitulation, and charging him with having granted them unnecessarily. This fort, it seems, had been the depot of all the plunder that Maxwell and his party had been rioting in for some months past, and the place of refuge of the most obnoxious loyalists. It had been now for some time invested by the very men who had suffered under their rapine; and they had been solacing themselves with the hope of restitution, indemnity, and revenge. In all these they were disappointed, and compelled to look on and see horses, plunder, and enemies move off under a safe-guard. Sumpter thought that there was no necessity for this precipitation—that he might have moved on towards Augusta, and left the reduction to himself, or to the main army, and probably suspected the general of something of a disposition to foster the military reputation of a supposed favourite. For, in his letter of the 14th, he says—"I hope it may not be disagreeable to recall Colonel Lee, as his services cannot be wanted at that place; and as to his taking command, *as at the post at Motte's*, I cannot believe it would be your wish. And notwithstanding I have the greatest respect for Colonel Lee, yet I could wish he had not gone to that place, as it is a circumstance I never thought of; his cavalry can be of no service there, and may be of the greatest here. I have been at great pains to reduce that post, I have it in my power to do it, and I think it for the good of the public to do it without regulars."

When facts came to be known, there was, unquestionably, no pressing necessity for hurrying through the negotiation, from the approach of Rawdon. But an officer must act upon the state of his advice; and by intelligence furnished by General Sumpter himself, it appears that Lord Rawdon, after passing the Santee, actually made a movement towards his post at Granby; as if

intending to relieve it. And this is urged by Colonel Lee as a ground for hastening the capitulation. It has been communicated to us from the most respectable quarter, that Greene, on this occasion, compelled Lee to apologize to Sumpter. But this is impossible, for Lee was certainly acting in the letter and spirit of his orders, and must have been supported by his commanding officer. An explanation, no doubt, he was requested to give; and his martial appearance, courteous manners, and insinuating address, could not have failed to produce the desired effect.

Certain it is that General Sumpter was pacified, and his understanding was too correct, to interpose any difficulties, after receiving an explanation of the views and necessities which led to the event.

Time was all-important to the American commander, and the loss of it not to be risked upon considerations of etiquette, or upon the possible duration of the enterprise which had called Sumpter away. And such was the exhausted state of the American supplies, that it was scarcely possible to prosecute ulterior views, without getting possession of those which this post was supposed to contain, and actually did contain. These must have diminished every day that the siege was protracted. Some concessions to the militia, a flattering notice of their merits and conduct, and the general good humour which good fortune diffuses, served also to pacify them; and the tempest happily blew over. To those who are acquainted with the personal character of their immediate commander, Colonel Thomas Taylor, this will not appear surprising. His country's good never had a rival in his bosom.*

* It is due to the just claims of the many respectable citizens who composed this body of militia to state, that they deny the correctness of Colonel Lee, in assigning the cause of their discontent. They assert, that they never murmured at the terms of the capitulation, although they well knew, that the covered wagons of the enemy, then moving off before their eyes, drawn by their own horses, were crammed with plunder from their farms, and even conveyed away some of their slaves. But, when on the next morning, they saw Colonel Lee's men paraded, equipped in new clothing, while the rest of the army were left to prosecute the war in rags, that then they blamed his motives for precipitating the surrender. There cannot be a doubt, that the surrender of the fort was unnecessarily hurried through. For the approach of Lord Rawdon, the justification assigned by Colonel Lee, was rather to be wished for than deprecated; since the main army was on the banks of the Congaree on one hand, and General Sumpter on the other, and the militia had proved themselves sufficient to hold the fort in a state of investment; so that, even Lee's command would have been at liberty to co-operate against the enemy. Colonel Lee has incurred the charge of hastening the capitulation in order to anticipate Sumpter, and the grand army. One of his motives is discovered in the use he made of his conquest. No officer was ever more devoted to the interests of his own corps, or his own fame.

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The next day, General Sumpter's commission was returned to him in a highly complimentary letter, which ingeniously waves every discussion that could give pain.

"I take the liberty," says the writer, "to return you your commission which you forwarded me yesterday for my acceptance, and to inform you that I cannot think of accepting it, and to beg you to continue your command.

"I am sorry for your ill-state of health, and shall do every thing in my power to render your command as convenient as the nature of the service will admit.

"It is unnecessary for me to tell you how important your services are to the interest and happiness of this country, and the confidence I have in your abilities and zeal for the good of the service; your continuing in command, will lay the public under an obligation in general, and me in particular; and though it may be attended with many personal inconveniences, yet I hope you will have cause to rejoice in the conclusion, at having contributed so largely to the recovery of your country's liberties," &c.

Lord Rawdon, after crossing the Santee River, did advance some miles up the south bank of that river, but returned the following day and pursued his route to Charleston. On the way he was watched by Marion's parties, but no material advantage was gained by the American detachments. It is presumable that he never seriously contemplated the relief of the Granby post, but intended only to excite a jealousy for that place, that Greene might call in his detachments, and leave the baggage of the British army to proceed unmolested to Charleston.

General Sumpter, ever delighting in vigorous enterprise, strenuously contended that, united with Lee and Marion, he could have destroyed the enemy's baggage, and perhaps his army. But, Greene never ventured on a hazardous game when he could play a safe one. The loss of baggage to an army within three days march of a fortress and a depot, and marching towards it, is of no vital importance. The possession of it would, indeed, have been a great acquisition to the American army; but, whenever its loss became inevitable its destruction would have followed. The posts in the interior country presented to General Greene the most desirable object. There appeared to be no doubt of their falling, and with them might be acquired, supplies, prisoners and the country that they commanded. That country would have furnished the means of confining the enemy to those places, which he could not be prevented from retaining while possessed of the ascendancy on the water.

It is but justice to General Sumpter here to observe, that his conduct towards the inhabitants in the expedition into the low country in advance of

Lord Rawdon, in removing the means of transportation, was in strict conformity with the orders under which he acted. "Although," says General Greene in a letter of the 15th of April, "I am a great enemy to all kind of plundering, yet I think the horses belonging to the inhabitants within the enemy's lines should be taken from them, especially such as are either fit for the baggage or dragoon service. If we are superior in cavalry, and can prevent the enemy from equipping a number of teams, it will be almost impossible for them to continue to hold their posts, and utterly impossible to pursue us if we should find a retreat necessary. But, any horses, or indeed any other property, whether from whig or tory, certificates ought to be given for, that justice may be done the inhabitants hereafter ; and if any discrimination is necessary, government may make it when the certificates are to be paid."

It is also but justice to observe, that the terms upon which General Sumpter had raised his mounted brigade, were sanctioned both by Governor Rutledge and General Greene. And when Fort Granby was taken, and a number of negroes captured in it, we find the following passages in the general orders of the 17th May—"Such of the negroes as were taken in this garrison, as are not claimed by good whigs, and their property proved, belonging to the tories or disaffected, you will apply to the fulfilling of your contracts with the ten-months troops."

These extracts serve to show how far the authority of the commander of the southern army, sanctioned the violation of personal property. He was scrupulous to fastidiousness on this subject, when not forced upon him, by necessities which could not be evaded without sacrificing the cause he was contending for ; but, if officers acting under his authority have, in some instances, done acts of violence, or incurred the imputation of having done them, he has left behind him on his files, the evidence to show how far their conduct was sanctioned by his authority.*

Colonel Lee did not rest a day from his labours ; he was immediately pushed on from Granby to Augusta. The astonishing celerity of this offi-

* It was a few days after this event that a party was sent down by General Sumpter to seize and carry away a large gang of negroes belonging to a loyalist who had rendered himself particularly obnoxious. It is probable, that the distribution made of the negroes captured at Fort Granby, by exciting discontents in those whose claims were postponed, rendered this measure indispensable. But, the unfortunate consequences which flowed from it, rendered it afterwards a subject of much complaint ; for in retaliation, many of the negroes of distinguished whigs were taken from their plantations, and a great proportion of them returned no more. This measure we find no sanction for on the files of the southern department.

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cer's movement will be duly appreciated, when it is considered, that on the 13th he had received the surrender of one fort, on the 15th commanded at that of another, and on the 18th had reached a third. The distance from Fort Motte to Augusta exceeds one hundred miles. On the 16th, he received his orders to proceed to Augusta, and on the morning of the 19th, cavalry, infantry and artillery were all before the town.

Captain Oldham had been withdrawn from his command, and it now consisted of the legion, the North Carolina infantry under Major Eaton, and Finley's six-pounder, with matrosses enough to serve it. It is presumed also, that they took with them the two-inch pieces taken at Granby, as Pickens appears, soon after their arrival, to be furnished with the means of mounting a battery.

The day after Colonel Lee was dispatched for Augusta, Greene took up the line of march for Ninety-Six, moving up the north side of the Saluda; and sat down before it on the 22d. By the fall of four forts he had now acquired a very respectable supply of ammunition, provisions and arms, and between six and seven hundred prisoners. The long protracted negotiation for a general exchange was therefore soon agreed upon, and one of General Greene's first cares was, to dispatch Major Hyrne to Charleston, to carry it into effect. The consequence was, the happy reunion of many families, who had long been separated by captivity. Nor was this all; success on the American part had turned the tide of desertion, and great numbers made good their escape from the British army in its retreat to Charleston. The country favoured it exceedingly, and full sixty-five are said to have left the enemy the day he commenced his retreat from Camden.

The reduction of Ninety-Six was now become to Greene an object of the greatest interest. Of Augusta, he had no doubt that it would soon fall. And these posts reduced, he had resolved to take some strong position that would confine the enemy to the line of Dorchester and Monk's Corner—to leave General Huger in command to push on the war in this quarter—to hasten on the North Carolina levies to Huger's support—and proceed immediately to take command of the troops in Virginia, and throw himself in the front of Lord Cornwallis.

In the meantime General Sumpter was left in command of all the country now recovered from the enemy; particularly enjoined to arrange and organize the militia, and hold them in readiness to be called into the field, should necessity require; to demolish the works at the posts that had been taken, and guardedly to watch what was going on in Charleston. Should the enemy move out in force, he was immediately to communicate the intelligence; and

should they move towards the relief of Ninety-Six, he was to take measures to remove the stores from Granby by Winstanborough, into the upper country, and move on with all the force he could collect, to join the main army. CHAP. XIII.

To Marion was committed the care of reducing and holding in subjection, the port of Georgetown and the disaffected settlements to the north of it.

The village of Cambridge, or as it is called in the dispatches of this day, the post of Ninety-Six, was at this time the pivot of very extensive and critical operations. Three great objects divided the attention of the southern commander. To arrest Cornwallis, who was then advancing through North Carolina—to hold Lord Rawdon in check in Charleston—and to reduce the two posts which he was then besieging. All were practicable had he possessed the means; in these he was totally deficient, and, in anguish of heart, in a letter of the 26th to Stenben, he declares,—“We who serve in the southern department, are little less than devoted, so unequal are the means to the duty expected from us.” To the marquis, under the same date, he writes,—“The actual situation of these states, the tardiness of the legislature, and the drowsiness of the people, are truly distressing and alarming. However, could you hold your ground in Virginia for a few weeks, I should begin to hope for a change for the better. But I have reason to fear several wagon loads of stores fell into the enemy’s hands at Petersburg, after they fell down the river; and that all our stores at Carter’s Ferry, if not those at Prince Edward, have been destroyed. Should this be true, it will distress us exceedingly. God avert so fatal a misfortune. Cannot the French fleet be brought to operate with us to the southward? Try to bring it about, you have great influence at court, and are not less interested than myself.

“My former letter will inform you what is my desire respecting the forces in Virginia, and those coming from the northward, and you will give the necessary orders accordingly; the people have much to hope from your activity and zeal, but I have every thing to fear from the inferiority of your force, which, like ours here, is but the shadow of an army.”

All the views of the southern commander towards arresting the progress of Lord Cornwallis, when marching to form a junction with Philips, were baffled by the slow movements of the Pennsylvania line, the tardiness with which the North Carolina and Virginia levies were brought into the field, and the total destitution of the means of equipping them. With these troops Greene intended that La Fayette should advance and meet the British commander at the passage of the Roanoke, and hold him in check, until having completed the reduction of the posts of Ninety-Six and Augusta, he should himself be able to join

CHAP. him with a detachment, if not with his whole regular force, and put a final stop
XIII. to his lordship's views on Virginia.

The task of holding Lord Rawdon in check in Charleston, it has been seen, was confided to Sumpter and Marion. In the execution of their duty, they closed in upon the British commander until he established a line of fortified posts, extending from Georgetown, by Monk's Corner, Dorchester, &c. to Coosawhatchie. The enemy was frequently harassed by parties who made incursions within this line; but to attack it at any principal point near enough to Charleston to receive support, was beyond their force. Georgetown, however, being separated by water-courses and swamps of great magnitude from the rest of the line, was left with a garrison so weak as to suggest to Marion the measure of an attack upon it. The parishes that lie along on both sides the Santee, towards its mouth, had turned out with so much zeal on Marion's returning in force into the country, that he found himself at the head of a command, which enabled him to leave a strong party under Colonel Mayham to cover that country, and to proceed with the main body of his command against Georgetown.

The enemy made but a show of resistance. At the first serious indication that the attempt was intended to be pressed, the place was hastily evacuated: the enemy falling down with their galleys to a position in the bay, at which the American party could do nothing to annoy them, and finally abandoning the harbour altogether. Marion deliberately removed all the military stores and public property up the Pee Dee, demolished the works, and returned to join his detachment in St. Stevens.

During this period, Colonel Peter Henry, having been detached against the loyalists up the Pee Dee, had succeeded once more in pacifying or subduing them. The repeated struggles between the contending parties in that country, had now reduced it near to desolation. Disgusting were the scenes of massacre and revenge which the raging conflict had exhibited in that quarter.

To a similar situation, was the country on the south side of the Santee, soon destined to be reduced. The zeal with which the inhabitants of St. Johns and St. Stevens, had lately shown in the American cause, had raised the arm of revenge against them, and the tormenting excursions of the parties connected with Marion and Sumpter, suggested the measure of depriving them of subsistence by laying waste that country. This honourable office was delegated to a Colonel Ball, under whom the loyalists of Charleston and its vicinity had been embodied into a regiment. But there were in his command too many to whom the service was disagreeable, to admit of its being concealed from Marion. Hints were sent off to neighbours to be on the look out; and it became the

painful task of the American commander to anticipate his enemy, by driving off and removing across the Santee all the stock and provisions that could be collected. It was saving it both for their own subsistence and that of the proprietor.

But Marion felt his incapacity to resist the force that would be sent to drive him out of the country, and well knew the fate that awaited the families of the men who had joined him, if the loyalists should be let loose upon them. Between the loyalists and the regular troops, it was as the choice presented to the king of Israel in the day that his heart was lifted up. With him the whigs might have exclaimed—"Let me fall now into the hands of the Lord," (for he is merciful and great,) "and let me not fall into the hands of man."

Filled with apprehension for the fate of many wealthy and respectable citizens, and dreading the subduing effects of an example of military execution, he wrote pressing to General Greene to detach him some aid, or he could not cover the country.

Infantry it was impossible for the general to spare; but he instantly dispatched Colonel Washington's cavalry, the terror of whose arm he was not without a hope, would prove a sufficient safe-guard against an operation, which, if conducted by infantry, in sufficient force to awe him, would be conducted too slowly to be very efficient.

During these transactions in other quarters, the sieges of Augusta and Ninety-Six were advancing, but with a tardiness that put to trial the utmost patience of the American commander.

Colonel Lee, who had recently been embroiled with two out of three of the South Carolina generals, was now entering upon a service which brought him into contact, without bringing him under command of a third. Among the many trials of skill and patience to which the service subjected General Greene, it was not the least that he had to reconcile the jarring materials of which his forces were composed. Regulars and militia never do co-operate cordially, when brought immediately together. Regulars despise militia for their want of discipline and their inefficiency in the open field, and militia repay it on them with interest, because of their mercenary and obligated condition, and, generally, low character. The militia-man, also, considers himself as the master or employer of the regular, and expects the latter to perform the drudgery and incur the danger of service. While the commander cannot conceal from himself, or act uninfluenced by the consideration, that his main dependance must be upon his permanent troops; and is pained by the necessity of exposing the father of a family, or the citizen who has many high duties to perform, in order to

CHAP. XIII. economize the lives of those who, after a war is over, are little more than a burthen to the body politic.

Nor was it easy to reconcile the officers of the regular troops to the idea of being commanded by a militia officer. Feelings of military pride must be cherished in an army, whatever be the inconveniences occasionally flowing from it. And, although the good sense and superior self-control of the commander of a detachment might reconcile it to him to submit, it was not so easy to manage the spirited, vivacious, and aspiring young men who filled subordinate grades. In serving together in convoy and other duties, a conflict of feeling and command must often ensue.

To avoid as much as possible the inconveniences that were felt from this cause, General Greene, from the time of the surrender of Fort Motté, where the evil first made its appearance, held up the command of Colonel Lee as the van of his own army, and therefore exclusively under his command; but, most anxiously exerted his influence and authority, to inspire both parties with that spirit of urbanity and deference, which would produce cordial and disinterested co-operation.

With such a man as Pickens, there was no difficulty in succeeding in this effort; and, accordingly, a few days after the arrival of Colonel Lee before Augusta, we find him acknowledging himself "very happy with General Pickens," and highly gratified at having committed to him exclusively, the operations against a fort about twelve miles below Augusta, called Fort Galphin or Dreadnought.

The post at Augusta was still under the command of the celebrated Colonel Browne, a man of unquestionable courage and abilities, but whose conduct had proved his vindictiveness insatiable. Under him commanded a Colonel Grierson, also a loyalist, and equally distinguished for his persecuting spirit. These men, already execrated for their cruelties, had recently done some acts which had exasperated the whigs almost to madness. The spirit of retaliation had been exacerbated to such a degree, that no man capable of bearing arms could remain at home. The plantations had all been deserted by all but the women and children, and the aged men whose only remaining cares in this life were, to prepare for the next.

The families of the whigs had very generally been turned homeless into the woods, their farms laid waste, and now the grey-headed ancestors of some of the leading officers were lying imprisoned in the forts, collected as hostages for the submission of their sons or grandsons. Browne had probably the case of Coriolanus in mind, but he did not succeed. Fathers and sons mutually encouraged each other to persevere. It is asserted, that in the conflict which en-

sued,* these old men were exposed on the ramparts to receive or arrest the bullets of their sons. We hope it is not true. But, posterity will not credit the shockingly unnatural ferocity which was sometimes displayed in this afflicting contest. Let one fact, to which there still live many witnesses, serve as a specimen. Individuals, as in all civil contests, were frequently changing sides, and treachery was often practiced under the pretext of desertion. The fidelity of such persons was known to be insured by obliging them to kill one of the party from which they had deserted. To return to their quondam friends afterwards, was known to be impossible. This, however, was only done by small parties, and under commanders of no note. Officers of respectable standing, endeavoured in vain to suppress such practices.

Among the foremost of those who hastened into action upon the advance of the American army, was Colonel Clarke of Georgia. His followers immediately gathered round him, and he found himself at the head of a party sufficient to invest Augusta, as soon as Pickens was able to hold in check the garrison at Ninety-Six. His approach was sudden and unexpected. Boats containing the annual presents to the Indians, as well as supplies of many articles, particularly salt, for the garrison and those who still traded with the place, were then ascending the river. Clarke heard of it, and before they could make good their retreat, had way-laid the river. The stream, though deep, is narrow, and riflemen among the trees which crown its banks, would soon sweep the decks of any boat not provided against such an attack. Unable to ascend or descend, the boats took shelter under Fort Galphin; and Clarke was carefully guarding this invaluable prize when joined by Pickens, and, some days afterwards, by Lee.

Immediately on Colonel Lee's arrival he was complimented with a request to undertake the reduction of that post; and detaching Major Rudolph on the enterprise, it was soon effected without loss, eight or ten only being wounded.† A strong detachment of the Georgia and South Carolina militia marched to cover and co-operate with the troops under Rudolph. But Rudolph's report, and all the correspondence, shows that he conducted the enterprise. In the narrative of this affair, Colonel Lee's memory, or his correspondence, must have totally failed him. He was not present at the affair, as appears from his own communications;‡ and the fort, instead of being taken by a *coup de main*, surrendered on capitulation. The original articles are now before us.

* McCall's History of Georgia. † Rudolph's report to Colonel Lee. ‡ Letter to Greene, 22d May.

By the fall of this fort there were one hundred and twenty-six prisoners made, of all descriptions, including seventy commissioned officers and privates, in the regular service.

But by far the most valuable acquisition was a quantity of clothing, blankets, small arms, rum, salt, and other articles, which the army had long been very limited in the enjoyment of; and some ammunition, and articles of military equipment.

But, was it all to be appropriated to the use of that army? The militia of the two states had also their claims: and their naked, bare-footed, destitute condition, countenanced those claims. The incident furnished an opportunity of exhibiting the character of both Greene and Pickens, in a view equally honourable to both.

With an air of modesty, characteristic of the most just and unassuming of men, Pickens states the destitute condition of the men under his command, and begs that they may be permitted to share in some part of the goods which constituted a part of the booty. Greene, in his reply, authorizes him to divide the whole according to his sense of justice and the good of the service. Pickens sets aside the military stores for the public service, loads thirteen wagons with rum, salt, sugar, medicines, &c. for the main army, and dividing the clothing into three equal parts, assigns one part to Georgia, another to South Carolina, and the third to the continental troops; and the transaction terminated with a request from Greene, that he would distribute the fowling pieces, of which the number was considerable, among the militia; only urging the policy, of making all the distributions to the militia the means of retaining them for a specified time in service.

This affair being thus happily arranged, the reduction of the post of Augusta was pressed with spirit. Colonel Lee, in a letter of the 25th, says, "in a conference with General Pickens, it was agreed that I should conduct the operations against the post at Galphin's Plantation, while the general made the necessary arrangements and preparations for the complete investiture of Augusta." Under the auspices of this harmonizing temper, on the return of Rudolph from Fort Galphin, Pickens was prepared for ulterior operations.

The post at Augusta was defended by two forts, called Fort Cornwallis and Fort Grierson, constructed near to the river bank, about half a mile distant from each other. Fort Grierson was erected near the ravine that falls into the Savannah, about half a mile above the town, and Fort Cornwallis lower down the river, where the episcopal church now stands. The river bank, having a natural stage near the water's edge, served as a covert-way between the posts; they were supplied with water from the river; but being both erected on a plain

not much elevated above the river-bed, water could be obtained by digging. At a point equally calculated to act upon both forts, Pickens constructed a small work for the purpose of using his artillery with security and effect.

The first object of the allies was, to occupy an advantageous piece of ground which would have cut off the communication between the two forts; and in the spirit of mutual concession, the honour of conducting the enterprize was delegated to Pickens, as Lee had been permitted to appropriate to himself the harvest of laurels gathered at Fort Galphin. Hence, the report of this affair is made by Pickens alone, but the honours of the next and more important one, are shared with an impartial hand. This we gather from Colonel Lee's letters to Greene. General Pickens on this subject simply states—"Last Saturday, Lieutenant Colonel Lee arrived at my camp,* and the infantry of the legion, and one troop of horse being detached on the march for Fort Dreadnought at Silver Bluff, Colonel Hammond with his regiment, except one company, and what of Colonel Harden's regiment was with me, marched that afternoon for the same place, and on Monday evening Captain Roath surrendered the fort and garrison to our arms, &c."

Fort Grierson was defended by two pieces of artillery and about eighty men. Fort Cornwallis had near four times that number to defend it; and if the two hundred negroes surrendered with it were armed, the force was much greater. In either alternative, it was a great relief to the garrison to have their fatigue duties discharged by this species of force.

Early on the morning of the 24th, Picken's battery opened upon the upper forts, and at the same time, Colonel Lee with his legion advanced upon Fort Cornwallis, to hold that garrison in check, while Colonel Clarke at the head of the militia, and Major Eaton at the head of the North Carolina troops, marched directly from the battery towards the post meant to be occupied and fortified. No immediate attempt was intended upon Fort Grierson; but Colonel Grierson, galled by the fire from the battery, and perceiving that he was likely to be cut off from communication with Fort Cornwallis, suddenly issued from the rear of his fort, and attempted a retreat to Fort Cornwallis, under cover of the river bank.

The North Carolina troops went into action under command of Captain Smith, and that officer and Colonel Clarke, immediately as they perceived the motive of Grierson, pressed forward to the river bank to intercept him. A very smart action ensued, in which the British party, with the exception of a

* Letter 25th May

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very few, were killed, wounded or taken. Colonel Lee asserts, that Colonel Grierson was made prisoner and killed in cold blood. General Pickens positively declares, that he with a very few others, made good his escape into Fort Cornwallis. And it is certain that that unhappy affair occurred subsequent to the fall of the principal fort.

It is very clear, however, that too much blood was shed; for a major and thirty men were killed, and a lieutenant colonel and forty-odd only made prisoners. The prisoners had probably the good fortune to encounter the troops from North Carolina. In Georgia, the conflict between whig and tory was, at this time, *bellum inter necionis*.

Major Eaton, it is also said, fell in this action in the first fire. We are at a loss how to reconcile this account with the official report of the 5th June, in which it is suggested, that he had been made prisoner and put to death in cold blood, and that a rigid inquiry into the fact was then going on. His loss was universally and justly lamented.

By the capture of Fort Grierson, the American party obtained the accession of two field-pieces and some excellent arms.

All were now turned against Fort Cornwallis; but Browne made a most pertinacious defence, and only surrendered at last, under the galling fire of rifle-men and field-pieces mounted on Mayhem towers.

The capitulation bears date the 5th June, and Colonel Lee immediately moved forward with a valuable accession of artillery, to aid in the reduction of the post at Ninety-Six. Mr. Steedman asserts, that he escorted the prisoners along with him; and when arrived at that post, marched them in triumph—colours flying, drums beating, and the British standard reversed, in review before the army and the garrison. The assertion could hardly have been made without some authority; but, we must express our extreme surprise, that men so unostentatious, delicate and humane, as Greene and Pickens, could have incurred the charge of having tolerated an idle display, calculated only to furnish to the besieged, another motive for obstinate resistance.—Colonel Lee asserts, that the insult, if any, was accidental, if so, the circumstance of the reversed standard, must have been added or imagined. We trust the American officers are unjustly charged with the unmanly insult. The following extracts will show, that the object in marching the prisoners to Ninety-Six, was expressly to protect them from injury and insult. Is it consistent with such views to impute to the officers the outrage charged upon them?

*General Pickens to General Greene.*CHAP.
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AUGUSTA, June 7, 1781.

“ A very disagreeable and melancholy affair, which happened yesterday in the afternoon, occasions my writing to you at this time. I had ridden down to Bowne’s Fort, where I had been but a few minutes when information was brought me, that a man had ridden up to the door of a room here, where Colonel Grierson was confined, and, without dismounting, shot him so that he expired soon after, and instantly rode off; and though he was instantly pursued by some men on horse-back, he effected his escape. Major Williams, who was in the same room, immediately ran into a cellar among the other prisoners; but standing in view, was soon after shot at, and wounded in the shoulder. I have given orders for burying Colonel Grierson this afternoon with military honours, but as Colonel Browne was also insulted yesterday, though the man was for some time confined for it, and the people are so much exasperated against some individuals, I have found it necessary to give orders to cross the river with the prisoners, under the care of Colonel Hammond’s regiment, and Captain Smith’s detachment of North Carolinians, and march them to Ninety-Six, or till I meet your orders respecting them, being fully persuaded, that were they to march for Savannah they would be beset on the road, but think they may go to Charleston, by way of Ninety-Six, if you should so order.”

This letter needs no comment to prove, that nothing was further from the intentions of the American commanders, than mortifying the feelings of the prisoners, or intimidating the garrison of Ninety-Six. It also completely exculpates Colonel Lee from the charges made against him, since he had, at this time, nothing to do with the disposal of these prisoners; and, in fact, had preceded them several days, and was at head quarters on the day they were marched from Augusta.

This unfortunate affair, of the murder of Grierson and the attack upon Williams, was a subject of the most sensible regret to all the American officers. A similar outrage had, but a short time before, been committed upon the person of Colonel Dunlap, and although Pickens had made every effort to discover the murderer, he had failed of success. A large reward was immediately offered by proclamation, for the discovery of the murderer of Grierson; but principle in some, fear and fellow-feeling in others, effectually precluded information. It has since appeared, that the attack originated in individual revenge, from the sons of some of the old men confined and exposed in Fort Cornwallis. Their chil-

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dren had now had access to them, and received from the palsied lips of their parents, such tales of insult and oppression, as instigated men, otherwise correct and respected, to the commission of these disgraceful acts. Human passions are ever carrying on the work of deception, and the violation of the sanctity of age or female delicacy will, in precedence to all others, be deemed justifiable causes of the most bloody revenge. Perhaps the suspicions at that time entertained with regard to the fate of Eaton, may not have been without its influence in suppressing information. A recent excursion of a party of Cunningham's, in which, as General Greene expresses himself, "savage cruelty never equaled the conduct of this party," was certainly, at that time, in full operation on the feelings of the militia. Many an eye in the army was streaming for the murders that had been committed by that party.

It must be acknowledged also, that the conduct of Browne, in one instance, during the siege, had favoured the circulation of the report, that the prisoners had been purposely exposed to arrest the fire of the besiegers.

On the day before the surrender, when the batteries overreached the fort, and every thing within it lay exposed to their fire, a flag was dispatched to the British colonel, proposing that the prisoners should be sent out "and remain prisoners, or otherwise, as the final issue of the contest should decide;" "confident, says the dispatch, that you cannot oppose this dictate of humanity and custom of war, we have only to say, that any request of a similar nature from you will meet with our ready assent."

The application was rejected, and the answer too plainly indicates the purposes for which the prisoners were detained; nor can the professions of humanity and feeling which it contains, be exempted from the charge of affectation and hypocrisy.

"Though motives of humanity, and a feeling for the distresses of individuals incline me to accede to what you have proposed concerning the prisoners with us, yet many reasons to which you cannot be strangers, forbid my complying with this requisition. Such attention as I can, consistent with *good policy and my duty*, shall be shown them."

No language can depict the excitement of the besiegers, when this reply was made known in camp. Personal danger was altogether forgotten—every crevice was explored by the marksman to level his aim at an enemy—men, creeping on their bellies, or their hands and knees, approached and watched their opportunity; and, exposed as were the towers to the artillery of the garrison, the riflemen would crowd and struggle to obtain possession of these posts. But one care pervaded every mind—to let no shot err from its mark. The next day a surrender became unavoidable.

The men also who composed the loyalist's force under Browne, were known to be the most obnoxious of their party. They were precisely the men who had fought against Clarke in his former attack upon this post, and every thing in view served to bring to recollection the horrors that had been acted on that occasion.

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Maddened by all these concurrent causes, the militia could, with difficulty, be restrained from acts of blood and violence. All the firmness of the officers was necessary to control or to quell them ; and, at last it has been seen, that it became necessary to march the prisoners off, under a strong guard of South Carolina militia and North Carolina regulars, to insure their safety.

Let not man, when in the sunshine of prosperity, or the pride of power, indulge himself in the gratification of haughtiness, caprice, or cruelty.—Many and frequent are the vicissitudes of human fortunes. He who is lowly, bound, and powerless to-day, may, by the casualties of war, become terrible to-morrow. Sadly had these truths been realized by the parties to this tragedy ; but, suffering had not yet rendered them wise.

CHAPTER XIV.

Siege of Ninety-Six. Lord Rawdon re-enforced—Marches for Ninety-Six. Assault of and retreat from that post. Country laid waste. Lord Rawdon divides his force. Moves down for Granby in person. General Greene advances to meet him. Attempt on Stewart's Detachment. Junction of the enemy's force at Orangeburgh. Greene offers them battle. Descent under Sumpter. Battle of Quinby.

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THE siege of Ninety-Six was one of the most animated and critical occurrences of the revolutionary war. It lasted very near a month, and gave time for a change of circumstances which produced a total reversion of the current of success. The proper name of the place, as has been observed, is Cambridge, but being the metropolis or county-town of the district of Ninety-Six, it is frequently distinguished by the name of the district, a name which the ancient inhabitants maintain, it derived from a fanciful allusion to the uniform excellence of its soil. The two numbers which compose its name, viewed on any side, will express the same quantity.

This place derives some celebrity in the annals of this country, from having been the scene of the first conflict in the southern, and perhaps in the revolutionary war. In this place, commenced in the year 1775, that dreadful conflict between whig and tory, which afterwards desolated this beautiful country. A peculiar circumstance invited the hostile parties to this spot. It had been surrounded with a stockade as a defence against the incursions of the Indians, whose settlements were not, at that time, far removed from it.

This stockade was still remaining, and very soon after the enemy got possession of Charleston, they had garrisoned the place, and made it a principal point in the chain of their military posts.

The situation rendered it peculiarly important; it maintained a communication with the Indians—kept in check the whig settlements to the west of it, and covered those of the loyalists to the north, south, and east. It was the most advanced post occupied by the enemy; and by its approach to the upper parts of North Carolina and Georgia, supported Camden and Augusta in their influence upon the population of those two states. It was also a depot of recruits, and the parties established for some leagues around it were but too successful in drawing the youth of the disaffected families into the royal service.

At this time it was under the command of Colonel Cruger, with a garrison of five hundred and fifty men, all of whom, officers and privates, had been recruited in America. Such is the progress of conquest. The Romans conquered Italy, and with Italy conquered Europe—with Europe they overran Asia and Africa, and with troops drawn from her conquests, her ambitious consuls conquered the liberties of their country.

Of the soldiers under Cruger, his native state of New York, and the state of New Jersey furnished the principal part. These had been enlisted early in the war, and were equal to the best soldiers in the royal army. Recruits from the neighbourhood under Colonel King, made up the residue. These latter were all desperate men, and marksmen of the first order. The English writers give them much credit for declining the permission tendered them on the approach of the American army, to return to Charleston; but, they knew better than to trust themselves from under the shield of civilized warfare, or perhaps from under the protection of the intrenchments that surrounded them. They were men whose conduct had rendered them peculiarly obnoxious, and who had seen enough in the occlusion of intercourse with Camden and Charleston, not to know that the whig-militia were abroad.

It was not among the least vexatious freaks of fortune, that Greene owed all the mortifications he encountered before this place, to the successful activity of this very militia. Lord Rawdon had issued orders from Camden to evacuate this post, as soon as he perceived that he would probably be obliged to draw together his garrisons, in order to give his main body strength sufficient to resume aggressive operation, or even to maintain his ascendancy on the coast. And, although he had had the precaution to have his dispatches forwarded by Charleston and Savannah, as well as directly across the country, none of them reached the place they were addressed to. All were intercepted. Otherwise.

Greene would have been saved the necessity of this expedition to the west, and would have found himself, without a struggle, in command of the whole upper country. Nor is it probable that Cruger, after uniting with Browne, (for such were the orders issued,) could have made good his retreat to Savannah. He was destitute of cavalry, and the means of transportation by land; clouds of mounted infantry would have attended his retreat: and, probably, in the sands which he would have had to traverse, he might have encountered the plains of Parthia and the fate of Crassus.

It has been before hinted, and will presently be shown more particularly, that precisely the like casualty obliged Greene to raise the siege.

Cruger appears to have been a man of talents, and, judging from his correspondence, a correct and gentlemanly man in his deportment. Hearing of the advance of Greene, and feeling its effects upon the militia around, he lost no time in proceeding to place himself in an attitude for defence. Calling in the aid of the neighbouring slaves, he soon completed a ditch around his stockade, throwing up the earth upon it, parapet height, and secured it within by traverses and coverts, to facilitate a safe communication between all his points of defence. His ditch he further secured by abbatis; and, at convenient distances within the stockade, erected strong block houses of notched logs.

When the enemy had first established themselves in this post, they had constructed a very respectable work, called the star-battery, to the south-east of the village. It was of a star shape, with sixteen salient and returning angles, and communicating with the stockade. In this were fought three pieces of artillery, mounted on wheel carriages, so as to admit of their transportation from one point of defence to another. On the north of the village extends a valley, through which flows a rivulet, on which the garrison depended for water. The county prison, lying contiguous to this valley, on its south side, was fortified, and commanded the valley on the side next the village. On the opposite side of the valley, and within the reach of the guns from the gaol, was constructed a strong stockade fort, with two block-houses, which covered the communication with the rivulet in that quarter. A covert-way led from the town to this rivulet.

In relating the events which occurred before this place, Colonel Lee copies the narrative of Mr. Steedman, with the addition of a few incidents, probably introduced from his own recollection.

Mr. Steedman has worked up the British account of the affair into a very brilliant story; we shall confine ourselves to such facts, as we find authentic intelligence to establish.

On the first reconnoitering of this post General Greene predicted his failure; for he saw the strength of it, and had considered the judicious arrangements for

VIEW OF NINETY SIX.

Scale of Yards

10 20 30 40 50 100 200

Present Village of
CAMBRIDGE

Village of
NINETY SIX

REFERENCES.

- a. The Spring.
- b. Stockade Fort.
- c. Old Jail.
- d. Court House.
- e. Star Redoubt.
- f. First Mine.
- g.g.g.g. The besieging encampments.
- h.h. The Lines enclosing the Town.

its defence, and well knew all the disadvantages under which he should labour in pressing a siege. In a letter to the marquis, the day after sitting down before the place, he says, "the fortifications are so strong, and the garrison so large, and so well furnished, that our success is very doubtful. If we are successful here, I shall move northwardly immediately, with a part of our force if not all."

No pains that zeal and ingenuity could dictate, had been neglected by Cruger, in preparing for defence. Besides the force in arms in the post, he had a number of slaves, sufficient to perform many services, so as to spare and relieve the garrison. He had laid in an abundant supply of provision, and had taken the most effectual measures to destroy the resources from which the besiegers might draw subsistence; so effectual, that had not the command of the river been secured, the American army could not have subsisted for a fortnight in that position. General Cunningham's loyalists, well-mounted, after gathering into the fort all the provisions in the neighbourhood, and destroying those of the whig settlements more remote, had now dispersed themselves in small parties over the country, and lying concealed in the thickets, were ever on the alert to waylay convoys and couriers. This they could do in great safety in the disaffected settlements in that neighbourhood, especially as all the cavalry and mounted infantry of the American army found full employment elsewhere.

For the besiegers to have operated against any other part of the works but the Star, it was immediately perceived, would be nugatory; that entirely commanded the whole, and an enemy could have been swept from within the stockade in an hour. How to operate against the Star was the question; and, totally destitute as the besiegers were of battering cannon, there was no alternative but to get under it or get over it. Greene resolved to adopt measures for attempting both.

Colonel Lee, however, who cannot resist the temptation of hinting that nothing went right until Achilles reappeared before the walls of Troy, very confidently asserts, that towards the close of the siege, the besiegers "began to deplore the early inattention of the chief engineer to the enemy's left, persuaded that had he been deprived of the use of the rivulet in the beginning of the siege; he must have been forced to surrender," &c.*

This chief engineer was no other than the celebrated Kosciusko, between whom and Colonel Lee the world will decide, whether the following note of the former is conspicuous for modesty or correctness:†—"Kosciusko was extremely amiable, and I believe a truly good man; nor was he deficient in his

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 122.

† Ibid, p. 119.

CHAP. XIV. professional knowledge—but, *he was very moderate in talent—not a spark of the etherial in his composition.* His blunders lost us Ninety-Six, and General Greene, much as he was beloved and respected, did not escape criticism, for permitting his engineer to direct the manner of approach, &c.”

We are confidently assured, by a member of the general's family at the time, that it was perfectly understood in camp, that the general himself directed the operations of the engineer. The project of cutting off the water had been well weighed and considered, and rejected on mature deliberation. There was not a doubt entertained of the practicability of obtaining water by digging in almost any part of the enemy's works. The country was so level, and the crown of the hill so little elevated above the bed of the rivulet, that there was no room to doubt this; and it was historically known, that when Colonel Williamson was besieged here in the year 1775, and the besieged were almost destitute of the necessary implements, they had yet succeeded in getting water by digging.

Thus circumstanced, as the Star commanded the other works, and the approaches against the water would be useless against the Star, it would have been a waste of labour, and worse than a waste of labour, to operate against the works that commanded the water: for, by the effort to defend the rivulet, the enemy weakened himself at the principal point.

It cannot be doubted, that if Greene could have commanded a sufficient force, the two operations would have been carried on concurrently, and the moment the detachment returned from Augusta, we find they actually were so carried on. But, until that time, after detaching the necessary convoys, and posting the parties necessary to invest the town, there were scarcely men enough left to guard the parties labouring in the ditches. His whole force, at that time, scarcely doubled that of the besiegers. With an aching heart was he obliged to behold the incessant fatigue to which his men were subjected, not a moment scarcely of respite, their whole time divided between labouring and fighting. To have attempted, under such circumstances, to carry on his advances both on the right and left of the enemy, simultaneously, would have been exposing both detachments thus employed, to interruption and to ruin; and to have confined his attention to the rear alone, where the defences were situated, would probably have eventuated in mortification and disappointment.

It appears, however, notwithstanding the reasons to think otherwise, that cutting off the water effectually, might have produced some serious inconveniences to the besiegers. This inference is drawn from a paragraph of Mr. Steedman's, in which he asserts, that a well had been sunk with great labour in

the Star, but no water obtained. How this comports with the positive fact of its having been found in the neighbouring stockade five years before, we are at a loss to determine. The very spot could not have been unknown to the inhabitants, nor the traces of the well itself obliterated. Perhaps we are to understand the assertion as confined to the site of the fort, which lay a little without the limits of the stockade. But, whatever be the fact, it could not be known to the besiegers.

The night of the 22d, the day on which Greene sat down before Ninety-Six, was dark and rainy, and highly favourable to the purposes of reconnoitering. With this view, accompanied by Kosciusko, and Captain Pendleton his aid, the general made the entire circuit of the enemy's works, closely observing the face of the ground, and approaching the works even within hail of the sentinels. They were actually hailed and fired upon. The investigations of this night, completed the information necessary to direct his measures. An under-lation in the ground, at a point which the enemy's artillery was not posted to defend, presented a favourable situation to commence a mine. This was what led to the throwing up of the works, which the enemy take much credit for having driven the Americans from very early in the siege. The general soon perceived, that they were too much within the control of the enemy's fire, (for they were but seventy yards distant) and withdrew his parties to a more secure distance at a place beyond a ravine. Here they broke ground on the 23d, and proceeding by regular approaches, by the 3d June had completed their second parallel. On completing the first, a mine was commenced under the cover of a battery erected on the enemy's right. The mine was directed against the Star.

Day and night the work was pursued by the besiegers, with incessant perseverance, alternately labouring in the ditches, or guarding those who laboured, and ever sleeping on their arms to repel the sallies of the besieged. These were frequent, daring, and productive sometimes of very spirited contests. The British assert these sallies were often attended with success, but they are contradicted by the steady advance of the American works, and the assertion of the American commander, that they were always successfully repelled. But not a night passed without the loss of lives on both sides.

As soon as the second parallel was completed, the garrison was summoned to surrender. Mr. Steedman has asserted, (and Colonel Lee has followed him,) that in consequence of this summons having been delivered in a note from the adjutant general, Colonel Cruger would return nothing but a verbal answer. But the note of the British commander, this moment under our eye, exculpates him from this act of indecorum, whilst it convicts the writer of such a want of

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Cruger's answer was that of an officer and a gentleman,—"I am honored with your letter of this day, intimating Major General Greene's immediate demand of the surrender of his majesty's garrison at Ninety-Six; a compliance with which my duty to my sovereign renders inadmissible at present," &c. From the order in which this and some other events are related in the memoirs of the war in the southern department, one might be led to suppose that it had occurred after the junction of Colonel Lee's detachment; but, his error is more excusable in this mistake than his own narrative would suggest, inasmuch as he was then prosecuting the siege of Augusta, and did not reach Ninety-Six until the third and last parallel was far advanced. This was commenced immediately, as it was ascertained that the enemy was resolved to hold out, and prosecuted with more vigour than could have been expected from the feeble and exhausted state of the army.

In the mean time the attention of the general was forcibly called away to other important and pressing objects.

With time to complete his approaches, the fall of the garrison was certain. But the time consumed in that work would depend upon the number of hands he could employ; and his eyes were anxiously cast towards the militia ordered from Virginia. Those of South Carolina and Georgia, who had not emigrated or been destroyed, were barely sufficient to watch Lord Rawdon's movements, and keep in check the numerous loyalists dispersed through a country so long under the undivided control of the enemy. The Virginia militia had now long been expected; early in March the requisition for them had been issued. Fifteen hundred were called for, and the governor had ordered two thousand. They ought to have arrived in time to cut off the enemy's retreat from Camden, and the blow would have completed the recovery of the southern states. Disappointed in that hope, Greene was still consoled by the promise of their being immediately expedited. He calculated, with certainty, on their joining him before Ninety-Six, and enabling him to press that siege with a vigour that would have brought it to as speedy close: Or if the enemy advanced to relieve the place, then to have left them to invest it, whilst he marched to meet and repel the advancing relief. Day after day elapsed under this last hope, when the appalling news arrived that their march had been countermanded by their governor. The sudden subversion of every hope would have been enough, but it was attended with an attack upon the authority delegated to him as commander of the southern department, which established a precedent for the total subversion of that authority. A respectful, but animated and dignified remon-


stance was the consequence, concluding with a declaration, "that if the power to command the militia when detached to serve under him was thus to be exercised by the governors of the states, he never could and never would calculate again upon a militia force in his future operations." A circumstance particularly grating to his feelings in this case was, that he had recently stripped himself of his whole permanent disposable force, for the protection of Virginia. It was at his instance that La Fayette had been ordered back, after recrossing the Chesapeake on his return to the northern army; upon the first news of the march of Lord Cornwallis for Virginia, he had ordered the Pennsylvania troops to halt on their march to the south, and act under La Fayette and Steuben; and the North Carolina levies had all received from him the same orders, when actually on their march to join him; this too after the battle of Camden and when he was lying in the face of a superior force, and almost destitute of every thing. And at the moment when the march of the militia had been countermanded, his principal motive for wishing their aid was, to hasten through the work in the south, that he might march with his more efficient troops, to re-enforce La Fayette.

But the evil was now past remedy, and it remained only to adopt such measures as might relieve him from its evil consequences. He immediately issued orders for the North Carolina levies to join him instead of marching to the north; and employed himself in an effort, to draw some troops of a permanent kind from the states of South Carolina and Georgia.

But both states were destitute of civil government. There existed, indeed, titular governors, but law and order hung suspended on the sword; and the dreadful consequences were daily and hourly exhibited in rapine and murder.

In South Carolina there existed three men high in public confidence, and of so much decision of character that there was no difficulty in drawing them into the adoption of any measures calculated for the public good; these were the three generals Sumpter, Marion, and Pickens, and governor Rutledge was ready to sanction, with dictatorial authority, whatever measures should be recommended, for collecting a military force.

In Georgia, Colonel Clarke appeared to have the whole destinies of the state in his own hands. The confidence of the people in him was unbounded, and supported by Jackson and Twiggs, he appeared the most proper and competent person to address on the subject. It happened also, that Mr. Joseph Clay arrived about this time in camp, and to him and Colonel Clarke, Greene addressed himself for the purpose of procuring an effort to be made, for establishing some form of civil government, to revive the appearance of law and order; and which, whilst it restrained the excesses of civil warfare and individual

CHAP. XIV.  outrage, might suggest some mode of adding a proportion of the Georgia contingent to his effective force. His recommendation was, to call on the people to elect a council of discreet men, and vest them with the exercise of such general powers as the exigencies of the times called for. This measure led to the revival of civil government in Georgia, and was soon followed by the raising of that body of men, who afterwards served so honourably under Colonel Jackson. In South Carolina also, the legionary corps, commanded by Mayhem, Horry, and Conyers, had their origin in Greene's present necessities. To those officers he issued commissions of colonels, and authority to raise and equip commands of cavalry and infantry in equal proportions. But alas! where were the funds? They were to be supplied upon the personal responsibility of the officers, dispensed with by the public spirit of the soldiers, or obtained by impressment.

General Greene had now been for some time in possession of intelligence, that a re-enforcement of three regiments of British troops had sailed from Cork, and were probably destined for the port of Charleston. These were the troops respecting whom Lord Cornwallis had expedited a dispatch-boat for Charleston, to require of Lord Rawdon not to permit them even to cross the bar, but to forward them directly for New-York. The receipt of this order would have done all for Greene, that those on whom he had claims had neglected to do. But the unfortunate vigilance of the American privateer, who had made prize of the boat, disappointed this chance of relief; and though the boat was retaken and sent forward on her destination, she came too late. The re-enforcement had landed, and Lord Rawdon was already far on his way to relieve his besieged garrison.

The fleet arrived on the 2d June, and some idea will be formed of the efficiency of General Greene's arrangements for procuring intelligence, when it is told, that on the 6th he received at Cambridge, Charlestown papers of the 2d, containing the news—the distance is near two hundred miles. Marion, whose vigilance and capacity at procuring intelligence, were proverbial, received it the same day that it was printed, and forwarded it through Sumpter. General Sumpter, by some fatality, did not receive the intelligence though it passed through his hands, until the enemy had commenced his march.

This was on the 11th June, and before the news of it reached head-quarters, every possible arrangement had been made to meet the event. General Greene immediately adopted the resolution to press the siege with redoubled ardour, and take particular pains to exclude intelligence. Colonel Washington, who had recently rejoined the army with his cavalry, and the cavalry of the legion under Major Rudolph, were ordered to re-enforce Sumpter, and Sumpter and Marion were instructed to form a junction, and the whole to

hang upon the enemy, and embarrass and retard his movements by all possible means; in hopes still of gaining the necessary time to reduce the post, before the British re-enforcements could be brought up to act against him. Intending immediately as that object was effected, to take with him the Georgia and South Carolina militia, and forming a junction with Sumpter and Marion, to meet and fight the enemy, on his advance.

But, the reduction of the post was the very pivot of this plan of operation. Having no force to hold it in a state of investment in his absence, he could not move off and leave it, and to encounter the enemy in the presence of the garrison, would have been madness. Having, therefore, issued the most pressing orders to his several officers, he applied his whole mind to the reduction of the post.

The completion of the third parallel was greatly facilitated by the aid of the Mayhem towers—invented on this spot. Constructed with strong logs, the artillery could not easily destroy them, and in a short time the marksmen who manned them, succeeded in driving the artillerists of the garrison, completely from their guns. Hot shot were tried to destroy these towers, but the greenness of the wood rendered that attempt abortive. At length, the artillery no longer annoyed the assailants while there was light enough to distinguish objects; and at night, it could not be directed with sufficient certainty to be much dreaded.

After the reduction of the post at Augusta, the detachment under Colonel Lee was ordered to take post in the rear of the village, and operate against the enemy's left; this, however, was not until the 12th, six days before the assault was attempted. Colonel Lee began with regular approaches in that quarter, and notwithstanding repeated interruptions from the sallies of the enemy, had made such respectable advances, that between his fire and that of the third parallel, the enemy could no longer venture to the rivulet, by day. Steedman says, that the naked negroes brought in water to the garrison by night. Those who are acquainted with the habits and character of these people, will judge to what extent this operation could have been carried on.

Two bold and unsuccessful attempts, distinguished the operations of the besiegers in this quarter: the first was on the day that they had taken their position.

Fort Motte had been reduced by communicating fire to the buildings within it, and a similar attempt was now made with arrows bearing ignited substances. Cruger instantly unroofed his houses, and put an end to this annoyance. A few brave men had reached and removed the abbatis at Fort Watson, and Colonel Lee thought it practicable to destroy by fire, those which surrounded the stockade fort. In open day, a sergeant and nine brave men

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attempted this hazardous service ; six actually reached the ditch, but were immediately shot down by the garrison. The English writer, remarking on this attempt, observes—"That Colonel Lee suffered his impatience to get the better of his discretion." The fire could neither have extended itself, nor the garrison have been prevented from extinguishing it.

The works of the besiegers were, at this time, so near completion, that the American commander confidently asserts, the place could not have held out four days longer. Besides the Mayhem towers before spoken of, one of which was within thirty yards of the enemy's ditch, the besiegers had erected several batteries for cannon, one of which of twenty feet in height, within one hundred and forty yards, so entirely commanded the Star, that it became necessary to give its parapet, already twelve feet high, three feet more of elevation. This was done by means of sand-bags, through which apertures were left for using the small arms ; and without any previous indications by day, at what point the artillery would appear, the removal of the sand-bags, left embrasures for using the pieces by night.

Thus, the two parties, besiegers and besieged, lay continually watching each other for near ten days, during which time not a man could show his head on either side without receiving a shot. Much blood was consequently shed on both sides.

Still, however, the garrison resisted, with a constancy that often calls forth a warm eulogium from the American commander ; until on the 17th, the posture of affairs rendered it indispensable that the place should be carried by assault or abandoned. Lord Rawdon was close at hand, and the garrison had got intelligence of his approach.

This important communication is said to have been made to them on the 12th—it was probably two days later. The ingenuity and immunities of women we find, had often been resorted to by the American commander, in circumventing the enemy. On this occasion they were successfully employed against himself. A lady, the daughter and sister of tried whigs, had formed a matrimonial connexion with a British officer. Her residence at a place not far distant, countenanced her visiting the camp with a flag, on some pretence of no moment. She was received with civility, and dined at the general's table. It was afterwards ascertained, that she had remained at a farm-house in the vicinity a day or two. In that time, a young loyalist, well mounted, dashed past the pickets of the American army, and the guns of the centinels discharged at him in vain, were his passport of admission into the garrison. A verbal message from Lord Rawdon was all he brought, but it was conveyed under circumstances which insured it credence. Huzzas and

feu de joyes, with a reanimated fire from the besiegers, announced the exhilaration produced on the occasion.

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A communication in general orders on the 14th, that the enemy had taken the field, and was advancing, shows the general's consciousness, that the garrison was in possession of the intelligence. It would be some palliation to this act of treachery, had it been attributable solely to love, or loyalty ; but, we have seen a positive and circumstantial assurance, that the sacrifice was made to a deity of less purity than Hymen or Cupid. The fate of the treacherous *Tarpeia* has perhaps awaited the traitoress in life.

The resolution having been taken, and all the necessary orders given the day before, on the morning of the 18th, the different detachments of the army, were ready by twelve, to attempt an assault. On the American left, against the Star-Battery, Lieutenant Duval with a command of Marylanders, and Lieutenant Seldon with another of Virginians, led the forlorn hope. Close in their rear followed a party furnished with hooks at the end of staves, and next advanced Colonel Campbell at the head of the 1st Maryland and 1st Virginia regiments, prepared for the assault. These all marched under cover of the approaches, to within a few yards of the enemy's ditch.

The American forts, the rifle towers, and the advanced works were all manned, with orders to clear the enemy's parapet previous to the advance of the storming party.

On the American right, against the stockade fort, Major Rudolph commanded Colonel Lee's forlorn hope, supported by the infantry of the legion, and Captain Kirkwood, with the remains of the Delaware regiment.

Duval and Seldon were ordered to clear away the abbatis and occupy the curtain opposite to them, then driving off the enemy from the sides of the angle thus occupied, to open the way for the hookmen to draw down the sand-bags. This service being performed, Campbell was to advance to the assault, and by aid of the sand-bags now piled against the face of the parapet, to gain its summit. During this operation, the artillery, rifle batteries and troops of the advanced works, were to keep the parapet clear, for Campbell to mount to the assault.

On the left, Colonel Lee was to possess himself of the stockade, and await events to determine his ulterior movements.

A discharge of artillery precisely at noon, was the signal for the storming parties to move. From right to left immediately, a blaze of artillery and small arms, directed to the point of attack, covered the forlorn hope under their smoke. In an instant, this gallant little band leaped into the ditch, and commenced the destruction of the heavy abbatis ; but the enemy was prepared for

them, and met the assault with coolness. Bayonets and pikes bristled above the parapet, and from the loop-holes in the sand-bags poured an incessant stream of fire, making dreadful havoc among the assailants. The form of the redoubt gave complete command of the ditch, and exposed the party to a close cross-fire, the effects of which increased in proportion as the abbatis were removed. Yet, near three quarters of an hour did these brave men persist, and notwithstanding the fall of their leaders and two-thirds of their number, still pressed on, occupied the curtain, and maintained the conflict with the garrison, while the hookmen, who promptly followed, were struggling to get down the sand-bags. But, the opposition they had sustained convinced the general, that success could only be purchased at a sacrifice of lives, that would lay him at the feet of Lord Rawdon; and the party were called off. The greatest part of their men were killed or wounded, but they brought the most of their wounded off, notwithstanding the galling fire they had to sustain.

This is the American account of the termination of this part of the affair. The British account, followed by Colonel Lee, attributes it to a sally of two parties of the besieged on the right and left of the American party, and a charge of bayonets so impetuous, that the two British parties met in the ditch. Happy if their impetuosity was checked in time to avoid falling by mutual wounds!

We can only say, we find no hint, that this gallant little party ever retired until ordered off by their commander, or that they encountered any enemy in the ditch, on equal terms. The British accounts of the day do not mention this sally, and the evidence of facts is directly against it; for, how could the Americans have brought off their wounded? or how could one of themselves have escaped? If such a sally was made, it appears to have escaped the view of the American army, and must have been made after the forlorn-hope was withdrawn. No doubt, the gallant parties who made it, would have performed good service, had they encountered a living enemy. The dead, the dying, and the wounded who remained, could oppose no obstacle to the meeting of such impetuous assailants. The riflemen probably gave a good account of them on their return.*

On the left, Colonel Lee found no difficulty in getting possession of the stockade. It had been evacuated the night preceding, but the movement had been so silent, that the fact appears to have been unknown at the time of the assault. Upon the relinquishment of the assault, he had orders to retire to his own position as soon as the cover of night would admit of it.

* Steedman, vol. 2, p. 370.

Thus ended this bloody and spirited little affair, in which, for the number engaged, there was as much bravery displayed as ever was exhibited by man. It was an experiment on the practicability of seizing and holding the curtains of one or two of the enemy's angles, as indispensable to a general assault. The attempt did not require the exposure of any great number of men, and the object was certainly one which justified the risk. Had Greene succeeded in carrying this fort, he had time enough to have demolished his own works, and would have had his election either to march against his adversary, or if he found in it a sufficient store of provisions, to have met him under the protection of the British works. With the American detachments commanding the whole country between this place and Charleston, Lord Rawdon must have undertaken to reduce the fort by siege. A storm would have given the American general every advantage that he desired.

The American loss in this affair was very serious, considering their diminished force. There were near forty killed and wounded, including some very valuable officers. Captain Armstrong, of the 1st Maryland regiment, was killed, and Captain Benson and Lieutenants Duval and Seldon severely wounded. Very few men were killed, except of the forlorn-hope and hookmen, the residue being under cover. But the anxiety of Benson and Armstrong about the party in the ditch, had exposed their persons to the enemy's marksmen.

Far from being cast down by the issue of this attempt, the general orders issued on the occasion, breathe nothing but exultation in the bravery and good conduct of the troops, and congratulations on the approaching prospect of meeting the enemy on equal terms. In his dispatches to the president of congress, General Greene says—"The behaviour of the troops on this occasion deserves the highest commendation," "they have undergone incredible hardships during the siege, and though the issue is not successful, I hope their exertions will merit the approbation of congress. *Had the Virginia militia joined us, agreeable to orders, success would have been complete.* The siege has been bloody on both sides, from the frequent sallies that the enemy made. The garrison behaved with great spirit, and defended themselves with judgment and address." "We continued the siege until the enemy got within a few miles of us." "It is mortifying to be obliged to leave a garrison so near reduced, and I have nothing to console me but a consciousness, that nothing was left unattempted that could facilitate its reduction." "It will be my endeavour, in our future movements, to oblige Lord Rawdon to move down into the lower country, and evacuate Ninety-Six; but my force is so small that I can hardly flatter myself with the hopes of success. Our movement to the southward has been attended with very great advantages, and had not this re-enforcement arrived so soon, or had not the Vir-

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It has been said,* that on this occasion a truce was proposed by General Greene for the purpose of burying the dead, but rejected by Cruger, as the ceremonial of burying the dead was, by custom, appropriated to the victor. The least reflection would have pointed out that, situated as the two armies were, neither could have ventured on rendering this last mark of respect to the brave men who fell between the lines, or even in the ditch, without the concurrence of the other. We have it in our power to exculpate the British commander from the charge of having set up a claim, only to be asserted by the undisputed possessor of the field of battle.

No general truce was requested, for this might have suggested what Greene wished concealed,—that he was preparing to retire. But a proposal, through the adjutant general, was submitted, for both parties to be mutually permitted to pass in security between the lines for the purpose of burying the dead, with a particular request that due attention be paid to the wounded who fell into the enemy's hands. To this the following answer was returned:—"Major General Greene may, with the fullest confidence, rely on every attention which humanity can dictate, being paid to those men of the American army whom the fortune of war has thrown into our hands. The killed of your army of yesterday, within our abbatis, shall be immediately sent to you to be buried." In every stage of the siege, the same liberal and soldierly intercourse was maintained between the combatants, and the American commander was not in this, or any other instance, compelled to submit to any act of humiliation from his enemy.

On the day of the assault it had become indispensable to General Greene, that events should determine, whether he should meet and fight Lord Rawdon, or raise the siege and retreat. But to be prepared for either alternative, he had sent off his heavy baggage across the Saluda, at the Island Ford, on the route which led to his depots on the Catawba River.

Lord Rawdon had been ever since the 11th, pressing on with all possible expedition to relieve his garrison. The force which he had with him has been variously stated, but it certainly was not less than two thousand men of all arms. The American officers, who were hanging upon his march, reported it variously from fifteen hundred to two thousand five hundred; and it most probably approached the latter number. The British accounts make his cavalry to amount

* Colonel Lee, vol. 2, p. 129.

one hundred and fifty, but he most certainly had with him a mounted force considerably above that number. Those who had seen it and felt it too, estimated it at four hundred. The British accounts probably, give only the regular cavalry, but it is known that when he retired from Camden, Lord Rawdon was followed by a numerous retinue of loyalists, from whom he had now drawn a very efficient force of mounted infantry, well equipped, and, in his circumstances, full as valuable as his regular horse; as good as most of those under Sumpter and Marion. Lord Rawdon had felt the effects of a superior cavalry, and had spared no pains to collect a respectable body of that kind of troops, before he moved from Charleston. He readily conceived that the American general would spare no pains to retard his movements, and would probably succeed, unless he could outnumber the American cavalry.

It was with astonishment that Greene received the intelligence of his strength in this description of force, and in it, he too plainly saw the defeat of his hopes to succeed in retarding the enemy's progress. An unfortunate incident that occurred to a large party of Sumpter's troops, under the command of Colonel Myddleton, tended not a little to realize his apprehension. It was led into an ambuscade, and so completely cut to pieces and dispersed, that only forty-five out of one hundred and fifty could be collected by their colonel. Some stragglers rejoined their commander, but many were killed, and more too much alarmed to return to service.

Still, Rudolph, Washington, and Sumpter hung upon the flanks of the advancing army, but his march was too prudently conducted to offer any opportunity for successful enterprise. It happened also, unfortunately, that some doubts were entertained with regard to the route which Lord Rawdon would pursue. Until you reach Orangeburgh, the route is common to Ninety-Six and Granby; as the latter was Sumpter's head quarters, and the depot of the American stores, as well as the site of an armory recently established, it might have been an object, with Lord Rawdon, *en passant*, to visit that post. General Sumpter, therefore, remained at Granby, and to that point ordered up his re-enforcements of militia, until he had ascertained that Lord Rawdon, on the 15th, passed Orangeburgh, on the road to Ninety-Six, by the Juniper Springs. All the parties were then sent forward in that direction, whilst General Sumpter in person, moved slowly up the Saluda, so as to communicate with his detachments and Ninety-Six, and be in the way to receive the militia who were ordered to follow and join him. This course necessarily gave the enemy the advantage of him in time, speed, and distance, so that, on the day that the enemy reached Little Saluda, it was not possible for General Sumpter to call in his detachments and reach Ninety-Six in time, to enable General Greene to advance and choose his

ground for fighting the enemy. In this there was no disobedience of orders, or want of zeal betrayed, nor was it ever so regarded by the American commander. The error lay in detaching his parties before he had thrown himself in front of the enemy's advance; the latter certainly was the proper construction of the orders given him; but it was perfectly consistent with the immediate object of the orders, to pursue measures for galling and harassing the enemy in his advance.

There is a vivacity in the letters addressed by General Greene to Sumpter, Marion, Pickens, and Clarke, when pressing them to convene and fight the enemy, which evidently discovers that he looked forward to the opportunity with pleasurable anticipations. "It is my wish to meet him," he says, in a letter to Clarke of the 17th, "and I doubt not of victory if the virtuous militia collect and fight with their usual gallantry. Come on, then, my good friend," he continues, "and bring Lieutenant Colonel Jackson with you, with all the good troops you have collected; let us have a field-day, and I doubt not it will be a glorious one. No time is to be lost, be here by to-morrow evening at furthest."

But before the morrow evening had arrived, the event of the assault and the news from below, had rendered a retreat indispensable. Lord Rawdon was at Little Saluda; Sumpter, with all the cavalry of Washington and Lee, and even the light troops of the legion, too far on Rawdon's right to make a junction with Greene either certain or secure. Reluctantly, therefore, he resolved to abandon the siege, and in the night of the 19th moved off across the Saluda, on the track of his baggage; having first issued orders to Sumpter to march up within the fork of the Broad and Saluda, so as to fall into his track and join him.

But little was the aid to be expected at this time from such a junction. The influence of retreat and misfortune, upon the fluctuating spirits of the militia, began to show itself; and both Sumpter and Marion wrote that they were almost abandoned by those who had been with them, and found it next to impossible to call forth others. Every man of his four regiments, general Sumpter mentions, had abandoned him in one day, and scarcely any troops remained with him, except his brigade of ten months men. The late re-enforcements gave the enemy at least double the effective force that Greene could command, and the most gloomy apprehensions once more pervaded the country. The late recall of the Virginia militia, the arresting of the march of the continental troops for the defence of that state, the retreat of La Fayette before Lord Cornwallis,—all conspired to strike a damp through the spirits of the people, which favoured the prevalence of an opinion, that the southern states were abandoned to their fate. It is said, that there were not wanting, at that time, politicians who were in-

clined to the compromise of relinquishing the southern, to secure the independence of the northern and middle states. The present state of things left no room to doubt the utter impolicy of carrying on the war any further through the fluctuating aid of the militia. Measures were immediately adopted for re-establishing the South Carolina line; and the execution of the cartel having furnished some excellent materials in the discharge of the prisoners from the prison-ships, different rendezvous were opened, and Mayhem and Horry's corps began to fill up; but still slowly, for they had to be raised upon promises, and state promises were at that time far below par.

The retreat from Ninety-Six was pressed without intermission beyond Bush River a distance of twenty-two miles, on the route that crosses the streams at their lowest fords. A retreating army could not have pursued a route which would expose it to the casualties and delays of ferries, and the American general was resolved to relinquish as little ground as possible. On the 22d, Greene halted to observe the movements of the enemy. On the morning of the next day, intelligence was received, that Lord Rawdon had entered Ninety-Six at two o'clock on the 21st, and the American army was immediately put in motion; crossing the Enoree, Tyger and Broad Rivers, it halted on the 25th at a place called 'Tims' Ordinary, eleven miles beyond Lisle's Ford on Broad River.

Lord Rawdon did not, in fact, move from Ninety-Six until the morning of the 24th; believing, from the report of deserters, that the American army was still encamped at Bush River, he took with him the troops of the garrison, and all the force capable of sustaining the fatigue, in all about two thousand effectives, and without even their knapsacks, or a wheel carriage except his tumbrils, made a most vigorous push to overtake the retreating army. Fortunately, this movement had been anticipated, and he advanced no further than Duncan's Creek, a tributary stream of the Enoree River. A retreating army has always the advantage of sweeping away with it the means of subsistence, and two strong detachments of cavalry and infantry, under Washington and Lee, had sullenly preceded the march of the enemy, presenting a precaution against venturing too far with his foraging parties. With these, in person, was the American general, while the army under Colonel Williams pursued its march.

Pursuit was obviously vain; for while Greene was falling back upon his magazines and re-enforcements, Lord Rawdon would have been removing further, at every step from all support. The very routine was before him through which Lord Cornwallis had recently passed, and by a singular coincidence, Greene lay encamped at the very spot from which Lord Cornwallis'

career had commenced. Nor were the British troops in a condition to press the pursuit; for they had recently travelled two hundred miles in ten days, and now about thirty-seven in a day and a half: and the newly arrived European soldiers, well clad in thick cloths, could ill withstand the melting heats of mid summer in this climate. The American troops were but little incommoded with any incumbrance of this kind.

On the 24th, therefore, Lord Rawdon commenced his march by the left, to bid a final adieu to the interior of South Carolina. Such was the state to which he had been reduced lately for want of provision, that the army subsisted almost wholly on beef, and the only bread-stuff afforded them, was prepared by means of a number of hand-mills, which Lord Rawdon had judiciously transported with his army on its march from Charleston: the few mills in the intermediate country had all been destroyed. The maize thus prepared is wholesome, palatable and nutritious, but is seldom relished by those who are unaccustomed to it.

A distressing scene soon followed the return of Lord Rawdon to Ninety-Six. The day of retribution had overtaken the unfortunate loyalists. Very numerous, as has been seen, in the commencement of the revolution, every thing hitherto had conspired to increase their numbers. Ninety-Six had long been their market, and the seat of power—the source of wealth, of influence and opinions to the surrounding country. The feeble, the avaricious, and the wavering, had, of consequence, been drawn into its vortex.

Let the scene now be imagined of so large a proportion of the population of this beautiful country, set in motion to evacuate it in the height of all the luxuriance which the farms exhibit at this season of the year. Many were the eyes that streamed at the necessity of abandoning homes, endeared to them by thousands of tender associations; and seeking a precarious and dependent subsistence in a climate, which is always viewed with terror by the inhabitants of the interior. But Lord Rawdon had called together their chiefs, and communicated to them the necessity of abandoning the post that protected them. With it, they abandoned all idea of security.

Nor was it without reason that these unhappy people preferred any thing to remaining behind unprotected.

Soon after Cunningham's bloody excursion into the upper counties, and the return of the American army in force into this neighbourhood, many small parties, in pursuit of plunder or revenge, had been traversing the country in all directions, living at free quarters on the inhabitants, and alternately indulging their cupidity or cruelty in outrages upon whig and tory. On the latter, the evil principally fell; and the specimens of licentiousness exhibited in repeated in-

stances were calculated to inspire the fear, that no safety was to be expected by them after the retirement of the British army.

It is confidently hoped, that the perpetrators of these enormities were generally a lawless race of frontier-men, or banditti, without connexions, civil, political, or military, who availed themselves of the suspension of law and order, which necessarily existed during the struggle that prevailed for the mastery of the country. The civil arm was nerveless; and the military commanders, striving in a contest which kept their eyes, necessarily, to the point of each other's swords, could do but little for the tranquillity of the country.

Yet General Greene was not inattentive to what was going on around him. Intreaties, remonstrances, threats, were all wasted on the air, until events afforded him leisure to meditate on the means of acting with efficiency. He then addressed a letter to the inhabitants of Saluda, in which he declares himself their protector; and being cordially supported by Pickens in the effort, he succeeded in calming the apprehensions of great numbers, and preventing the country from being wholly depopulated. But many had wanted moderation in the hour of prosperity. They expected that the re-establishment of civil government would follow the reconquering of the country, and prosecutions, both civil and criminal, would await their offences.

For some days, the roads leading to Ninety-Six were crowded with an unhappy cavalcade of women and children, wagons, stock, and slaves, collecting at that place, preparatory to the departure of the garrison.

It is said of Lord Rawdon, that, previous to abandoning the post, he submitted to the loyalists an offer, "that if they would keep together, and undertake the defence of the district against their disaffected countrymen, a small party should be left to keep them in countenance; with the further encouragement, that detachments from the Congarees should, at all times, be sent to their support, equivalent to any force which Greene might dispatch to invade their territory."

If such an offer was made, it was rather the dictate of that officer's heart than his head. But in all his conduct during his command he had exhibited too much prudence and judgment, to have held out a fallacious hope, which subsequent events prove he could not possibly have realized. An offer so tempting, would probably have been too readily grasped at under the well-grounded confidence reposed in his honour and judgment, and would have led to certain and fatal disappointment. The intelligence of the day certainly negatives the making of such a proposition, for the loyalists, who submitted, uniformly declared, that the communication to them was, that they must all remove below Orangeburgh, or be deemed enemies to the royal cause; that they should be

put in possession of the estates of the whigs until restored to their own, and be conducted under protection of the British army within the new line of British posts. Certain it is, that if such a proposition was made, there was no hesitation in rejecting it; and Lord Rawdon, leaving one half of his force to cover the retirement of the loyalists under Cruger, on the 29th took up the line of march for the Congarees, by the south side of Saluda, at the head of eleven hundred infantry, sixty cavalry, and two companies of artillery, with four field pieces.

The movements of the two armies which followed this period, present a curious specimen of the vicissitudes of war, and a brilliant one of the prudence and enterprise of the rival commanders.

Rawdon, though young in years, had lived over the experience of ages in the retirement of the closet, and was well aware of the trecks which fortune plays in the field of war. On proceeding from Charleston, therefore, he had issued orders for a strong detachment under Colonel Stewart, to follow after him to Orangeburgh and await orders. The position was well chosen for support or co-operation. Before leaving Ninety-Six, he had received intelligence from Colonel Stewart that this detachment was on its march, and he appointed it to meet him at Granby on the 3d July. The time was perfectly well calculated, to form a junction with him at that place before Greene could reach it from the position at Tims' Ordinary, allowing for the time that must elapse before the latter could hear of the movement and destination of the British army.

But, the measures adopted by the American general, anticipated Lord Rawdon's arrangements, and had nearly involved him and his detachments in defeat and ruin.

Lee with his legion, was ordered to hover about the post of Ninety-Six, to follow the enemy in his movements, strike where an opportunity offered, and keep the general constantly informed of the minutest occurrences. While Washington with his cavalry and Kirkwood's infantry, was directed to move down between the Broad and Wateree Rivers to Granby, and throwing himself between that post and Orangeburgh, to pursue the same course pointed out to Lee. General Sumpter, at the same time, was instructed to penetrate lower down the country, and communicate with Marion in measures of co-operation in that quarter. The American army then recommenced its march by the right, and quieted the apprehensions of the country by advancing a day's journey on the route to Granby. Here it halted, as well to ascertain the ultimate views of the enemy, as to await the arrival of a detachment of

two hundred North Carolina levies, advancing under Major John Armstrong.

At the Big-Spring on Rocky Creek, in the present district of Fairfield, the American general passed two days *of rest* to his army, but to him, of anxious suspense. He had little doubt of the intentions of the enemy to retreat : but, the indications of this intention may have been a feint, and Lord Rawdon, after resting and supplying his army, might again attempt to overtake and force him to battle. In this event, his retreat lay across Land's Ford on the Catawba, where his detachments might join him by ascending the east side of the Wateree. But, if the British commander should be serious in his preparations for retreat, then the position of the American army was well calculated for ulterior operations, whether his views were to retire within his new line of posts, or to establish himself on the Congaree, and circumscribe his operations to the space comprised between the Edisto to the west, and the Congaree and Santee to the north and east.

The latter, it appears, was the real object of the British commander ; but it was not until the evening of the 1st July, that such intelligence was received by his adversary, as decided the course which he must pursue. We are minute as to time ; for so critical were the operations of the two armies at this period, that a day was decisive of the fate of the one, or the triumph of the other.

Washington had intercepted a letter of Stewart's, communicating intelligence of his advancing towards Orangeburgh, but stating the impracticability of reaching Granby by the 3d of July. Lee, at the same time, informed the American commander from the other quarter, that Rawdon had marched from Ninety-Six with less than half his force, and taken the road that leads southerly on the south west of the Saluda.

The direction of the British commander's march was now ascertained, his force was reduced to a state which Greene's recent re-enforcements enabled him to control, and it was also ascertained, both, that the re-enforcements on which Rawdon calculated to maintain his ascendancy could not reach the point of junction in time, and that Lord Rawdon was proceeding in full confidence that it would.

Very early the morning following the receipt of this intelligence, the American army was put in motion, and after reaching Winnsborough, it was ordered to disembarass itself of every thing that could impede its march, and was left under the command of General Huger, with orders to press on to the Congaree, while Greene, attended by a small escort of cavalry and an

aid, pushed on to find Colonel Washington, and observe more nearly the indications by which his ulterior measures should be directed.

The forward movement of the American army appears to have alarmed Lord Rawdon for the safety of his re-enforcements; for his march was urged with an obvious anxiety to reach Granby in anticipation of the American army. Notwithstanding some unfortunate incidents which attended his accelerated movements, it proved exceedingly fortunate for the safety both of himself and his detachment. For it brought him to Granby two days before that appointed for his junction with Stewart, and, consequently, two days before that on which the American general had calculated to present himself in the place of his expected re-enforcement. But, still disastrous consequences here awaited him. Colonel Lee had executed his orders with the greatest zeal and activity, and keeping pace on the north east side of the Saluda River with Lord Rawdon's descent on the opposite side, had detached Major Egleston with one troop of cavalry to hang on the march of the British army, with orders to harass it and cut off its foraging parties, and otherwise retard its march. The great superiority in quality of Egleston's horses, enabled him to discharge this critical service with perfect security.

Having ascertained from Egleston that Lord Rawdon had with him but sixty horse, Lee dispatched an additional troop under Captain Armstrong, in order to enable Egleston, if an opportunity offered, to strike a blow at the English cavalry.* Egleston very soon made an opportunity for this purpose, by throwing himself in front of the enemy below Granby. His re-enforcement had been received in the night, and the enemy were ignorant of it. The next morning, very early, he presented himself in view of the British cavalry, with a diminished appearance of his original number, and drew on himself, as he expected, an attack from nearly the whole hostile cavalry. His flight extended no farther than to the thicket where the rest of his command were in ambush, and their joint-charge completely overwhelmed the whole body of their antagonists. Forty-five men and horses, a captain and several other commissioned officers, fell into the hands of the Americans in the face of the enemy, and less than a mile distant from their army.

Deprived of his cavalry, harassed by Egleston, incapable of collecting provisions or intelligence, warned by the audacity of Lee's parties, of the approach of the American army, and learning the distant prospect of a junction with Stewart, and the preparations going on in his front to embarrass and detain

* Lee, 3d July.

him, Lord Rawdon halted only to destroy the boats for some distance down the river, and immediately pressed on to reach Orangeburgh. In this march from Ninety-Six to Orangeburgh, it is confidently asserted by the British prints of the day,* that more than fifty of the British army fell dead from heat, fatigue and privation. Lord Rawdon's situation was desperate, and some were necessarily sacrificed to the safety of the whole.

On the arrival of Greene at Washington's camp, he had occasion for the exercise of all his equanimity, for fortune again had acted the will-o'-whisp towards him, and seemed determined to beckon him on, only to amuse herself with disappointing him. It was now certain that Rawdon could not be overtaken by the main army; but, Greene's views had not been limited to that one object. As early as the 29th, he had received intelligence of the advance of Stewart from Dorchester with a large and valuable convoy of wagons; and measures had been taken to strike a blow at his detachment, that could scarcely have failed of effect. In the actual state of Lord Rawdon's army, the destruction of this convoy, on which alone he depended to relieve his army, most probably would have given a bloodless victory over the whole.

Orders of the 29th had been transmitted to General Sumpter, to detach Colonel Middleton with his regiment to re-enforce Washington, at Ancrum's on the Congaree; and to Lee, to hasten up and form a junction with Washington on his assigned position, or appoint some other place where it could be effected with more expedition or perform the enterprise himself, if strong enough to attempt it. Washington was ordered to repair to Ancrum's Ferry, and immediately on being joined by these re-enforcements, to hasten on and intercept Stewart. But, as it was uncertain whether Lee could be found promptly, or what his difficulties might be in forming a junction with Washington, the latter was ordered, on being joined by Middleton, to proceed, without halting for Lee. And as it was not certain that General Sumpter was present with his command then under Middleton, direct orders were sent to Middleton, to put himself under the orders of Washington at Ancrum's Ferry, and proceed to the execution of the blow intended against Stewart.

It is curious to follow out these well concerted measures to their final failure. In common with the commander in chief, General Greene had often to dissemble his feelings, and to bear with his officers, because the service could not well bear their loss. In this instance there was a call for the most absolute self-command. Neither Middleton nor Lee ever joined Washington, and the

* Annual Register.

latter, instead of directing his views against Stewart, thought proper to throw himself in front of Rawdon, in prosecution of a feeble and fatal effort to embarrass his march. The express dispatched after General Sumpter, after three days search, found him at the Hanging-Rock on the Catawba River, in prosecution of some measure connected with his command, which he did not abandon, and which detained him from joining the army until the 8th or 9th of July. Washington, in the mean time, anxious to prosecute the enterprise against Stewart, dispatched a courier to Marion, who was below with four hundred mounted militia, pressing him to hasten to unite in the undertaking. When General Greene reached Washington's head-quarters, Marion had joined him, and at the head of these two corps united, he resolved to lead the enterprise in person.

Pressing down the Orangeburgh road, on the 6th July he succeeded in passing Lord Rawdon, and then watching the progress of the British army at the head of a company of Washington's cavalry, lest relief should be pushed forward to Stewart, he detached Marion to attack and seize this important convoy, freighted, not only with relief for Rawdon's army, but with the various supplies necessary to re-establish the post at Granby.

Thus far every thing appeared to have succeeded to a wish. The hourly communications kept up with Marion, exhibited the anxiety entertained respecting passing events, and positive information had been communicated on the 7th, that Stewart was still below and approaching. At one o'clock in the morning of the 8th, Marion sallied forth from his covert to seize upon his prey, but, to his utter discomfiture, Stewart, unconscious of his danger, and influenced only by a choice of roads, had turned aside into one, while Marion had pursued another and they had passed each other in the night.

On the morning of the 8th, Stewart and Rawdon effected a junction in Orangeburgh, and the following letter from Marion, of the preceding day, exhibits a striking picture of the fact, that the army of Rawdon, at that time, was in no condition for fighting or for flying:—

"Their troops are so fatigued they cannot possibly move. Three regiments were going to lay down their arms, and it is believed they will to-day, if they are ordered to march. They have no idea of any force being near them."

Greene had now been five days incessantly in motion, and fatigued with all the agitation that hope and fear can dispense. On the 8th, he turned the heads of his crest-fallen cavalry again towards the Congaree, and having issued orders to all the troops, that Sumpter, Marion, Lee and Washington,

could add to the main army, to form a junction as soon as possible, he resolved to march up to Orangeburgh and offer the enemy battle.

The militia under Pickens, was not included in this order, for that officer was, at this time, usefully employed on the important mission of watching the motions of Cruger. Prompt and correct intelligence from that quarter was obviously indispensable to the safety of the American army. Re-enforced by the strength of Cruger, Lord Rawdon's force would have been so overwhelming, that the American commander could not have kept the field for a moment; and the ferries of the Congaree presented a formidable barrier to a precipitate retreat. Yet it was his only retreat; for baggage, stores, re-enforcements, all lay beyond that river.

Cruger was, in fact, at this time fast approaching the post of Orangeburgh.

That officer, it will be recollected, had been left at Ninety-Six to cover the retreat of the loyalist families. Whilst waiting their assembling, it would have been happy for his reputation, and that of the British arms, had he confined his efforts to the demolition of the defensive works that had been constructed at that post. But this last opportunity of wreaking vengeance on the unfortunate whigs, could not be suffered to pass away. A swarm of tories, supported by a regular force, were permitted to carry fire and sword into the Long-Cane settlement. The ravages sanctioned in this quarter give countenance to the assertion, that orders had been issued to lay the whole country waste. This dreadful calamity is sometimes justified or excused by the necessities which war imposes; but what was there to justify it here? They were abandoning the country—there was no army to be starved into a retreat; and the country was entirely too remote to furnish supplies to that which must be the seat of war. There is but too much reason to believe, that the measure was one of revenge, perhaps of plunder, or of the penulgence of disappointment.

Fortunately the flood was unexpectedly arrested before it had reached very far. Pickens and Clarke were at hand, and both were advancing with their followers to re-enforce the army, then retreating over Broad River. The ravages of the enemy were checked, by these parties, re-enforced by the enraged multitude whose smoking dwellings still stimulated their vengeance, and the enemy was once more forced within his intrenchments, or under the protection of his guns. Recent advices from Rawdon, of his increasing difficulties, now hurried on the evacuation of the post of Ninety-Six.

Cruger, at the head of a cavalcade, not unlike the pictures of the Exodus, commenced his march on the 8th of July. Many had been the distressing scenes that this country had exhibited; but few had equalled this. And, to add to the mental and bodily sufferings of the miserable loyalists, parties gathered

from the recently desolated settlements, and re-enforced by those habitual plunderers who had disgraced the American cause, hunted and cut off the small parties as they moved towards the rendezvous appointed on Cruger's line of march—stimulated not less by revenge than by a desire for plunder, glossed over by the excuse of retaliation or indemnity. Nor were their sufferings destined to terminate with this dangerous and distressing journey, to which every age and sex, and condition, were exposed; but after reaching the tract of country to which they were ordered to retire, and their land of promise—the rich estates of the banished whigs, they soon found that all the remuneration and protection promised them ended in delusion. If they were fortunate enough to survive the diseases of the climate, they were soon driven from their new homes by the wandering parties of whigs, or perhaps excluded by some prior possessors, who did not find it convenient to relinquish their hold. At length they gathered in great numbers in the suburbs of the city, and, lodged in tents, formed a settlement of wretchedness, which, in the spirit of burlesque or reproach, took the denomination of Rawdon Town. Here many perished miserably; but many, who had brought off their slaves, removed to some of the British settlements, among the islands, or on the Spanish Main, where their descendants still exist. Others, resolved to brave all the dangers of returning to their native homes, secretly stole back, and finally cast themselves on the clemency of their neighbours. We can, with confidence, say that none who had not rendered themselves infamous by their crimes, were rejected. In Pickens they found a zealous and benevolent protector. Yet, in too many instances, family-feuds had been so exacerbated by mutual injuries, that private revenge too often exhibited itself in acts of disgraceful violence. But Pickens, in his communications, attributes the agitated state of society which still prevailed, to the loyalists who had fled to the Indians, and to the whigs who still lay among the mountains, leading a half savage life; and both, like the Gael of other times, descending occasionally to the plains from which they had been driven, to gratify revenge or thirst of plunder.

Multitudinous and multifarious as was the caravan that incumbered Cruger, he managed to move forward with astonishing eelerity. Whatever was the speed of his motion, his convoy must keep pace with him, for fear gave wings to their flight, when the danger of losing his protection pressed upon them. Lord Rawdon had written pressing to him to hasten to Orangeburgh, and, by travelling by moonlight, he was enabled greatly to mitigate the sufferings attendant upon marching over barren sands in such a climate, at such a season.

The route which Cruger had taken, is that which leads to Orangeburgh, between the great forks of the Edisto, crossing into that place at a bridge, to the

west of the town, thrown across the northern branch. For a great distance above and below that point, the river was impassable, so that he proceeded in security, from attack by the troops to the east of the river. And Pickens, with all the exertions he could make, could not collect together a force sufficient to retard him in his march. The loyalists, acting as mounted infantry, were too formidable for his party, mounted, as he expresses himself, "on horses so exhausted by service, that they could neither get up with the enemy, nor get away from him."

As soon as Cruger had descended so far down the fork as to leave no cause to fear for the safety of his convoy, he dismissed it under protection of their own mounted men, with instructions to pursue their journey down the southwest side of the Edisto, so as to keep that river between them and the American parties. He then moved on to a junction with Lord Rawdon, at the head of twelve or thirteen hundred men.

On the 10th July, General Greene had collected together all his different detachments, and being re-enforced by Sumpter with his brigade, and some militia, moved on to within four miles of Orangeburgh and offered the enemy battle. The ground he had chosen is on the north side of the creek which crosses the old Orangeburgh road to Granby, four miles from Orangeburgh; and the force he had with him amounted to about two thousand, but among them there were scarcely eight hundred regular infantry. Lord Rawdon's force, after the junction with Stewart, is estimated at fifteen hundred, all disciplined men. In artillery the two armies were nearly equal; in cavalry, the preponderance was infinitely in favour of the Americans.

Thus circumstanced, had it not been for the approach of Cruger, it was still in the power of the American general, to have forced Lord Rawdon to almost any measure he pleased, as every avenue could have been closed against communication and supplies. But, the certainty of Cruger's arrival in a few days, left no time for deliberation.

Greene finding the enemy would not leave his ground to attack him, resolved, if practicable, to move up and give battle. Nor was it until he had closely reconnoitered, in person, at the head of his cavalry, all the advantages of the enemy's position, that he reluctantly concluded he should be obliged to relinquish the attack.

Orangeburgh is situated on the east bank of the North Edisto, which winding round it, covers nearly one half of its circumference. To the north and south are swamps and ravines, which approach so near to each other, as to leave but a narrow isthmus on the east side, and even that is broken and uneven. The gaol, a strong brick building of two stories, not inferior, as

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 Greene observes, to a strong redoubt, with some adjacent buildings, completely commanded this approach. The crown of the hill on which it was situated, was sufficiently spacious for forming and manœuvring the British army, and the fences and houses of the town afforded shelter to the infantry from all attempts of the American cavalry or mounted militia; while the bridge in their rear afforded a secure retreat in case of misfortune.

To have attacked, in this situation, with a force consisting chiefly of mounted infantry, would have been madness; and the American commander, consoleing himself with having lain two days in positions where the enemy had, at any time, the choice of giving battle, and marching on the 12th in sight of his position to offer him battle, resolved to retire. As his ulterior measures contemplated the separation of his army into two nearly equal parts in the very face of the enemy, as well as crossing the Congaree at a ferry, it was, of course necessary, that the movement should be masked, until the enemy could no longer avail himself of the advantages it afforded him.

Accordingly, moving off with his infantry on the night of the 13th, whilst his cavalry, who had nothing to fear, covered its retirement effectually from notice, the former was across the river before the enemy knew that it had moved from its encampment. The latter were then let loose on that memorable incursion into the lower country, which drove the enemy in all quarters into Charleston, and for a while prostrated every appearance of royal power down to the gates of that place.

As this interesting piece of domestic history has never been fully related, we shall take the liberty of introducing its particulars as an episode. The correspondence of the day supplies all the details.

The command of the expedition was given to Sumpter, but under him acted Marion, Lee, the Hamptons, Taylor, Horry, Mayhem, Laey, and most of those enterprising partisans, who, during the revolutionary struggle, gave vigour and animation to the American cause. The command consisted of all the state troops, Colonel Lee's legion, and a detachment of artillery with one field piece, in the whole about one thousand men. The objects of it were, besides the positive injury which there was a prospect of doing the enemy by striking at his line of posts, to inspirit the whigs, and by drawing the attention of Lord Rawdon to that quarter, induce him to relinquish altogether, his views upon the Congarees and the country beyond him.

In the letter to General Sumpter, on this occasion, written on the 14th, Greene advises him, "that by a letter from General Pickens, he finds that Cruiger must have formed a junction with Lord Rawdon the evening before," therefore he says, "there is no time to be lost, push your operations night and

day ; keep a party to watch the enemy's motions at Orangeburgh, as they move down. Should they move in any other direction I will advise you. Keep Colonel Lee and General Marion advised of all matters from above, and tell Colonel Lee to thunder even at the gates of Charleston. I have high expectations from their force and enterprise. Nothing can deprive you of complete success, but the want of time. Do not neglect to have your boats in readiness for crossing your artillery over Santee, should it be necessary."

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At the date of this letter, General Sumpter's detachments were sweeping down by every road that led to Charleston; whilst he, with the main body, was pursuing the Congaree road leading down the south side of that river, and the east side of the Cooper river.

To Colonel Lee, with the legion, was assigned the service of carrying Dorchester, and then pressing on to carry terror to the gates of Charleston. Colonel Wade Hampton, at the head of a detachment of Sumpter's cavalry, was ordered to co-operate with Lee, whilst Colonel Henry Hampton seized and held the bridge over the Four-Holes Creek, to hold these parties advised of the movements of Rawdon's force at Orangeburgh. But as it was expected that the post at Dorchester would offer some resistance, Henry Hampton, after posting a party at the bridge, had orders to proceed on and support Lee in the attack on Dorchester. And a detachment of Marion's troops under Colonel Mayhem, passing the head of Cooper River and Wadboo Creek, penetrated below, to the eastward of Biggin Church, to obstruct the retreat of the garrison by destroying the bridge over Wadboo Creek. It would have been difficult to imagine arrangements better calculated to effect the purposes of the expedition, and if any defect remained, it was removed when Colonel Wade Hampton, in concert with Lee, (who still acted the independent partisan,) passed on to the east of Dorchester, by the Wassmasaw Road to Goose-Creek Bridge, thereby cutting off the communication between Dorchester and Monk's Corner, and between the latter place and Charleston by the route west of Cooper River.

Contrary to expectation, Colonel Lee encountered no resistance at Dorchester. The garrison was at that time greatly reduced by the draft made on it by Stewart, and recently by a very serious munity, in which it was said one hundred men were killed and wounded before it was quelled.

The sudden appearance of Hampton at Goose-Creek Bridge, seems to have alarmed the garrison of Dorchester, and caused it to abandon the post. But Lee arrived in time to seize a number of horses, variously estimated at from fifty to two hundred, and four wagons, three of which were empty, but the fourth contained a valuable supply of fixed ammunition.

Whilst Lee was securing and sending off his prize, Colonel W. Hampton's patience, it seems, became exhausted at his post at Goose-Creek Bridge, and hearing nothing from the former, and fearing that all fruits of the near approach to Charleston would be lost by the alarm that the knowledge of his advance would occasion; or perhaps apprehending that Lee meant to appropriate to himself all the eclat of the dash into the vicinity of Charleston, Hampton moved rapidly down the road, spreading terror into the very lines of the city. A scene of greater alarm and confusion has seldom been exhibited. The bells rung, the alarm-guns were fired, and the whole city was under arms.

Captain Read, who commanded Hampton's van-guard of twelve men, encountered at the Quarter-House a patrol of British dragoons, whom he immediately charged and made prisoners. The guard posted at that place shared the same fate, and after exhibiting themselves coolly to the centinels on the advanced redoubts, Hampton's party retired, bearing with them fifty prisoners, among whom were several officers.

Hampton's loss in numbers was trifling; but, in the fall of Captain Wright, the service lost a brave and valuable officer.

The next day, Colonel Lee approached and made his charge over the same ground. In his *Memoirs*, he expresses his disappointment at finding every thing in solitude; without adverting to the fact, that Hampton had gleaned the field before him.

The two parties then moved on to join Sumpter, probably in no very good humour with each other.

The first cause why the expedition so auspiciously begun failed of complete success, is to be found in an unfortunate occurrence, which drew the commander's attention away from his main object, and occasioned a loss of that precious time, on which he had been warned that his success must altogether depend.

On his march, General Sumpter received intelligence, that the enemy had appeared in force at Murray's Ferry. This lay to the left of his line of march, but he thought it advisable to send off a strong detachment of three hundred men to strike at this hostile party. The intelligence was erroneous, or the party had retired immediately; but, had it been otherwise, it was no object in comparison with that against which all his measures had been directed, and which could not fail of sustaining some derangement from such a deviation from original views.

Accordingly, the enemy received re-enforcements, and then General Sumpter was compelled to check his march, as he was too weak, in the absence

of his detachments, to approach the enemy within striking distance. In the mean time, intelligence was collected, the enemy recovered from his alarm, and preparations were made for destroying the stores and evacuating the post.

The American army could better have spared the prisoners than the stores, for they are said to have been very considerable.

At thirty miles from the coast Cooper River is supplied by a variety of branches, all respectable streams, bordered by impassable swamps, and only to be crossed in a very few places by ferries, or causeways and bridges. Of these streams, Biggin Creek is the most northwardly, and is esteemed the head of the west branch of Cooper River. On the east of this creek, the road to Charleston crosses Watboo and Quinby Creeks, between which the road forks, and crosses the latter, esteemed the east fork of Cooper River, at two different points, the left at Quinby Bridge, the right at Bonneau's Ferry. From Biggin Bridge, the only road westwardly to Charleston, crosses at Goose Creek Bridge.

The church near Biggin Bridge, a strong brick building, is about a mile from Monk's Corner, and the post consisted of a redoubt at the corner, (at this time abandoned) and the fortified church at Biggin, which covered the bridge, and secured the retreat at that point, by way of Monk's Corner. But, could Watboo Bridge be destroyed, the retreat by the eastern route became impracticable, and this bridge became of course, an important object with the two parties.

The detachment under Mayhem had not dared to approach the enemy with any confidence, prior to the advance of the main body; for the enemy's force consisted of at least five hundred disciplined infantry, being the 19th regiment, commanded by Colonel Cotes; with one hundred and fifty horse and a piece of artillery.

On the 16th, Sumpter's detachment, (with the exception of Colonel Henry Hampton's) being collected, he marched up to support Mayhem's detachment in its attempt upon the bridge. Re-enforcing it with a detachment under Colonel Peter Horry, the command devolved upon that officer, and he proceeded on to effect the intended object—the destruction of the bridge.

The enemy's cavalry were ordered to prevent this, and advanced to the attack with a show of great confidence. But, they were received with a firmness which drove them back in confusion. Colonel Lacy, who was one of the American party, broke entirely through them with his mounted riflemen. Some were killed, and a number of prisoners taken. Horry then dispatched an officer to destroy the bridge, and remained to cover the party

engaged in the undertaking. The enemy soon made their appearance in such force, that he was obliged to call in the party engaged in destroying the bridge, and to retire before the enemy, to the main body.

Sumpter, believing that the enemy had marched out to give him battle, retired behind a defile a little distance in his rear, and prepared for receiving them. But, the purpose of the enemy was only to wear out the day in amusing him; and, accordingly, retiring in the evening, they heaped together their stores in the church, (which might just as well have been heaped together out of it) set fire to them, and moved off on the road to the eastward, by Watboo and Quinby.

The flames, bursting through the roof of the church about three in the morning, announced to Sumpter that the enemy had fled. The pursuit was immediately commenced, but unfortunately Lieutenant Singleton, with his piece of artillery, was ordered to remain on the ground, that he might not delay the movements of the infantry.

Lee and Hampton led the pursuit, until, having passed the Watboo, they discovered that the cavalry of the enemy had separated from the infantry, and pursued the right hand route. Hampton then struck off in pursuit of the cavalry, urging his panting horses in the hope to overtake them before they could make good the passage of the river. But he was disappointed; they had completed their escape, and secured the boats on the opposite side, before he came up with them. He had then to measure back his way to witness the escape of the remaining object of pursuit, the enemy's infantry; lost, perhaps, because the first had divided the attention of the pursuers.

Marion's cavalry, under Colonel Mayhem, had joined the legion cavalry in pursuit of the infantry; and about a mile to the north of Quinby Creek, the rear guard of the retreating army was overtaken, with nearly the whole of their baggage.

The rear guard consisted of one hundred men, commanded by a Captain Campbell; they at first exhibited a show of resistance, but terrified at the furious onset of the cavalry, they threw down their arms without firing a gun—a piece of conduct which had nearly proved fatal to their whole regiment.

Colonel Cotes had passed Quinby Bridge, and made dispositions for its demolition, after his rear-guard and baggage should be placed in safety. The plank which covered the bridge had been loosened from the sleepers, and a howitzer, at its opposite extremity, was placed to protect the party left to complete its destruction, after the rear-guard should have passed.

As neither alarm gun nor express had apprized Cotes of an enemy's approach, he was not prepared for immediate defence. But, fortunately for his command,

he was present at the bridge when the American cavalry came in view, and his measures were promptly taken to avert the threatening danger. His main body was, at the time, partly on the causeway, on the south side of the bridge, and partly pressed into a lane beyond it, which wholly disabled them from immediate action. Orders were dispatched to them to halt, form, and march up, whilst the artillerists were called up to their howitzer, and the fatigue-party to the renewal of their employment at the bridge.

The legion cavalry were in advance of Mayhem's command, and Captain Armstrong led their front section. The plank sliding into the water, and the lighted port-fire approaching the howitzer, left no time for deliberation to a body of men, advancing upon, and closely pressed into a narrow causeway. Nor did the American Cocles hesitate on his duty. One moment longer, and the destruction of the bridge would leave the howitzer in security to vomit death into the American ranks. History does not record an instance of more absolute self-devotion than was displayed on this occasion.

Armstrong, followed close by his section, dashed over the bridge and drove the artillerists from their gun. Lieutenant Carrington immediately followed, and the third section advanced, but faltered. Mayhem, feeling the halt, charged by the legionary cavalry, but the death of his horse arrested his career. Captain M'Cauley, who led his front section, pressed on and passed the bridge. The causeway was now crowded, and a desperate conflict, hand to hand, occupied the combatants. Some of the working party, snatching up their guns, had delivered one fire and fled. Two of Lee's dragoons fell dead at the mouth of the howitzer, and several were severely wounded; but the officers were unhurt; and Cotes and his officers, covered by a wagon, opposed them with their swords, while the British troops were hurrying on to where they could display. Lee had come up, and alighting, was engaged with Mayhem and Dr. Irvine, his surgeon, in endeavouring to repair the bridge. At this moment Armstrong and M'Cauley, looking behind them, and finding their own party halted; and looking before them, and perceiving what was preparing for them in advance, exhibited a presence of mind, in their critical situation, which belongs exclusively to consummate bravery. They knew that leaving the British officers in their rear would protect them from the fire of the army in the front, and urging their way through the flying soldiers on the causeway, they wheeled into the woods on their left, and escaped by heading the stream, to verify the trite proverb, that "fortune favours the brave."

General Sumpter, in his official communication, says, "if the whole party had charged across the bridge, they would have come upon the enemy in such a state of confusion, while extricating themselves from the lane, that they must

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have laid down their arms." It is certain that Colonel Lee was very much censured at the time for leaving these brave men to their fate; but he has given his reasons to the world, and it would be a folly to censure him for not performing that which he asserts was impracticable.

Colonel Cotes, after throwing the plank from the bridge, retired to the adjoining plantation, and not daring to trust himself to the open country in face of such an active and powerful cavalry, resolved to defend himself under cover of the buildings of Captain Shubrick's plantation, which afforded him many advantages. They were situated on a rising ground, the dwelling-house of two stories, and contiguous to it a number of out-houses and rail fences, affording security from the cavalry, and a covering from the marksmen of his enemy.

As the main body of the Americans had to make a considerable circuit to approach the house, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge; it was three o'clock P. M. before General Sumpter's force arrived on the ground. He found the enemy drawn up in a square in front of the house, and prepared to receive him. As he had very few bayonets, it would have been a folly to march directly up to the attack; and the precedent of King's Mountain furnished him with his order of battle. His infantry was divided into three bodies. His own brigade, under Colonels Middleton, Polk, Taylor, and Lacey, advanced in front, under shelter of a line of negro houses, which they were ordered to reach and occupy. General Marion's brigade, which was very much reduced, was thrown into two divisions, and ordered to advance on the right of the enemy, where there was no shelter but fences, and those within forty or fifty yards of the houses occupied by the enemy. The cavalry not being able to act, was stationed in a secure position, remote from the scene of action, but near enough to cover the infantry from pursuit.

It was four o'clock when the parties had reached their respective positions, and the signal was given to advance. With the utmost alacrity they moved up to the attack. Sumpter's brigade soon gained the negro houses in their front, and from these directed their rifles with certain effect. Colonel Thomas Taylor, with about forty-five men of his regiment, then pressed forward to the fences on the enemy's left, and delivered a fire which drew upon him a charge of the British bayonet, which was not to be withstood.

Marion's men were resolved not to be idle spectators, and seeing the danger of Taylor's party, with a firmness that would have done honour to veteran troops, rushed through a galling fire up to the fences on their right, and extricated Taylor; and, notwithstanding that, the open railing afforded but a slender protection, they continued to fire from this slight covering as long as a charge of ammunition remained in the corps. The brant of the battle fell

upon them ; and they maintained to the last, the reputation they had acquired in many a rude conflict. All who fell in the action were of Marion's command. When their ammunition was expended, they were drawn off in perfect order, exhibiting not a symptom of alarm. Very early in the action, the enemy retired into the house, and within a picketted garden, and the action was warmly maintained from the doors, windows and pickets.

The sun was down when the assailants were drawn off, and this, at this season of the year, will make the combat to have lasted three hours. It is confidently asserted, that not a man left the ground while there remained to him a charge of ammunition ; and such was their self-possession at the close of the action, that they were ready to have returned to it the next hour ; but, the ammunition of the detachment was exhausted, and that captured at Dorchester, by some unfortunate mismanagement, had been forwarded directly on towards head-quarters.

Still there was a hope left. The artillery had been ordered up, and it was possible that Captain Singleton had with him some spare powder. "Pewter ball," as General Sumpter writes, "they could have made in plenty." The army was drawn off across Quinby Bridge, (which had been repaired during the action) and encamped at the distance of three miles, leaving the cavalry to watch and control the movements of the enemy, and intending to renew the combat in the morning.

But, the dæmon of discord was now working the ruin of the expedition. When the parties who had been engaged, met and compared their losses, and the circumstances under which they fought, those jealousies which ever infest irregular and volunteer troops, suggested to Marion's men, that they had been exposed, whilst Sumpter's own, with the exception of Colonel Taylor's command, had been spared, and the idea furnished a sufficient pretext for disgust and retiring. Many of them moved off in the night ; the infection communicated to some of Sumpter's men ; and to complete the catastrophe, in the morning early, Colonel Lee with his legion, took up the line of march for head-quarters, without consulting the wishes of the commanding general.*

It is a very remarkable fact,† that in the account which this author has given of the battle of Quinby, he represents it as having been fought by himself and Marion, without the presence of Sumpter ; when every thing shows, that it was altogether fought under the command of Sumpter ; and in none of the official accounts does Colonel Lee's name appear, except when the fact of

* General Sumpter's official letter.

† Lee's Memoirs, vol. 2. p. 154.

CHAP. XIV. his separating himself from Sumpter the morning following the battle, is mentioned. From the letters both of Marion and Sumpter, now before us, we are led to the conclusion, that Colonel Lee's legion must have been posted with the cavalry, which it is well known were not, and could not be, engaged, and that the legion infantry was held in reserve.

We will not assert, that it was in the spirit of retaliation that Sumpter's name is not mentioned, for we would impeach Colonel Lee's *recollection*, not his *veracity*; but, it is certain, that this expedition must have terminated in great irritation between these distinguished officers, since Sumpter directly charges Lee, with having failed in every thing that he undertook during the expedition.*

In this action, Marion lost some brave men, and others were, for some time, lost to the service. Among the latter were Colonels Swinton and Baxter, two of the most active adherents to Marion during all his trials. It is wonderful, considering his exposure, that his loss was not much greater; but, General Greene accounts for it by observing—"the enemy were all raw Irishmen, who knew very little about the use of the gun."

The loss of the enemy has never been ascertained; the American account represent it as very great—they say seventy killed, and a proportionate number wounded. With so many marksmen, for three hours watching the appearance of a musket at a crevice or a window, or between the garden palings, and firing by the direction it afforded, there must have been some lives taken, but the number was probably exaggerated.

Nor can the numbers actually engaged be well ascertained. The British returns of issues, taken in the baggage, give nine hundred rations and forage for two hundred and fifty horses. Estimating the cavalry at one hundred and fifty, there could not have been less than five or six hundred infantry.

Sumpter asserts, that "their infantry alone was superior to his whole force,"† and "that he attacked them with half their number." Be this as it may, it is no reproach to the British commander, that he retired into his citadel; for, with the cavalry watching his motions, and the three parties of infantry alternately returning and advancing, he would probably have shared the fate of Ferguson, had he kept the field. The event vindicates his prudence and firmness.

Notwithstanding the defection of his militia and the retirement of the legion, Sumpter had still a sufficient number of troops to have held the enemy

* Sumpter's letters, 18th, 22d and 25th July.

† Sumpter's letter, 25th July.

in a state of investment, whilst he tried the effect of his artillery ; but, finding that it brought with it no supply of ammunition, being but twenty miles from Charleston, and at a place accessible by tide-water, having heard that Lord Rawdon had moved down in force from Orangeburgh, being himself now fifteen miles below Monk's Corner, which is but sixteen from Goose-Creek Bridge, where Lord Rawdon's force might already have arrived, there being serious ground for apprehending disaster, General Sumpter resolved to retreat across the Santee.

Thus, finally, this expedition, which promised so much, ended in disappointment. There can be little doubt, that the British regiment was in the grasp of the American detachment, and ought to have fallen. General Sumpter, it seems, apprehensive that it was too strongly posted at Biggin Church to admit of its being forced, or compelled to surrender in the time he had at command, manœuvred with a view to induce it to retreat, and compel it to pursue the route to the west ; in which case, it would have encountered Colonels Lee and Wade Hampton. In this, he says, "he was disappointed by the representations of the officer who was charged with the destruction of Watboo Bridge. It was reported to him to have been effectually destroyed, but the enemy succeeded in repairing it in time to escape by it." The retreat of the enemy on the east side of the river, could have been effectually cut off by either Lee or Hampton, or both, by crossing below at Strawberry Ferry and ascending on that side, so as either to possess and hold the passes at Wathoo and Quinby, or destroy the bridges and pass on to form a junction with Sumpter. The route would have been shorter and better than that which they had pursued. Why this was not done, can only be explained by the supposition, that General Sumpter had no doubt of his succeeding in demolishing the bridge at Wathoo, by the party detached under Mayhem and Horry. And he would have succeeded ; had his main body approached near enough to give full support to the party detached for that purpose ; or if the precaution had been taken of demolishing that at Quinby, and destroying the flats at Bonneau's Ferry, which could certainly have been effected.

There was another point of time when the enemy was equally exposed to the necessity of submitting. It was when he had taken post in the houses at Quinby, and his retreat had become impracticable. If, instead of wasting the ammunition and dispiriting the men, by an attack on the houses, which could scarcely be expected to succeed against an officer such as Cotes had proved himself, General Sumpter's troops had been drawn off to a convenient distance, until the arrival of his artillery ; or rather, if the artillery had not been left behind, the enemy must have capitulated, and there is no doubt would

CHAP. XIV. have capitulated, for the arrival of the artillery would have confirmed the belief they entertained, (and which was then known to General Sumpter) that the attacking party was only the advance of the American army under General Greene.

Finally, it is not improbable that even at last, had Sumpter marched up with his artillery, submission must have followed; but, abandoned as he was by his troops, and exposed to be cut off or opposed by re-enforcements, his retreat cannot be censured. General Greene, in his communications, expresses his entire approbation of it; and instead of chiding or discontent, his letters are full of the most consoling and encouraging observations, and expressive of nothing but gratitude for the efforts made by Sumpter and Marion, and their detachments. Yet this expedition, had it succeeded, would have superceded the necessity of the battle of Eutaw, the object of which was to force the enemy from the field; since the loss of the 19th regiment must have drawn the whole British force down from Orangeburgh, as the order had now been received to withdraw from Charleston two of the regiments lately arrived, and hasten them to New-York; and the remaining British force would all have been necessary to hold the line of posts by Dorchester and Monk's Corner, and even to holding Charleston itself perhaps, in subjection and security. The end in view was an important one, and the means provided appeared amply adequate.

It was not that on this occasion Greene was not disappointed—that he expressed no dissatisfaction to the officers engaged in this expedition; but from habitual self-command, and that restraint which he ever imposed on himself, to do that only which was best for the service. In correspondence with others, he repeatedly says, “upon the whole the affair was clever, but by no means equal to what it ought to have been. The whole regiment of six hundred men would have been captured if General Sumpter had not detailed too much, and had not mistaken a covering party for an attack.”

Yet, although the principal object was not attained, some benefits resulted from this expedition; the British interest was materially shaken; their party alarmed and humbled; the spirits of the whigs raised; and the fact ascertained to the world, that the country was not conquered. Nor was it without serious injury to the enemy in actual losses; one hundred and fifty prisoners were taken, and nine commissioned officers, besides an unascertained loss at Quinby. One officer and some privates had been killed; stores to a large amount, as well in the church as in four schooners that were captured, were destroyed;

horses wagons, and stores, to a respectable amount, were captured and carried off.

Among the latter was a prize not unworthy of notice, from its extreme rarity in the American army. This was the sum of seven hundred and twenty guineas in the paymaster's chest, taken with the baggage at Quinby bridge. Sumpter, that evening, divided it among the soldiers, and so much hard money had perhaps never before been in possession of this army at one time. Had the general been more politic than liberal, the detention of it for a day or two might have prevented the departure of some who left him, and who were the better able, and the more desirous to leave him, after the receipt of the glittering guinea which fell to the share of each soldier, and it furnished the means of determining pretty accurately the number of Sumpter's command. How much more beneficially to the service could this money have been employed, at this time, in secret services !

But perhaps the greatest benefit that resulted from this expedition, was the confidence with which it inspired the militia in themselves. The party actually engaged in the attack on Colonel Cotes, were almost exclusively South Carolina militia, and the bravery they had displayed would have done honour to veteran troops. It was demonstrated, that this species of force wanted nothing but consistency to enable it to meet the enemy with effect. Their terror of the British bayonet and British discipline began to diminish, whilst the respect of the enemy for their undisciplined valour rose in proportion.

General Sumpter retired across the Santee; and Marion into the heart of his brigade, to undergo any of those military transformations to which he, in common with the other state commanders, was constantly subjected. By a state law the tour of militia service was two months. Notwithstanding the prostration of civil government, this was still the law under which the militia were called into service : and as often as the two months expired Marion had to retire, like animals that shed their horns or shells, until again re-established in the means of attack or defence.

CHAPTER XV.

Camp of Repose at the High Hills of Santee. State of the Army. Re-enforced from North Carolina. Measures to cover the Country. Exchange of prisoners. Colonel Hayne. Rumours of Lord Cornwallis' retreat through North Carolina. Measures to meet him. Attempt to drive the enemy into Charleston. Battle of the Eutaws.

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GREENE and his army had now been some days, for the first time, breathing from the intense and continued efforts of this eventful campaign. Crossing the Wateree, at Simons's Ferry, he had taken post on the east side of that river, in the salubrious and delightful region of the High Hills of Santee.

His camp was on a plain, at that time known by the epithet of James's Old-field, late the hospitable residence of Colonel John Singleton.

Here the army enjoyed rest and refreshment, only to prepare it for another great effort to drive the enemy from the interior country. "As soon," says the general,* "as I shall form a junction with the Salisbury militia, and General Sumpter's brigade of regular troops, we will seek the enemy wherever we can find them, unless they take sanctuary within the gates of Charleston." And in a letter to the marquis, he says, "I have already directed Sumpter to join me; with which re-enforcement, aided by the militia, I mean to struggle with the

* Letters to several, 14th July.

enemy until I can hear further from you respecting their future designs in your quarter."

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The baggage of the southern army had been previously forwarded to the High Hills of Santee. When the army moved from Wimsborough, every thing that could encumber its movements, including the sick and wounded, had been ordered away to Simons's Ferry; and some apprehension being entertained of a blow meditated against it from Ninety-Six, it was ordered to cross the river to Statesburgh, and very minute instructions given for the defence and preservation of it. The detachment which accompanied it as a guard, was composed of a body of Virginia militia, who had accompanied the artillery from Prince Edward Court-House, and some new levies from North Carolina. The following extracts of letters from Major Armstrong, of North Carolina, to whose command this service was committed, present a curious view of the necessity which the American general was under of retiring to this camp of repose, not less for recovering his sick troops, than for disciplining and re-enforcing those who are well.

(" July 7.) The command you have placed me in, is the most disagreeable I have ever had since in service. The continentals are two thirds sick; it requires the rest to take care of the baggage. The Virginia militia are sick, or at best in such order that it is out of my power to command them to duty; they are determined to go home, insisting that their time is out; the officers say it is out of their power to stop them, for they will go off in the night, &c.

" I have examined the returns of provisions, and find that rations are drawn for upwards of one hundred and fifty men, and but one hundred fit for duty."

" (July 10.) Since my last, upwards of forty of the Virginia militia deserted.

" Our men are getting sick very fast. I am distressed to know what to do. I am sure, if the whole army had been picked, you could not have got a more disorderly crew. Plundering and stealing are in full perfection, and done in such a manner, that we cannot come to the knowledge of it.

" I cannot depend upon Colonel Lacy's men to guard the prisoners, for they will not be confined to camp. The militia will every man desert, and I shall not have sufficient men to guard the prisoners and the camp."

" (July 12.) I am just now informed, that fifteen of them deserted two of their posts at the provost-guard."

Some measures attempted by General Greene, whilst in this camp of repose, drew upon him the imputation of under-rating the services of the militia. An imputation which found its way to congress, and furnished his old enemies with a new charge not a little affecting his popularity. Much as

CHAP. he had been tormented, and seriously as he had been wounded, in seeing his
 XV. fairest prospects blasted, and his most promising measures baffled, by depending upon this fluctuating kind of force, he must have indeed been more than human, not to have felt the deepest mortification at the necessity hitherto imposed upon him, of trusting, not his own reputation, (for that he might have tolerated) but his final success in rescuing the country from the enemy, to a force not calculated to carry into effect, measures, on an extended scale, or operations that required time. With a force embodied but for six weeks or two months, and consuming half of it in marching to and fro, what commander could trust the safety of his army, and of the country, in entering upon combined operations, which many months might be necessary to bring to maturity? especially, when the whole, as in a recent instance, was liable to be withdrawn from him, at the most critical period, by a state governor, even without consulting his wishes or his views, or giving reasonable notice of his intentions?

There never was a time, when an army, on a permanent footing, was more indispensable to the views of the southern commander, than the present. Cornwallis was now descending towards Norfolk—the siege of New York supposed to be contemplated by the commander in chief—all the disposable force of the enemy ordered to that place—and a French fleet daily expected on the southern coast. Under these circumstances, could he but drive the enemy into Charleston, and leave him under control of a force that could be depended on for a few months, there was the most flattering prospect of securing Lord Cornwallis himself, whilst the attention of Clinton was absorbed in the defence of the head-quarters of British power.

The state of North Carolina was, at this time, straining every nerve in the common cause. It is at that point of time that the eye of candour ought to consider the conduct of this state, in judging of its merits during the revolutionary war. The whig interest was, at no previous time, at liberty to exhibit its elasticity. Repressed by the numerous population of loyalists, its limbs were fettered, and its councils distracted. But, when the British army was seen to cower and fly before the American, the feeble and undecided no longer wavered; and those whose voluntary hostility to the American cause had been made manifest, sought protection in the garrison at Wilmington, followed the British army, or fled the country.

A legislature was then convened, not tinctured with loyalty—a governor of tried vigour elected—and the leading whigs, for the first time, asserted an undivided control over the councils of the country.

From this time, there was nothing refused that the general solicited ; and could the spirit of the legislature, and of Governor Burke, have been infused into their colonels of counties, the southern army would never have wanted for regulars, militia, horses, equipments, magazines, or any thing else that the country afforded. CHAP.
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There is, and perhaps ought to be, a clannish spirit in the states of the union, which will ever dispose the writers they produce, to blazon with peculiar zeal, the virtues and talents of the eminent men of their respective states. It is a tendency so natural to man, that religion, the retirement of the cloister, and the bare-footed friar who has renounced the world, acknowledge its influence in exaggerated eulogies on a patron saint or a beatified brother. And it will probably happen, that in future times, the states that have produced the ablest writers, will enjoy the reputation of having produced the ablest statesmen, generals and orators. But, if ever the characters of men shall be tried by the standard of evidence, rather than the elegance of a writer's style, and the confidence of his assertions, the conduct and correspondence of Governor Burke of North Carolina, will entitle him to a respectable standing among the illustrious men of his time ; nor will the country refuse to his predecessor, governor Nash, a full share of its esteem and gratitude.

It was under the administration of the latter, that the law was passed which enacted, that " those persons who have been lawfully drafted, and have neglected or refused to march, and go into actual service on due notice, or find a substitute as therein is directed, shall be held and deemed a continental soldier for twelve months ; and that those persons who have deserted their colours, when in actual service, shall be held and deemed a continental soldier during the war."

Very soon after the battle of Guilford, Governor Nash entered upon the serious execution of this law, against those of the North Carolina militia, who had fled on that day without again rejoining their regiments ; and many others who had incurred its penalties. Many emigrated or absconded, to avoid its operation ; but, the law was submitted to, by a greater number than could have been reasonably expected.

But, the state did not depend chiefly upon this resource for reinstating her quota. A draft was ordered, the quota of the counties assigned, and the militia charged with its execution. But, law and order had too long been depressed, to resume at once their elasticity. And it required all the zeal and influence of the Generals Sumner, Caswell, Polk, Parsons and others, to give speed to the movements of those, on whom the duty immediately devolved to collect and embody the drafts. The measure, spread over too extensive a

space to admit of rapid execution. At length, however, the recruits began to collect, and could have been marched in time to re-enforce the southern army, even at Ninety-Six; but the state had no arms, and no means of purchasing them. Messengers were dispatched in all directions, to beg or to borrow, but in vain. Virginia had none to spare, and La Fayette could only promise, that North Carolina should have the arms, then under repair, as soon as they could be put in order. Some had been recently dispatched by Steuben to the southern army, and some wagon loads were then on their way from the north, with the same destination; and these, it was suggested, might be stopped and made use of. We have seen what became of those at the laboratory, and those on their way from the north. The supply of about three hundred stand, previously dispatched by Steuben, was all that reached Hillsborough; and for some time the troops could neither be marched nor disciplined for want of arms. Two detachments, amounting together to four hundred and twenty men, it has been seen, had already joined the southern army, and Greene had now fallen back to receive five hundred men then assembled at Hillsborough, and expected to march immediately under General Sumner.

Some very handsome measures had recently been adopted in North Carolina, both for remounting the cavalry of the army, and for supporting it by a regular supply of militia; and for marching immediately to its support, fifteen hundred militia from the districts of Salisbury and Hillsborough.

When General Greene had ascertained, by the most mortifying experience, that he must no more rely upon drawing either horses or men from Virginia, he dispatched Colonel Malmedy from Ninety-Six, to wait upon the legislature of North Carolina, then in session, and press upon their attention, the necessity he was under, of looking to them for support in his present circumstances. The application was promptly met, and two hundred horses, a monthly draft of militia, to keep constantly in the field the number of two thousand, and an immediate draft for fifteen hundred, to be marched forthwith to the army, and to serve three months after reaching its destination, were voted without hesitation. This detachment of militia, from counties high in reputation for bravery, was another object with the southern commander, for falling back to his present encampment.

It is but justice to the state of Virginia here to mention, that it was not long before she repented of the evil she had done in withholding her support from the southern army. And although she could not remedy the injuries sustained by it, both at Camden and Ninety-Six, unsolicited, she proffered a draft of two thousand militia and three hundred cavalry horses. General Nelson had now

succeeded to the office of governor, and one of the first acts of his administration was to communicate this vote of the state to General Greene, accompanied by the most cordial proffer of his own support. But as the right of commanding the militia after being detached on continental service, had been asserted and fatally exercised by that state, although the offer of the horses was accepted with avidity, the militia was not called out, but instead of it the most earnest entreaties pressed upon the governor to draw the attention of the state to the necessity of replenishing her regiments, now very thin, and their eighteen months term of service fast approaching its termination. "I hope," he observes, "every exertion will be made to fill up the line before the men get their discharge; and that your excellency will make every endeavour to enforce the necessity on the minds of the legislature. Your own experience, no doubt, teaches you the great impolicy of depending too much on militia. Regulars alone can insure your safety. Men will not yield to the hardships of a camp, nor submit to the severity of discipline, without a certain line of duty prescribed as something professional; and, by the force of discipline only, are they made to encounter dangers and hardships as the most honourable attendants of a soldier's life. I would by all means recommend drafting for three or four years at least. Short enlistments are dangerous, and can give no permanent security. Before you can finish a character for the duties of the field, twelve months experience and severe service are absolutely necessary. Eighteen months men are but little better than raw undisciplined militia. Before you can reap any material advantage from them, their times of enlistment will expire, and they will leave you perhaps at a moment when every thing is at stake; and at a time too, when the country looks up to the army for safety and protection; and too frequent calls on the militia serve to weaken the powers of industry, destroy the means of agriculture, and break up the resources of your country."

As far as it was indispensable that he should depend upon a militia force, it was the intention of the commander of the southern army, to make use of the militia of the three most southern states, and of volunteers from the mountains; and it is remarkable, that in making out estimates for supplies, he instructs his officers to make a double charge where militia are to be used, assigning as his reason, that "after doing all you can, they will waste twice as much as regular troops."

Yet never was accusation more unjustly raised, than that he undervalued this species of force. He often speaks in the strongest terms of their valour and patriotism, and only regrets the sacrifice of such men to the exposures and hardships of a camp; and his earnestness in pressing upon the states to raise

CHAP. their troops by drafts, can only be attributed to its efficiency in forming an army,
 XV. from the excellence of the materials furnished by the militia.

This method he now endeavoured to avail himself of, to re-establish the South Carolina line.

To Pickens, whose brigade furnished the most abundant materials, he particularly addressed himself: stating the indispensable necessity of furnishing a permanent force, for at least twelve months, in that mode, for the defence of the country; warning them against resting in security because the enemy had withdrawn for the present, and at any rate, intreating, if the country would not submit to be drafted in the absence of civil power, that they would consent to engage to remain in the field at least four months when called into the service. We regret that we have to acknowledge his requests were not complied with. Not for want of zeal in their commanders, but either from the necessities of the people, or their want of inclination.

The distresses of the people at that time, in that quarter, it must be acknowledged, were very great. In those parts of the country which the enemy had laid waste, they were so great that the southern commander took upon himself to order Pickens to take from those who had a plenty, their superfluous grain, and distribute it among the necessitous, at a reasonable price, and on a convenient credit. This salutary measure brought plenty to the door of many a suffering family.

Nor could any one in that country yet venture, with any confidence, from his home. The Indians, as usual, had again been led to attack their remote settlements, and the danger was aggravated by the support of the whites residing among them; and the ravages of the parties of plunderers who prowled over the country, were too alarming to admit of the voluntary adoption of any measure that would remove them from their families.

The present respite was favourable to the extirpation of this evil: and Pickens solicited and obtained immediate permission, once more to make an inroad into the settlements of these deluded people. This was the season when such an attack was calculated to produce the most decisive effect. Their corn was advanced to maturity, and whilst it furnished subsistence to their invaders, the destruction of it brought with it famine, or submission, or retirement to remote hunting grounds for their own subsistence. The chastisement thus inflicted is severe, but it is indispensable against an enemy that so easily evades pursuit.

The movement of Pickens in that quarter, combined with the spirited measures of Arthur, Campbell, Shelby, Seviere, and some other distinguished leaders on the northern frontier, at length brought these unhappy people to a sense of their weakness, and enabled the commissioners appointed by Greene,

in the spring of the year, after having been repeatedly baffled, finally to conclude a treaty of general pacification, or rather of cessation of hostilities.*

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Thus liberated from the danger which threatened their fire-sides, those officers signified their readiness to march to the aid of the southern army, and Greene appointed Shelby to meet him near Fort Granby, in the latter end of August. This was another part of the force which he was endeavouring to concentrate for his future operations.

Not a moment of the time spent in the camp of repose at the Hills was spent in idleness. The combatants had retired to breathe, but it was to prepare for another desperate onset. Every hour was devoted to some employment having that purpose for its object. To refresh his troops, restore the sick, discipline the unexperienced, invigorate the spirits of the whole, were the employments which filled up the limits of the camp. Beyond those limits, the commander had other cares of a more general nature, and equally indispensable. To invite the states—to direct their measures—to collect supplies—to establish magazines—to reinstate his lines of transportation, his armories and depots—all required immediate attention. Judicious officers, dispatched in all directions, had these objects especially committed to their charge. But, the grand objects of all were the passing events at Portsmouth and at Charleston, on the contingencies of which his future measures must depend. Lord Cornwallis in the former, and Lord Rawdon in the latter place, were the two adversaries with whom he had to cope. He had wrestled with both, and respected their skill and vigour.

Nor could his attention be withdrawn from occurrences passing immediately around him. That spirit of plundering which he abhorred, that blood-stained vindictiveness which the brave instinctively detest, the fruits of that misrule which had long lorded it over this country, claimed the first efforts of his authority.

When Sumpter had retreated across the Santee, orders had been transmitted to him to ascend the Congaree and take post near Fridig's Ferry, leaving Marion to take charge of the country on the Santee. The cares of his brigade having called Sumpter into the upper parts of the state, the command of his force in the field was committed to Colonel Wade Hampton. The following extract of a letter from that officer, will present one among many pictures that could be drawn of the licentiousness of man, when his passions have burst the bonds of civil rule :

* Art. Campbell's letter.

"FRIDIG'S FERRY, 27th July, 1781.

"The situation in which I found this neighbourhood, the day after I had the honour of seeing you, is truly to be lamented. Almost every person who remained in this settlement after the army marched, seems to have been combined in committing robberies the most base and inhuman that ever disgraced mankind.

"Colonel Taylor, who had arrived here a few days before me, had apprehended a few of the most notorious of those offenders, whilst the most timid of those who remained were busily employed in collecting and carrying into North Carolina and Virginia, the very considerable booty they had so unjustly acquired. The more daring, but equally guilty part of this banditti, seemed to threaten immediate destruction (by murder, &c.) to those who might presume to call the conduct of them or their accomplices into question. Matters becoming thus serious, made it necessary that something decisive should take place immediately.

"With a few of the state troops, and those of the militia who had spirit or inclination to engage in it, we have secured all of those wretches that can be found, but we find a number of them, on finding matters were likely to terminate against them, have taken their flight towards the northward," &c.

The answer to this letter orders all this gang of plunderers to be forwarded to head quarters, to be tried for their lives, and a body of mounted men to be immediately dispatched after the fugitives, that they may undergo the same fate. And that martial law had been executed on them, and on all others similarly offending, from this time, is most certain; had not the arrival of Governor Rutledge, and the re-establishment of the civil power, required that they should be handed over to be tried by a more regular tribunal.

The return of this gentleman into the state, was hailed by the southern commander as an event replete with beneficial consequences. Compelled as he had been for some months to exercise a military despotism over the state, he now saw a prospect of being relieved in his arduous duties by a man of known talent, clothed with dictatorial powers. Doubts had been raised about this time, of the legality of the powers exercised by military authority, and much discontent introduced, among the few state troops embodied under the different officers created by Greene, lest his engagements should not be ratified by state authority. His only hope also, of raising a permanent force by draft, enlistment, or otherwise, depended upon the aid of the civil arm; and if the country retained any resources for supporting the war, no other means than civil govern-

ment could be resorted to for drawing them forth: for there was still not a dollar in the military chest. CHAP.
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Another evil also, at this time universally prevalent, gave him infinite trouble, and he believed it entirely out of his power to suppress it. This was the dreadful animosity between whig and tory. General Greene never felt any animosity against those who had taken part against the revolution upon principle, and had prosecuted open and honourable war. On all occasions his efforts were directed towards reclaiming them by mild measures, and converting them from foes into friends. In this he had been sadly opposed by the spirit of the times; and the want of civil tribunals for prosecuting such persons, had long been the pretext for inflicting private revenge and the most bare-faced robbery. In a letter to General Pickens, of the 30th July, he says, "I am exceedingly distressed that the practice of plunder still continues to rage. Colonel Beard says it is exercised to such a degree, that the poor inhabitants tremble the moment a party of men appear in sight. If no check can be given to this fatal practice, I am persuaded the inhabitants will think their miseries rather increased than diminished. I beg you to take every possible step in your power to bring offenders to justice; and let those who are capitally concerned be sent prisoners to the camp for trial; for I am determined to subject them to martial law if there is no other mode by which the evil may be remedied. It is, most certainly, our interest to encourage the return of the tories; and I wish you to give them all the encouragement in your power, and afford them all the protection you can."

This inveterate practice of plundering was, in fact, at this time not only disgracing and desolating the country, but seriously prejudicing the service; for, universally, the plunderer would steal away from his party if possible, to carry off or secure his booty. So that the officer (and it is too true that there were such) who did not imperatively restrain his men from plunder, soon found himself deserted and alone.

The attention of Governor Rutledge was therefore, immediately called to this subject; and the first act of his resumed authority, was a proclamation, dated the 5th of August, calculated to put an end to these disorders, by invoking the whole vengeance of the community upon those who had been guilty of them.

Still, the aspect of the war continued, at this time, of the darkest hues. The spirit of retaliation had gone abroad; injuries of the most irritating nature were received and inflicted; and had the commanding general given way to the temper and feelings that were excited, carnage and desolation must have covered the country.

It is certainly true, that whenever the enemy in the revolutionary war, found himself compelled to relinquish his conquests, he exhibited too much of a peevish vindictiveness.

Among the prisoners who were discharged from confinement, under the arrangements of the commissary of prisoners at this time, were those who had surrendered on capitulation at the fall of Charleston; including those who had been transported to the fortress of St. Augustine. By the articles of capitulation, these prisoners, most of whom were men of large families, and considerable property, were to enjoy that property unmolested, as long as they demeaned themselves peaceably. Notwithstanding many vexations from billets and restrictions, this article had not been wholly violated by the enemy, and the families of the prisoners enjoyed the produce of their estates. It was some consolation to the prisoners, when shipped from St. Augustine to Philadelphia, to reflect, that whatever privations and hardships they might themselves be exposed to, their families had a prospect of enjoying comparative plenty.

But, what was the astonishment of all, when the exchange was immediately followed up by a proclamation, ordering all these families to depart from the state in a specified time. Nor was the favour granted without patronage and solicitation, to be permitted to take with them a few servants, or to sacrifice their household property, to raise the money to pay their own passages in cartels provided for them.

Governor Rutledge viewed this act with great indignation; and in retaliation, was led to the adoption of a measure which certainly cannot be defended on the score of policy or humanity. He ordered all the families of the loyalists, many of whom remained on their plantations,* to repair immediately to Charleston. Many obeyed the mandate, and served to swell the number, and increase the miseries of the inhabitants of Rawdon-town.

Retaliation, when it falls upon women and children, is at all times, indefensible; and besides that, it should never be resorted to but in the last extremity, in this case its impolicy was obvious, as the residence of their families, in the country occupied by the whigs, offered a security for the regular conduct of the loyalists, and probably for their deserting the cause they had espoused.

Such measures, when once begun, seldom terminate without some repetitions. It is a struggle in which pride soon takes part with the leading motive, or perhaps supercedes it.

* See Proclamation, 27th September.

It was whilst the army lay in the camp of repose at the Hills, that the execution of Colonel Hayne took place—a n event which spread cimmerian darkness over the face of the army. The feeling it excited, was too deep for utterance; the knotted brow and compressed lip, were its appropriate expressions.

It is the remark of one of the general's family, who had often observed him closely under every vicissitude of fortune, that this was the only occasion in which he ever saw him give way to feeling. The expression was loud and solemn with which he vowed retaliation. And poor Pyles, who, after being dreadfully mangled in the affair near the Haw River, had miraculously recovered of his wounds, and was, at this time, a prisoner on parole, had well nigh felt the weight of the general's wrath. Orders were issued, but soon recalled, to put him into close confinement; as the only officer, then a prisoner, whose commission, rank and standing made him a fit offering to the manes of Hayne.

But, it was only the shadow of the passing cloud over the mind of Greene; and the following extract of a letter to Marion, written on the day he received the intelligence, shows that, instead of indulging his own resentment, his first effort was, to restrain that of others and give it a wise direction.

Marion had, not long before, sustained some injuries from the enemy, for which he had vowed retaliation. Greene knew his decisive cast of character; and was, not without some reason, apprehensive that he would be prompt, as he was fearless, in a case of this kind. Hence he writes—"You will see by Colonel Harden's letter, that the enemy have hung Colonel Hayne. Do not take any measures in the matter towards retaliation, for I do not intend to retaliate upon the *tory* officers, but the *British*. It is my intention to demand the reasons of the colonel's being put to death; and if they are unsatisfactory, as I am sure they will be, and if they refuse to make satisfaction, as I expect they will, to publish my intention of giving no quarter to British officers, of any rank, that fall into our hands. Should we attempt to retaliate upon their militia officers, I am sure they would persevere in the measure, in order to increase the animosity between the whigs and tories, that they might stand idle spectators and see them butcher each other. As I do not wish my intentions known to the enemy but through an official channel, and *as this will be delayed for some few days, to give our friends in St. Augustine time to get off*, I wish you not to mention the matter to any mortal out of your family."

Promptly as General Greene's resolution to retaliate was adopted, it was for the reason assigned to Marion, communicated to no one but the latter until the 26th—three weeks after the execution of Colonel Hayne took place.

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On that day, he writes to General Washington—"Since I wrote your excellency by Colonel Morris, nothing very material has taken place, except the hanging of Colonel Hayne, one of our militia colonels, whom the enemy hung in Charleston a little time since, as a traitor, as they call him. He was a man of a most amiable character, highly respected, and of most extensive influence. This insult offered to the good people of this country, and to the business of exchange, it being a most flagrant breach of the cartel, I am determined to retaliate; and as the enemy are indifferent about their militia officers, I mean to retaliate on the British officers, as the surest way of putting a stop to a practice that can only serve to gratify private revenge."

The date of this letter was that of the receipt of positive information, that the prisoners from St. Augustine had arrived in the Delaware; a considerate precaution in their behalf, which entitles General Greene to their lasting gratitude, and gives an honourable explanation of that want of promptness with which he would otherwise seem chargeable, in not earlier noticing this unhappy affair.

Simultaneously with the writing of this letter appeared his proclamation, declaring:

"Whereas Colonel Isaac Hayne, commanding a regiment of militia in the service of the United States, was taken prisoner by a party of British troops, and after a rigorous detention in the provost prison at Charleston, was condemned and executed on the 4th of this month, in the most cruel and unjustifiable manner, in open violation of the cartel agreed upon between the two armies for the release and exchange of all prisoners of war; and it being no less the duty than the inclination of the army, to resent every violence offered to the good citizens of America, to discountenance all those distinctions they have endeavoured to establish, in making a difference between the various orders of men found under arms for the support of the independence of the United States; and further considering, that these violences are committed with a view of terrifying the good people, and by that means preventing them from acting in conformity with their political interest and private inclinations; and that this method of trying and punishing in consequence of those distinctions, is no less opposite to the spirit of the British, than it is inclusive of an unwarrantable infringement of all the laws of humanity, and the rights of the free citizens of the United States.

"From these considerations I have thought proper to issue the present proclamation, expressly to declare that it is my intention *to make reprisals for all such inhuman insults as often as they take place.* And whereas, the enemy seem willing to expose the small number of the deceived and seduced inhabitants,

who are attached to their interests, if they can but find an opportunity of sacrificing the great number who have stood forth in the defence of our cause, I further declare, *that it is my intention to take the officers of the regular forces, and not the inhabitants who have joined their army for the objects of my reprisals.* But while I am determined to resent every insult that may be offered to the United States, for having maintained our independence, I cannot but lament the necessity I am under of having recourse to measures so extremely wounding to the sentiments of humanity, and so contrary to the liberal principles on which I wish to conduct the war. Given," &c.

Letters were addressed on the same day to Lord Cornwallis and Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, on the subject of Colonel Hayne's execution. Lord Rawdon had at this time sailed for New-York. The letter to Lord Cornwallis is dignified and respectful, expressive of a deep sense of injury, but withholding all reproach until his answer should declare how far he was implicated. "I flatter myself," says the writer, "your lordship is too well acquainted with the feelings of human nature, from the history of mankind, to suppose that any national advantage can result from those cruel distinctions which can only serve to increase the miseries of individuals, nor can I suppose your lordship can have a single doubt, that a people who have gone thus far in support of their liberties, will hesitate a moment to retaliate for every violence offered to their adherents."

To Colonel Balfour, the writer obviously assumes a very different style; he is addressing himself to one who has forfeited his respect—who had by his previous conduct forfeited it; and who, could he have been taken, would most certainly have expiated his crime upon the gallows.

"I wrote to you the 2d inst. respecting a number of prisoners, detained contrary to the express conditions of the late cartel settled for the exchange of prisoners in the southern department. Since I wrote you I am informed of a more flagrant violation than the former, in the cruel and unjust execution of Colonel Hayne; for which I mean immediately to retaliate, unless you can offer something more to justify the measure than I am informed of, or is mentioned in the Charleston paper.

"For the honour of humanity, from an abhorrence of every thing that bears the marks of cruelty, and with a desire to give every man an opportunity to act agreeably to his principles and inclinations, it was my wish to have all considered as prisoners of war who should be found in arms and made captives on either side; and I am fully persuaded that it was no less consonant to Lord Cornwallis' intentions, that they should be exchanged as such, than it was correspondent with my own wishes," &c. "All other exchanges will be dis-

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But these appeals to the world, and to the actors in this dreadful tragedy, had been anticipated by a noble act of self-devotion in the officers of the southern army. Without a knowledge of the resolution adopted by their general, and while universal surprise at his supposed hesitation prevailed because the motive was prudently withheld, they met together on the 20th, and addressing him in a memorial equally distinguished for feeling and firmness, solicited him to retaliate, professing their consciousness of the danger to which it exposed themselves, and their readiness to encounter it. The original, with their respective signatures, is before us, in the handwriting of Colonel Williams. After introducing the subject by observing—"That they are informed not only by current reports, but by official and acknowledged authorities, that, contrary to express stipulations in the capitulation of Charleston, signed the 12th May, 1780, a number of very respectable inhabitants of Charleston and others, were confined on board prison-ships, and sent to St. Augustine, and other places, distant from their homes, families, and friends; that, notwithstanding the general cartel settled for the exchange of prisoners in the southern department, and agreed to the 3d day of May last, several officers of militia, and other gentlemen, subjects of the United States, have been and still are detained in captivity. That the commanding officer of the British forces in Charleston, regardless of the principles, and even the express terms of the said cartel, hath not only presumed to discriminate between the militia and other subjects of the United States, prisoners of war, partially determining who were, and who were not objects of exchange, but hath even dared to execute, in the most ignominious manner, Colonel Hayne of the militia of the state of South Carolina, a gentleman amiable in his character, respectable in his connexions, and of eminent abilities, &c. We, therefore, with submission, beg leave to recommend, that strict inquiry be made into the several matters mentioned, and if ascertained, that you will be pleased to retaliate in the most effectual manner, by a similar treatment of British subjects, which are or shall be in your power. Permit us," it continues, "to add, that while we seriously lament the necessity of such a severe expedient, and commiserate the sufferings to which individuals will necessarily be exposed, we are not unmindful, that such a measure may, in its consequences, involve our own lives in additional dangers; but, we had rather forego temporary distinctions, and commit ourselves to the most desperate situations, than prosecute this just and necessary war upon terms so dishonourable."

At the head of this list of self-devoted soldiers, is the name of *Isaac Huger*; *William Washington*, signing for himself and his officers, brought up the rear. The only known name of the army not upon it, is Colonel Lee; and in justice to his reputation, it is proper to remark, that he had, for some days previous, been detached to the banks of the Congaree.

It would seem, that Lieutenant Colonel Balfour was induced, finally, to consider this affair in a very serious view. Captain Barry, his secretary, was dispatched as a special messenger to General Greene, invested, as he expresses himself, "with full powers to negotiate and settle the points stated in your letter of the 26th ultimo, to Colonel Balfour. Let me flatter myself with being in part the means of happily, for all sides, terminating differences which, I would trust, need only a candid explanation to be mutually agreed upon," &c.

But, the captain's explanatory mission was arrested at the Eutaws, where he was taken in arms, before he could reach the head-quarters of the American commander. Balfour had written an answer to the letter of the 26th, in which he vindicates his conduct, and criminales that of the Americans, by charges which gave no little umbrage to the American commander.

It is a very remarkable fact, that he avows the execution of Hayne to have been the act of Lord Rawdon and himself, without the intervention of any court, civil or military, under orders especially given by Lord Cornwallis. Can it be possible, that in his tender mercies, the king of Great Britain could have vested his military commanders with the absolute disposal of the lives of his subjects? This would be asserting a despotism in the *crown*, as well as in the *parliament*. Yet, such power was certainly exercised by Lord Cornwallis in Camden, by Colonel Browne in Augusta, by Colonel Wemys in the case of Cusack, by Major Tarleton in the case of Johnson; and in vindication of the execution of Hayne, in the house of lords it was urged—"that such had been the practice in other cases."

It was high time to get rid of such a government.* In the case of a spy, whose crime is assimilated to that of the wolf who prowls at night, the practice of war, in its despotism, sanctions it; but, if in any other case, we are not aware of it.

It does not appear that Lord Cornwallis ever answered the letter addressed to him on this subject. It was not long after it was written, that he became hemmed in with difficulties, which engrossed all his cares for his own safety.

But, the most serious alarm was excited among the British officers serving in Charleston. A very few days had elapsed, after the intelligence of Hayne's execution, when a party, commanded by Captain Ervine of Marion's cavalry,

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 XV. a Captain Campbell, who was known and esteemed among the Americans, and two subalterns. On their arrival at head-quarters, they were committed to the provost guard, and their apprehensions for their safety were soon communicated to Charleston. A meeting of the British officers was held, and their discontents expressed to Balfour in language, which probably produced the mission of Barry. After Barry was made prisoner, Colonel Balfour solicited that he should be discharged, as he was under protection of a flag, and that an officer should be nominated to discuss with him, the subject of his mission. The answer to this letter, which also includes an answer to Balfour's reply to that of the 26th, concluded the discussions on this unhappy affair. The original is before us, without a word scratched or interlined, and contains too much intrinsic merit to be consigned to oblivion.

“HEAD QUARTERS, *September 19th, 1781.*

“SIR,

“Your favour of the 3d inst. I have received, and am happy for the honour of Colonel Hayne, to find nothing better to warrant his cruel and unjust execution than the order of Lord Cornwallis, given in the hour of victory, when he considered the lives, liberties, and property of the people prostrate at his feet. But I confess that I cannot express my astonishment that you and Lord Rawdon should give such an extraordinary example of severity upon the authority of that order, under such a change of circumstances, so long after it had been remonstrated against, and after a cartel had been settled to restrain improper severities, and to prevent the necessity of retaliation.

“You will see by my letter to Lord Cornwallis of the 17th December last, a copy of which is enclosed, that I informed his lordship that his order was cruel and unprecedented, and that he might expect retaliation from the friends of the unfortunate.

“You observe, that to authorize retaliation there should be a parity of circumstances, to which I can by no means agree. Retaliation presupposes an act of violence having been committed, and that it is adopted to punish the past and restrain the future, and, therefore, whatever will produce these consequences is warranted by the laws of retaliation.

“You observe that the inhabitants of any country at war owe allegiance to the conquering power.

“The right of conquest, from partial successes, is often made use of to levy contributions, but I believe there are no instances where the inhabitants are

punished capitally for breach of parole given under these circumstances, especially while the two parties are contending for empire; and this act of severity complained of, is the more extraordinary, as you had long lost that part of the country, and upon your own principles the inhabitants owed allegiance to the conquering power.

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"The execution of Lieutenant Fulker was without my knowledge or consent. Nor did I ever hear of it before. I understood there were some who fell victims to the violence of the militia for the many outrages they had been guilty of, and this without the knowledge of the commanding officer, who put a stop to it the moment he discovered it. But there is a great difference between deliberate executions, and deaths which happen from an enraged people, urged by a sense of injury and oppression.

"I have never authorized or countenanced an execution but for the crime of desertion. On the contrary, I have taken all the pains in my power to soften the resentments of the inhabitants towards each other, and to prevent as much as possible the dreadful calamities of private murder. It has been my object to *reclaim* not to *destroy* even such of the inhabitants as have been opposed to the interests of their country; and I cannot but consider your remarks respecting Colonel Grierson and Major Dunlop, as both illiberal and ungenerous if you are acquainted with facts, if not, I hope you will be more careful how you censure without authority in future. A handsome reward was offered for the detection of the murderers of both those persons, as you will see by the enclosures No. 2 and 3.

"As you have referred the justification of your conduct, in the affair of Colonel Hayne, to Lord Cornwallis, and as his determination upon that matter will govern the business of future exchanges, I can see no advantage in appointing a person to meet Captain Barry on the subject; besides which, that gentleman is now a prisoner of war, and no longer in a capacity to negotiate affairs of this nature."

General Greene did not retaliate for the execution of Colonel Hayne. And were it now the duty of his biographer, to relate that he had relented and relinquished his purpose, he should find an apology in the observation, that it was a promise "more honored in the breach than in the observance." But, the causes which prevented it, were such as will satisfy both national feeling and the exigencies of consistency and energy.

To wait a decent time for the answer of Lord Cornwallis, was indispensable; and, immediately after the date of the letter addressed to him, commenced the active movements which terminated in the battle of Eutaw.

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Here a prisoner fell into the hands of the enemy, whose name and worth were not to be exposed precipitately to the gallows. This was Colonel Washington. And, as if fate were resolved to furnish the American general with excuses for not executing a threat which, every day it was deferred, became more abhorrent to his feelings, it was not long after, that Governor Burke of North Carolina, had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the enemy, and was conveyed under the significant epithet of "a state prisoner" to Charleston. He was expressly held as a hostage against retaliation.

But, in fact, the threat of retaliation had produced all the beneficial effects that could have resulted from the execution of the threat. Balfour was universally condemned and execrated for the act he had committed, and the British officers generally and openly expressed their disapprobation of his conduct. From the numbers who were made prisoners at the battle of the Eutaw, it was very satisfactorily ascertained, that the crime would never be repeated; and from that time, one fortunate occurrence followed on the foot-steps of another, until the humbled enemy became no longer an object of resentment. Yet, the subject was never lost sight of, and was seriously renewed in February following, in a correspondence with General Leslie, who had then assumed the command of the British forces in the south. In this General Greene says—
 "The subject has been referred to congress. I cannot think you are under any obligations, either from duty or honour, to support the sanguinary measures of Lieutenant Colonel Balfour; on the contrary, I think you are bound to disavow them, especially as they are opposed to the spirit and letter of the cartel, and have nothing better for their support, than claims without right, and reasons without force. Captain Barry is ordered into confinement, until those detained upon the principles of discrimination are enlarged; and if there is not an order for retaliation in the other case, (Hayne's execution) I am persuaded it will be, because of *the author's not being in our power.*" General Leslie requested—"as the discussion might lead to serious consequences, that it might be referred to officers appointed to meet and adjust all existing difficulties;" and it terminated in the nomination of Colonel Allen and Doctor Frazer by Leslie, and Colonel J. Laurens and Captain Shubrick by Greene, and was finally superseded by a general exchange negotiated in New York, and by the approach of peace.

The vindication of the part which General Greene acted upon the execution of Colonel Hayne, must rest upon the correctness of the views in which he considered that occurrence. And it cannot be controverted, that the act was one of *the most wanton and idle barbarity*; sheltered under the pretext of necessity or policy, but really the result of peevish cruelty or low vindictive-

ness. Men may profess what motives they please, but the world will judge of them by concurrent circumstances.

Had not Colonel Hayne come so near to bringing General Williamson to the gallows, it is probable he would not have met the fate he did.

It is known, that having the command of a detachment of Harden's horse, he had succeeded, by a sudden dash at a place in the vicinity of Charleston, to which Williamson was in the habit of resorting, in making that officer a prisoner. By an act of the most unfortunate indiscretion, he was then overtaken by the British cavalry, and immediately committed to close confinement.

Williamson was the Arnold of Carolina; and much importance would have been attached at this time to bringing him to the punishment due a traitor. Perhaps, also, the insult offered to the dignity of the commandant of Charleston, and his commander Lord Rawdon, in invading the region over which the benign influence of their immediate presence extended, may not have been without its influence upon the fate of Hayne. We shall have occasion to notice a fact hitherto unknown, that will give countenance to the imputation of motives so unworthy.

It is truly to be regretted, that the English nation, as well for its own reputation as for the interests of mankind, has not long since disavowed the act of her officers in the execution of Colonel Hayne. Nay, on the only occasion in which it was ever discussed in her constituted councils,* it was openly justified, and an inquiry into it refused by a large majority. This was in the house of lords, on the motion of the Duke of Richmond, in the winter of this year. Had it been the undivided act of Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, it would scarcely have been an object of national concern. He was the petty tyrant; haughty, capricious and unfeeling—his character was too insignificant to form the basis of a national charge. His acts might reasonably have been imputed to his own vices or follies. But, Lords Cornwallis and Rawdon were men of high national standing, extensively connected, and distinguished in the world, not less by the confidence of their sovereign, than by their own actions. It was not to be presumed, that they would commit themselves, in taking human life in a case in which they were unsupported by national authority. For the part they acted in the drama, it is true we have only the authority of Colonel Balfour; but, having never disavowed the action, they must stand charged in

* Gentleman's London Magazine, 1782.

the eyes of the world. In the discussions in the house of lords, before alluded to, their concurrence with Balfour was not controverted.

In examining the case of Colonel Hayne, it is impossible for two minds to be led to opposite conclusions. His execution can neither be reconciled to principle nor policy, and was attended with circumstances of peculiar atrocity.

We will not attempt to repeat the thrice-told tale of this martyrdom. Those only who were present can form any idea of the dignity with which he met death, or of the solemn gloom which overspread the city, when he was led out to execution. To the last, even until the fatal signal was given for the cart to move, it was not believed by the spectators, that the wicked act could be consummated.

We confidently hope, that of the multitudes who witnessed the spectacle, two only exulted in it, Colonel Balfour and General Williamson. We would even exempt the latter, and leave the entire banquet to the British commandant.

Submitted to the test of principle, the worst that can be made of Hayne's offence was, that of high treason. As he had never been in arms on the British side, the charge of desertion cannot be preferred against him. Nor was it attempted to sustain his execution on this charge;—he is expressly declared to have been hung *as a traitor*. Whence a British commander could derive the power to execute even *a traitor* without legal trial, we confess ourselves at a loss to imagine. That the king may constitute special commissions for their trial may be assumed, but such commissions must conform to the mode of trial known to the laws of England. How courts martial can, by those laws, be vested with jurisdiction over the lives of subjects not of the military order, or not committing offences which subject them to military law, is equally incomprehensible. A subject, taking up arms against his sovereign, has always been held to have committed a civil, not a military offence. If the British measure of declaring the colonists out of protection of their laws could deprive a British subject of his right to trial, then was he no longer subject to the duties of allegiance, and was entitled to the protection of international law. Protection is the purchase-money of the duties of subjection.

If the British commanders acted in the exercise of the barbarous powers asserted by conquerors over the peasantry of conquered countries, there was no point of view in which the case of Hayne ought to have been assimilated to that of an individual of a vanquished people. The struggle was a general one, in which the whole people of the United States were engaged, and until all were subdued, none were subdued. But if the enemy were at liberty to exercise the powers of recent conquest over minute sections of the country, then the conquest

of that of Hayne's residence, which was beyond the Edisto, had been completely overturned, and, in fact, fully relinquished, and the enemy's detachments withdrawn within the Edisto.

Colonel Hayne had no trial either pursuant to civil or martial law. It is distressing to read his simple appeal, on this subject, to Rawdon and Balfour.

"On Thursday morning I had the honour of receiving a letter from Major Frazier, by which he informed me that a council of general officers would be assembled the *next day* for my trial; and on the evening of the same day I received another letter from the same officer, acquainting me that instead of that, a court of inquiry would sit for the purpose of deciding under what point of view I ought to be considered. I was also told that any person whom I should appoint would be permitted to accompany me as my counsel. Having never entertained any other idea of a court of inquiry, nor heard of any other being formed of it, than of its serving merely to precede a council of war, [court martial it is presumed,] or some other tribunal for examining the circumstances more fully, except in the case of a spy; and Mr. Jarvis, lieutenant marshal of the police, not having succeeded in finding the person named for my counsel, I did not take the pains to summon any witnesses, though it would have been in my power to have produced many, and I presented myself before the court without any assistance whatever. When I was before that assembly I was further convinced that I had not been deceived in my conjectures. *I found that the members of it were not sworn, and the witnesses were not examined on oath;* and all the members, as well as every one present, might easily have perceived, by the questions which I asked, and by the whole tenor of my conduct, that I had not the least notion that I was tried or examined upon an affair on which my life and death depended."

What, then, must have been his feelings when informed that he was condemned to die, and to die in forty-eight hours!

But that his enemies disdained even the shelter of judicial trial was expressly avowed: "I have to inform you," says Mr. Frazier, the town-major, "that your execution is not ordered in consequence of any sentence from the court of inquiry, but by virtue of authority with which *the commander in chief in South Carolina, and the commanding officer in Charleston are invested: and their resolves on the subject are fixed and unchangeable.*"

From this imperious sentence all the efforts of sex, age, infancy, and character were united to rescue the victim; but no more could be gained than a respite to the 4th of August, forty-eight hours beyond the original sentence, and that clogged with this remarkable restriction,—“but should General Greene

CHAP. offer to expostulate in your favour with the *commanding officer*, from that mo-
 XV. ment this respite will cease, and you will be ordered to immediate execution."

What could these mysterious words have had for their object?

One would, at first view, be tempted to conclude that the whole of this unworthy transaction had been got up between the commandant and town-major, and sedulously concealed from the knowledge of Lord Rawdon, the commanding officer alluded to. But we find it recorded in the annals of the day, that the most pathetic personal appeals had been made in vain to the feelings of his lordship. Was the idea then to be tolerated, that what his lordship's heart had refused to yield, might be extorted from his apprehensions? or why was General Greene to be precluded from the knowledge of the transaction, lest he should "expostulate?"

General Greene, in his letter referring this subject to congress,* makes this strong charge against him: "It is said Lord Rawdon was the great instigator, and principal cause of Colonel Hayne's being executed. It happened just before he embarked for England, *when he knew retaliation could not reach him.*" In another, of the 25th October, to President M'Kean, he observes, "it is to be wished that vengeance would fall on the head of the most deserving. Lord Rawdon was the principal instigator of Hayne's execution, and there is hardly a mile from Camden to Charleston in which he has not left monuments of his barbarity, by arbitrary and savage executions, most of which happened even without the form of a trial."

Such was the estimation in which the life of a *rebel* was held by their lordships!

We have it in our power to solve the mystery.† In addition to this outrage to law and humanity, the execution of Colonel Hayne, involved in it an evasion of national faith, and was attended with circumstances of the most disingenuous concealment.

A cartel, it will be recollected, had been negotiated in May for the exchange of prisoners. In June, Major Hyrne had been dispatched into Charleston to adjust the details. Finding it difficult to liquidate the balance of militia prisoners, a sweeping contract had been made and published, that a general release of such prisoners, from parole and from prison, should take place on a day specified.

During the whole months of June and July, Hyrne had resided in Charleston, engaged in this business; and the British had attempted to except from the

* September 2.

† Papers relative to prisoners of war.

benefit of the cartel but five individuals, of whom Hayne was not one. Nor was the fatal object of the mock-trial he had undergone revealed to him *until the day that Major Hyrne left Charleston*. The cartel expressly makes provision for future as well as present militia prisoners, both officers and men; it contains no exception unfavourable to any description of militia officers, and Hayne was in arms at the time it was agreed upon.

When the exception was set up, unfavourable to the five individuals alluded to, the exchange was suspended, and their case referred to officers mutually chosen; but they not being able to concur in opinion, had recommended that the prisoners excepted to, be enlarged on their paroles, and the exchange proceed as to the residue; which was done accordingly. Two of those individuals, Mr. Smith and Mr. Skirving, were precisely circumstanced as Colonel Hayne was.

Here then, at least, it was known to the British commanders, that the American general claimed the benefit of the cartel in favour of all persons similarly situated with Colonel Hayne. Nay, as he was not specially named, the general recommendation of the commissioners in favour of the prisoners, might well have been claimed in his behalf. The right to put him to death, at least, was not contended for, nor the least ground furnished to him for suspecting such a design, until the very day that Major Hyrne had turned his back to depart. Nor did they dare to let the knowledge of their intention be communicated to the last; for they conjectured that, to prevent the execution, the American commanders would perform acts of severity, which they would not so readily execute when the evil was past remedy. Or, perhaps, they shrunk from the appeal, they anticipated would be made to honour, humanity, and national faith.

But the British commanders could not have made a more unfortunate selection of a victim, than they did in this instance. Hayne's character was of a cast, to reconcile animosity even in civil warfare. It was something of a triumph in his dying hour, to observe prognostics of the deep disgust which his execution was likely to create. Curiosity had little influence in collecting the crowd that flocked after him to the place of execution; it was the last expression of respect, of the mourning attendants upon a funeral. And the last mandate that consigned him to the gallows, contained an acknowledgment that he had not dealt so by his enemies. "In consequence of the humane treatment shown by you to British prisoners who fell into your hands, you are respited for forty-eight hours." Could the hand that wrote these words have held the pen that signed his death warrant!

And the circumstances under which Hayne had taken protection, were so well known, and so tragical, that there was not a heart among his enemies which did not acknowledge his doom, cruel and unmerited. A wife and lovely family, all festering with the small-pox! to choose such an hour to

CHAP. XV. propose the alternative of leaving them to perish or taking protection—thus to force upon the best affections of man, the performance of a deed that he abhorred, was an outrage to nature which the vilest would resent.

His opposition to the royal cause, had been open, manly, and divested of persecution; and even those who imputed to him error, acknowledged that he acted from the purest motives. The sacrifice of such a victim, confirmed no one in his loyalty, and sharpened many a sword for revenge. It was, indeed, an impotent and injudicious act of severity.

It may well be supposed, that among the cares which engaged the attention of the southern commander, that which gives life and action to all military operations, was not neglected. We are fatigued with dwelling upon the impoverished state of the army; it is, once for all, enough to say, that it had no money, and never had any. What the officers could manage to draw from their private resources, they clothed themselves upon; but such was the state of utter privation in which they lived, that we have before us the letter of two officers of high military reputation, in which they inclose their commissions, because “so destitute of clothing, (in their own language) as not only to be unable to appear with decency as officers, but not a sufficiency to prevent being disagreeable to themselves and others.”

But, Governor Rutledge brought with him the means of exciting a hope, and that hope, for a while, brightened up the countenances of the army.

The effect of banks upon capital, may be likened to that of a globe of cut glass, upon the guinea deposited within it. As long as the purchaser can persuade the seller, that all he sees is real, commerce may go on briskly. But wo to the dupes, when the receptacle comes to be explored. The simple African will look in vain, behind the mirror, for the object which had met his eye in front of it. The congress of the United States, after passing through all the ordinary routine of expedients to support credit without capital, had now thrown themselves upon Mr. Robert Morris and the French king, as their last hope. Louis XVI. furnished them the guinea, and Mr. Morris proposed to furnish the reflector. Any thing which, at that time, could sustain the almost expiring hopes of congress, was conferring a public benefit; although, it were only another shift or expedient, added to the many which had been vainly resorted to already, as the substitute for the solid basis of loans or taxation.

Mr. Morris was, at this time, engaged in the prosecution of his financial operations, of which, his bank was an indispensable machine; and communicated to General Greene, authority to raise money, by sale of bank shares or drafts upon him to a specified amount.

But, this was no country for the success of such measures, and he still found himself in a situation which is best described in the following answer to Mr. Morris' letter : CHAP.
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" I am favoured with yours of the 12th instant, by the hands of Governor Rutledge, and am sorry to inform you, that the governor met with none who were willing to interest themselves in the bank. His route was through a tract of country where the inhabitants are little acquainted with commerce, and therefore not likely to become adventurers in a measure of that sort. But, whether it was owing to an objection to this particular scheme, or to all projects of this kind, that the people manifested no inclination to become interested in the bank, I cannot pretend to determine. But, certain it is, not a single subscriber could be found, nor a shilling of money raised.

" To conduct a war, which is carried on so much at arms-end as the operations here are, so remote from supplies of every kind, and where the enemy can be re-enforced with so much facility, and we with such difficulty, and the whole service attended with so many contingencies, and all this to be done without money, and with a force little more than one-third equal to the enemy's, is an unenviable task, and requires more experience, and greater talents than I possess. I find myself frequently ready to sink under the load of difficulties that oppress me, where all our resources depend upon *expedients*. Hitherto, we have embodied them with some degree of success, but this cannot be expected to continue without more effectual support. I know that government is exceedingly embarrassed. I feel for them. But, it is nothing more than might have been expected from that unhappy policy, (to say nothing worse of it)—I mean sporting with public credit.

" No nation ever had greater resources in the confidence of the people than congress had at the beginning of the war ; nor would it have diminished to this day, had they maintained their own dignity, and a due subordination of the states. But, the desire of indulging those, and easing the people of heavy taxes, led to measures that were no less dishonourable than they have been destructive to our true interests. The tender-laws, and the plan of redeeming the continental money forty for one, have been replete with every kind of mischief. Credit and reputation are much alike, either in public or private life. Once lost, they are very difficult to be regained, and no advantage, gained at the expense of our credit or reputation, can compensate for the loss of them. It was ever my opinion, that we ought to have supported the continental money ; and, I am persuaded, it would have offered us the best medium of any plan we had it in our power to adopt. The hope of benefitting by its appreciation, would have supported its credit. *If the states*

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could have been prohibited from making money, and the taxes kept in motion, the continental money would have afforded a tolerable medium for business of all kinds. The regulating laws were another source of mischief; indeed, these and the tender-laws were sufficient to stop all intercourse among men, where they could have no election either in price or pay; especially, when the legislators of many states discovered such dishonest intentions. Trade, commerce, and paper money of all kinds, like religion, depend upon the opinions of people; and where compulsion is made use of, they soon languish and die.

"I lament exceedingly, that congress have given up so much of this just and necessary prerogative into the hands of the states: and I am very apprehensive, we shall want that force and vigour in our national character, which is necessary to our security; and I am not less apprehensive, that intestine broils and feuds will frequently convulse the empire, for want of sufficient respect and dependance of the states upon congress. Politics furnish a knotty subject, and all general principles are liable to many exceptions. Measures which were promising in prospect, often terminate in opposite consequences. Perhaps what I conceive now unfavourable, may produce national advantages. Time will bring all things to light; there rests too heavy a cloud upon the subject for me to penetrate, and I will drop it.

"When I tell you I am in distress, do not imagine I mean little difficulties; but suppose my situation to be like a ship's-crew in a storm, when the vessel is ready to sink, and the water gaining ground in the hold with every exertion to prevent it. It is a maxim in republican governments, never to despair of the commonwealth. Nor do I; but, I foresee more difficulties than I readily see how to conquer. I hope to discharge my duty, but events will depend upon means, and upon the hand of Providence. If I have any opportunity of obtaining money and drawing bills on you, I shall embrace it. But, it is a very uncertain source, and therefore I leave you to judge of the prudence of exposing an army to such contingencies."

In this letter the reader will have noticed some very early hints on the great improvements which have been introduced into the constitution of the United States, and we shall have occasion afterwards to show that Morris's bills were introductory to one of the most interesting and unfortunate incidents of General Greene's life.

Governor Rutledge was soon made sensible, that the southern army could not calculate on relief from the source which he thought he had opened to it. Necessity compelled him to adopt other means of raising money, without which, he saw how feeble and embarrassed must be its future movements. It was at this time that he resolved to impress for state service, a quantity of indigo, which

article, at that time, the middle county chiefly cultivated for market. Occupying but small space when raised, it had been hid away and conveyed to market occasionally, as opportunities offered. As these were neither frequent nor safe, there was a good deal of the article at that time in the country.

This was the first substantial supply, not of cash, but the means of raising cash, the army had ever had since General Greene had been in command. By borrowing a proportion of it for the use of his officers, he was enabled to restore them to comparative decency and comfort.

But it was ever the destiny of the commander of this department, as soon as relieved from one embarrassment to be surrounded by a swarm of new ones.

A change of prospects in the northern department, resulting from measures concerted between General Washington and the minister of France, had discovered to General Greene that he must prepare for important movements, hitherto not in contemplation. As a leading measure in the new plan of operations, was to cut off Cornwallis' retreat by water, the southern commander immediately saw and suggested to the commander in chief, the probability of his attempting to escape by flight to Charleston, and the necessity that he should be under to set about preparing to meet and oppose him in the attempt. But should he fail in the effort, he expresses a hope that the commander in chief, after disposing of New-York, will not be prevented, through considerations of delicacy to himself, from following on, and laying siege to Charleston. A luminous and comprehensive view of the force necessary, (not less than ten thousand,) and the measures indispensable, to that attempt is then spread before him, and the whole closes with an assurance, worthy the great man and good citizen, "that he shall be equally happy in serving as subordinate, or as principal, provided the public good is the object, and the happiness of society promoted."

To disembarrass himself of the enemy before him, was obviously the first end to be attained. It has been asserted,* that in advancing on the enemy at Eutaw, General Greene's desire was, to induce him to retreat into Charleston; that he only hazarded a battle to effect that object. But, it was far otherwise; he would have esteemed it a capital misfortune to have lost the opportunity of reducing him to a state of impotence; for, without crippling him, he could not, in the event of Lord Cornwallis' retreat, have thrown himself in his lordship's front, while a superior enemy lay ready to advance upon his own rear.

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 2. p. 278.

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It is known that, when too late, Lord Cornwallis actually resolved on attempting to escape in another direction ; and had he not been baffled and held in suspense until the time had gone by, we shall have cause to show, that the attempt to escape to Charleston, would have been vigorously made.

But for the necessity of attending to this object, General Greene could scarcely be justified for resuming active operations when he did. And for want of a knowledge of the leading motive of his conduct, he has been charged with an unnecessary waste of human life, and hazarding more than circumstances would justify, in the instance of the attack at the Eutaws.

In the latter part of August, and beginning of September, the climate in that country is certainly at its worst ; and an accumulation of the usual disappointments, had left the American army in a state of weakness, from which a few weeks might have relieved it. He occupied also a healthy, pleasant, and abundant station, while all the posts of his enemy must have been wasting with disease. There was no prospect of his adversary's being re-enforced ; he was driven from the country where he could recruit, had manifested no disposition for action, and the state of the rivers which had been greatly swollen by recent rains, precluded all probability of active movements on his side.

Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, actually formed a junction with Lord Rawdon, the evening of the day after General Greene had retired from Orangeburgh. This placed the British commander at the head of near three thousand men ; and manifested the prudence of his adversary's retreat, and the vigour of the measure of drawing the attention of the enemy another way, whilst the American general retired, unpursued, to his present position.

Sumpter's incursion into the low country, drew Lord Rawdon immediately down to Charleston, at the head of five hundred men, leaving Colonel Stewart in command at Orangeburgh. Here his lordship remained only long enough to tarnish his laurels with the execution of Hayne ; after which, he took shipping for New York, intending to return to Europe, to enjoy the reputation which he had acquired in arms. But, he was destined to return a prisoner of war, in the mortified group which accompanied Earl Cornwallis. The vessel he sailed in, was captured by the French fleet on the way to the Chesapeake, and he was present, no unconcerned spectator, at the operations which led to the capitulation of York Town.

Some weeks elapsed before Stewart was in a condition to move his fatigued and discontented troops, and the American general was, during that time, agitated by no small degree of suspense relative to Stewart's future views ; but, not doubting that the necessity of providing for his army, would lead him to

the banks either of the Congaree or Santee, measures were taken for removing all the provisions upon those rivers to the north side, and thus limiting his means of subsistence, while it increased those of the American army. CHAP.
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At length, Colonel Stewart advanced on the route to M-Cord's Ferry, and took post on the south side, amidst the Hills near the confluence of the Congaree and Wateree. Here the two armies lay in sight of each other's fires, sharpening their swords for future conflicts. The heat of the weather was excessive—both armies had felt it, (one very severely) in the movements of June and July; and, as if by mutual consent, military operations were, for a while, suspended. Two large rivers intervening, secured each from sudden attack; and all their views of annoyance were confined to watching convoys, foraging parties, and detachments. In this service, Washington, after having observed the enemy until his views became developed, was detached down the country across the Santee, and Lee upwards along the north bank of the Congaree; the latter to operate with Colonel Henderson, then in command of Sumpter's brigade at Fridig's Ferry; and the former to strike at the communication between the enemy and Charleston, and co-operate with Marion and Mayhem in covering the country on the lower Santee. Colonel Harden, at the same time, with a body of mounted militia, collected beyond the Edisto, had it in charge to straiten the enemy in that quarter.

General Greene, in speaking of the efforts of his cavalry in these expeditions, asserts with confidence, "that their character for enterprise was never excelled in the world."

Washington succeeded in falling in with two parties of the enemy's horse, and making fifty prisoners. Lee, crossing the Congaree with his cavalry, penetrated between the main body of the enemy and his post at Orangeburgh, and in sight of the latter place, drove in, dispersed, or captured a number of their communicating parties. Numbers never appear to have appalled the American parties. Their confidence in their own prowess was such, that to see and to attack were considered as inseparable; and their audacity compelled the enemy, greatly to fatigue his troops by the large detachments made necessary to his convoys.

For some time after the removal of Colonel Stewart to his present position, his embarrassments in obtaining provision were very considerable. At the time that the grain was removed across the rivers, that all could not be secured, Henderson and Marion destroyed. And every boat above and below the confluence of the Congaree and Wateree; was either removed or sunk and concealed. The consequence was, that, within arms reach of plenty, Colonel Stewart found himself obliged to depend on the country below, for supplies. This compelled him

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to strengthen his post at Dorchester, in order to cover the communication by Orangeburgh; and to post Major M'Arthur at a place called Fairlawn, near the head of the navigation of Cooper River, from which, supplies received from Charleston were transported by land to his headquarters. And as this communication was interrupted and watched by Washington, Marion, and Mayhem, in order to secure the means of communicating with the opposite bank of the Congaree and draw supplies from thence, the British commander was under the necessity of transporting boats adapted to the purpose, from Fairlawn to the Congaree, on wagon wheels.

Whilst his detachments were engaged in these operations, General Greene was anxiously looking north, south, and west for his expected re-enforcements. But he was now too much habituated to disappointments, to look with confidence. Early in August he had had reason even to expect Wayne with eight hundred Pennsylvanians. This re-enforcement would have rendered the destruction of his antagonist certain. His position left him entirely at the command of the American general, if the latter had been strong enough to avail himself of the advantage. He saw it, and the tantalized state of his feelings is curiously expressed in the correspondence of the day.

After Cornwallis had retreated to Plymouth, and was engaged in shipping his men, La Fayette, not doubting the fact that he had been ordered to the relief of New-York, had authorized Wayne to resume his original design of marching to the relief of Greene. But when the British transports were recalled and proceeded up to York Town, Wayne's march was countermanded, and finally, as has been before related, his detention extended to the fall of Lord Cornwallis.

It was with feelings of extreme regret that the intelligence of his detention was received by the southern commander, for it was at a time that he had fully ascertained that almost every other hope had failed him. Nevertheless, he expresses to the commander in chief, his perfect acquiescence in whatever the public service required; yet he ventured to hint, that if the force before York Town really equalled ten thousand men, Wayne's detachment might be profitably employed, in destroying Stewart and cutting off Lord Cornwallis' retreat.

Of all the re-enforcements that General Greene had counted upon, none were received but about two hundred North Carolina levies, and about five hundred North Carolina militia; many of the latter were destitute of arms, and all of the former furnished with the arms which he had destined for other hands, to wit, the troops which he proposed to raise in South Carolina.

How it was possible for any mind or temper to bear up against such reiterated disappointments, is well calculated to excite surprise. But new difficulties

only called forth new efforts. That he was at this time somewhat chafed, is obvious from his letters, but his expression of feeling never went beyond the means most proper for recalling men to a sense of duty, or bringing things back to the course which ought to have been pursued. He knew that reproaches neither instruct nor reclaim.

In three instances his patience, at this time, was severely tried.

Colonel Jackson had succeeded in raising in Georgia one hundred and fifty men, under the powers granted him while the army lay before Ninety-Six. On the talents of this commander, and the quality of his troops, the general had calculated with confidence, and nothing but a severe dispensation of Providence could have disappointed him. The whole were taken down with the small-pox nearly at the same time; full fifty of them fell a sacrifice to it, and the survivors were still too much reduced by the consequences of that disease, to be in a state for service.

This misfortune came from a hand which could only be bowed to with profound submission; but, from other quarters, similar disappointments were sustained, not without circumstances for just complaint. On the militia of Mecklenberg and Rowan, Greene had been assured he might rely for support. But he was destined again to experience the baneful effects of that narrow-minded policy, with which the states, perhaps without exception, were too often chargeable;—that of looking too exclusively to their own security—of being excited only when danger advanced towards their own soil, without recollecting how intimately the safety of each depended upon the safety of all.

The promising appearances upon which he had formed his expectations from that quarter, had been exhibited whilst he was retreating towards Charlotte, followed by the enemy from Ninety-Six. As the danger receded, the martial spirit subsided, and the promise of three thousand five hundred militia produced him less than five hundred. It was the repetition of the occurrences at the Dan. But as Greene knew the value of the example and services of particular men in such emergencies, and how much the conduct of the people is directed by that of influential individuals, he appears to have been particularly excited by a communication from Colonel Locke, informing him that he should not be able to take the field in person, in command of the Mecklenberg militia. This officer has appeared before in these pages, and had acquired the confidence of the general by his zeal and services. To him he writes, “I mean not to censure, but to represent matters as they appear to me. It is true the people are tardy in taking the field for the support of their liberties and protection of their distressed brethren. Those in security are too apt to be unfeeling towards those in distress. But where the people manifest such a lukewarm dis-

position and decay of patriotism, the laws should be brought in to oblige them to do what their duty and interest require. You will pardon me if I speak feelingly on this subject; my sufferings and distressed situation will not permit me to be silent. You are all embarked in the same cause with me, and your ruin is not less certain than ours if you do not support us, though it may come a little later.

"I am not in pursuit of military glory; my object is the safety of the people, and the establishment of our liberties; a becoming zeal to promote those ends, I hope will not be displeasing to the honest citizens of America," &c.

Still he had expectations from another quarter that could have indemnified him for this disappointment. Shelby and Seviere had promised him a re-enforcement of seven hundred of their select followers. With such a body of men, with limbs strung to toil by the sports and the labours of the field, minds elevated by mountain scenery, and courage confirmed by many a trying conflict in these border-wars, the American general would have trod on air in advancing upon his enemy. And they had actually advanced far on their way to join him, when intelligence reached them of his advance towards Orangeburgh, to which was added, as usual, that he had driven the enemy into Charleston; and at the close of the month, after frequently expressing his wonder "what could detain Shelby and Seviere," he received a letter from the latter, informing him, that as they supposed his recent successes rendered their services unnecessary, they had returned and disbanded.

It will hardly be credited, that a still greater disappointment awaited him from a quarter where he least expected it.

Colonel Henderson, who had commanded one of the state regiments captured in Charleston, and immediately on his exchange, had joined General Greene. The latter soon discovered his merit and talents, and had employed him in efforts, as before related, to raise a regiment of state troops. His success had not been great; but with the few he had enlisted he was ordered to take command at the post at Fridig's Ferry. General Sumpter had retired to the upper country from indisposition; but Greene calculated on a permanent disciplined force of four or five hundred men in that quarter, under excellent officers, Henderson, the Hamptons, Polk, and Middleton.

When General Sumpter was ordered to that place, General Greene had addressed a letter to him in these words:—"As soon as re-enforcements arrive, and the troops have had a little relaxation, we will draw our force to a point, and attack the enemy wherever he may be found." *And again; "Care should

be taken to refresh your cavalry as fast as possible, as we shall, no doubt, have severe duty in a few days."*

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What was his disappointment, in receiving intelligence from Henderson on his assuming the command, that there remained but two hundred men fit for duty, and these almost in a state of insurrection; and that he had received from General Sumpter, a communication expressing his wish, "that the troops should have a respite from service until the first of October, and as many of them furloughed home, from time to time, as the service would admit of: and that Colonel Henderson apply to General Greene for that purpose, at the same time ordering, "that the horses of the brigade should be sent into the river swamps to pasture, and committed to the care of detachments of militia." "Have I," says Henderson,† "come here only to furlough a parcel of troops? and that too when the enemy is at our doors? and their horses to be guarded by militia!—no readier way to dismount them could be devised." "With expectation," says he, further, "of seeing at least four or five hundred men fit for the field, I came to take command of the brigade of state troops; I have not been able to collect quite two hundred fit for action, and they in a most shattered condition. I was doubtful my command would be disagreeable, and nothing would have induced me to undertake it, but your wish and my own abhorrence of living an inactive life."

In a letter to Governor Rutledge, of the same date, he wrote—"On my arrival to take command of them, I found them the most discontented set of men I ever saw, both men and officers; a few individuals excepted, who, regardless of every pecuniary consideration, are determined to serve their country. The thirst after plunder that seems to prevail among the soldiery, makes the command almost intolerable. This circumstance is the most disagreeable, as this infamous practice seems to be countenanced by too many officers. Until some very severe examples are made, very little credit can be expected from them. The men are likely and brave, and want nothing but service and discipline to make them truly valuable; but, this is impossible to bring about, unless the necessary assistance is given by officers, most of them having no more idea of subordination than a set of raw militia."

It seems, that the public service was, at this time, experiencing the ill-effects inherent in the principle upon which the corps had been raised. The field officers were selected, and very judiciously selected; but, in order to expedite

* July 28th, 1787.

† Henderson's second letter, 24th August.

CHAP. the raising of the men, the captains and subalterns were commissioned, indis-
 XV. criminate, upon bringing a certain number of men into the field. As the popularity of men in private life, or their facility in procuring followers, is far from being decisive, either of private worth or military talent, it followed, that the inferior officers were in many instances badly selected. It is also asserted, and we have it from high authority, that the men had been promised a participation in plunder. As we are very confident this could not have been a part of their contract of service with their commander, it can only be ascribed to the officers who were immediately engaged in the enlistments. But, whether it was real or deceptive, the influence upon the men would be the same—either in inciting to plunder, or creating discontents, if restrained from it. And the distributions that had taken place, of the slaves seized and carried into North Carolina to be distributed, could not fail to produce a necessity to furlough those who had received the compensation stipulated for, that they might take it home; and frequently their desertion; and to render all who remained, restive and mutinous. As to the actual correctness of Henderson's account of the reduced state of the corps there cannot be a doubt, as it did not muster one hundred and fifty men at the battle of Eutaw; besides a detachment of, perhaps, a third of that number, supposed to have been left with the baggage guard. But, this was not the result of furloughs sanctioned by Greene, or granted by Henderson. General Sumpter's orders and wishes were peremptorily resisted; and this last occurrence it was that drew General Greene into that review of the whole of General Sumpter's conduct, since he had commanded in the department, from which, there is reason to believe, that he imbibed the opinion, that he had never been cordially and candidly supported by that officer.

When General Sumpter interfered with General Morgan in the execution of the orders under which the latter acted, General Greene was willing to attribute it to indistinct views of the duties of subordination, and took great pains to reconcile those two officers, and remove all cause for irritation or disgust. When the descent was made upon Camden, and General Sumpter did not advance with his brigade into the field, to intercept re-enforcements from the side of Broad and Saluda Rivers; nor make any other movement, until he had completed his brigade; and then, instead of descending between the Broad and Catawba, moved down beyond the Broad River; General Greene, although seriously affected in his views against Camden, saw no reason to question General Sumpter's cordiality, and uttered no complaint, although many officers in the army were then seriously dissatisfied with General Sumpter's conduct. When, afterwards, he was ordered to march

towards Camden, and form a junction with the main army, General Greene yielded to his remonstrances against the measure and revoked the order, substituting for it a particular charge to watch the movements of Colonel Watson, to the west of the Wateree, and prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon; when, instead of bending his whole attention to this object, (which he probably could have effected, had he marched his cavalry to Simons' Ferry, on the Wateree, leaving his infantry to invest Fort Granby) Watson was suffered to pass him, and Rawdon again acquired the command of the field: Greene could not still be led to question the sincerity or subordination of an officer of such acknowledged zeal in the service. When, after the surrender of Fort Granby, in his absence, General Sumpter took offence, and offered to throw up his commission, although Greene could not approve of the mode of resenting such an injury, by an act so detrimental to the cause of the country, he still bore with it as an ebullition of passion, and took pains to sooth and to satisfy General Sumpter. When, on the advance of Lord Rawdon to relieve Ninety-Six, General Sumpter suffered himself to be cut off from a junction, and held Marion back by his orders; notwithstanding retreat and defection of the country was the consequence, he still acquiesced in the excuses alleged, to wit, incorrect intelligence, and the difficulties in getting out or managing the militia. And when General Sumpter afterwards formed a junction with him, bringing up only his mounted brigade, and reported his four regiments, commanded by Taylor, Winn, Tate, and Richard Hampton, as having broken away from him, still not a complaint was uttered. When, on the advance from Tim's Ordinary, upon Lord Rawdon, orders dispatched to General Sumpter to form a junction near Fridig's Ferry, in order to fight Lord Rawdon, found him high up the Catawba, and left him pursuing a route which precluded the possibility of his aiming either to intercept Stewart or fight Lord Rawdon, still the reproach uttered on that occasion, was tempered with such mildness as scarcely to be expressive of complaint; while General Greene himself, with the only force at command, pressed forward to endeavour, when too late, to effect the service himself. When afterwards, the flattering opportunity was offered, of cutting off the 19th regiment, and making every man of them prisoners, at Biggin Church, although he was perfectly sensible that the attempt ought to have succeeded, far from uttering a complaint, he addressed General Sumpter in the language of eulogium, and never entertained a doubt of his zeal, attributing his failure to the pursuit of measures, which led him away from his principal object.

But now, when he had informed General Sumpter that his resolution was, "as soon as he had refreshed and recruited his army, to seek out the enemy,

CHAP. if to be found any where without the gates of Charleston ;" to find him, in
 XV. effect, disbanding and disorganizing a force so indispensable to the purposes of giving an honourable and happy termination to the campaign, he only balanced, whether to attribute General Sumpter's conduct to want of cordiality in contributing to the success of measures which should crown the commander of the southern department with honour, or an avidity for personal distinction, which impelled him to a deviation from the plans of others, that he might enjoy the undivided honour of his own achievements. General Greene's feelings, at the time, were certainly vented to Colonel Henderson, in language which leaves it beyond question, that he felt offended. "I received," says he,* "your favour of the 14th, inclosing General Sumpter's order for disbanding his brigade, for I can consider it in no other light. What can be his reasons for such an extraordinary measure, I cannot imagine : nor can I conceive, how he could think of taking such a step without consulting me, or obtaining my consent for the purpose. If he supposes himself at liberty to employ those troops, independently of the continental army, it is time he should be convinced to the contrary. It is true, I have granted every indulgence to those troops, and given the general a latitude to act much at discretion. But, this I did from a persuasion, that his own ambition would prompt him to attempt every thing that his force could effect ; and it was never meant, or intended to have any operation when the general was not in the field. By a measure of this kind, the country will be left open for the enemy to ravage, and the continental army exposed to every attack which the enemy may think proper to attempt, while those troops are at home on furlough. But, besides the impolicy, the injustice done the public, in granting such extensive indulgences to an order of men who have more than five times the pay† of continental soldiers, who are confined to the field from one year's end to the other, forbids the measure. A comparison of services must give great discontent to the latter, to see the former, who took the field but yesterday, at liberty to go home and see their friends, whilst those of the continental army are rigidly confined to their duty. Upon the whole, sir, I cannot persuade myself, that General Sumpter gave himself sufficient time to trace out the consequences of the measure he recommends, or rather orders to take place. But, be that as it may, I can, by no means, give my consent to it ; and

* August 16th, 1781.

† They received a prime negro, valued at three hundred and sixty dollars, for ten month's service, above a hard dollar per diem.

therefore, you will not furlough a man or officer unless for some particular reason; and you will give positive orders, to have the whole collected as fast as possible, and every man at home called to the field as soon as may be, who are not employed as artificers. You will procure an exact return of the state troops, horses, and accoutrements. It is the governor's intention, and my wish, to have the corps reduced into a less number, (of regiments.) Let the horses be recruited in the most speedy and convenient manner you may think advisable; discipline the troops all in your power, and punish plundering with the utmost severity. It would be little less than madness, to grant the indulgences General Sumpter requires, when the enemy are in motion in every part of the state, and all our regular force, including the state troops, so much inferior to theirs. I have the public good, and the safety of the good people of the state, too much at heart to think of such a measure."

If this letter exhibits any more excitement than the occasion will justify, it is but justice to General Greene to mention, that some very strong measures recently pursued by General Sumpter, had given the former some uneasiness and trouble. Many leading whigs, and among them General Isaac Huger, had suffered very severely by the retaliating measures adopted by the enemy in consequence of the seizure of negroes, made by General Sumpter, for the payment of his brigade. Their complaints were, of course, pressed at head-quarters, and the general's mind was harassed with the dilemma of compelling the state troops to disgorge the negroes on the one hand, or leaving those who had suffered, to remain without redress on the other.

To the complaints uttered in this quarter were added others still more poignant and distressing, arising amidst the smoking ruins of Georgetown.

On the 29th of July, Colonel Lee writes to General Greene, "I, this moment, learn, by certain authority, that General Sumpter has detached Captain Davis to Georgetown, to seize, for public use, the goods of every sort that may be found. It seems that the tories left much linen cloth, &c. &c. in the hands of whigs, on the evacuation of that place; and that these goods are now making their appearance for sale. Your officers are naked, and I presume no order of men have greater claim to your attention," &c.

The only plausible excuse ever uttered by the enemy for the destruction of the place was, "that the whigs were about to draw from it supplies for their army." The raking of the streets by the fire from a galley, whilst the town was consumed, seems to have been calculated to prevent the merchants from saving their goods. It is known that that place had begun to open a trade with the Havana; and the fast sailing boats of Captain Anthony and others, did actually,

CHAP. afterwards, contribute much to supply the wants of the army, through this
 XV. port.

At the time that Captain Davis is said to have been dispatched for this purpose,* General Greene was actually making arrangements for drawing, by purchase, from Georgetown, supplies to a considerable amount. Captain Conyers was detached for that purpose, and arrived only in time to witness the melancholy conflagration.

This beautiful little town, the seat of taste, wealth, and hospitality, was committed to the flames on the first of August. Under the name of Manson, the immediate perpetrator of this incendiary act, is consigned to infamy, and to the execrations of the inhabitants of a place which has never recovered from the blow it then received. But the operation was too important in its nature, to have been undertaken by him, on his own responsibility. The galley he commanded, was dispatched from Charleston; Lord Rawdon was still in that place, and must bear the reproach, or enjoy the eclat, of this destructive outrage. Posterity will judge whether it was not, like the burning of Camden, another proof, that he wanted but an excuse, when obliged to abandon his conquests, to leave them a desert. The date of its destruction corresponds with the time of Captain Davis's supposed mission, and renders it probable, that he was actually, at this time, engaged in discharging the duties assigned him. The fact of the intelligence communicated to General Greene, on this subject, we will vouch for; of the reality of the act, and its consequences, we are no further informed. The disappointment felt by the army, on the occasion, was too great not to make it a subject of much discussion. And if it be true, that such a measure was pursued, under General Sumpter's orders, without the sanction of the commander of the department, it certainly was calculated to prepare his mind for drawing into review all the acts of General Sumpter since he had been in command, and adopting the unfavourable impressions which appear, at this time, to have possessed his mind, towards an officer to whose patriotism and bravery he had ever been ready to yield the most favourable acknowledgements.

But the state of things to the north leaving him no time to deliberate, General Greene, on the 22d August, broke up his camp at the High-Hills, and calling in all his detachments, except those under Mayhem, Harden, and Marion, appointed them to a general rendezvous at Fridig's Ferry. Great rains had now laid all the swamps, which border the Wateree, for miles in

* Colonel Lee, 30th July.

width, under water, and without great difficulty, and some danger to his advance, he could not cross the river, without ascending it to Camden. By that route he reached Howel's Ferry, on the Congaree, on the 28th, and ordered his detachments to join him at that place, with intention immediately to cross it, and advance upon Colonel Stewart. CHAP.
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But that officer, on hearing of the movements of the American army, had fallen back upon his re-enforcements and convoys, and taken a position at the Eusaw Springs. General Greene warmly expresses his regret at the enemy's retreat, as he conceived an apprehension, that it would finally be continued, until he should approach too near his garrison to be pursued with safety, or to admit of the full fruition of the advantages expected from beating him.

As the British army had moved by forced marches, to a distance of forty miles below its position at the mouth of the Congaree, it was no longer in the power of the American commander to force it to action. He, therefore, meditated, for the present, a discontinuance of the pursuit, and crossing the river, moved slowly down the south bank, intending to take post at Motte's, and wait events. Colonel Lee in the mean time was pushed forward to watch Stewart's movements, and General Pickens, who had now taken command of the state troops under Henderson, was ordered to move leisurely down, and take a position to observe the British garrison, still remaining in Orangeburgh. These slow movements, indicative of a want of confidence, probably induced Colonel Stewart to halt and fight his enemy. Being now separated from Orangeburgh, he ordered up the detachment from Fairlawn to re-enforce him, while the garrison at Orangeburgh proceeded across the country below, and replaced the garrison drawn from Fairlawn.

This movement, he was enabled to make, without fearing for the safety of his post at Fairlawn, because Marion, at this time, had disappeared from that neighbourhood, in one of his secret and rapid excursions, entirely across the country, as far as Pon Pon. Harden was, at this time, in that quarter; and very hard pressed by a British party of four or five hundred men. The loyalists, who had been driven to Charleston, had been compelled to engage in active service, under a threat that rations would be withdrawn from their families. And the demands for subsistence being greatly increased, by the necessity of feeding so many mouths, as well as by the prospect of being, ere long, shut up within narrow limits, this detachment had been dispatched, as well to collect provisions for the one party, as to destroy the means of subsisting of the other, in the vicinity of Charleston.

Harden, after every possible effort to cover the country in that quarter, found his force dwindling so fast, under the necessity which the ravages of

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this party imposed upon his followers to look to the safety of their families, and the terror excited by the execution of Hayne, that he solicited support from Marion. The latter applied for, and obtained permission from Greene, to undertake the enterprise.

To cross the country from St. Stephens to the Edisto, passing through both lines of the enemy's communication with Charleston—to surprise, defeat, and disperse this force, actually much superior to his own—to return by the same route, pass the Santee, deliver his prisoners to the care of Mayhem, and return twenty miles below the Eutaw, to watch the communication between that place and Fairlawn—then, at the call of Greene, to make a circuit and pass the enemy, so as to reach a position on the south side of the Santee, in the track of Greene's advance, was all the work of six days. These movements merited and received the particular thanks of Congress.

It is not true, as some authors assert, that this officer had been ordered, in the first instance, to form a junction with General Greene; nor, that the latter was delayed in his advance for the arrival of Marion, until the army reached Motte's; the intention of the commander was, to have fought Colonel Stewart without the aid of Marion. Until intelligence was received, that the detachment from Fairlawn had marched to re-enforce the British army, and the garrison from Orangeburgh was about taking an excellent position for supporting it, Greene was persuaded, that his antagonist meant to decline the combat. That intelligence induced him to adopt a different conclusion, and at the same time that he became convinced, the British commander intended to measure swords with him, the addition to Stewart's strength made it indispensable, that Marion should be ordered to the aid of the American army. The supine inattention of the British commander to the watching of his adversary, and his ignorance of his movements, until a few hours before the battle, have been the subjects of surprise and censure; but, it is easily accounted for from the circumstance, that he knew Marion was below him the day before, and had no suspicion of the fact, that by marching the whole night he had thrown himself above him, so as to form a junction with Greene. That he would be attacked in his present position by a force which, without that of Marion's, was numerically, as well as in quality of troops, so much his inferior, probably appeared to him chimerical.

So far from delaying the march of the army, the order for Marion's junction is dated the 4th of September, and on the 5th, we find him in advance of the army, waiting its approach at Laurens' plantation, seventeen miles above the enemy. The movement of this officer was that of light, and his actions partook of its purity. To have lost or delayed an opportunity of fighting the

battles of his country, would have been lamented by him and his followers, as a visitation from Heaven.

On the 5th, General Pickens' command was ordered up, and the army halted at Laurens' place; the 6th, was devoted to rest and preparation for battle; and on the afternoon of the 7th, the army marched up to Burdell's Tavern, on the Congaree road, seven miles from the Eutaws. Baggage, tents, every thing that could embarrass or detain, were left under guard at Motte's; the general shared in common with his officers: a change of linen and their canteens, were all they incumbered themselves with; and, excepting the tumbrils, the artillery, and two wagons containing each a hogshhead of rum and hospital stores, not a wheel carriage accompanied the army. Wrapped in his cloak, and canopied by the Heavens, with his head pillowed on the root of a shady china-tree, the general passed that night in slumbers, undisturbed by anticipations of the bloody scenes of the following day.

The number of men brought by the two combatants into the action of Eutaw, has never been definitively ascertained; each party contending that his force was much inferior to his adversary's. The following are all the facts which we can command to elucidate the subject.

The returns upon which General Greene's order of battle was founded, are dated the 4th of September, and would furnish conclusive evidence of his force but for two causes: General Marion having joined the day after, his return does not appear, and the number detailed as a baggage-guard, is not exhibited.

The rank and file of the American regulars, on the 4th, were one thousand two hundred and fifty-six. The cavalry of the state troops, in action, seventy-two, and the infantry seventy-three. The militia of North Carolina, about one hundred and fifty; those of Sumpter and Pickens' brigade then in the field, three hundred and seven. The number of Marion's troops could not have exceeded forty cavalry and two hundred infantry; and if two hundred be allowed for the camp-guard, then forty miles in the rear, Greene's whole force could not have exceeded two thousand combatants.

On the other side we only know, that on the junction of Cruger with Lord Rawdon, in Orangeburgh, their force approached very near three thousand. Five hundred of these were marched off under Lord Rawdon, and it was estimated that the garrison lately marched to Fairlawn, amounted to six hundred men. The detachment, with which Colonel Stewart was lately re-enforced from the latter place, was supposed to have counted five hundred. And these estimates will give a result of two thousand three hundred, the general estimate of Colonel Stewart's force. There was another view taken of the

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subject at the time, which makes it probable that the British force could not have been less. The British regular force at that time in South Carolina, was estimated at four thousand,* besides one thousand loyalists under arms, and four hundred cavalry. The garrison of Charleston was composed of loyalists and five hundred regulars; and after making due allowance for the garrisons of Orangeburgh and Dorchester, and for the sick and detached, it is not probable, that the force under Colonel Stewart, could have been less than two thousand three hundred. These were all disciplined troops; and a large portion of the old regiments consisted of American deserters and recruits, adding to British discipline, the precision of American marksmen. It will be seen, that the correctness of their aim made it a fatal day to the American officers. General Greene was often heard to say, "that at the close of the war, we fought the enemy with British soldiers, and they fought us with those of America." In cavalry, the superiority was decidedly with the Americans; or General Greene would not have fought this action, destitute as he was of the means of retreat or support. Washington's cavalry amounted to about eighty, and Lee's to as many, and there were about the same number of state cavalry, including those brought up by Marion. The British had not above half that number, but they were commanded by an able officer, Captain Coffin. In artillery, the armies were probably equal. The accounts from deserters, prior to the battle, were, that the enemy had five pieces. It is certain they brought two sixes and a four into action; whether more, we are not informed. The Americans had two four and two six-pounders.

The memorable battle of the Eutaw Springs, was fought on the 8th September, 1781. The day was fair and intensely hot, but the combatants were relieved by the shade of the woods, at its commencement.

It is a curious fact, that there is not in print a correct and full account of this battle. In common with most official accounts of drawn battles, both comman-

* In a letter from General Greene to Colonel Williams, written in November, 1782, we find the following passage.

"I find by a parliamentary register there were eighteen thousand troops, and upwards, in the southern department last year; besides all the militia which acted with the enemy, and those amounted to not less than two thousand, exclusive of the negroes: they had more than one thousand of them in the different military departments of the army. This includes Lord Cornwallis' army in Virginia. At the time the battle of Eutaw was fought, by the enemy's returns laid before parliament, it appears the enemy had in Charleston, and in their advanced army, six thousand seven hundred men fit for duty, besides all the militia and negroes. What an amazing difference between their force and ours. From these authorities I find our operations were much more glorious than ever we considered them. I long to get them away, that the issue may be as pleasing as the whole has been important."

ders had something to boast of, but much to conceal. And that of the American commander is, in one passage, so ambiguous that it requires a very attentive consideration of the context to understand, whether he is speaking of his own right and left, or those of the enemy. If of the enemy, it reverses and confounds some of the leading incidents of the battle.

The truth is, that in the commencement of the battle, the American triumph was complete; and it was the only instance during the American war, in which a British army was driven from its ground in a pitched battle. What made the triumph more complete was, that it was obtained at the point of the bayonet. But it is equally true, that the American army was afterwards repulsed with loss; and although it retained possession of the ground with its pickets, really retreated in some confusion from before the last position taken by the enemy. Finally, all the fruits of victory remained with the Americans, but they were purchased at a distressing sacrifice.

It is not to be wondered at, that in the midst of this melange of good and evil fortune, we should find the official accounts perspicuous and prolix on one class of events, but folding up the others in all the involutions of ambiguity. Policy, as well as the strongest tendencies of human feeling, lead to blazoning our successes on the one hand, and disguising our misfortunes on the other.

Writers who had no other sources of information to resort to but official communications, or who were reluctant at detecting the truth and exposing it, were necessarily led into error themselves, or not unwilling to lead others. But, to the author, who was himself a distinguished actor in the bloody scenes of the day, we naturally turn for full and authentic information. Yet, of Colonel Lee's work, we are compelled to quote the following passage, from one who was also, present and every where, on that occasion: "The most incorrect of all Colonel Lee's historical memoirs, are those which relate to the movements of the army previous to, and at the battle of the Eutaw Springs."^{*}

Fortunately we have it in our power to quote the man, who, we believe, never errs on the events which he describes. Colonel Otho Williams wrote a minute account of the occurrences of this battle, which our good fortune has thrown into our hands. And it has led to inquiries from Colonels Hampton, Polk, Howard, Watts, and several others of the distinguished men of that affair, which have enabled us to submit the following account of it, with confidence, to our readers.

* Major Pendleton.

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One leading cause of defect in the descriptions of the battle of the Eutaw, has been a limited knowledge of the topography of the field of battle. In this, and all other cases, we depend only upon actual inspection ourselves, having visited them all, except the Cowpens.

At 4 o'clock in the morning, the American army moved in four columns from its bivouac, in the following order: The South Carolina state troops and Lee's legion, formed the advance, under command of Colonel Henderson. The militia, both of North and South Carolina, under Marion, moved next. Then followed the regulars under General Sumner; and the rear was closed by Washington's cavalry and Kirkwood's Delawares, under Colonel Washington. The artillery moved between the columns. The troops were thus arranged in reference to the order of battle, in which they were to be formed on the field.

It is an admitted fact, that on the evening of the 7th, Stewart was unapprized of the approach of the American army. He supposed them to be still posted at Laurens', and the apology which he makes for it is—"that the Americans had way-laid the swamps and passes in such a manner, as to cut off every avenue to intelligence." He would have found a better apology in the fact, that the only patrol which appears to have been dispatched up the Congaree road, had been entrapped and captured by Colonel Lee, during the night. So entirely secure had he felt himself in his position, that an unarmed party, under a small escort, had been advanced up the river for the purpose of collecting the sweet potatoe, (very generally cultivated in this state) to contribute to the subsistence of his army. This party, commonly called a rooting party, consisting of about one hundred, after advancing about three miles, had pursued a road to their right, which led to the plantations on the river.

The first intelligence, that Greene had approached within seven miles of his position, was communicated to Stewart by two of the North Carolina conscripts, who had deserted early in the night. And Captain Coffin, at the head of his cavalry, was advanced, as well to recall the rooting party, as to reconnoitre the American position, and ascertain their views.

The American advance had already passed the road pursued by the rooting party, when they were encountered by Coffin; who immediately charged with a confidence which betrayed his ignorance of its strength, and of the near approach of the main army. It required little effort to meet and repulse the British cavalry; but, the probability that their main army was near at hand to support the detachment forbade the measure of a protracted pursuit. The firing at this point drew the rooting party out of the woods, and the whole fell into the hands of the Americans.

In the mean time, Colonel Stewart had pushed forward a detachment of infantry to a mile distant from the Eutaws, with orders to engage and detain the American troops, while he formed his men and prepared for battle. But, Greene, persuaded by the audacity of Coffin, that the enemy was at hand, and wishing to have time for his raw troops to form with coolness and recollection, halted his columns, and after distributing the contents of his rum casks, ordered his men to form in the order for battle.

The column of militia, when displayed, formed the first line; the South Carolinians, in equal divisions, on the right and left, and the North Carolinians in the centre. General Marion commanded the right, General Pickens the left, and Colonel Malmady, (who held a commission under North Carolina) commanded the centre. Colonel Henderson, with the state troops, including Sumpter's brigade, covered the left of this line, and Colonel Lee, with his legion, the right.

The column of regulars also displayed into one line; the North Carolinians under General Sumner, occupied the right, divided into three battalions, commanded by Colonel Ash, and Majors Armstrong and Blunt; the Marylanders, under Colonel Williams, on the left, divided into two battalions, commanded by Colonel Howard and Major Hardman; the Virginians, in the centre, under command of Colonel Campbell, were also divided into two battalions, led by Major Sneed and Captain Edmonds. The two three-pounders, under Captain Lieutenant Gaines, moved in the road with the first line, which was equally distributed to the right and left of it; and the two six-pounders, under Captain Browne, attended the second line, in the same order. Colonel Washington still moved in the rear in column, with orders to keep under cover of the woods, and hold himself in reserve. The relative numbers of the corps that formed the American second line, were nearly as follows: the North Carolina line, 350; the Virginians, 250; the Marylanders, 250. Those of the militia have been already mentioned. The troops of the two covering parties, and the reserve, make up the total of the regulars before stated.

In this order the troops moved forward. The whole country, on both sides of the road, being in woods, the lines could not move with much expedition consistently with preserving their order. The woods were not thick, nor the face of the country irregular; it undulated gently, presenting no obstacles to the march, although producing occasional derangements in the connection of the lines.

When the first American line reached the ground on which it encountered Stewart's advanced parties, it was ordered to move on in order, driving the

CHAP. enemy before it. And in this manner it advanced firing, while the enemy
XV. retreated, and fell into their own line.

At about two hundred yards west of the Eutaw Springs, Stewart had drawn up his troops in one line, extending from the Eutaw Creek beyond the main Congaree road. The Eutaw Creek effectually covered his right, and his left, which was in the military language, in air, was supported by Coffin's cavalry, and a respectable detachment of infantry, held in reserve at a convenient distance in the rear of the left, under cover of the wood.

The ground on which the British army was drawn up, was altogether in wood; but, at a small distance in the rear of this line, was a cleared field, extending west, south and east from the dwelling house, and bounded north by the creek formed by the Eutaw Springs, which is bold, and has a high bank thickly bordered with brush and low wood. From the house to this bank, extended a garden inclosed with palisades, and the windows of the house, which was two-stories high, with garret rooms, commanded the whole circumjacent fields. The house was of brick, and abundantly strong to resist small arms, and surrounded with various offices of wood; one particularly, a barn of some size, lay to the south-east, a small distance from the principal building. In the open ground, to the south and west of the house, was the British encampment, the tents of which were left standing.

The American approach was from the west; and at a short distance from the house, in that direction, the road forks, the right hand leading to Charleston, by the way of Monk's Corner, the left running along the front of the house by the plantation of Mr. Patrick Roche, and therefore called, by the British officers, Roche's road; being that which leads down the river, and through the parishes of St. Johns and St. Stephens.

The superiority of his enemy in cavalry, made it necessary that Colonel Stewart should cast his eye to the Eutaw house for retreat and support. To that, therefore, he directed the attention of Major Sheridan, with orders, upon the first symptoms of misfortune, to throw himself into it, and cover the army from the upper windows. On his right also, he had made a similar provision against the possibility of his lines being compelled to give ground. In the thickets which border the creek, Major Majoribanks, with three hundred of his best troops, was posted, with instructions to watch the flank of the enemy, if ever it should be opened to attack. This command had assumed a position having some obliquity to the main line, forming with it an obtuse angle.

The artillery of the enemy was also posted in the main road.

As soon as the skirmishing parties were cleared away from between the two armies, a steady and desperate conflict ensued. That between the artillery of

REFERENCES.

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| 1. American Reserve. | 11. The British Line. |
| 2. Maryland Line. | 12. British Reserve. |
| 3. Virginia D ^o . | 13. Kirkwood. |
| 4. N. Carolina D ^o . | 14. Lees Infantry. |
| 5. S. Carolina Militia. | 15. Hampton. |
| 6. G. N. Carolina D ^o . | 16. Capt. Coffin. |
| 7. Lees Legion. | 17. Cavalry of the Legion after the Enemy's defeat. |
| 8. 9. Henderson's Command. | △△ British Encampment. |
| 10. Majoribanks. | |


BATTLE of the EUTAWS.

1st VIEW

Shewing the Armies drawn up in the wood.

2nd VIEW

Shewing their situation after the British were driven into the old field.



the first line, and that of the enemy, was bloody and obstinate in the extreme; nor did the American artillery relax for a moment from firing or advancing, until both pieces were dismounted and disabled. One of the enemy's four pounders had shared the same fate, and the carnage on both sides had been equal and severe. CHAP.
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Nor had the militia been wanting in gallantry and perseverance. It was with equal astonishment, that both the second line and the enemy, contemplated these men, steadily, and without faltering, advance with shouts and exhortations into the hottest of the enemy's fire, unaffected by the continual fall of their comrades around them. General Greene, to express his admiration of the firmness exhibited on this occasion by the militia, says of them, in a letter to Steuben, "such conduct would have graced the veterans of the great king of Prussia." But it was impossible that this could endure long, for these men were, all this time, receiving the fire of double their number; their artillery was demolished, and that of the enemy still vomiting destruction on their ranks. They at length began to hesitate.

Governor Rutledge, who was anxiously attending the event of this battle, a few miles in the rear, wrote to the South Carolina delegates, that the militia fired seventeen rounds before they retired. That distrust of their own immediate commanders, which militia are too apt to be affected with, never produced an emotion where Marion and Pickens commanded.

General Sumner was then ordered up to support them. This was done with the utmost promptness, and the battle again raged with redoubled fury. In speaking of General Sumner's command, General Greene observes, "that he was at a loss which most to admire, the gallantry of the officers or the good conduct of their men."

On the advance of General Sumner's command, Colonel Stewart had brought up the infantry of his reserve into line on his left, and the struggle was obstinately maintained between fresh troops on both sides.

From the first commencement of the action, the infantry of the American covering parties, on the right and left, had been steadily engaged. The cavalry of the legion, by being on the American right, had been enabled to withdraw into the woods and attend on its infantry, without being at all exposed to the enemy's fire. But the state troops under Henderson had been in the most exposed situation on the field. The American right, with the addition of the legion infantry, had extended beyond the British left. But the American left fell far short of the British right; and the consequence was that the state troops were exposed to the oblique fire of a large proportion of the British right, and particularly of the battalion commanded by Majoribanks. Never was the con-

stancy of a party of men more severely tried. Henderson solicited permission to charge them, and extricate himself from their galling fire, but his protection could not be spared from the artillery or the militia. At length he received a wound which disabled him from keeping his horse, and a momentary hesitation in his troops was produced by the shock. The exertions of Colonel Wade Hampton, who succeeded to the command, aided by those of Colonel Polk and Middleton, proved successful in restoring them to confidence and order, and they resumed their station in perfect tranquillity.

In the mean time things were assuming important changes along the front line. Sumner's brigade, after sustaining for some time, a fire superior to their own in the ratio of the greater numbers opposed to them, at length yielded, and fell back. The British left, elated at the prospect, sprang forward as to certain conquest, and their line became deranged. This was exactly the incident for which the American commander was anxiously watching, and the next moment produced the movement for availing himself of it. Colonel Williams now remained in command of the second line. "Let Williams advance, and sweep the field with his bayonets," was the order delivered to a gentleman of the medical staff, who acted the surgeon, the aid, and the soldier, indifferently, as occasion required.*

Never was order obeyed with more alacrity; the two brigades received it with a shout; emulous to wipe away the recollections of Hobkirk's Hill, they advanced with a spirit expressive of the impatience with which they had hitherto been passive spectators of the action. When approached within forty yards of the enemy, the Virginians delivered a destructive fire, and the whole second line, with trailed arms, and an animated pace, advanced to the charge. Until this period their progress had been in the midst of showers of grape, and under a stream of fire from the line opposed to them. But eye-witnesses have asserted, that the roll of the drum, and the shouts which followed it, drew every eye upon them alone; and a momentary pause in the action, a suspension by mutual consent, appeared to withdraw both armies from a sense of personal danger, to fix their attention upon this impending conflict. It may well be supposed with what breathless expectation the southern commander hung upon a movement on which all his hopes depended. Had it failed, he must have retired under the cover of his cavalry.

Upon the approach of the second line, the advanced left of the British army had commenced a retrograde movement, in some disorder. This was confirmed

by the good conduct of Colonel Lee. The legion infantry had steadily maintained its order in its position on the extreme right; and the advance of the British left having exposed its flank, the legion infantry were promptly wheeled, and poured in upon them a destructive enfilading fire; then joining in the charge, the British left wing was thrown into irretrievable disorder. But their centre and right still remained; greatly outnumbering the assailing party, and awaiting the impending charge with unshaken constancy.

If the two lines on this occasion, did not actually come to the mutual thrust of the bayonet, it must be acknowledged, that no troops ever came nearer. They are said to have been so near, that their bayonets clashed and the officers sprang at each other with their swords, before the enemy actually broke away.

But, the scales of victory, fortunately for man, are never long in equipoise on these occasions.

In this instance, the left of the British centre appear to have been pressed upon, and forced back by their own fugitives, and began to give way from left to right. At that moment, the Marylanders delivered their fire, and along their whole front the enemy yielded.

The shouts of victory resounded through the American line, affording a gleam of consolation to many a brave man, bleeding and expiring on the field. Among these was the gallant Campbell, who received a ball in the breast during this onset.

The victory was now deemed certain; but, many joined in the shouts of victory who were still destined to bleed. The carnage among the Americans had but commenced; it was in the effort to prevent the enemy from rallying, and to cut him off from the brick-house, which was all that remained to compel the army to surrender, that their great loss was sustained.

A pursuing army is always impeded by the effort that is necessary to maintain its own order; while, whether from terror, for safety, or for rallying the speed of the fugitive, is unrestrained. Hence, cavalry are the military means for rendering disorder irretrievable. It is obvious, that at this point of time, the legion cavalry might have been turned upon the British left with very great effect. Their position was highly favourable to such a movement, and their infantry was close up with the enemy to afford support. Why this was not done, has never been explained; we can only conjecture, that it was prevented by one or both of two causes known to have existed on that day. Colonel Lee was generally absent from it during the action, and bestowing his attention upon the progress of his infantry; and Captain Coffin was in that quarter, attending on the retreat of the British left. Coffin's force was,

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probably, superior to that of Lee in cavalry ; whether so superior as to justify the latter's not attempting the charge in the presence of the British cavalry, although supported by that of his own infantry, could only have been decided by the attempt.

At this stage of the battle, Majoribanks still stood firm in the thickets that covered him ; and, as the British line extended considerably beyond the American left, their extreme right still manifested a reluctance to retire ; and, as their left had first given way, and yielded now without resistance, the two armies performed together a half wheel, which brought them into the open ground towards the front of the house.

General Greene now saw that Majoribanks must be dislodged, or the Maryland flank would soon be exposed to his fire, and the conflict in that quarter renewed under his protection. Therefore, orders were dispatched to Washington, to pass the American left and charge the enemy's right. The order was promptly obeyed, and galloping through the woods, Washington was soon in action. Had he had the good fortune to have taken on Kirkwood's infantry behind his men, all would have gone well ; to have been detained by their march, would have been inconsistent with his general feeling.

Colonel Hampton, at the same time, received orders to co-operate with Colonel Washington ; and the rapid movement which he made to the creek, in order to fall in upon Washington's left, probably hastened the forward movement of the latter. On reaching the front of Majoribanks, and before Hampton had joined him, Washington attempted a charge, but it was impossible for his cavalry to penetrate the thicket. He then discovered that there was an interval between the British right and the creek, by which he was in hopes to succeed in gaining their rear. With this view, he ordered his troop to wheel by sections to the left, and thus, brought nearly all his officers next to the enemy, while he attempted to pass their front. A deadly and well directed fire, delivered at that instant, wounded or brought to the ground many of his men and horses, and every officer except two.

The field of battle was, at this instant, rich in the dreadful scenery which disfigures such a picture. On the left, Washington's cavalry, routed and flying, horses plunging as they died, or coursing the field without their riders, while the enemy, with poised bayonet, issued from the thicket, upon the wounded or unhorsed rider : In the fore-ground, Hampton covering and collecting the scattered cavalry, while Kirkwood, with his bayonets, rushed furiously to revenge their fall, and a road strewn with the bodies of men and horses, and the fragments of dismounted artillery : Beyond these, a

scene of indiseribable confusion, viewed over the whole American line advancing rapidly, and in order: And, on the right, Henderson borne off in the arms of his soldiers, and Campbell sustained in his saddle by a brave son, who had sought glory at his father's side.

Nothing could exceed the consternation spread at this time through the British ground of encampment. Every thing was given up for lost, the commissaries destroyed their stores, the numerous retainers of the army, mostly loyalists and deserters, who dreaded falling into the hands of the Americans, leaping on the first horse they could command, crowded the roads, and spread alarm to the very gates of Charleston. The stores on the road were set fire to, and the road itself obstructed by the felling of trees, for miles, across it.

Lieutenant Gordon, and Cornet Simmons, were the only two of Washington's officers who could return into action. The Colonel himself had his horse shot under him, and his life saved by the interposition of a British officer. The melancholy group of wounded men and officers, who soon presented themselves to the general's view, convinced him of the severity of his misfortune; but, he had not yet been made acquainted with the full extent of it.

The survivors of Washington's command being rallied, united themselves to Hampton's, and were again led up to the charge upon Majoribanks, but without success. That officer was then retiring before Kirkwood, still holding to the thickets, and making for a new position, with his rear to the creek, and his left resting on the palisaded garden. By this time Sheridan had thrown himself into the house, and some of the routed companies from the left had made good their retreat into the picketted garden; from the intervals of which, they could direct their fire with security and effect. The whole British line was now flying before the American bayonet. The latter pressed closely upon their heels, made many prisoners, and might have cut off the retreat of the rest, or entered pell-mell with them into the house, but for one of those occurrences, which have often snatched victory from the grasp of a pursuing enemy.

The retreat of the British army lay directly through their encampment, where the tents were all standing, and presented many objects to tempt a thirsty, naked and fatigued soldiery to acts of insubordination. Nor was the concealment afforded by the tents at this time a trivial consideration, for the fire from the windows of the house was galling and destructive, and no cover from it was any where to be found except among the tents, or behind the building to the left of the front of the house.

Here it was that the American line got into irretrievable confusion.—When their officers had proceeded beyond the encampment, they found them-

CHAP. XV. selves nearly abandoned by their soldiers, and the sole marks for the party who now poured their fire from the windows of the house.

From the baneful effects of passing through the encampment, only a few corps escaped. Of this number, the legion infantry appears to have been one. Being far on the American right, it directed its movements with a view to securing the advantage of being covered by the barn; and the narrow escape of the British army, is sufficiently attested by the fact, that this corps was very near entering the house pell-mell with the fugitives. It was only by closing the door in the face of some of their own officers and men, that it was prevented; and in retiring from the fire of the house, the prisoners taken at the door, were interposed as a shield to the life of their captors.

Every thing now combined to blast the prospects of the American commander. The fire from the house showered down destruction upon the American officers; and the men, unconscious or unmindful of consequences, perhaps thinking the victory secure, and bent on the immediate fruition of its advantages, dispersing among the tents, fastened upon the liquors and refreshments they afforded, and became utterly unmanageable.

Majoribanks and Coffin, watchful of every advantage, now made simultaneous movements: the former from his thicket on the left, and the latter from the wood on the right of the American line. General Greene soon perceived the evil that threatened him, and not doubting but his infantry, whose disorderly conduct he was not yet made acquainted with, would immediately dispose of Majoribanks, dispatched Captain Pendleton with orders for the legion cavalry to fall upon Coffin and repulse him.

We will give the result in Captain Pendleton's own language: "When Coffin's cavalry came out, General Greene sent me to Colonel Lee, with orders to attack him. When I went to the corps Lee was not there, and the order was delivered to Major Eggleston, the next in command, who made the attack without success." "The truth is, Colonel Lee was very little, if at all, with his own corps after the enemy fled. He took some dragoons with him, as I was informed, and rode about the field, giving orders and directions, in a manner the general did not approve of. General Greene was, apparently, disappointed when I informed him Colonel Lee was not with his cavalry, and that I had delivered the order to Major Eggleston."

By this time General Greene, being made acquainted with the extent of his misfortune, ordered a retreat.

Coffin, who certainly proved himself a brave and active officer on this day, had no sooner repulsed the legion cavalry, than he hastened on to charge the rear of the Americans, now dispersed among the tents. Colonel Hampton had

been ordered up to the road to cover the retreat, at the same time the order was issued to effect it, and now charged upon Coffin with a vigour that was not to be resisted. Coffin met him with firmness, and a sharp conflict, hand to hand, was for a while maintained. But Coffin was obliged to retire, and in the ardour of pursuit, the American cavalry approached so near Majoribanks, and the picketted garden, as to receive from them a fatally destructive fire. Colonel Polk, who commanded Hampton's left, and was, of consequence, directly under its influence, describes it by declaring, "that he thought every man killed but himself." Colonel Hampton then rallied his scattered cavalry, and resumed his station in the border of the wood. But before this could be effected, Majoribanks had taken advantage of the opening made by his fire, to perform another gallant action, which was decisive of the fortune of the day.

The artillery of the second line had followed on, as rapidly as it could, upon the track of the pursuit, and, together with two six-pounders abandoned by the enemy in their flight, had been brought up to batter the house. Unfortunately, in the ardour to discharge a pressing duty, the pieces had been run into the open field, so near as to be commanded by the fire from the house. The pieces had scarcely opened their fire, when the pressing danger which threatened the party in the house, and, consequently the whole army, drew all the fire from the windows upon the artillerists, and it very soon killed or disabled nearly the whole of them. And Majoribanks was no sooner disembarrassed of Hampton's cavalry, than he sallied into the field, seized the pieces, and hurried them under the cover of the house. Then being re-enforced by parties from the garden and the house, he charged among the Americans, now dispersed among the tents, and drove them before him. The American army, however, soon rallied, after reaching the cover of the wood, and their enemy was too much crippled to venture beyond the cover of the house.

General Greene halted on the ground only long enough to collect his wounded; all of whom, except those who had fallen under cover of the fire from the house, he brought off; and having made arrangements for burying the dead, and left a strong picket, under Colonel Hampton, on the field, he withdrew his army to Burdell's, seven miles distant. At no nearer point could water be found adequate to the comforts of the army.

Both parties claimed, on this occasion, a complete victory; but there is no difficulty in deciding the question between them, upon the plainest principles. The British army was chased from the field at the point of the bayonet, and took refuge in a fortress; the Americans were repulsed from that fortress. And, but for the demoralizing effect of possessing themselves of the British tents, the cover

CHAP. of the barn presented the means of forcing or firing the house with certainty,
 XV. and reducing the whole to submission.

But if further evidence of victory than driving the enemy from the field, occupying his position, and plundering his camp, be required, it is found in the events of the succeeding day.

M^rArthur was called up from Fairlawn to cover General Stewart's retreat; and leaving seventy of his wounded to his enemy, and many of his dead unburied; breaking the stocks of one thousand stand of arms, and casting them into the spring; destroying his stores, and then moving off precipitately, he fell back, and retreated to Fairlawn. The possession of the American artillery, was the strong ground on which the British founded their claim to victory. But in this the trophies were divided, for one of the enemy's pieces, the four pounder that was disabled on the field, was carried off by the Americans, and the two others were fairly in their hands, and would have been secured, had they not been brought up, through the officious zeal of some of the staff of the army, to attack their prior owners.

On the other hand, the enemy took no prisoners, except about forty wounded, whilst the Americans made five hundred prisoners, including the seventy who were abandoned when the enemy retreated.

But the best criterion of victory is to be found in consequences; and here the evidence is altogether on the American side. For, the enemy abandoned his position, relinquished the country it commanded, and although largely re-enforced, still retired, when the Americans advanced within five miles of him, to Ferguson's Swamp, where he had first halted.

It was General Greene's intention to have renewed the action the next day; and in hopes to prevent a junction with M^rArthur, Lee and Marion had been detached to watch the line of communication between the Eutaws and Fairlawn. By the simultaneous movements of the two corps, so as to meet at mid-distance and out-number Marion, their junction and retreat was effectually secured. This was the evening of the day after the battle. General Greene pressed the pursuit on the road to Charleston, during the whole of one day; but, finding that Colonel Stewart still retired before him, and being now left at liberty to watch the movements of Lord Cornwallis, and his wounded and prisoners requiring attention, he resolved to retire again to the High-Hills of Santee.

The truth is, that the British power in South Carolina was completely prostrated by the battle of Eutaw; for, independently of losing in killed, wounded and missing, near one half of the force brought into action, the enemy had lost the charm of imputed invincibility in the field; and, above all, that of

invincibility at the bayonet. By a very inferior force, they had been decidedly foiled at this weapon, in a conflict, in which the relative pretensions of the combatants to this kind of excellence, had been fairly tested. The question had been depending from the very commencement of this campaign, and had now been conclusively decided in favour of the American bayonet. It was a subject of great exultation among the Virginians and Marylanders and every other corps in the army, among whom great pains had been taken to make it the point of honour.

General Greene had need of all the consolations of victory, to relieve the distressed feelings which burthened his heart at the close of this day. To see the British army, by circumstances which no human foresight could have anticipated, snatched from his grasp at the moment when he had every reason to expect its surrender on the field of battle, might have been borne, by one so familiarized to the vicissitudes of war, and the persecutions of fortune. But, the frequent little groups of soldiers, bearing on litters his bleeding or expiring officers, excited feelings which no philosophy could control. They were not only his brothers in arms, but his brothers in affection, most of them formed to service under his own eye, the cheerful uncomplaining associates in many a day of toil and privation, and their conduct on this day, had exhibited such proofs of devotion to their country and their general, as left an impression never to be effaced from a grateful heart. "Never," says he, in his official account of this battle, "did either men or officers offer their blood more willingly in the service of their country." Thin as were his regiments, he had always been deficient in officers, and now sixty-one had been killed or wounded. Twenty-one of these had died on the field of battle, and among them Campbell, of whose merits he entertained the most exalted opinions. "He was," says he, "the great soldier and firm patriot."

An anecdote, related of this officer by several historians, and shedding lustre over his tomb, has been contradicted by Colonel Lee. It is this; that after receiving his wound, and when drawing fast to his end, he inquired how the battle went; and being informed that the enemy were routed, and flying, he exclaimed, "I die contented."

Colonel Lee asserts,* that Campbell received the fatal wound in his presence, and expired "without uttering a word." The reader will decide between the authority of Colonel Lee, and the following testimony of Captain Pendleton, to the dying sentiment of Campbell :

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 292.

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"I was not present when Colonel Campbell received his wound ; but, late in the afternoon, I was directed by General Greene to pass through the woods, on the south side of the road, and direct the straggling parties I might meet with dispersed through them, to rendezvous at the house from which we had marched in the morning. In doing this I met with Colonel Campbell, carried upon a litter by some soldiers. I got off my horse and went to him. He perfectly retained his senses, but was in great pain, and seemed near his end. He asked me who had gained the battle. I told him we had completely defeated the enemy. "Then," said he, "I die contented." I left him, and understood he died shortly after."

In support of Captain Pendleton, it is in our power to adduce a fact, well calculated to replace this laurel on the tomb of a gallant officer. In the afternoon of the day of the battle, Captain Pearce was dispatched to congress with the intelligence of the victory. That Campbell was not dead when Pearce left the army, appears from a letter of his, written on his journey, in which he particularly inquires, "if it be true that Campbell was dead !"

General Greene, in his official communication, distinguishes particularly the Virginians, Marylanders, infantry of the legion, and Kirkwood's light infantry. To their free use of the bayonet, he attributes the victory ; the last mentioned corps had moved up with astonishing celerity from the rear, and forced its way wherever the enemy's right manifested a disposition to make a stand. Every corps in the army, indeed, is mentioned with some expression of applause, except the cavalry of the legion, of which it is only said, "it was discomfited in an attempt on the right." Its inactivity during the action, when opportunities for service certainly presented themselves, and its shrinking at the close of the battle, when ordered into action, were subjects of no little criticism at the time. That the men and officers were brave, had been proved in many a rencontre ; but, it was remembered, that nearly the same thing had occurred at Guilford. The failure of the charge upon Coffin, had passed under the eye of the whole army ; and, although the superiority of the latter had been great at the commencement of the action, it must have been much diminished at this time, after the fatigues and combats he had undergone. It is most probable, that the appearance of the legion cavalry in the field, drew upon it the fire from the house, and this may have been the cause that checked and dispirited its movements. Yet, rapidity of movement, and actual contact with the enemy, must have diminished, if not obviated this evil. It is but justice, however, both to this corps, and to Colonel Lee, to mention, that General Greene never censured either ; on the contrary, at a subsequent day, when Colonel Lee was writhing under the imputations that these occurrences had produced, we

find this tribute rendered by the general to their merit.* "I see by your letter to Major Burnet, you think great injustice was done your legion, in the report of the battle of Eutaw; and you lament my giving credit to idle tales, in forming my report. You may rest assured I did not. There was no man that deserved greater credit than you that day; and if you are not so represented, it is my fault. The infantry of the legion deserved every thing that could be said of them also. Nor was the cavalry blamable, but less fortunate. They did not make a successful charge in the course of the day, though they attempted it several times. Two corps may be equally disposed to distinguish themselves—one may have an opportunity, the other not; and where a case of this kind should happen, I would ask you, whether you could report them to equal advantage? If they can be, then intention is every thing, action nothing. You know, it is a rule with me, to give a candid account, let the matter operate as it may," &c.

Colonel Lee, in his anxiety to exculpate the conduct of his favourite corps, has cast an imputation upon the aid who delivered the order to Eggleston, by pronouncing it an officious order, and one "in truth never issued by the general." The officer who delivered that order now avows it to the world, and with confidence appeals to the expression of approbation publicly declared by the general, of his conduct on that day. "I also feel myself greatly indebted to Captains Pierce and *Pendleton*, Major Hyrne and Captain Shubrick, my aids-de-camp, for their activity and good conduct throughout the whole of the action." Censure, Captain *Pendleton* observes, not approbation, would have followed "an officious order," ending in a disaster "conclusive of the disappointment of a commander's highest hopes," as Colonel Lee pronounces it.

But the officer whose conduct, on this day, met with the loudest applause, was Colonel Williams; of him General Greene says—"I cannot help acknowledging my obligations to Colonel Williams for his great activity on this and many other occasions, in forming the army; and for his uncommon intrepidity in leading on the Maryland troops to the charge, *which exceeded any thing I ever saw.*" Marion, Pickens, Sumner, Henderson, Hampton, Polk, Middleton, Lee, Washington, and many others, had been previously complimented upon their conduct, by his noticing the occurrences happening under their respective commands.

* General Greene to Colonel Lee, October 7th, 1782.

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Henderson, Pickens, Howard, and many other invaluable officers, were among the wounded. Marion and Williams, through the whole campaign, seem to have been guarded by the hand of Minerva.

On the evening after the battle, while General Greene was discharging a duty which he never failed to perform, that of visiting the couch of the wounded, when he came to the hovel in which Washington's wounded officers were grouped together, the sight of so many gallant young men, so suddenly brought down from the high hopes and martial exhibition of the preceding day, so strongly affected him, that after the kindest inquiries which a warm heart, and unfeigned admiration could dictate, he took his leave, with telling them, "it was a trying duty imposed on you, but it was unavoidable, I could not help it."

The American returns exhibit a loss of one hundred and fourteen rank and file killed, three hundred wounded, and forty missing; the aggregate exceeding one fourth of all who marched into battle. The enemy acknowledged a loss of three commissioned officers killed, sixteen wounded, and ten missing: Rank and file, eighty-two killed, three hundred and thirty-five wounded, and two hundred and forty-seven missing. But if the number acknowledged killed and wounded, was as much less than the reality as the number acknowledged as missing is known to have been, (and the chance of detection was less as to the killed and wounded,) then must their actual loss have been much greater. For General Greene actually carried off the field four hundred and thirty prisoners, which, added to the wounded left behind the day following the battle, made up the number of prisoners five hundred. The whole, killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounting to more than half of their number acknowledged to have been brought into the field. A victory on such terms could only have existed in imagination, or in bold deception!

The immediate cause of the defeat of Colonel Stewart was certainly, as he alleges, the disorder produced by the advance of his left out of line. But for that occurrence, promptly and happily improved by his adversary, it is probable that he would not have been forced from his ground, and the affair would have terminated in a drawn battle, or rather a repulse of the Americans. General Greene's bayonets were too few to have forced the British line, had it been steadily preserved.

Majoribanks did not live long to enjoy the high reputation he had acquired on this day. He died on the march to Charleston; and his tomb is still seen on the road-side, where he expired and was buried.

The rest of the British wounded narrowly escaped the restless enterprise of Marion. Understanding that they had been shipped at Fairlawn for Charles-

son, he moved rapidly, by night, below that place, on the opposite bank of the river, and would certainly have intercepted them, had not a slave of one of the plantations given a signal proof of his loyalty, by hastening to the British camp with the intelligence. Marion was, in his turn, compelled to steal away, and avoid interception.

The congress of the United States took particular notice of the affair of the Eutaws. After voting their thanks to the commander of the department, and every description of troops specifically, a British standard was ordered to be presented to the commander, and a gold medal commemorative of the event ;* a sword to his aid, Captain Pierce, who was bearer of the intelligence; their thanks to the general's aids by name, and a very particular acknowledgment made to General Marion for his services generally, and particularly in the expedition to Pon Pon, and the battle of Eutaw.

* This medal is now in the hands of Mr. Eli Whitney, of New-Haven. The impression was also made in copper, and distributed to his friends, among whom it is sacredly preserved.

CHAPTER XVI.

General Greene recrosses the Santee. Resumes his post at the High Hills. Correspondence. British army re-enforced, returns to the banks of the Santee. Takes post at Monk's Corner. Extreme distress of the American army. Rumour of Lord Cornwallis' flight revived. Great efforts to prepare to meet him. Governor Burke, of North Carolina. His laudable conduct. Valorous enterprise of Hector McNeil. Burke and his council are captured, and sent prisoners to Charleston. State of things in North Carolina and Virginia. Shelby and Seviere join the army—are detached under Marion. American army cross the Wateree and Congaree, and take post at Round-O. Affairs of Fairlawn and Dorchester. British army forced below the Quarter-House. The mountaineers desert Marion. American army without ammunition—the causes. General St. Clair, Gist, and Wayne join the army, with the Pennsylvania line and recruits from Maryland and Delaware. Wayne detached to Georgia. Preparations for the Jacksonborough Assembly. American army advances to cover it. Colonel Laurens. Attempt on Colonel Craig. General Greene takes post at Colonel Skirving's. Campaign closes.

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ON the day of the battle of the Eutaws, General Greene had received intelligence, by express from Governor Burke, which forbade his continuing on the south of the Santee longer than was necessary to ascertain whether his adversary would await another attack.

The French fleet had arrived off the Chesapeake, General Washington was on his march for Virginia, and Cornwallis was indicating intentions to make

PART OF
SOUTH CAROLINA;
 Shewing the Seat of War after the
Battle of Eutaws.



Round O. 1st station of Gen. Greenes Army

his anticipated movement to the south. To meet and counteract the movement of Cornwallis southwardly, it was necessary that the American army should take a position to the north of the Santee, and that every nerve should be strained to collect re-enforcements.

La Fayette and Governor Burke had been early warned to be on their guard against this movement; and they were not inattentive to the discharge of their duty.

On the 12th General Greene crossed the Santee, at Nelson's Ferry; and on the 15th resumed his former position at the Hills. This was the first breathing moment he had enjoyed after the battle: such had been the duties which the movements of the enemy, the care of the wounded, and the order necessary to be taken, in the new state of things, had heaped upon him.

Orders being first dispatched in every direction, for every re-enforcement that he could hope for, with a view to preparing for the probable event of having to throw himself in front of Lord Cornwallis, we find General Greene, on the 17th, for the first time after the affair of the Eutaws, sitting down to indulge himself, in communicating with his private friends on that occurrence.

Writing to General Varnum, one of the intimates of his youth, and then a member of congress, he says, "I have the pleasure to inform you, that we have had a most tremendous fight, and gained a victory. You will see my letters to congress, and have an opportunity to converse with Captain Pierce, my aid, who will have the honour of delivering you this letter; therefore I will not go into particulars, but depend upon it, it was by far the most obstinate and bloody fight I ever saw.

"*We fight*, you must acknowledge. I hope the conduct of the army may merit the very particular approbation of congress. I am sure we endeavour to deserve it.

"I congratulate you on our happy prospects in Virginia. General Washington is a most fortunate, as well as a great and good man. He will be hailed as the deliverer of his own country. How pleasing the task! how honourable the undertaking! "Nations shall rise up and call him blessed!" I long for domestic life; but, Britain will persevere as long as there is a gleam of hope. However, I think her prospects are not a little blasted in the south; but, we are weak and feeble, notwithstanding the enemy fly before us. They have more than two to our one."

To the marquis he writes—"If you succeed against Cornwallis, which I am sure you will, unless he escapes through North Carolina, which I shall take every measure to prevent, I have invited the commander in chief further south.

CHAP. XVI. that we may give at one blow a finishing stroke to the war in this quarter, and I shall be equally happy in serving subordinate or principal.

“We have had a most bloody battle since I wrote you before. It was fought at the Eutaw Springs, near Nelson’s Ferry. We obtained a complete victory, and had it not been for *one of those incidents to which military operations are subject*, we should have taken the whole British army. However, we took five hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded a much greater number, and have driven the enemy almost to the gates of Charleston; we also took near one thousand stand of arms. It was, by far, the hottest action I ever saw, and the most bloody for the numbers engaged. But, the enemy greatly outnumbered us,” &c.

In his letter to General Washington, among many other topics, alluding to the attempt on Lord Cornwallis, he writes—“I wish most devoutly, that glory and success may attend you. If Cornwallis falls, which I think nothing can prevent but his escaping through North Carolina to Charleston, Charleston itself may easily be reduced, if you bend your force this way. Since I wrote you, we have had a most bloody battle. It was, by far, the most obstinate fight I ever saw. Victory was ours; and had it not been for one of those little incidents which often occur in the progress of war, we should have taken the whole British army. Nothing could exceed the gallantry of our officers, or the bravery of our troops, &c. I am trying to collect a body of militia to oppose Lord Cornwallis, should he attempt to escape through North Carolina; and you may rest assured, nothing shall be left unattempted in my power, to impede his march, so as to give your army time to get up with him. But, my force will be very small, and I am exceedingly embarrassed with a numerous wounded.”

In General Washington’s answer, dated October 6th, before York-Town, he writes—“How happy am I, my dear sir, in at length having it in my power to congratulate you upon a victory, as splendid as I hope it will prove important. Fortune must have been coy indeed, had she not yielded, at last, to so persevering a person as you have been. I hope now she is yours, she will change her appellation of fickle to that of constant.

“I can say, with sincerity, that I feel in the highest degree, the good effects which you mention, as resulting from the perfect good understanding between you, the marquis, and myself. I hope it will never be interrupted; and I am sure it never can, while we are all influenced by the same pure motive—that of love to our country, and interest in the cause in which we are embarked. I have happily had but few differences with those with whom I have the honour of being connected in the services—with whom, and of what nature

those have been, you know. I bore much for the sake of peace and the public good—my conscience tells me, I acted right in these transactions; and should they ever come to the knowledge of the world, I trust I shall stand acquitted by it," &c.

In a letter of the 16th, to General Nelson, we find the following passages relative to the Virginia line:—"Since then we have had a bloody action, by which their ranks are considerably thinned. The officers paid severely for the honours of the day; but, such as fell, met their fate with becoming dignity. Your line participated considerably in the loss; and their very material services claim the most generous acknowledgments of gratitude from their country. Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who commanded the brigade, and who was killed in the heat and fury of the conflict, merits all that can be said of a brave, active, and intrepid soldier. His worth I recommend to you as deserving very particular public notice. He has been engaged in our service from the commencement of the war, and has bled more than once to save the liberties of his country. A numerous family is left behind to lament his loss; and a very gallant youth, his son, who is a lieutenant in the line, and who fought bravely by his side, is here to partake of such honours as Virginia may think proper to bestow on his father's merit."

In a letter to General Smallwood, he says—"Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the Maryland line. Colonels Williams, Howard, and all the officers exhibited acts of uncommon bravery; and the free use of the bayonet by this and some other corps, gave us the victory. But, though our glory was complete, and advantages great, yet it has been at the expense of much blood. Many brave fellows have fallen, and a great number of officers are wounded; among the number, is Lieutenant Colonel Howard. The Maryland line made a charge that exceeded any thing I ever saw. But, alas! their ranks are thin, and their officers few!

"Are we to have any re-enforcements or not? or, am I to be left to sink after the great exertions we have made? It is a long time since I was favoured with a line from you. From others I can hear of troops coming, but never can hear of their arrival."

In all his communications it is perceived, that Greene wrote with great warmth on the bravery of his officers and men. Nor, was he less just to the merits of their antagonists. The praise he bestows upon the latter is not the mere affectation of rating still higher his own exploits; it was the unaffected effusion of real admiration. But, we are left to conjecture what this "*incident*" was, to which he so often alludes, as the cause of his failure to capture the whole army.

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There can be no doubt, it was the disorder produced in his army by the plundering of the camp. But for this, Majoribanks, when he charged upon them, must have been overthrown in an instant at the point of the bayonet: and the piazza of the house would have covered the men from the enemy, while they set fire to it. He was unwilling to excuse his loss of the prize, then almost in his grasp, by acknowledging the disgraceful conduct of his men in that instance. Their bravery, previously, had been such, and the offence, though fatal to him, so natural to men of their habits, that he obviously wished to throw the fact into the shade.

We will dismiss the subject of this battle by one further observation. Every author who has related it, has asserted, that when the American line charged upon the enemy, the contest was maintained with such obstinacy, that the soldiers fell pierced by mutual wounds. As the experience of military men goes far to discredit the truth of this assertion, we have taken some pains to ascertain how far it comported with facts. The result is, that one such instance was seen. General Greene's body-servant, a black man, a private in the Maryland line, had taken his post in the ranks (as did every other of every description belonging to the regiments;) he happened to encounter an adversary worthy of coping with him, and they fell and were found mutually transfixed, each by the other's bayonet. Although the fact does not furnish ground sufficient to except the battle of the Eutaws from the general rule, "that soldiers never actually stand the thrust of the bayonet;" yet, it proves the near approach, and desperate resolution of the assailing party, and the firmness with which they were received. Less reality often furnishes groundwork for more fiction.

Critical and embarrassing as Greene's situation had often been, it never was more so than immediately after the battle of the Eutaws. His militia soon all left him; of the North Carolinians, there remained but one hundred, and their term of service was near expiring. Pickens, Marion, and Hampton, had been necessarily detached to cover the country; and with the continentals alone, he had to discharge all the painful and necessary services required by near six hundred wounded, three hundred and fifty of his own, and two hundred and fifty of the enemy. Added to this, the fatigue and exposure which his troops had recently undergone among the swamps, at this season of the year, had brought on them the diseases of the climate, and the commander himself became a subject of their attack.

At all times embarrassed in the quarter-master's department, his means of transportation by land were quite inadequate to his present necessities; but for the contiguity of the river, it would scarcely have been possible to move the

army, without leaving its wounded behind. By collecting boats, the wounded were happily accommodated in a manner well suited to their situation, and sent up the Wateree. But exposure to the miasma of the swamps, at that season, could not fail to produce attacks of endemial disease among them and their attendants.

General Greene certainly could not, ten days after the battle of Eutaw, have mustered, at head-quarters, one thousand men fit for action. With this diminutive force, and himself labouring under disease, two important objects pressed on his attention. The most positive intelligence was now received, "that Lord Cornwallis meant to penetrate, with his army, from York to South Carolina by land;" and "that in consequence of the arrival of the French fleet, Lord Cornwallis was about moving from York to James River, and was getting his boats across from Queen's Creek to the College Landing, from thence to Jamestown, and there to cross James River to Cobham, from that place to South Carolina."* A simultaneous movement of Colonel Stewart's forces, confirmed the truth of this intelligence. For that officer, after collecting all the re-enforcements he could gather from below, strengthening his cavalry to the number of two hundred, had once more advanced to the Eutaws, and was pushing the American detachments both up and down the Santee. Hampton above, and Marion below, were both obliged to retire across the rivers; and some apprehension was entertained of a serious blow being meditated against the boats transporting the wounded.

Had the enemy, at that time, pressed across the Santee, there was but too much reason to apprehend they might have reinstated their power; prostrated though it was, at the Eutaws. But either they were too much reduced to attempt it, or proposed only to hold their adversary in check from opposing Lord Cornwallis; or, as Marion mentions, "made the movement only *in bravado*," with a view to regain the hold on public opinion, which had been forfeited by his recent retreat."

Although the movement of Lord Cornwallis, with a view to retreat southwardly, is not mentioned by any historian of the war, yet the intelligence came from La Fayette and Muhlenberg, through Governor Burke, and there is little reason to doubt its reality. It is known that La Fayette actually moved to the bank of James River, to counteract such a movement, and Muhlenberg was thrown across the river, to place himself in Lord Cornwallis' front. Not with

* Governor Burke's Letters, 1st, and 3d, and 6th September, and enclosures from La Fayette and Muhlenberg.

a hope of resisting him in his progress, but, as Muhlenberg declares, "with a view to precede him, and by destroying all the means of subsistence and transportation, to impede his progress until he could be overtaken by a force competent to cope with him."

Upon the first intelligence of this movement of Lord Cornwallis, the most animated measures were adopted by Governor Burke, to co-operate with Muhlenberg. Every boat on the Roanoke, Neuse, and Meherrin were secured under guard, or destroyed; every crossing place guarded, and crossed by abbaties; and the militia were ordered out *en masse*—a proportion to guard the roads and passes, while another protected their families in their absence. The whole state, from the Dan to the sea-coast, appears to have been set in motion by this active governor. But in the midst of this preparation, an event occurred which has few parallels in history. A band of loyalists, not exceeding three hundred, headed by the celebrated partisan, Hector M'Neil, issuing from Wilmington, penetrated the country as high up as Hillsborough, and seizing the governor and some of his council, and every continental and militia officer in the place, made good their retreat, with their prisoners, to Wilmington.

The celebrated attempt of Pulaski on the king of Poland, may have furnished the model; and contemporaneous events will explain the motive. The key to the object of this daring adventure is furnished by the fact, that Burke was immediately shipped to Charleston as a *state prisoner*. Lord Rawdon, it will be recollected, had recently fallen into the hands of the allies; this event occurred about a fortnight after his capture was published; and his lordship had been particularly dwelt upon as the object of retaliation for the execution of Hayne.

This motive, which never could have been doubted, was afterwards explicitly avowed. The hostages of St. Augustine had been released, and it became necessary to procure others.*

The success of this adventure, equally bold in its conception and execution, produced an extraordinary excitement among the loyalists of the state. They began immediately to assemble in the vicinity of the Pee Dee and renew their ravages, and to harass the whigs in every quarter. General Greene dispatched General Sumner, as soon as he received the intelligence of the governor's capture, with instructions to promote and execute the measures of that active governor, and counteract the evil consequences apprehended from his capture;

* Craig's letter to General Martin, November 17th.

and as he had long been sensible that the post at Wilmington was the source of many an embarrassment in North Carolina, he seriously meditated an attempt to reduce it. But his force, at present, was scarcely adequate to his own safety. CHAP.
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That Lord Cornwallis had provided a number of boats, transportable on wagons, in the nature of pontoons, is well ascertained; and the reasons which led to the relinquishment of his project of retreat southwardly, are easily deducible from the occurrences of the day. It will be recollected, that the French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake the 1st of September; that a few days after, the British fleet, under Admiral Graves, made its appearance, and Count De Grasse stood out of the Chesapeake and engaged him; having first furnished an accession of strength to La Fayette, which put it in his power to advance upon, and alarm the adversary. This was the period of the attempt of Lord Cornwallis to escape into Carolina, and also of its relinquishment. The arrival of the French fleet suggested the movement; its departure delayed it until he found himself environed with difficulties. Below him he saw the whole country in arms to oppose his retreat, whilst Greene waited in the south to receive him on the point of the bayonet; above him La Fayette watched his opportunity of striking when he should expose his flank; towards the ocean, the face of the bay was covered with the fleets of France, and Washington was advancing to seize him in his toils. Yet, it was not until the 30th of September that he found himself entirely hemmed in on the south, and compelled to cover himself beneath the shield of his intrenchments.

Until then, Greene was indefatigable in his efforts to collect his militia, the only re-enforcement, with the exception of some few North Carolina levies, then within his command.

The day which gave the army of Lord Cornwallis to the allies, was the first that brought complete relief to the anxieties of the southern commander. He then thought that men and munitions of war would be supplied him in abundance.

During the time that the American army lay fast at the Hills, the enemy had not been idle in the work of annoyance or desolation.

Colonel Stewart being confined by a wound received at the Eutaws, Major Doyle commanded the army on its return to the Santee. This officer had taken post at Fludd's plantation, three miles above Nelson's Ferry; and, according to the intelligence of the day, after all the reductions which the British force had recently sustained, both from battle and disease, had under him an army of two thousand men, besides a detachment at hand of three hundred, under Major M'Arthur, at Fairlawn. The loyalists, also, who had retired to

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Charleston were, it has been seen, about this time, obliged to engage in active service, with little discrimination. They furnished a very efficient band of mounted infantry. Many of the lower and poorer orders, and of the young and adventurous, joined the royal regiments. The terror at seeing the British army driven before the Americans, had either induced them to steal away from the royal garrison, or converted them into active enemies.

So much had the American cavalry suffered in the late battle, that the enemy had, for some time, a decided superiority in that species of troops; and it was not until the cavalry of Sumpter's brigade could be again brought together, and Horry's and Mayhem's, with Marion's mounted infantry, collected at head-quarters, that Greene's superiority could be restored. That it should be restored, was indispensable both to the protection of the country, and the safety of his own army.

Those officers were, therefore, immediately on Doyle's advance, ordered to take the necessary steps to strengthen the main army: but, until that was effected, the enemy possessed the undivided command of the country to the south of the Santee and Congaree, and westward to the Edisto.

But, Major Doyle saw his reign was ephemeral, and improved his opportunity in plundering the country on the Santee and Congaree, of every negro, young and old, and of almost every thing else that could be carried away. Fortunately, Marion and Hampton still guarded the opposite banks, to afford protection to every thing that could be removed across the rivers.

Emboldened by their successes, the enemy began, about the close of the month, to meditate, or to threaten operations beyond the rivers; and the weakness of Greene's force, and the collection of boats by his adversary, at one time, excited the most serious expectation that the attempt would be made. But, Marion had now embodied a respectable force, and feeble as he was, in comparison, every where presented himself to the enemy, resolved to oppose him in the passage of the river. Disease had also assailed this active officer and his command; and in Mayhem's party alone, we find it, at this time recorded, that there were one hundred men sick. But, disease could not drive the men of that day from the field. Could it have done so, the state of things in the American camp, at the time of this demonstration of the enemy of an intent to pass the river, might well have occasioned the dissolution of the army.

Among the evils brought upon the southern army, by the incursion of Tarleton and Simcoe into Virginia, was the destruction of its hospital-stores, which had reached the Point of Fork on their way to head-quarters. Immediate measures were adopted to replace them, and an active and intelligent purveyor

sent on to the north to procure a supply. But, none had arrived at the time of the battle of Eutaw ; nor could the army stores supply even the ordinary comforts allowed to the sick and wounded. Coffee and sugar could only be procured at Newbern, in North Carolina, and transported by the way of Charlotte, to avoid Wilmington and the loyalists ; and after being purchased at the rate of fifteen pounds for one hundred weight of tobacco, it may very well be supposed, in what quantities, at what cost, and in what time it reached the army. It happened, fortunately, that Governor Rutledge had, at this time, a small supply of medicines, among other articles which he had procured in Philadelphia, and brought out for the state troops. These were cheerfully furnished to the sufferers in the common cause, and relieved the minds of the officers from the dreadful necessity of seeing their comrades perish from wounds and disease, for want of the most common medicines. Yet, the relief must have been very inadequate to the necessities of the army. “ Our sick and wounded,”* says General Greene to the president of congress, “ have suffered greatly. The extent of our hospitals, the malignity of disorders, and increasing sick since the battle of Eutaw, together with the numerous wounded on hand, the little means we had to provide for them, and the great number of our physicians who fell sick in service, have left our sick and wounded in a most deplorable situation. And numbers of brave fellows, who have bled in the cause of their country, have been eaten up with ——, and perished in that miserable condition. Hospital stores and medicine have been exceedingly scarce—not an ounce of bark have we in the department at this time ; but, fortunately the cold weather is coming on, and the malignity of the fevers begins to abate.”

Even the indispensable article of salt had now failed ; and it must be acknowledged, that the subjoined extract of a letter to Colonel Davie, seems to indicate that the general’s patience began to fail with it. “ Captain Meals” writes you by this opportunity, of our approaching deplorable situation for want of the article of salt. You are too well acquainted with the wants and sufferings of this little army, to render arguments necessary to induce you to exert yourself to provide for them. I shall only observe, that an army which has received no pay for more than two years, distressed for want of clothing, subsisted without spirits, and often short in the usual allowance of meat and bread, will mutiny if we fail in the article of salt. And besides, if they were ever so well disposed to bear up against misfortune, it would soon produce such a

* 25th October.

† 18th October.

variety of diseases and complaints, that the greater part would soon be transferred from the field to the hospital. We have no other source of supplies but from you; and you may easily foresee the consequences of a failure, and will take seasonable measures to prevent them. If not, should the army disband, the evil will rest at your door."

An expression of impatience, to one who had served him so faithfully, and possessed so large a portion of his esteem as Colonel Davie, could only have been wrung from General Greene by feelings highly wrought upon. But the sufferings of his soldiers were always brought close to him. The hospitals he constantly visited in person; and as they had been, in the course of his successive marches, stretched along the road from his present encampment, as far as Charlotte, his visits were extended as far as the latter place. To witness the sufferings of brave men, and want the power to relieve them, was well calculated to produce the feelings which this letter expresses. General Davie was, at this time, commissary general of North Carolina, and this letter found him at Halifax. It is unnecessary to add that it was answered with feeling, and attended to with promptness. But his means were small; the distance great; and the magazines remote, and in the mean time the army suffered. Symptoms of mutiny actually did make their appearance, preceded by a most pathetic address of the Maryland line, in which they call the eye of the general to their thinned ranks, reduced from a full brigade to the number of two hundred, and implore his justice and his humanity to relieve their wants. What could he do but weep!

He was compelled to do more; although the contract had been grossly violated on the part of the government with the soldiers, Timothy Griffin, a private soldier, perished on the gallows "for encouraging mutiny and desertion," three days after the foregoing letter was written.

It was in the height of his distresses, and when the term of the Virginia line wanted but a few weeks of expiring, and not a recruit was marching to supply their place, that General Greene received the intelligence that his Maryland and Delaware recruits, near seven hundred in number, had been halted, and turned into the army destined against Cornwallis. Every other re-enforcement he had voluntarily abandoned to Virginia and the marquis; but these were absolutely indispensable to his keeping the field; and General Gist had been earnestly pressed to hasten them on to join their regiments. Never was their presence so much wanted; and in justice to the officers and men of those corps, whose force was now reduced to a shadow, the general could not have held himself justified in dispensing with their presence.

His letter to General Washington, on this occasion, exhibits symptoms of suppressed feeling, but profound deference. Resignation to the will of his commander and friend, and a willing sacrifice to the public good; but not altogether free from the conviction that his recruits might have been dispensed with. "I wrote your excellency," he says, "on the 17th, by Captain Pearce. Since which, I am informed the Maryland troops, who were expected to re-enforce this army, have been ordered to join the army in Virginia. Our situation is truly distressing, and the want of a re-enforcement very pressing; but if it will interfere with more important concerns, I am very willing to struggle with every difficulty and inconvenience. However, I am told your force in Virginia amounts to little less than fifteen thousand men. If so, the Maryland troops will be of little or no consequence."

But his officers and men were not all equally passive; some complained bitterly that they were sacrificed unnecessarily; and the example, remonstrances, and even severity of the general were necessary to restrain their feelings.

It was at this time, when pressed to the earth by the distresses that surrounded him, and listening to the daily representations made of the forlorn state of his men and officers, not unfrequently accompanied with the indignant exclamation, "we are abandoned, let us retire," that he uttered that celebrated declaration, which South Carolina will never forget, "I will deliver the country or perish."

Whether it was to improve the opportunity afforded by the complete diversion of all support from the southern army, to that under Washington; or, really to favour Cornwallis in the attempt which Greene was endeavouring to defeat, there was, at this time, a vigorous effort made to revive the royal interest in North Carolina. The embers in that quarter had been only covered—they were not extinguished. Craig, it has appeared from intercepted letters, had always maintained a correspondence with secret adherents of the royal party, in every part of the state; and, under his instructions, they watched, in silence, for the time when he should issue the signal for resuming their arms. As soon as the militia were called out to march to the support of Greene, in the preceding months, Craig had exerted his influence to impede or defeat the drafts and other measures of government; and in his dispatches to Lord Cornwallis, he says, with great confidence, that such and such parts of the country "will not turn out." When, afterwards, the militia were called out to oppose Lord Cornwallis on the Roanoke and the rivers to the north of it, he appears to have availed himself of the removal of the friends of the revolution, and summoned his adherents into active employment. Some idea will be formed of the extent of the British influence in that state, from the force which is said to have assembled under M'Neale. It was estimated at one

CHAP. XVI. thousand men; and to this party Craig attached the celebrated Major Fanning, with a detachment of regular cavalry, so as to produce a most serious diversion in the neighbourhood of Cross Creek. The whole country between the Pee Dee and Cape Fear River was quickly overrun, and two American parties successively attacked and overpowered. But, fortunately, his career was not of long duration.* A Major Butler, at the head of about an equal number of militia, and some levies, attacked McNeil, killed him, and severely chastised his followers; and General Rutherford soon after succeeded in dispersing their collected force. But, the alarm excited throughout the country adjacent to McNeil's enterprise, for some time prevented the militia of that quarter from obeying the summons of Marion to repair to his standard.

The intelligence of the defeat of this formidable body of loyalists, was attended with a piece of information false in fact, but which created the greatest uneasiness in the mind of the southern commander. He was informed, that General Rutherford was pursuing the loyalists with fire and sword, and driving before him every age and sex, to compel them to take refuge in Wilmington. Every act that increased the miseries of war, General Greene had uniformly marked with disapprobation and even punishment; and the attentive perusal of his sentiments on this subject may, it is fondly hoped, contribute at some future day, to temper the horrors of civil warfare, and teach men, in those contests in which their own passions, or the selfish views, or fanatical opinions of others, may involve them, the folly of giving way to the exercise of unnecessary cruelty and violence.† It will also present a succinct view of the policy which always governed his conduct towards this class of people.

"We have various reports here," says the writer, "respecting your operations in North Carolina; all of which agree, that you are treating the inhabitants denominated tories, with great severity, driving them, indiscriminately, from their dwellings, without regard to age or sex; laying waste their possessions, destroying their produce, and burning their houses. That we have great reason to be offended with the infidelity of the tories, must be confessed; and that your sufferings in captivity have been sufficient to exasperate you, must be acknowledged. But, in natural concerns, as well as in private life, *passion is a bad counsellor, and resentment an unsafe guide.* If we suffer those to influence us, a sense of injuries will often hurry us into acts of the most

* P. Horry's letter, 28th September, 1781.

† October 18th, 1781.

horrid cruelty ; and, whatever may be the opinion of people respecting severity, both philosophy and experience prove, that persecution does but confirm the error it is meant to destroy. And, therefore, I think those measures highly unwarrantable, which carry the marks of cruelty ; and in fact, only increase our enemies. If we pursue the tories, indiscriminately, and drive them to a state of desperation, we shall make them, from a weak and feeble foe, a firm and determined enemy. The enemy have, in numberless instances, made those active enemies, whose political sentiments have been favourable to them. I speak from observation, and am persuaded of the truth of the remark. Besides the disadvantage of increasing the number of our enemies, as well as rendering them formidable by obliging them to engage in the British regular battalions, cruelty is a reproach to our cause ; and we set the enemy an example, to treat our people with that severity which we have so often, and so justly complained of. Burning and destroying the people's property who are called tories, will authorize the enemy to retaliate. And they want but a pretext, as you may see by the proceedings in the British parliament, and by the minister's instructions to lay waste the whole country ; nor will their army fail to do it when authorized by our own example, and have so fair an opportunity of laying the odium upon us. As there are a number of confederated states, I cannot think any one at liberty to take measures which may expose the rest, especially in a matter wherein they do not agree in the policy or utility of the measure. In my opinion, destroying tory property is nothing less than a kind of war upon ourselves, particularly in the articles of produce ; for it is uncertain where our army may operate, and not unlikely that our own ravages may prove distressing to ourselves. I have viewed the measure in every point of light, and think it not less injurious, in point of policy, than inconsistent with the principles of humanity. As to exterminating the tories, it has ever appeared to me to be a chimerical plan ; especially in a country where so great a proportion are disaffected. The very attempt, I fear, will soon unite such a force, as will be able to contend to advantage, with such bodies of militia as we shall be able to keep in the field. For, as the former will act from despair, and our people only from principle or choice, they will be much more determined and uniform in their exertions than ours. To drive the tories to the necessity of engaging in the enemy's regular battalions, is what the enemy wish ; and there is no way in which we can serve their views so effectually, as promoting this mode of recruiting ; and though they may affect to pity the tories, they cannot but be pleased at the policy. To detach the disaffected from the British interest is our true policy, and this can be done by gentle means only : and such as remain stubborn and

obstinate, there are ways and means of bringing to punishment, far more consistent with the dignity of government. If the enemy can form a tory-interest sufficient to balance the militia of the country, they know they can carry their point, their regular force being greatly superior to ours. If we can but detach the tories from them, and leave the militia to aid the operations of the regular army, we can, with little difficulty, give full protection to the country.

"Our prospect are flattering in Virginia, but the events of war are precarious and uncertain; and, therefore, we should take our measures as if we still expected the war to rage with unremitted fury; and we should embrace the present moment to employ our force to the best advantage. For this purpose I have sent Colonel Malmady to wait on you, to see what force you have, the time they are out for, and how they are provided for serious operations; and whether any thing can be attempted against Wilmington, which Governor Burke and myself had in contemplation before he was surprised and taken prisoner.

"I am told you refuse to pay any regard to the promises which have been made to the disaffected, who have surrendered, and have not since violated conditions on their part. Nothing, in my opinion, can strike a more deadly blow at the existence of the present government. It is impossible for those people to determine who has a right to enter into those engagements, if those in power, for the time being, have not. And if another comes and refuses to pay any regard to such engagements, public truth and national confidence are at an end. I cannot credit the report; and therefore only give it as hearsay. We have one common cause, and one common interest; and I persuade myself you are not less anxious to adopt the most salutary measures for promoting them, than I am. I have nothing more at heart than the interest and happiness of this country, which, I flatter myself, my past exertions for its protection, and for the enlargement of my suffering brethren in captivity, must convince you, and every well wisher to our cause," &c. &c.

Major Creig did not await the attack meditated against Wilmington. Hearing of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and the advance of General Rutherford, he evacuated the place on the 14th of November, and transported his men and stores by water to Charleston.

This event restored North Carolina to a state of tranquillity, to which she had long been a stranger. In Wilmington, all the hopes of the disaffected centered; and from that place emanated all the orders that directed them, and all the funds and supplies that supported them. Their hopes sunk when that place was abandoned; and to fly or to submit were the only alternatives left them. Never was a change more fortunate, or more desired. The money and credit of the state were exhausted, and although almost the only source of supply left

to the southern army for some months past, it could furnish nothing but what was obtained by impressment. An unfortunate measure of Governor Nash's had totally prostrated the commerce which had before been carried on through her numerous small ports. He had seized upon imported articles by impressment; and no more articles were imported. Governor Burke had assured the merchants, that the fault should not be repeated; and upon the evacuation of Wilmington commerce began to revive and to flourish. But still, there was neither credit nor money to procure any thing for the army; and it must have starved in the view of plenty, but for a *ruse de guerre*, of a very justifiable nature, played off at this time upon the financier, Mr. Robert Morris.

It is related in Marshall's Life of Washington,* that "the distresses of the southern army, like those of the north, were such that it was often difficult to keep them together. That he might relieve them when in the last extremity, and yet not diminish the exertions made to draw support from other sources, by creating an opinion that any supplies could be drawn from him, Mr. Morris employed an agent to attend the southern army, as a volunteer, whose powers were unknown to General Greene. This agent was instructed to watch its situation, and whenever it appeared impossible for the general to extricate himself from his embarrassments, to furnish him, on his pledging the faith of government for repayment, with a draft on the financier, for such a sum as would relieve the urgency of the moment. Thus was Greene frequently rescued from impending ruin, by aids which appeared providential, and for which he could not account."

If this be correct, and we presume it is related upon authority, it must be acknowledged to have been a most uncandid and illiberal piece of conduct, to one who did not merit it. And one who Mr. Morris knew and acknowledged did not merit it: for in a letter from the latter, of the 10th of September, we find the following highly complimentary paragraph. "While I congratulate you on the many successes which you have obtained, under every disadvantage, let me also congratulate you on the just sense of your merit, which is now generally diffused. The superintendant of finance in particular, circumstanced as the American superintendant is, must give the fullest applause to an officer who finds in his own genius, an ample resource for the want of men, money, clothes, arms, and supplies."

We are at a loss, however, to imagine who this agent could have been: as the evidence is before us of Greene's being often under the necessity of borrow-

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ing the smallest sums in gold, to keep up his secret intercourse with Charleston. Mr. Joseph Clay, who appears to have been the only individual through whom purchases of general supplies were ever made, was connected with the southern army, not as a volunteer, but as commissary of purchases; and all the drafts which ever passed through his hands, to the relief of the southern commander, were made upon the governors of the respective states, within his department, or were those which had been drawn by the commissioner of loans upon Dr. Franklin, minister to France, as early as September, 1780.

The only evidence we find to support Mr. Marshall, exists in the clearly substantiated fact, that General Greene was most unmercifully pinched and cramped in the article of cash by the financier. Let the following extract, from the same letter, furnish the proof. "I have made another attempt to place some money in your hands, by requesting the lieutenant governor and council of South Carolina to pay you, *when convenient*, five hundred pound this currency, advanced by order of congress to them, their state being accountable. *As I presume they will mention the affair, you need not.*"

The previous attempt hinted at, was that by Governor Rutledge, before related; and this draft, with one upon an individual for a small advance made for the education of his son, were the only attempts made *to place money in his hands*. Both these orders General Greene refused to present, declaring it "cruel to make the demand upon a gentleman just returned from captivity, and known to be destitute of every thing." The first sum in cash ever advanced by Mr. Morris, was that one thousand pounds, Philadelphia currency, paid to Captain Pearce, when he brought the news of the battle of the Eutaws, and that was paid upon the following strong demand upon the gratitude of him who received it. "I have detained Captain Pearce a day, in order to make up, with infinite difficulty, one thousand pounds, Pennsylvania currency, in gold, which he is the bearer of, and which I hope will be agreeable and useful." This was in November, 1781; and this was expended in hospital stores, and other necessities for the army.

Mr. Robert Morris has acquired a high reputation in the United States, for the intelligence and effect with which he conducted the financial affairs of the United States. Unquestionably, his services were great; and it must be acknowledged, that he entered upon the office at a time highly favourable to the acquirement of reputation. So entirely prostrate was public credit, that it was impossible for him not to acquire applause if he effected any thing, however inadequate to public exigencies. But, the bubble that had occupied the place of property, had now burst, and a solid medium must find its way into the country from abroad, or out of individual hoards at home; in-

stead of the factitious representative which had recently melted from the hand that held it. But, the stream would have been slow in filling the vacuum, or must have been laved out as fast as it entered, had it not been for the actual introduction of a large sum in specie from France, and the substitution of a powerful army and navy from the same quarter, for the swarms of militia, which must have been otherwise employed. Mr. Morris was appointed early in 1781, just when these causes began to operate. Although the science of banking was in its infancy in America, yet Mr. Morris knew how to avail himself of this great art, of placing capital at the disposal of mercantile intelligence, and its sister art or abuse, of dazzling the public eye by the same piece of coin, multiplied by a thousand reflectors.

Specie made its appearance in circulation; members of Congress, and all the retinue of attendants at the seat of government, were paid in hard-money; a general exhilaration was produced; the financier was the channel through which all flowed; and all who drank at the fount, bestowed on it a benediction.

But, the stream sunk in the sands long before it reached the state of South Carolina, and never reached it until after the fall of Lord Cornwallis; nor for long after, except indirectly through the supplies acquired by conquest. On the contrary, the only fund in the military chest, was ordered to be withdrawn from it. This was the balance on hand, of the bills drawn upon Dr. Franklin, about three hundred thousand dollars in amount; and which, by the resolves of congress, were among the funds placed at the direct disposal of the financier.

In the month of August, when General Greene's officers were destitute of necessaries, almost to the offending of decency, and his army in the greatest want of many indispensable articles, when the country rung with felicitations on the revival of credit, and the great benefits resulting from the judicious measures of the financier, the general resolved on an effort to appropriate to his army, some of the general benefits, and dispatched Major Burnet, to wait in person upon the board of war, and endeavour to obtain from them some relief. That board, which at this time began to be very complaisant to the southern commander, readily entered into General Greene's views, and voted the supplies solicited, but referred to the financier, to determine if the public funds would admit of their being procured. After some demur, the financier agreed to sanction the purchase, but the articles, Burnet was given to understand, must be procured from Boston.

The delay incident to procuring them at such a distance, and transporting them by land, the army could not submit to; but, Burnet was provided

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against the contingency. Greene considered the French bills as pledged to his army, and Burnet, to whom they had been confided, had his instructions to sell as many of them as would relieve the necessities of the army. In the south, this had been hitherto impracticable; but, credit was rising in Philadelphia—the seat of both mercantile and political negotiation; and twenty thousand dollars of the bills were sold before Mr. Morris got intelligence of their being in market. Upon hearing of this fact, he immediately interfered and stopped the sale of the residue. But, Burnet had provided the money indispensable to his purposes, and the balance was deposited with Colonel Petit, to await the orders of the general respecting them. The sum thus obtained in cash, judiciously applied in aid of drafts on the states, enabled General Greene to make such purchases, as anticipated the necessity of looking, for the present, to Boston, to supply his most pressing wants. Prizes and importations introduced into the ports of North Carolina, furnished many articles that would have been months in passing by land from Boston to head-quarters; and Philadelphia furnished others. But, with all, it was a mere alleviation of distress, not the restoration of comfort.

During the time that the allies lay before York Town, General Greene had made an earnest effort at engaging them to turn their arms against Charleston, as soon as they should have reduced Cornwallis. The season was highly favourable to the attempt; and it was unquestionable that the place could not hold out long against such a force, so amply provided with battering artillery, and all the equipments necessary to a siege. To have prostrated the enemy's power in the south, would not only have hastened the termination of the war, but have relieved the southern country from that lingering and distressing war, which he foresaw it would yet have to undergo. To have attempted the siege without a naval superiority, would have been frivolous; but with it little was to be feared, either there or in any other quarter; for it had been fairly ascertained, that the force under General Heath was sufficient to hold Sir Henry Clinton in check in New-York. Unfortunately, it has been seen, that Count De Grasse had entered into engagements with the French forces, in the West Indies, to join them at a specified time, which precluded a delay before Charleston; or, a fatalist would suggest, was led on by destiny to the unhappy catastrophe, which awaited his fleet in that quarter.

General Washington apprized General Greene of this obstacle to a co-operation; but, not discouraged from an attempt which held out so many public advantages, and so much private relief, he dispatched Colonel Lee to the commander in chief, fondly hoping that the pressing intreaties, engaging address, and military reputation of Lee, would do something towards promoting this

favourite project. But solicitations were vain; and after the fall of York Town, all that could be obtained for his relief, was the leaving of a body of two thousand French troops to cover Virginia, thus to place her at liberty to devote all her resources to the support of the southern army.

Colonel Lee, being baffled in his principal object, now turned his attention to one personally, of not less interest. Hard service, desertion, and limitation of enlistments, had greatly impaired his legion; and Captain Rudolph had been dispatched some time before the battle of the Eutaws, to endeavour to recruit it in Virginia. As it was not a state corps, he found the effort useless, and returned baffled and disconcerted. "The executive," says the marquis, "has been tried on the subject personally, and by letter, but nothing could be effected in your favour. As to my ordering any of their levies on this service, it is a measure which I have no power to attempt. These are to fill up their line, and they would consider it a sacrilege were but one applied for any other purpose."

In fact, at this time no one of the Virginia levies could have been spared for any other purpose. For Virginia had not, in both armies, eight hundred enlisted troops under arms; and those of General Greene's army must all be discharged in January. Anxious to provide against every contingency, as well as to stimulate every state to its duty, the state of Virginia was also pressed on the subject of recruiting its troops, of which there was a prospect that she would soon have not a man in the field, as the business of enlistment, or rather of drafting, had for some time flagged greatly, or been wholly abandoned. "Inclosed," says General Greene* to Governor Nelson, "I send you a return of your line, serving with this army; and small as their numbers are, they are of great importance in this quarter, as our whole collective strength does not exceed one thousand men fit for duty. In this state of things, we cannot look forward to the short period of their service, in our remote situation, without the most sensible pain. Our conflict has been too unequal, and I cannot think of prosecuting the war on such unequal ground: nor would it be in my power, however strong my inclination, to support the spirits of the officers and soldiers under such severe trials as they have lately gone through. I hope, therefore, you will re-enforce me in time, or I cannot be answerable for consequences." A request, which we rather apprehend, it was wholly out of the power of the governor to comply with, as the time of service of the troops in Virginia, it is

* October 23.

believed, would expire, contemporaneously, with that of those in South Carolina.

The personal influence of Colonel Lee, effected no more than the solicitations of Rudolph, or the pressing instances of La Fayette. Secure on every point at which Virginia was vulnerable, it was but consistent with the nature of man, if the *first* hours of respite from toil and apprehension were devoted to indulgence, and the wants of others deferred as the employment of the *next*. From this time Virginia appears to have retired from the war.

It was not until the last of October that General Greene was able to replace the six-pounders, lost at the Eutaws; Colonels Shelby and Seviere also, joined him, about the same time, with five hundred men, and a detachment of one hundred and sixty North Carolina recruits was added to his infantry. The approach of these corps was the signal for preparing for active movements; the weather had become cold; the frost had delivered his army from the remains of their agues; the survivors of his wounded had rejoined their regiments, and the corps under Sumpter, Horry, Mayhem, and Marion, had been collected, or were concentrating.

Seviere and Shelby, Horry and Mayhem, were ordered to place themselves under Marion, to act in the country between the Santee and Charleston. Together they formed a very efficient corps of cavalry, mounted infantry, and riflemen.

General Sumpter was ordered at the head of his brigade of state troops, and some companies from his militia brigade, and from Pickens', to take post at Orangeburgh, and cover the country from the inroads of the loyalists from Charleston. While Pickens, with two regiments, covered the frontiers from the predatory war still raging there, and kept in awe the Indians. About the 1st of November the commands of Sumpter and Marion crossed the rivers, and advanced upon the enemy. The former soon fell in with a strong party of loyalists, under General Cunningham, who had advanced near to Orangeburgh, and one of his officers, a Major Moore, had the misfortune to be led into an ambuscade, and sustain some loss. The force of the two parties being nearly equal, about seven hundred each, General Sumpter was obliged, for the present, to fall back; but his advance was very fortunately timed to check the further progress of Cunningham, who, it seems, had issued from Charleston to pursue a pillaging excursion in the upper country.

General Marion also found it necessary to make a halt, by encountering Colonel Stewart, posted at Wantoot, at the head of near two thousand men. The enemy, it seems, were, at this time, seriously engaged in preparing to sustain a siege; laying in provision and collecting all the slaves in the country,

first for fortifying Charleston, and then to be converted into plunder. Else, why remove the women and children. The sequel was conclusive of the motive. They had heard of, or anticipated the fall of Cornwallis, and were preparing to abandon the country, but not without first borrowing jewels of gold and jewels of silver from the Egyptians.

The intelligence of the surrender of York Town, reached the American camp the last of October; but, the official communication was not received until the 9th of November. On the 19th it had taken place; but, twenty days were then necessary to convey intelligence now transmitted in less than five.

The day was observed as a day of jubilee in camp. The few enjoyments that it afforded were liberally distributed; and, that not a heavy heart might darken the festivity of the day, punishments were all remitted, and the doors of the provost thrown open.

The Pennsylvania and Maryland troops being now on their march to join him, General Greene could have moved with confidence across the rivers for the long wished-for purpose of driving the enemy into Charleston. This object was now become one of high importance, that elections might be held as generally as possible for members of the legislature, and civil government fully re-established.

The miserable state of the quarter master general's department, prevented the possibility of marching before the 18th. "Our situation," says the commander, in a letter to the president of congress, soon after the battle of Eutaw, "is truly deplorable in the quarter master's and ordinance departments. We have no ammunition, and not half tents enough; few camp-kettles and no axes; and until very lately, no canteens. Colonel Carrington has done all in his power; but, what can a man do, empty-handed and so remote from supplies of all kinds. We have not a ream of paper with the whole army; but, I am in hopes, our success in Virginia will pave the way to more easy and effectual supplies, and in the mean time, the army will bear their sufferings with a soldierly patience."

On the 18th of November, the camp at the Hills was a second time broken up; and as the route to be pursued led the army off from the support of Marion, who was charged with guarding the left of the army on its march, Captain Egleston, with the legion, strengthened by a detachment from the Virginia line, was ordered to join him. The main army then took up the line of march on the route by Simons' and M'Cord's Ferries, through Orangeburgh to Riddlesperger's; thence by the Indian-field road to Ferguson's Mill,

CHAP. where that road crosses the Edisto ; intending to take post at Mr. Sanders' on
XVI. the Round-O.

The intention of the American general appears, at first, to have been, to take a position on the Four-Holes, for the double purpose of covering the country beyond him, and controlling the movements of the enemy on his right. Intelligence had been received from Charleston, by Marion, of an intention to evacuate that place, and concentrate the enemy's force at Savannah. Such, possibly, would have been their course, had the French fleet appeared off Charleston, and the army that captured Cornwallis put in motion for the south. General Greene did not credit the information, except as dependant on an event which he knew, and the enemy did not know, would not take place—the co-operation of the French fleet. “Nor can I flatter you,” says he, “with the hopes of getting rid of them at so easy a rate. I expect several more good hard fights this winter ; and if we hold our ground until spring, possibly an evacuation may take place, for fear of a combined operation with the French fleet.”

But, independently of the object of intercepting a retreat to Savannah, if in contemplation by the enemy, the position at the Round-O, was favourable to covering the country ; and an event had occurred, which rendered it indispensable that he should throw the Edisto between himself and the enemy.

It was on the sufficiency of the force assembled under Marion, to keep in check that of the enemy under Stewart, that Greene had ventured to advance to the Four-Holes, or meditated taking a position so much exposed to an attack from Charleston. The mountaineers under Seviere and Shelby, constituted the re-enforcement upon which he had ventured into the field. And this force, to his astonishment, *deserted him*. He had been given to understand, that they were to remain in service “until the spring of the year, or until Charleston was reduced.” To his disappointment and surprise, they all abandoned Marion by the 25th of November. It is, most probably, attributable to Shelby's having obtained leave of absence, as we find no other cause or excuse for their retiring after three weeks' service. Perhaps the service was not sufficiently active for their habits. Greene had informed Marion, “that he must give them something to do, or they would become dissatisfied.” In all his efforts to effect this, Marion had been unsuccessful. He had approached the enemy, but could not tempt him from his encampment. With numbers decidedly superior to the Americans, it was with chagrin that Marion found it impossible to induce him to take the field. And it was not until Stewart decamped from Wantoot, and retired near to Goose Creek Bridge, that Marion discovered the cause. Colonel now General Stewart's (having lately been

promoted) orderly sergeant fell into the hands of Marion, and on him was found a return, from which, it appeared, that out of two thousand two hundred and seventy-two men, the enemy had nine hundred and twenty-eight on the sick-list. CHAP.
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To keep hold on public opinion, to command the country, or to collect provisions and plunder slaves, the enemy had kept the field in this sickly part of the state, during the whole of the fall; but, they must have paid dearly for it in the destruction of troops. If, on the 25th of November, so near one half of the British troops were still sick or convalescent, those who are acquainted with the climate, will readily judge of the affliction and mortality that must have prevailed among them at an earlier period. Place an hundred Europeans in the same country, to perform the same service for the same months, and ninety-nine of them would, at the present day, be attacked with bilious fevers.

The only services in which the mountaineers (as they were called) were employed, while with Marion, were in attacks on the post at Fairlawn, and on the redoubts at Wappetaw. Detachments of about two hundred of them, supported by Mayhem's cavalry of about one hundred and eighty, were, in both instances, employed under the command of Shelby. The latter place, on being approached, was abandoned, for General Stewart was then drawing in his forces under the protection of Charleston. But, the attack on Fairlawn was made while the enemy lay at Wantoot. A garrison, of considerable strength, had been usually kept at that place, to cover the landing-place on Cooper River; but, when the main army of the enemy lay in advance of it, the garrison had been weakened, no doubt, upon the supposition, that its services were rendered unnecessary. Marion knew that the garrison was reduced, and aimed a blow at it by turning their left, and moving rapidly into their rear. The landing-place was covered by a fort of too much strength to be carried by assault, with such troops as Shelby's and Mayhem's; but, at the distance of half a mile, was a strong brick-house, built at a very early period, and known to have been calculated for defence, as well as comfort. This had been inclosed by strong abbatis; and being on the route from Charleston to Monk's Corner, had been used as a stage for their troops and convoys, in passing from post to post. It was sufficiently capacious to cover a party of considerable magnitude, and was unassailable by cavalry, the only force from which sudden incursions could be apprehended. It was also a convenient depot in the transportation of negroes, stock, &c. taken above the British posts, and moving to Charleston, and had been used as a hospital.

In passing the post at Wantoot, Mayhem was ordered to show himself, and to endeavour to decoy the British cavalry into the field. The manœuvre did not

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succeed, but it brought out a strong detachment, to tread on his heels and preclude the possibility of his effecting any thing further, unless with great dispatch.

On approaching Fairlawn, every thing within the abbatis indicated resistance; and the loss of time, with the fort in view, and the enemy in his rear, must have resulted in disappointment. A party of the riflemen were ordered to dismount, and, approaching the abbatis, appear and act as infantry, while the residue of that corps, headed by the cavalry, advanced boldly into the field and demanded a surrender. The idea of resistance was abandoned, and the place surrendered at discretion. In it were found three hundred stand of arms, many stores of value, some sick, and eighty convalescents, able to have fought from the house windows.

The medical men, officers, and the sick were parolled; and the convalescents carried off on horseback, behind Mayhem's men. But the house, with its contents, and the abbatis, were committed to the flames.

This exploit was made the subject of very heavy complaints at the time, by General Stewart, under the charge of burning a hospital, and behaving with cruelty to the unfortunate tenants of such an establishment. But obviously, more from the mortification of having it done close in his rear, and not being able to prevent it, than from any just cause of animadversion, either in law or fact.

A correspondence ensued, in which the American commander exhibits as accurate a knowledge of the laws of arms as of their practical uses. It was bordering on the ridiculous to claim the immunities of a hospital for a place which had been appropriated to so many military uses; it was even denied that the sick were under a military guard, notwithstanding the quantity of arms and stores actually found in the place. But it ought to have been recollected, they were not guarded by others because they were now able to guard both themselves, and the depot put under their protection. The Americans were particularly reproached with hurrying off sick men from their beds, to perish in the swamps; when it was not only proved, that no one was taken off who was declared by the physician too unwell to move, but that Mayhem had offered to leave the whole, if the officer who commanded would give his receipt for them as prisoners. After this, the cruelty, if any, lay altogether at the British officer's door; since he could only have refused to give such a receipt, in the hope that the captors would be embarrassed and overtaken while bearing off their prisoners. It was obviously too much the interest of the Americans to have made this arrangement, to admit a doubt on Mayhem's declara-

tion, that he had offered to make it; but humanity, no less than policy, removed the obstacle to retreat, in the means employed to bear away his prisoners.

That hospitals may justly be the object of military operations, results from the consideration that they are auxillary to the restoration, if not the nurseries, of military force. That the buildings which solace the sufferings of the soldier, are not to be wantonly burnt, is but a partial application of the more general rule, that no buildings, not appropriated to active war, shall be wantonly destroyed; but it was unfortunate, at this time, for the argument of General Stewart, that the smokes of Camden, of Georgetown, and of Biggin Church, were ascending; and the consumption of stores had been the cause, or pretext, of their destruction.

That the unhappy tenants of an hospital are to be treated with every attention to their actual situation, is also but the application of the general principle, that the miseries of war are not to be unnecessarily aggravated. But the sick and wounded of hospitals are the recruits, on their way to add numbers to the enemy's force, and are fairly the subjects of capture and parole. General Stewart asserts the contrary doctrine, but General Greene's reply places the subject in its proper light, and maintains the principle asserted by Stewart, to be only an exception, resting on the basis of positive stipulation; or of comity, demanded by example, which had never been set towards American prisoners.

The whole of this affair is easily explained. The enemy had lost a garrison; and would have obviated the disgrace, or mitigated the mortification, by persuading the world that the Americans had attacked and burnt an hospital. It was an ordinary *ruse de guerre*: but eighty prisoners, all able to bear arms, delivered in safety at the High-Hills, (the American depot,) bore sufficient evidence of the reality.

General Greene received, with astonishment, the intelligence of the intended return of his mountaineers. Upon this re-enforcement he had ventured across the Santee, and was now too far advanced to recede. Marion also, relying on this support, had passed the Santee, and penetrated down the country, on the enemy's right. The baleful efforts of retreat had often been experienced, and at this time would have been seriously felt. Yet Marion, in his weakened state, would be greatly exposed, and if any capital misfortune should be sustained by him, the main army must retreat with precipitation. The most pressing entreaties were dispatched to prevail on the mountaineers to remain; but before the message reached Marion's camp, there was not one of them remaining. Fortunately, however, Greene's movement across the Congaree, had induced Stewart to draw towards Charleston, and leave Marion in safety; and that movement of the enemy, evincing his ignorance of the actual state of the Ame-

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With these views, General Greene, leaving the army on its march under the command of Colonel Williams, moved briskly forward towards Dorchester, at the head of about two hundred cavalry, and as many infantry. The cavalry consisted of Lee's and Washington's commands, and one hundred drawn from Sumpter's. The infantry consisted of those of the legion, and detachments from the Maryland and Virginia lines.

Colonel Lee, in relating this expedition, appears to have forgotten, that he did not command the party. He had rejoined the army, but was, at the time, confined by indisposition. Subjoined to a letter of Colonel Williams' to General Greene, of the 4th of December, dated at Riddlesperger's, we find the following paragraph, under the hand of Colonel Lee—"I have the honour of your letter of the 2d, and have the pleasure to inform you, that I have perfectly recovered from my indisposition. I shall continue with the army until I know how and where to find you." The fact is indeed notorious, that the command was given to Colonel Wade Hampton, whom Colonel Lee represents as acting a subordinate part on this occasion.

General Greene flattered himself with the hope, that he would be able to surprise the post at Dorchester. But, notwithstanding the celerity of his movements, the pursuit of the least frequented paths, and every precaution for arresting intelligence, he was so watched and surrounded by the loyalists in the woods and swamps, that notice of his approach preceded him half a day; and the enemy lay on their arms all the night of the 30th, expecting an attack. As he did not appear, at a late hour on the 1st of December, a reconnoitering party of fifty loyalists, was dispatched for intelligence. Hampton's advanced guard fell in with this party, and suffered but few of them to escape. So close was the pursuit pressed to the enemy's post, that the whole cavalry of the British army, which, with a strong detachment of infantry, had been dispatched to re-enforce that post, issued out to charge the pursuing party. Never did the heart of the commander swell with a more pleasurable anticipation than at this moment. This was the very corps he was most desirous of cutting off; for it was the one which would give him the most trouble in his future measures; besides the probability that the surrender of the infantry would follow its des-

truction. Hampton darted on them with all the speed that could be given to his horses, but they wheeled and avoided the conflict. Twenty or thirty, chiefly loyalists, were killed, wounded or taken, and such an alarm excited by the presence of the commander, and the belief that his whole force was upon them, that during the night, the garrison destroyed every thing, threw their cannon into the river, and retreated to Charleston. The fort at Dorchester was so situated, that a retreat was practicable, either by land or water, and either on the east or west side of the river, which ever was most secure from annoyance. An army must have the command of both banks of the Ashley below Dorchester, to cut off the retreat of its garrison. A bridge, on the direct route of the east side of the river, being taken up, the advance of the pursuer on that side was stopped; but, Greene could not have pursued from another cause—the infantry of the enemy exceeded five hundred.

The enemy halted, and was re-enforced at the Quarter-House, about six miles from the city, where the isthmus is very narrow; and General Stewart, making a simultaneous movement from Goose Creek Bridge to the same point, all the force that could be summoned from Charleston, joined them, and the whole were actively employed in preparing to resist an immediate attack. The alarm had been rapidly spread by the fugitives, and the force of Greene so magnified by report, that, in addition to three thousand three hundred men, then (including the garrison of Wilmington) in the city and its neighbourhood, and one thousand loyalists, General Leslie, who had now succeeded General Stewart, resolved to embody the young and active of the slaves that had been recently crowded into the city, into regiments. It was a fearful sight to the remaining inhabitants, to see the first recruits of these regiments paraded; and not less unpopular, with those who feared the loss of their plunder in slaves, from the measure of liberating them. When the alarm subsided, the project appears to have been relinquished.

General Kosciusko, who had preceded the army, had selected Colonel Saunders' place, on the Round-O, as a proper position for an encampment. The army was joined by the commander at that place, on the 7th, and Colonel Lee ordered to take command of the light detachment. Marion, advancing still nearer to Charleston, kept the right of the enemy in check. General Sumpter occupied Orangeburgh and the Four-Hole Bridge; Colonel W. Hampton, with fifty of the state cavalry, kept open the communication with Marion; Colonels Harden and Wilkinson watched the enemy's movements on the south, between Charleston and Savannah; and Colonel Lee, posted in advance, kept him from prying into the real weakness of the American army.

It is a singular fact, that there were not, at this time, eight hundred men at the American head-quarters; and, after supplying the different detachments with ammunition, the army had not four rounds to a man left.

The army had been greatly disappointed lately with regard to ammunition. From Camden, south, the country afforded little or no means of transportation: nearly all had been destroyed; and what remained, as well as what the country beyond it for some distance, afforded, had been necessarily occupied, in collecting magazines on the line of General St. Clair's advance with the troops from York Town. Captain Pendleton had been dispatched to superintend this indispensable object; and the quarter master's department, at all times ill-organized, had been embarrassed in the transportation of ammunition, to such a degree, as to produce this unexpected and distressing dearth of that article in the army.

Colonel Williams, in a letter of the 4th, says—"Your success at Dorchester would make your enemies hate themselves, if all circumstances were generally known; and the same knowledge would make your friends admire the adventure even more than they do. I am very happy that you have obtained your wish without risking a general action; and I hope you will be able to keep possession of what you have got, until the re-enforcement, under General St. Clair, will enable you to take more."

It was with no small anxiety, that General Greene's mind was turned, at this time, on St. Clair's advance. The ground acquired, since the passage of the Congaree, had been too much the result of manœuvre, to be held with confidence. The actual state of his strength, could not long be concealed from the enemy; and the approaching necessity of discharging the Virginia troops, was well known to Leslie, for their term of service was no secret. The enemy's force already doubled Greene's, though all had been concentrated; and the return of their convalescents to the ranks, during the season of health, must daily increase this disparity.

To complete his causes of apprehension, no ammunition having yet arrived in quantities to supply himself and his detachments, whilst all were clamouring from Georgia to the Santee, for this *sine qua non* of war, he had not a cartridge that was not dealt out to his men, and their cartouch-boxes not one-fourth filled.

This disgusting state of things had, in part, resulted from one of those contretemps, to which the southern commander had often been exposed, by the multiplied, multiform, and uncombined arrangements through which he was compelled to draw his supplies.

Laboratories had been established by Steuben, in Virginia, for the ordnance department of the southern army; the greatest part of the ammunition, intend-

ed for it, was halted there, and its fixed ammunition supplied from thence. Stephen, being dissatisfied with the deputy commissary of military stores, whose duty it was to forward this article, had, with the concurrence of General Greene, displaced him, and appointed another in his stead. The displaced incumbent appealed to the board of war, and they thought proper to reinstate him. This had happened in November, and some time in January he had not yet resumed his operations; sickness had detained him on his journey from Philadelphia. The department became totally deranged; and when the officers, charged by General Greene with inquiring into and remedying the evil, came into Virginia, they found every thing there prostrate, and scarce a possibility left of giving a spark of life to the quarter master general's means of transportation. Without these, the little ammunition manufactured, could not be transported to head-quarters.

Colonel Carrington, in the middle of November, when the capture of Cornwallis had furnished a large supply of cartridges, writes almost in despair—"I have obtained of the military chest, taken in York Town, two hundred and fifty guineas for the use of my department. I could obtain no more; this seems to be my only dependence for forwarding my business. There appears to be an end to business here in every department; the people, wearied out with impressments for the last campaign, are no longer to be lugged into any service, or to afford assistance in any respect, without money. Of this we have none; and as to government powers, they appear to be dropping to the ground; we cannot get a house together; and the governor being sick, no executive is convened to communicate with. I am endeavouring to lay a foundation for the most necessary stores to be got on as far as Peytonburgh, from whence I still have confidence of M'Craw, and the assistants in North Carolina, for getting them to you. As to Virginia, I find the same kind of indifference, in duty, prevails with too many of those employed in my department, as is exhibited by the officers of civil government; and as I have no means of paying them, I have no means of getting those into my service who will value the appointment so much as to attend to their business, with that zeal which will overcome difficulties. The want of money is made use of as a pretext for the most villainous negligence. In short, I find we are at last to depend on our own exertions immediately, in those points which we can effect with the aid of a few virtuous men from the army." Again, on the 29th, he says—"The quarter masters, for the reasons I had the honour to give you in my last, are of but little use to me. And as to government, it seems to be at an end. The governor is a good man in his office, but is unhappily clogged with a privy council, the constituent parts of which are both, naturally and politically, too

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Prior to General Greene's leaving the Hills the last time, it has been mentioned, that he had been straightened for ammunition. For ten days after he was ready to march, he had been detained there for no other cause. And it may be imputed to him as an error, that, with such prospects, he had ventured to take the field. But it must be recollected, that the detachment under Seviere and Shelby had then arrived; and to have held them in a state of inactivity, would have been not only useless to the public, but have certainly produced discontent and desertion in their ranks. A small supply of ammunition had arrived before the march of the main army. And by dispatching Captain Pendleton, on the line of communication with his depots, to Charlotte, to whom was added Mr. R. Forsyth, with instructions to proceed still farther, it was supposed that the present state of destitution could not have occurred. It must also be remarked, that the letters of Colonel Carrington had not then been received; and from the fall of Cornwallis, there was just ground to hope that things would have improved, instead of becoming desperate, in Virginia.

On the article of subsistence, the deranged state of the quarter master's department gave the southern commander no alarm. Had he, indeed, been compelled to rely on its aid to transport provision to his army, he could not have ventured a foot in advance. But to relieve that department from this heavy part of its duties, or rather himself from the necessity of depending on it, was one object for taking the position on the Round-O. It was in the midst of a plentiful provision country; and although rice was an article to which his soldiers had not been accustomed, and the uses of it in an army were not then tested, as they have been in latter times, it was found to afford nutritious diet for man and horse. To the officers, and to the sick, a source of supply was opened for delicacies, to which they had been long unaccustomed. This was an abundant supply of venison and wild-fowl, in which the neighbourhood abounded.

Animal-food, General Greene had long since ascertained, was best supplied to the soldiers upon the hoof. This was a standing relief to the quarter master's department; it also lessened the consumption of salt, then worth five hard dollars per bushel: and by obviating the necessity of magazines, left the army more at large in its movements, and presented fewer objects to be guarded by himself, or struck at by the enemy. Indeed, scattered as the loyalists were, at all times, over the country, and hardy and enterprising as many of their leaders were, the enemy would always have been able to annoy the army,

by destroying its magazines. For beef-cattle, no region could afford better pasture, at this season, than the rice-fields and cane-brakes of the low country.

The derangements in the quarter master's department, therefore, furnished strong reasons in favour of the movement to his present position.

While in a state of almost positive incapacity for action, General Greene had to sustain one of the most serious alarms of his life. Indeed, through his whole correspondence, we see but this one instance of extreme apprehension.

Not long after his taking post at the Round-O, Colonel John Laurens finally carried into effect, the design so early conceived, of joining General Greene. This active young patriot was never at rest with himself, but when actively engaged in the service of his country. He had, very recently, returned from France, charged with the invaluable supplies from that country, which had been delivered in Boston. He immediately resumed his post in the family of the commander in chief, until the fall of Lord Cornwallis: and acted a conspicuous part in the conflicts which preceded that event. The happy termination of that enterprise, left Laurens at liberty to solicit others, and he immediately obtained leave of the commander in chief, to repair to the only scene, which was likely to present opportunities for the exercise of his spirit and patriotism.

General Greene knew too well his talents, his zeal, and his temper, to keep him long in inactivity; and a detachment was formed and placed under his command, charged with co-operating in the measures previously adopted, for confining the enemy to the limits to which he was now restricted.

Laurens was so great a favourite, and so well known in the low country of South Carolina, that he soon found the means of opening a communication with Charleston; and through one of the channels of information he had opened, he learned on the 25th, that a fleet from Ireland, with three thousand troops on board, was within two day's sail of the bar; that some of the officers had actually arrived, and that a re-enforcement of two thousand more, was hourly expected from New York.

Lee, who was, at the same time, with his detachment low down Ashley River, received the same intelligence; and the reeking couriers, from both these officers, arrived at the same moment in the American camp.

The human mind readily credits intelligence of events that it has anticipated, and Greene had repeatedly foretold, that the British army to the south would be re-enforced; as well to maintain the *uti possidetis* principle, for which England was negotiating, as because the war must languish altogether, unless pressed in this quarter. Recent movements among the Indians, the never-

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failing presage of movements in the British army, had also taken place; his own diminished and ill-provided condition, invited attack; and the source of the information appeared of unquestionable authenticity. To have turned a deaf ear to it, would have been presumptuous; and the night was consumed in preparing dispatches to Count Rochambeau, the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, and many others, earnestly soliciting immediate support. To insure dispatch and effect to these applications, and hasten the advance of St. Clair and Wayne, officers of known zeal and fidelity, were made the bearers of these messages.

The impression made upon the mind of the general, was vented in many of these letters. In one, written to General Smallwood, who, at this time, was discharging in Maryland, the duties previously delegated to General Gist, now on his march for head-quarters, he writes—"I fear the misfortunes of this country are never to be at an end. After driving the enemy into Charleston, with the remains of our little army, I was in hopes to have a little respite; especially after General St. Clair should join us, which I expect will take place in three or four days. But, alas! I got intelligence yesterday, that four regiments of infantry, and two of dismounted dragoons, were hourly expected from Cork, and three regiments from New York. This force, with what the enemy had before, will make them upwards of eight thousand strong at Charleston, besides what they have at Savannah. Our force, when collected altogether, even after General St. Clair shall have joined us, will not amount to more than one-third of the enemy's. In this alarming and distressing situation, I beg of you to have forwarded, every man fit for duty in Maryland; and, if any little articles are wanted for their equipment, that they be forwarded after them. Should these re-enforcements arrive, (and there can be little doubt of it) it may serve to convince you, that the enemy mean to make still greater exertions for holding the southern states; and, therefore, no time should be lost in filling up your regiments. Unless I am speedily supported, I shall be obliged to abandon the country, or expose the army to ruin."

To Colonel Davies, now at the head of the Virginia board of war, he writes, "for God's sake, my dear sir, give no sleep to your eyes, nor slumber to your eyelids, until you get the troops on the march. Captain Ragsdale has orders to apply for two thousand militia, and to get two thousand beeves put up to stall-feed for this army. Please to lend your aid in this business, and forward us a good quantity of spirits, if you intend we shall either live or fight. If Virginia does not exert herself for our aid, we are inevitably ruined. An individual can do but little without assistance; and I beg the legislature and executive of your

state not to deceive themselves with false hopes. Fresh misfortunes may arise without effectual assistance, which may lay a train again for new calamities to Virginia. But, besides what concerns her own safety, she should not be unmindful of the sufferings and distresses of her sister states. Something must be done in your state to give more effectual aid to the business of transportation; Colonel Carrington says he can get no assistance."

To the governor of Virginia he writes—"I am sensible the censure always falls upon the officer who is unfortunate, let who will be in fault; but this would give me little concern, did I not see two states involved in the ruin; and, perhaps, three. But I flatter myself, I have something to hope from Virginia, independent of her federal obligations, as I paid particular attention to your safety last summer, when I was pressed with difficulties and dangers on every side. I hope, therefore, you will not suffer me to sink, and those states to be overcome which have been so ravaged and destroyed as to pain the humanity of every observer. Let me intreat you not to suppose that I am laying before you an exaggerated account; for you may be assured, that our difficulties and dangers are as great as I have represented them. I shall do all I can; but it would be nothing less than a wanton sacrifice of men, to attempt any thing against so unequal a force as is expected. The enemy have now, before any re-enforcements arrive, a greater force than our collective strength, after General St. Clair shall have joined us," &c.

Notwithstanding the sanctity attached, by military men, to the use of flags, and the affectation of using them only to mitigate the miseries of war, it is a well known fact, that they have, in practice, other uses attached to them besides keeping open an intercourse with an armed enemy. There was one sent in to General Leslie the following morning, with some earnest remonstrances on the subject of exchanges, which had probably been deferred, not without a motive; and its return gave full certainty to this state of facts, relative to re-enforcements.—That from New-York, consisting of two regiments of infantry, and about one hundred and fifty dismounted dragoons, was actually on its way, but the Cork fleet had brought with it only a re-enforcement of about sixty artillerymen.

Against this additional force, General Greene resolved, not only to maintain his ground, but to advance as soon as his own re-enforcement should arrive.

Had the intelligence, which had produced such excitement in the American camp, been really true, there can be little doubt that Greene must have once more yielded up all his hard earned conquests. Count Rochambeau pleaded, the want of instruction from his court and orders from General Washington,

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and could promise no support until Greene should be pushed beyond the Roanoke or Dan. North Carolina, ever since the capture of Governor Burke, had got into such a state of confusion, that she could not even get her legislature together. And Virginia, convulsed by a quarrel with her own governor, and with the financier of the United States; without a farthing in her treasury, or a prospect of any until October; so impoverished, that her one thousand recruits, in depot, "were kept from perishing" only by the private advances of the gentlemen at the head of the war department;* could only promise that those recruits should be immediately marched to head quarters. As to the militia required of her, Colonel Davies writes—"I am sorry to say, that I fear the whole power of government would not be sufficient to re-enforce you with two thousand men at this time; the truth is, the governor and council is not vested with any power to order them *out of the state.*"

It was in anticipation of all the mortification and distress to himself and his army, the desolation and ruin of a country which his heart had often bled for, and the baleful influence on the American cause, that must result from ever again retreating before a superior enemy; that General Greene addressed to Governor Rutledge that letter, which was the subject of much animadversion at that time, and may at all times be the subject of very various opinions, on its prudence and policy.

It bears date prior to the receipt of the intelligence which we have noticed, but expressly in anticipation of it; and from its importance will merit to be transcribed at length.

"From the preparations making in Charleston for its defence, the measures taken to incorporate the tories, and embodying the negroes, as well as to spirit up the savages on the frontier, it appears the enemy have further designs upon this country. It is difficult to tell what will be their plan; nor can we tell how far European politics may effect our operations here. Our attention is naturally directed to two objects; one is to cover the country, the other, to drive the enemy from their strong holds. An additional force to our present strength may become necessary for either, or both. Should the enemy have in contemplation offensive operations in this quarter, they will, undoubtedly, re-enforce their army here, will oblige us to fall back, unless we receive re-enforcements also, and once more give the enemy command of the most fertile parts of this country. A change of sentiment may also take place among the inhabitants—new difficulties arise, and the issue of the war be protracted, if not ren-

* Colonel Davies' letter, 21st January, 1782.

dered doubtful. Good policy would dictate, therefore, that you should strengthen yourselves by every means the natural resources of the country will admit. Re-enforcements from the northward are precarious, and a long time on their way, which must expose you, upon all emergencies, to fresh calamities, unless you take measures, seasonably, to provide against them. It is true, expense is a national consideration, but far less so than security against the ravages of a cruel and bloody enemy. But supposing the enemy should not have any immediate offensive operations in view, and only mean to secure themselves in Charleston, it is an object highly worthy of consideration, whether it is not for the interest of government to furnish such a force, as to oblige them to abandon it, or to hold it at such an expense, as will be both inconsistent with their national policy and national interest. I can readily conceive they may be willing to hold the place, if it can be done with safety with a small garrison, when they would not think of the measure, if they were obliged to employ a large one, and evacuate it.

"The cultivation of the country is so important an object, and so much dependent upon trade and commerce, and both so connected with the possession of Charleston, that the whole body of the people are deeply interested in the measure; and the expense that would effect this, would bear but a very small proportion to the advantages which would result from it.

"It has been said by some good judges of military operations, that Charleston could never be recovered but by a naval co-operation. This opinion is founded upon the facility with which the enemy may re-enforce it. But that may be more inconvenient than an evacuation.

"I cannot pretend to pronounce, positively, that the enemy may be compelled to evacuate Charleston, without a naval co-operation, even with a force as large as I should think proper to ask for the occasion; but the probability is so inviting that I think the measure highly warrants the experiment: and more especially, as a naval co-operation is so precarious, and our future security, as well as present advantage, so connected with the issue of it. If we can drive the enemy from our sea-port towns, without a naval co-operation, it will be a great point gained, not only in the present case, but will prevent future invasions. And if we fail in this experiment, it will only let us know how far we are dependent upon our allies. And after all, the force necessary for the experiment, should it fail, will give greater security to the country, and more repose to the militia; now become so necessary for the happiness of the community, as well from the ravages of the enemy, as the long interruption of all kinds of business.

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"The natural strength of the country, in point of numbers, appears to me to consist much more in the blacks than in the whites.* Could they be incorporated, and employed for its defence, it would afford you double security. That they would make good soldiers, I have not the least doubt; and I am persuaded, the state has it not in its power to give sufficient reinforcements, without incorporating them, either to secure the country, if the enemy mean to act vigorously upon an offensive plan, or furnish a force sufficient to dispossess them of Charleston, should it be defensive.

"The number of whites in this state is too small, and the state of your finances too low, to attempt to raise a force in any other way. Should the measure be adopted, it may prove a good means of preventing the enemy from further attempts upon this country, when they find they have not only the whites, but the blacks also, to contend with; and I believe it is generally agreed, that if the natural strength of this country could have been employed in its defence, the enemy would have found it little less than impracticable to have got footing here, much more to have overrun the country; by which the inhabitants have suffered infinitely greater loss than would have been sufficient to have given you perfect security. And I am persuaded, the incorporation of a part of the negroes would rather tend to secure the fidelity of others, than excite discontent, mutiny, and desertion among them. The force I would ask for this purpose, in addition to what we have, and what may probably join us from the northward, or from the militia of this state, would be four regiments, two upon the continental, and two upon the state establishment: A corps of pioneers, and a corps of artificers, each to consist of about eighty men. The two last may be either on a temporary or permanent establishment, as may be most agreeable to the state. The others should have their freedom, and be clothed and treated, in all respects, as other soldiers, without which they will be unfit for the duties expected from them.

"If the measure is thought eligible, the sooner it is adopted the better, and measures taken for arming, clothing, and equipping the men. And it shall be my endeavour to employ them most for the honour and interest of the state. I shall wish to know the sentiments of your excellency, and council, as early as possible, as other measures, connected with your decision, must be immediately taken in consequence thereof."

Those who can enter into the feelings and opinions of the citizens of those states which tolerate slavery, will be not a little startled at the proposition sub-

mitted to the governor and council, in this letter. A strong, deep-seated feeling, nurtured from earliest infancy, decides, with instinctive promptness, against a measure of so threatening an aspect, and so offensive to that republican pride, which disdains to commit the defence of the country to servile hands; or share with a colour, to which the idea of inferiority is inseparably connected, the profession of arms; and that approximation of condition which must exist between the regular soldier and the militia man.

But, the governor and council viewed the subject under the influence of less feeling. It seems, the proposition had formerly been under consideration in the state legislature; and as the meeting of that board was now at hand, it was resolved to submit it to their decision.

There is a sovereign who, at this time, draws his soldiery from the same class of people, and finds a facility in forming and disciplining an army, which no other power enjoys. Nor, does his immense military force, formed from that class of his subjects, excite the least apprehensions; for, the soldier's will is subdued to that of his officer; and his improved condition, takes away the habit of identifying himself with the class from which he has been separated. Military men know, what mere machines men become under discipline, and believe, that any men who may be made obedient, may be made soldiers; and that, increasing their numbers, increases the means of their own subjection and government.

It is now probable, that the idea of forming a military force by a draft from the slaves, had been suggested to General Greene, by a recent acquaintance with the habits, character, and feelings of that class of people. It could not escape his eye, that there was no sense of hostility existing between the master and slave; but, rather something of the clannish or patriarchal feelings known to exist, between the inhabitants of a village and their chief. He had remarked the joy expressed by the slaves, on their deliverance from the tyranny of the enemy, and the return of a protector in the person of their master. And it was obvious, that if the state could give a slave, for the services of a man as a soldier for ten months, as had been the case in raising some of its troops, it would be great gain to convert the same slave into a soldier for the war, to be paid only by his freedom, after having served with fidelity. But, the legislature, when it met, thought the experiment a dangerous one, and the project was relinquished. They adopted, however, the alternative of raising soldiers on the black population, by giving a slave for a soldier. Parties were sent to collect slaves from the plantations of the loyalists, and rendezvous, established in vain, in various places in the interior country.

A stronger vindication of the correctness of the opinion, that it was time the state should cast about it for the means of defending itself, could not have been desired, than was furnished when it was thought necessary to appeal to other quarters for protection and defence; and it received a strong practical illustration from the circumstances attending the advance of the re-enforcements under St. Clair. Ever since the month of March, he had been under orders to re-enforce the southern army; that he was halted on his march to aid in the defence of Virginia, proved the facility with which re-enforcements might be intercepted; and when again set in motion for his place of destination, the time he consumed was more than two months, in marching from York Town to head-quarters. Nor, was he chargeable with any unnecessary delay; on the contrary, he was charged with proceeding too rapidly; and so much was his strength impaired, when he reached the Round-O, that his force but little exceeded the one half of the numbers that crossed the Potomac.

Colonel Harmar, afterwards General Harmar, of Pennsylvania, kept a journal of this march, as he did of all the material incidents of the whole time that line was in service; and on the 9th of December, 1781, he minutes down—"we march too rapidly; at this rate, we shall bring but a small re-enforcement to General Greene."

It was not until the 4th of January following, that St. Clair formed a junction with Greene. The general had, four days before, dismissed the Virginia line, with his warmest acknowledgments for their active and patient services. Only about sixty, from that state, now remained, and they had but one month longer to serve.

The very first object of General Greene's attention, after being re-enforced, was the state of Georgia. The enemy, after the fall of Augusta, had made no effort to regain his standing in the interior of that state. Along the sea-coast, the communication with St. Augustine was kept open; but, the only garrisoned posts besides Savannah, were at Ebenezer and Ogeechee, each twenty-five miles from Savannah, the former west, the other south. The persecutions of General Twiggs and Colonel Jackson, soon drove them from these posts; but, still the country was much harassed by tory-parties from Florida, and often alarmed by the movements of the savages. Savanaah was the centre of British communication with these unhappy people; and they constantly regarded, with sullen vindictiveness, the party who strove to cut off their intercourse with that place.

Five days after the arrival of General St. Clair, General Wayne was detached with the 3d regiment of dragoons, under Colonel White, (who had

joined the army,) and a detachment of artillery, to place himself at the head of the forces then in arms in Georgia. Orders had been, some time before, issued to General Sumpter, to detach Colonel Hampton's cavalry to the support of General Twiggs, and that corps was also placed at the disposal of General Wayne. In the instructions under which General Wayne acted, General Greene says—"The peculiar situation of Georgia, and the great sufferings of the good people of that state, and their uncommon exertions to recover their liberties, induce me to embrace the earliest opportunity to give them more effectual support, than has been hitherto in my power." And particularly enjoins him, "to invite all the people to join him, when he should get into the low country; and to give protection and security to all such as should engage in service under his command. 'Try,' says he, "by every means in your power, to soften the malignity and dreadful resentments subsisting between whig and tory; and put a stop, as much as possible, to that cruel custom of putting men to death, after they surrender themselves prisoners. The practice of plundering, you will endeavour to check as much as possible; and point out to the militia, the ruinous consequences of the policy. Let your discipline be as regular and as rigid, as the nature and constitution of your troops will admit. I am sensible, there will many difficulties attend your command; but, the high opinion I have of your abilities, zeal, resources and enterprise, as well as perseverance, give me the most flattering expectations that you will find means to surmount them all, and do honour to yourself, as well as essential service to your country;" &c.

In addition to the forces under his immediate command, General Barnwell,* who, at this time, commanded in that part of South Carolina, which lay along the lower part of Savannah River, received instructions to co-operate with General Wayne, and render him all the aid in his power. A detachment of infantry, then expected under Major Moore, was also ordered to be dispatched to Wayne's aid, as soon as it should arrive. At present, diminished

* Governor Rutledge, considering that part of Marion's command, which lay from Charleston to Savannah River, too remote from Marion's scene of operations, had determined to constitute a new brigade in that quarter. Hitherto, Marion had confided that region to Colonel Harden; and never had service been more ably performed. Governor Rutledge thought Mr. John Barnwell, then lower in grade as a militia officer, a more proper person for the appointment of brigadier than Harden, and appointed him to the command. The officers and men took such disgust at Harden's being superceded, that they would not turn out under General Barnwell, so that he could do nothing, and was finally obliged to resign. Harden had immediately thrown up his commission on being superceded, and the public lost his services.

as his re-enforcements had been on their march, after dismissing the Virginia troops, the general found himself at the head of too few infantry, to admit of detaching any; especially, as he had every reason to expect, that as soon as General Leslie should be re-enforced, "he would resent the insult of convening the legislature, to sit and deliberate within hearing of his revillee."

The assembly of the state was now about meeting in the village of Jacksonborough. It was originally resolved, by the governor and council, to convene it at Camden; but, General Greene, after his excursion to Dorchester, had, with an escort of cavalry, reconnoitred the country between the Edisto and Ashley, and found it possessed of sufficient military advantages, to admit of his covering Jacksonborough from danger and insult. He had, therefore, warmly pressed the governor and council to convene the legislature at that place, as well to confirm the evidence of a complete recovery of the state, as to place them in security, from any sudden attempt from the loyalists of the Saluda or Deep Rivers; such as had been made on Governor Burke, and was afterwards repeated on the Georgia legislature.

The legislature was, accordingly, convened by proclamation at Jacksonborough, on the 16th January, 1782, and civil government fully re-established, after a suspension of two years.

The army, in the mean time, crossed the Edisto, and on the 16th, took post at the plantation of Colonel Skirving, six miles in advance of Jacksonborough, on the road leading to Charleston, still drawing closer to the latter place, and taking the position best calculated to give protection to the seat of government. But, before the legislature could be placed in perfect security from insult, there was one measure necessary to be taken against a party of the enemy occupying a post too near to Jacksonborough, and communicating with it both by land and water.

This was on John's Island, one of the inner chain of islands which stretch along the coast from Charleston to Savannah, separated from the main by marshes and creeks, and from each other by the estuaries of the rivers, generally designated by the epithet of sounds, or inlets. Excepting Charleston Neck, the enemy had retired from the main, but still occupied James and John's Islands, and guarded the points at which they were accessible, by galleys, well manned, and carrying heavy guns.

On John's Island, which is extensive, secure, and fertile, a number of cattle had been collected for the use of the British army, and it was covered by a respectable detachment under Colonel Craig. From this place the distance, by land, from its western extremity to Jacksonborough is not beyond striking distance; and by the aid of their galleys, that place might, in a tide, be approached

by the enemy, so as to be struck at with effect; while the communication with Charleston, by James' Island, made it easy to throw re-enforcements upon John's Island unperceived.

To drive the enemy from this post was, therefore, an object of some interest, and General Greene gave it particularly in charge to the commanders of his detachments to make this a subject of early attention. It was soon ascertained, not only that the island was accessible, but that the British commander, relying on his galleys, was quite unapprehensive of an attack.

There was one point between the Stono and Edisto, at which the island was formerly connected to the high land, by a piece of hard-marsh. To complete the inland communication between Charleston and the the Edisto, by way of the Stono, this marsh had been cut through, and the canal is known by the epithet of New-Cut. At low water this place is fordable; and to guard this pass, two galleys had been moored, at convenient distances, but, necessarily, somewhat remote, in order to prevent their being exposed by grounding.

Laurens was intimately acquainted with the country; and he and Lee had made all the necessary inquiries before the army moved from the Round-O. And these two enterprising young commanders, now solicited the permission of the general to enter upon the undertaking of passing, by night, between the galleys, and surprising the British detachment under Craig.

The attempt was readily sanctioned; and the night of the 13th fixed on for its execution. The main army, by concert, moved on the 12th, on the route to Wallace's Bridge, to draw the attention of the enemy from the real point of attack, while the two light detachments, under command of Laurens, crossing the country from Ashley river, headed the north branch of the Stono, on the night of the 13th, and advanced to New-Cut, which is at the head of the south branch. The main army, which had halted under feigned orders, to encamp for the night, and was intended to cover and support its detachment, was put in motion soon after dark, and the general, in person, reached the Cut before the hour of low-water, at which alone the ford was passable. Here he found his attacking party in a strange state of embarrassment. The detachments of Lee and Laurens, formed each a separate column on the march: the former, led by Colonel Lee in person, the latter, by Major Hamilton.

We quote the official communication of General Greene, to correct the error of Colonel Lee, in stating Laurens to have been second in command.* A cor-

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 2. p. 398.

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Lee's column was in advance, and Laurens accompanying it in person. Hamilton's had not moved from the ground precisely at the time that the first column was put in motion; but no mistake was apprehended, as he was furnished with a guide. Before reaching the point, however, where the path which led to the ford turned off from the road they were upon, Hamilton's guide deserted him; the silence necessary to be observed, prevented the detachments from communicating by signals; and Hamilton saw now no resource but hastening on, in the hope to overtake the first column. In his haste he passed the road to the ford; and pushing on with redoubled speed, as the hour of low-water approached, he so increased his distance from the first column, that messengers dispatched in advance, returned in despair of finding him, and those sent back to hurry him on, encountered the main body in its advance. Thus the second column was completely lost, and in its anxiety, as usually happens, became still more bewildered, and beyond the reach of recall, by an attempt to reach the ford by a short route across the fields.

Thus the time for executing the enterprise passed by. Colonel Lee, who had crossed over to the island, was necessarily recalled before the height of the tide should cut off his retreat. And an opportunity was lost of striking a certain and humiliating blow at a party of near five hundred of the enemy.

But the object could not be relinquished; and General Greene resolved upon forcing his passage into the island. A boat was immediately ordered from Edisto on wagons; and while the artillery drove their galleys from a station where they could annoy the Americans, Colonel Laurens passed over at the Cut, and penetrated to Craig's encampment. But the alarm occasioned by the narrow escape of the morning, had convinced the enemy of the insecurity of his situation; and Colonel Laurens found the island abandoned by all but a few stragglers, who were made prisoners. The cattle also, had been driven across the river, or dispersed in the woods. But the main object had been effected without loss; and the enemy had retreated so precipitately that the schooner, which contained their baggage and one hundred invalids, was very near falling into Laurens' hands.

General Greene, in his official communication,* observes—"Had our party crossed the first night, the enterprise would have been completely successful. The enemy had between four to five hundred men on the island."

* 23d January.

"The failure was not a little mortifying to me, but much more so to Laurens and Lee; had it succeeded, it would have been both important and splendid."

It was not until John's Island was cleared of the enemy, and in possession, or under control of the American detachments, that General Greene established himself in his new encampment at Colonel Skirving's.

This event properly concludes the campaign of 1781. The moderate climate of this country, makes winter as proper for military operations as summer, and, in some respects, more so. Campaigns cannot, therefore, be properly divided by seasons; but, as they really are, where seasons produces inaction, by cessation from military operations, whether produced by the failure or attainment of their ultimate object. In the present case, the most brilliant success had attended the efforts of the southern commander. Three states had been delivered from an hostile yoke, and he now rested from his labours, in order to support them in the organization of their civil governments. Before him, was the enemy occupying little more "than ground sufficient for their encampment;" but, behind him, was a vast region, again illumined by the sunshine of freedom, and covered by the shield of civil government; swarming with multitudes revisiting their desolated homes, and blessing the genius that had brought them tranquillity, though it were only to weep over the tombs of their fallen friends. It was an hour of triumph to the pride of the soldier, but one of luxury to the man and the patriot.

A stronger proof could not have been required of the terror with which he had inspired, or the impotence to which he had reduced the enemy, than compelling him to retire with a much superior army within his fastnesses, and leave the functionaries of the state, to perform all their offices in security, within less than thirty miles of the hostile lines.

CHAPTER XVII.

Jacksonborough Assembly. Civil Government re-established in South Carolina and Georgia. Votes of thanks and compensation. Campaign in Georgia. Savannah evacuated. General Pickens. General Sumpter resigns, and General Henderson succeeds him. General Marion. Skirmishes in St. Thomas'. Disputes between Mayhem and Horry. Surprise of Colonel M Donald. Affair at Mrs. Tydiman's. Virginia—North Carolina—South Carolina—their respective measures towards the general government and the southern army. Distresses of the army. John Banks. Plot against General Greene. Colonel Lee retires. Remonstrance of the Pennsylvania captains and lieutenants. Captain Gunn. Colonel J. Laurens. General Leslie prepares to seize provisions. General Gist's brigade formed. Disputes with the legion officers. The brave rewarded.

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THE Jacksonborough assembly, as it is commonly called, convened and formed a quorum on the day to which it was summoned to meet, to wit, the 18th of January. As the governor's proclamation precluded all persons from voting, and from being elected, who had taken protection, it will readily be conjectured, of what materials this legislative body was composed. It was not strictly an assembly of armed barons, but there were very few, if any, whose swords had not been girt to their thighs in the common cause. All had suffered, and many of them very severely. But, it was highly distinguished both in merit and talent, and excepting in one measure, by wisdom and moderation. This was the celebrated act for confiscating or amercing

the estates of some of the most obnoxious among the loyalists, and banishing a few others; a measure more exceptionable in policy than in morals, and which created much trouble and expense to the state, and produced but very little profit. Yet, there are two considerations which have not had their due weight, in estimating the merits of the measure. By a proclamation of Governor Rutledge's, the door had been, for some time, open to the return of a great number of these unfortunate people, and it was well known, that the protection of General Greene, had been liberally extended to all who manifested repentance, and a desire to be re-established in the good graces of their fellow citizens. Many there were who were excepted from the governor's pardon, on account of certain acts of persecution, or rancorous hostility, which were held unpardonable.

But, there was another, and probably more efficacious cause, for adopting this measure. The state was wholly destitute of funds, and the whig population so stripped and impoverished, as to put it out of the power of government to raise any immediate resources, either by loan or taxation. The estates of the loyalists were, therefore, seized upon, as the means of establishing a capital to build a present credit upon. From the liberality with which numbers were afterwards released, it is not improbable, that many supported the measure, rather as a present expedient, than a policy to be adhered to.

In the masterly speech which the governor delivered on the opening of the assembly, particular notice was taken of the services of General Greene.—After taking a review of the previous state of the country, of its sufferings and its struggles, and the many bloody scenes it had witnessed, he goes on to observe—"I can now congratulate you, and I do so cordially, in the pleasing change of affairs which, under the blessings of God, the wisdom, prudence, address, and bravery of the great and gallant General Greene, and the intrepidity of the officers and men under his command, has been happily effected—a general, who is justly entitled, from his many signal services, to honourable and singular marks of our approbation and gratitude. His successes have been more rapid and complete, than the most sanguine could have expected. The enemy compelled to surrender, or evacuate every post which they held in the country, frequently defeated and driven from place to place, are obliged to seek refuge under the walls of Charleston, and on islands in its vicinity. We have now full and absolute possession of every part of the state; and the legislative, judicial, and executive powers, are in the free exercise of their respective authorities."

Both senate and house of representatives responded to the governor's speech, with the warmest expressions of gratitude and praise. The former further

voted to General Greene their thanks, in the most flattering language, which were communicated through Mr. John Lewis Gervais, their president, in the following terms:—"The senate of South Carolina, in general assembly met, impressed with a high sense of the eminent services you have rendered to this state, have unanimously voted you their thanks, in behalf of their constituents, for the distinguished zeal and generalship which you have displayed on every occasion, particularly during the last campaign.

"The senate, sir, are sensible that a choice of difficulties only presented, when you took the command of this department, with the disadvantage of a comparatively feeble army. And that to your superior military genius, and enterprising spirit, are to be attributed the blessings which we now enjoy in the exercise of our free constitution, and the recovery of the property of our citizens. I am happy, sir, that it falls to my lot to transmit you this public testimony of their applause. I embrace it with ardour, from a sense that it is a tribute so justly due to you, and as it affords me an opportunity of assuring you, personally, of the great respect and attachment with which I have the honour to be," &c.

But the house of representatives gave a more substantial proof of its zeal and gratitude, by originating a bill, "for vesting in General Nathanael Greene, in consideration of his important services, the sum of ten thousand guineas." A grant which, in the sequel, was worth to the general a still greater sum; for the states of Georgia and North Carolina, resolved not to be outdone in expressions of gratitude, voted to him, the former five thousand guineas, and the latter, twenty-four thousand acres of land.

Never did relief come more opportunely, for at this moment General Greene was, probably, not worth a cent in the world. In common with the officers in the southern department, he had been obliged to maintain those appearances in person and style of living, which his high station rendered indispensable to the support of his respectability and authority; and in common with them, he had drained his private resources to the dregs.

Let not this picture be thought exaggerated; the following unaffected statement of facts, in a letter of the 14th December, which was never intended to be made public, will show, that, at least, the funds of the public never could have contributed to his private relief. It was in answer to one from Colonel Horry, communicating the discontents of his soldiers at the privations to which they were subjected. "Your soldiers," says he, "have much less patience than ours. Our horse have neither cloaks nor blankets, nor have our troops received a shilling of pay since they came into this country: nor is there a prospect of any, and yet they do not complain. However, this is no bar to the justice

of your people's claim, and I wish it was in my power to assist you. But the public have not furnished me with a shilling of money, for this department, since I have had the command here, except paper, of which I could make no use. *We took a couple of boats at Augusta, which were sold, and the product is all I have had for special services, and matters of intelligence.* My situation has been very distressing, and is so still, but I hope, if the officers stand by me with the same virtuous attachment they have done, we shall get through our difficulties in time, and I shall take a pride and pleasure in doing justice to your services.

"I have engaged Mr. P——, of Georgetown, to get me some blankets. should he succeed, you shall have part. All kinds of clothing we are in want of, and in the greatest distress on that account. Near one half of our soldiers have not a shoe to their foot, and not a blanket to ten men through the line."

This, reader, was in the middle of December.

But, when was man ever destined to partake of any sublunary enjoyment without alloy. It is with officers, in a diminished degree, as it is with soldiers. While their commander takes his full share of sufferings and privations along with them, they will manifest a disposition to lighten his burthens; but when all have claims, (and we are all equally disposed to put a false estimate on our own services) to compensate, much more, to reward one, and not even render common justice to the rest, cannot fail to produce discontents. Shame or pride may suppress them, but they will be privately vented in expressions of discontent, or petulant attacks. In heart, it is believed that every officer rejoiced that General Greene had been rescued from poverty; but the effusions of congratulation were closely followed by bitter complaints at the neglect and injustice that others had sustained. Discontents are contagious in an army.

In the correspondence between General Greene and General Wayne, on the mutinous symptoms which soon after were exhibited in this army, the latter makes this excellent practical remark: "I am exceedingly unhappy at the conduct of the Pennsylvanians: a prompt punishment will have a happy effect. The thoughtless conduct of some of our officers at this post, by speaking too freely before their servants, on account of the deficiency of pay, clothing, &c. and adopting an idea that more attention was paid to one part of the American army than to another, had like to be productive of some bad consequences; which I put a stop to by admonishing those officers, very seriously and pointedly, upon the subject. It is possible that some such imprudencies may have taken place among some officers belonging to the respective corps with you."

Nor was it very long after these grants were made to General Greene, before reports got into circulation as false and calumnious as those which had once

affected his moral character whilst in the quarter master general's department. It was said that he had intrigued with the legislatures to obtain those grants, and that he had combined with a mercantile house, under the firm of Hunter, Banks & Co. to participate in a contract for the supply of the troops, and even to practice upon the necessities of his companions in arms.

On the second subject, we shall have occasion to descant in due time; the futility of the first is almost too great to need refutation.

What were the means of intrigue, at that time, in his power? what was the time given him to practice those means? And who were the characters to be made the dupes of his intrigues?

A more pure, enlightened, and high-minded race of men, probably, never were brought together in the legislatures of the three states, than those who were convened at this time; every thing combined to draw together assemblies of the very first order of men, in the respective states; men who could neither be made the instruments nor dupes of intrigue. And what was he to offer for services conferred, who had nothing but his sword and his virtues to command devotion to his interests? It is not thus that intrigues are conducted. Or what was the time allowed him for maturing his plans? Not a week elapsed after organizing the South Carolina legislature, before the grant was complete; and the others followed as soon as the first was heard of. At least, from the legislatures of Georgia and North Carolina, his situation was too remote to admit of much skill and management in obtaining these votes. The truth is, that a more spontaneous offering never was laid upon the altar of merit. The causes of it were perfectly well understood at the time, and were highly honourable to the minds and hearts of the men who composed the several legislative bodies which conferred those grants.

It was impossible that the state of Greene's finances could be unknown in the southern states. All America knew that he had been transferred from the forge to the command of the army; and that at the commencement of the revolution his estate was very moderate. Experience taught every one in public life, that the part he had acted was but ill calculated to improve his fortunes. The idle reports circulated whilst he was in the quarter master's department, were now correctly estimated; and, above all, many of the members had had the most ample opportunities of making their own observations on his habits of life. Poverty will be detected by a skilful eye, even under the glare of affected profusion; but the simple, unaffected habits of the southern commander were not calculated, and never intended, to disguise the truth. What the camp afforded was to be found in his tent, and little more. Wine was seldom presented in it, and never, when wanted for the use of the hospital. Hoe-cake,

(not always improved by butter) and fresh beef, were often the only diet he could furnish in the exercise of that hospitality which his quarters, necessarily, must afford. But all was offered with an air of cheerfulness, and never introduced with an apology.

Some time before the commencement of the year 1783, congress had it under consideration, to substitute a secretary at war for the boards and committees which had hitherto administered the duties of such an office. The public eye was immediately cast upon General Greene to fill the place, and a letter from the late Gouverneur Morris, then a member of congress, announced to him the general wish, that he would accept the office. He resolved to decline it. "I am too much," says he, "a stranger to the nature and duties of the office, to wish the appointment if there were no other objections. But, when I consider the constitution of the United States, the feeble powers of congress, the difficulty of combining our force, the local policy of the states, the want of vigour, prudence and zeal, among military men, for the public good, in preference to their own pleasures or promotions, I can see many other objections. I confess, our affairs hitherto seem to have been too much under the direction of chance, and to have acquired too little consistency and method, to fix upon any general plan for their order and direction. Even the powers of congress are undefined, and the intervention of the states unlimited. What is to be expected from a delegated power, by one, subject to the control of the other? I cannot well form an idea of national policy, when the constituent parts claim absolute and independent sovereignty. It is true, these are qualified by the confederation, but, in a way, that leaves the seeds of much confusion; sufficient, in my opinion, to counteract the best plan in the world; and in a way, that will leave the secretary responsible, without having it in his power to avoid the evil.

"Something of this sort happened to me this campaign, and I mentioned the matter to congress. Troops that were destined for one purpose were, by the state, directed to another.* It embarrassed and distressed me exceedingly for a time; and though we did not meet with a capital misfortune, we lost many advantages.

"You think I am fond of an army and a busy scene; you mistake my feelings; I am truly domestic. The more I am in an army, and the more I am acquainted with human nature, the less fond I am of political life. At this time, there is no retreating from it without evident marks of disgrace. I

* Alluding to the remanding of the Virginia militia.

am but too sensible for my own happiness, of the fickleness of fortune ; nor have I any confidence in my own ; having felt too many adverse strokes to think myself one of her children. But, to retire from the army into a department of greater responsibility, subject to more expense, and exposed to equal, if not greater misfortune, will be neither wise nor prudent.

"To tell you the truth, my dear sir, I am poor, and I wish not to climb to a station from which I may be cast headlong in a moment, and lost, without the means of support. Eminence always begets envy ; and it is more difficult to support ourselves in high places, than to arrive at them.

"I have a growing family, and both duty and inclination lead me to wish to provide for them ; and I am persuaded, any appointment under government will afford nothing more than a decent support, if that, in an office where it will lead to a connection both foreign and domestic, civil and military.

"I have the highest opinion of Mr. Morris, minister of finance ; and had I the least inclination, to enter the department you propose, a connection with him, would be a strong motive. My acquaintance with him is small ; I venerate his character ; and the more so, for his engaging in so difficult an office, under such unfavourable appearances. Was I the fifteenth part as independent as he is, I should have fewer objections to what you propose, as a failure would only affect my reputation, and not my living. Not that I think my present employment more lucrative, but less expensive, and perhaps upon the whole, less hazardous."

This letter, it is confidently believed, furnished all the ground that ever existed for the charge of intrigue. If it was communicated by Mr. Morris to his friends in Philadelphia, it was obviously without a view to soliciting the favours that were heaped upon General Greene ; and, at least, was both written and communicated without any design on his part. It was, however, well calculated to work upon sensible and reflecting minds, to make a liberal effort for his relief. Independent of the general calls of gratitude, and a desire to promote his happiness, it naturally occurred to the liberal patriot, that it were a shame if such a man should be driven by poverty, from the course of life in which he was calculated to be so eminently useful ; and there can be little doubt, that in honourable rivalry, each of the states which made those grants, was anxious to make his talents and worth the property of the southern country. He certainly considered it so, and felt himself in honour bound to arrange his plans of life accordingly ; at least, so far as not to withdraw the fortune conferred upon him.

The American army, during the year 1782, was so circumscribed in its operations, as to extort from the general, a declaration at the close of it, "that

the campaign of that year had been as dull and insipid, as that of the preceding was critical and interesting.*

To cover the country and support his detachments, were the sole objects of the main army, while those of the enemy were restricted to occasional strokes at the American detachments, and efforts to collect subsistence at the point of the bayonet. But, in Georgia, a very different scene had been exhibited; and a degree of vigour and enterprise animated the military movements in the neighbourhood of Savannah, which added not a little to the chagrine experienced by the officers of the main army at their own inactivity.

Wayne reached the banks of Savannah, at the Sister's Ferry, about thirty miles above the town, on the 16th; and with singular audacity, at the head of about one hundred cavalry, crossed the river in small canoes, swimming his horses by their side. His artillery he was compelled to leave in his rear, as he had no infantry to support it, and no boat capable of transporting it.—General Greene knew well the arduous enterprise that he was confiding to this commander; but, he also knew, that he possessed courage, intelligence, and resources, to effect whatever could be effected with such slender means. It would, perhaps, have been a misfortune to Wayne, to have possessed a force sufficient to cope with his adversary in battle, for his ardent character would have impelled him forward too much; it may have rendered him incautious, or hurried him into acts of temerity.

The British General Clarke, at this time, commanded in Georgia, and had under him, the celebrated Browne, Ingram and Douglas, colonels who had distinguished themselves on various occasions, less by their humanity than their courage and loyalty. General Wright was also still recognised as the royal governor and civil representative of his sovereign.

The British force has never been precisely ascertained; General Greene, at the time of detaching Wayne, estimated it at seven hundred. But, subsequent information would seem to make it much larger. After being very much thinned by desertion, and the separation of Browne and his loyalists and Indians, it was asserted, that the number of effective men embarked, when the town was evacuated, amounted to one thousand. There is among the files of this day, an intercepted letter, which contains the following paragraph:—
“We are cooped up within the town of Savannah by about three hundred rebels, while we can muster two thousand five hundred men fit for duty.”

The writer must, unquestionably, have included the inhabitants in this estimate, in whom, in the hour of battle, the enemy would have been very unwise to confide, for the hearts of many were not with them. General Wayne, after all the information he could collect, estimated their force at one thousand one hundred men. In this number, however, was included, a body of Hessians, and a number of loyalists, in whose fidelity, it appears, the commanding general reposed very little confidence. Indeed, it was said, that such was the anxiety of the Hessians to desert, that they could not be trusted on guard duty. Numbers did escape, and the frequent executions of these unhappy men, which took place from time to time, proved how many were intercepted in a like attempt. Jackson and Habersham, it appears, had been secretly negotiating with them for some time; and on the approach of Wayne, it was only by filling the adjacent woods with Indians, negroes, and loyalists, that the whole could be restrained from the attempt. The settlement of their countrymen at Ebenezer, was the exciting cause. Wayne's instructions about detaching the loyalists, were also soon put to trial, and attended with great success. His reclaimed soldiers soon constituted a respectable part of his force, until acts of treachery, covered under the pretext of desertion, compelled him to receive them, with caution, into his ranks.

When Wayne first crossed the Savannah River, Colonel Browne, with a respectable body of loyalists, was encamped at Mulberry Grove, and the place adjoining—afterwards the respective residences of Greene and Wayne; and the ground with which their services were rewarded by the state, was literally that first won in the state by "their sword and their spear."

Upon the first appearance of the American party, Browne began to retire; but, carried with him, or destroyed all the grain and forage upon that river and the Ogeechee. By the aid of flats or boats, large quantities of both were deposited at Governor Wright's plantation, under the guns of Savannah, and on the north side of the river, on Hutchinson's Island, directly opposite the town. This was intended for the subsistence of the garrison; and the destruction of it, of course, presented the first object of enterprise.

In a few days, all the forces which had been ordered to join him, assembled under Wayne's command; but, he had the mortification to find, that it was wholly insufficient to face the enemy in the field. Jackson's corps had been cut down by the small-pox and some severe skirmishes, to about forty horse and as many infantry. Hampton could not muster one hundred men, and their term of service would expire in a fortnight. And the Georgia militia could not venture from the populous districts, for the country was, at this time, swarming with Indians.

A very general movement among these unhappy people, at this time, was one of the principal causes which induced General Greene to detach Wayne on this service. They had been invited down to Savannah, under the influence of Browne and the British traders, for the purpose of receiving their presents, and no doubt, to receive the further instructions of those who had hitherto guided them. Augusta was the post to which they had annually resorted for these purposes; but, that being, at this time, in the hands of the Americans, they were required to repair to Savannah, under assurances, that they had nothing to apprehend, if they would descend to the sea-coast, by the south side of the Altamaha, and approach the town from the south. Trusting to these representations, parties of the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks, some armed, and others unarmed, were, at this time, on the rout for Savannah, accompanied by many traders, with their horse-packs of deer skins.

Upon the approach of the Americans, Browne, who knew the consequences of leaving ground for the savages to think themselves deceived relative to the point of security, and the traders who dreaded the loss of their merchandize, adopted various means to apprize them of their danger, or rescue them from it. The principal expedient was, to dispatch boats to the mouth of the Altamaha, and transport them by the inland passage to Savannah. But, before these boats could arrive, or intelligence be conveyed to them generally, (for they did not all pursue the same route) some of them had advanced so far, that they fell into the hands of Wayne's parties. Many of them were conveyed by water, in safety, into the town, and armed and paraded for service. To involve the whole of them in the necessity of being thus employed, was, no doubt, among the motives for convening them at Savannah. Had the delivery of the presents been the object, the goods which compose them, could have been conveyed either to the Altamaha, Sunbury, or the St. Mary's, for that purpose. We shall have occasion to exhibit some of the horrors which result from the employment of this description of troops. They exhibit a dreadful picture of the state of society at this unhappy period.

Had Wayne been seconded by the men under his command, the Indians who were captured, would have been kindly treated, and returned in safety to their friends. The first party made prisoners consisted of twenty-four, but it appearing, from every circumstance, that they were a peace party, and knowing the straggling, irregular manner in which such parties travel, when unapprehensive of danger, Wayne was desirous of halting and collecting the whole, before they were dismissed, and turned back from their journey. For this purpose he detached Major Habersham, with a command of mounted militia, under Captain Carr, and another of the South Carolina cavalry. The major's

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report of the occurrences on this expedition, furnishes a detail of events, curious, and not uninteresting. He had not proceeded far when he began to fall in with small parties of the Indians, and personating the Colonel Browne, with whose name they were so well acquainted, the Indians made no difficulty about falling into his line of march, and submitting to his orders. But such was the rage for vengeance, at that time, existing between the Indians and the whites, that all his vigilance could not protect these unhappy people from the brutality of some of his command. Feigning that the bad roads would injure their horses, but really in order to extricate themselves from military restraint, his mounted militia, headed by a lieutenant, abandoned their commander, and after indulging their thirst for Indian blood, in more than one instance, broke into the Scots settlement, in the neighbourhood of Sunbury, called St. Andrews, plundered it, and massacred eleven persons, reputed loyalists.

The Indians, coming to a knowledge that several of their friends, and even some of their own party, when out of view, had been thus treated, stole away in the night, and made their escape. And the time of service of the South Carolina cavalry being expired, notwithstanding all the intreaties of Major Moore, their commander, they insisted on returning. Habersham was compelled to submit, and returned to camp with six officers and two men, unjustly charged with the enormities perpetrated by his mutinous troops.

Thus were all Wayne's good intentions baffled, both as to reclaiming the Indians and the loyalists; nor was either the civil or the military arm strong enough, at the time, to reach the offenders.

Let us now view the counterpart of this disgusting picture. We will extract it from a letter of General Wayne's, in his own language. "Inclosed are copies of some intercepted letters, which, together with the accounts given by the person upon whom they were found, amounts to a certainty, that every means is attempted to draw down the Creeks, and other Indians. The Choc-taws, have already commenced hostilities.* One of our dragoons was killed and scalped by them three days since, under the eye and countenance of the British officers and troops, who were out in force, but retreated with precipitation. We have since taken a Chickasaw chief, and expect that the party he commanded are by this time killed or prisoners. However, we shall hold him, who, with the first British officer that falls into our hands, will eventually be sacrificed to the manes of that brave, unfortunate dragoon.

* March 25th, 1761.

“Would you believe it possible, that a British governor, attended by British officers, would be so lost to every feeling of humanity, as to parade the streets of Savannah with the scalp, giving out to the citizens, that it was taken from the head of Major Habersham, and then entertained the savages with a ball, &c. on the occasion. Nor did their barbarity rest here;—the body was ordered to remain unburied, mangled and disfigured in so horrid a manner, as to beggar all description. The Ethiopians, more humanized, deposited it in the ground; for which crime a reward of five guineas is offered for the discovery of the person or persons concerned in the violation of the savage mandate.

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“I shall not remonstrate—that must be made the act of the enemy; and when I find them disposed to make war upon generous principles, I will meet them on that ground.”

It is impossible to doubt the facts asserted in this letter, when accompanied by the terrible resolution formed upon those facts; a resolution from which, however, it is known that Wayne relented. But his men never did.

Such are the results of associating with a people, whose natural manners and habits of warfare must be thus flattered to retain their friendship. The tale would be suspected of being mingled up with circumstances too horrible for credulity; but it is too true, that the same scenes had been before acted over at Augusta, under the eye of the same Colonel Browne; to which may be added, that General Wright, whose presence is said to have graced this exhibition, has always had the reputation of having been the prime instigator of the war of the savages; and is known, from his long agency in their affairs, to have been familiarly acquainted with the means of fixing their wavering fidelity. In this instance, some extraordinary sacrifice was necessary to still the disgust produced by the opinion, that they had been imposed upon, by the assurances made to them, that this country was still in the hands of the king's subjects.

Notwithstanding the reduced state in which he was left by the desertion of his militia and the retirement of the South Carolina ten months men, Wayne never remained, for a moment, inactive. Indeed, his safety depended on keeping his little force continually in motion. The superiority of his adversary was lost in the futility of aiming a blow at any particular spot, as he never rested long enough in one place for the blow to descend upon him. In all his movements he was ably seconded by Colonel Jackson, Major Moore, and several other officers, whose enthusiasm equalled his own, and whose desire for glory suffered no opportunity to escape them.

The enemy had now given up the field, and retired within the trenches of Savannah. Having opened a correspondence with General Barnwell, it was

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resolved to make simultaneous attempts to burn the forage and grain collected at Wright's, and on Hutchinson's Island. The time appointed was between twelve and two in the night of the 24th of February; and it was arranged, that the party under Wayne should advance and occupy the attention of the enemy, whilst General Barnwell, crossing from the north side of the river in canoes, should perform his part of the undertaking. By some misfortune General Barnwell was betrayed, or discovered; and being fired upon, as he advanced, retreated without effecting his part of the enterprise. Wayne, upon hearing the firing, advanced, in order to draw off the attention of the enemy to himself, and completely succeeded in effecting his part of the undertaking. Colonel White, who commanded the regular cavalry in person, covered the advance of Major Moore, with the few militia and infantry belonging to the detachment, and drew the attention of the enemy to the north side of the town, whilst Colonel Jackson, moving up to the magazines at Wright's, which lay within half a mile of the enemy's redoubts, and directly under their guns, succeeded in consuming both grain and forage.

The good effects of this enterprise were soon experienced in the reduced state of the enemy's cavalry, and the preparations which, not long after, commenced for an evacuation. Had General Barnwell succeeded in his part of the undertaking, the effects would have been witnessed at an earlier day, and have been very decisive.

Hitherto it had been among Wayne's most serious embarrassments, that the promised aid from General Barnwell's brigade, had not afforded him any relief; "not even," as he observes, "a sergeant's guard, to keep a look out at Puryburgh," (a place above him on the river.) It was at this time that the opposition to General Barnwell's command, and discontent at his appointment, ran highest,—at his promotion, to the prejudice of the superior rank, and, as it was thought, superior claims of Colonel Harden. Very soon after this, it was, that General Barnwell resigned his commission; and before his successor could bring the brigade into order, the enemy had evacuated Savannah.

Thus was Wayne, with a very superior force before him, and a gathering cloud of savages behind him, left without any support but Colonel White's horse, Colonel Jackson's corps, and a few thin and fluctuating commands of militia; together with his corps of reclaimed citizens, most of whom adhered firmly to their new engagements, to serve to the termination of the war. In fact, the camp was now their only place of security.

But vigilance, activity, and bravery, supplied the place of numbers; and the enemy could neither venture with safety from his strong hold, nor the savages approach by any avenue, and find it unguarded. At length to use their own

figure, "finding every path shut and bloody," they began to steal away to their nation, by obscure routes; or trusted to their sagacity in traversing trackless deserts. But the persevering approach of some strong war parties of the Creeks, still gave just cause of apprehension to the commander, and obliged him to watch their movements with attention, whilst he urged Greene to support him by a detachment of two hundred regular infantry.

In the necessity which his situation forced upon him, often to detach parties in pursuit of the Indians and Tories, in order to strike them without permitting them to concentrate their forces, he was, unavoidably, exposed to some loss; and in one instance, in which a party commanded by Major Moore had passed the Altamaha, in the ardour of pursuit, that gallant soldier fell in an attack on a superior party, leaving behind him the reputation of "a brave, judicious, and worthy officer."

General Greene felt the justice of the demand of Wayne for a detachment of infantry; but, to grant it, was utterly out of his power, until the arrival of Captain Posey with a Virginia detachment of about one hundred and fifty men. On the 1st of April, this officer formed a junction with Wayne, bringing up with him the piece of artillery hitherto remaining beyond the river. Thus re-enforced, he no longer feared the approach of the enemy, and closely watched his movements for an opportunity to attack. Yet, his force, even after this occasion, was far from being formidable for numbers. The small-pox and a long march, had reduced Posey's command considerably below two hundred; but, they were all old soldiers, who had passed through successive enlistments from the commencement of the war, and through the ordeal of the Charleston prison-ships.

It was not long, before an opportunity presented itself, of testing the valour of his troops, by a very trying adventure.

A strong party of Creeks and Choctaws, had met beyond the Altamaha, and an arrangement had been made for their reaching the Ogeechee, at Harris' Bridge, seven miles from Savannah, by a specified day. Wayne lay, then, at Ebenezer; and Browne, at the head of a strong detachment, moved on to Ogeechee, to convoy these Indians into Savannah. It happened, from a cause characteristic of national manners, that the Indians did not arrive. The two nations had quarrelled in a great ball-play, and had parted to return home, with threats that portended war.

Colonel Jackson was reconnoitering towards Ogeechee, on the 21st of May, and communicated to General Greene the intelligence, that Browne had advanced to the Ogeechee, at the head of about fifteen hundred men, including the whole of the British cavalry. Wayne's army was immediately put in

motion, and moved down to within six miles of Savannah, on the road leading north westward from that place, when intelligence was received from Jackson, that Colonel Browne was on the return by the Ogeechee road, and intended that night to reach Savannah.

There was now but one alternative, either to relinquish the enterprise, or cross the angle formed by the two roads, and throw himself into the face of the enemy. Notwithstanding the country was covered with woods and swamps scarcely passable, such was the ardor expressed by his troops, that he resolved on the daring enterprise of throwing himself between the whole enemy's force, that in Savannah, and that under Browne, at the distance of only four miles from the former. The enterprise was so bold, that the hazard of it must have rendered it improbable in the eyes of General Clarke; or by taking the one leg of the angle, while his enemy passed on an hypotenuse, embarrassed by thick woods and swamps, he must have succeeded in placing him in a situation, in which Wayne's infantry must have been sacrificed. His artillery had necessarily been left behind.

But fortune signally favoured the American commander. His advance, consisting of a troop of horse, under Captain Hughes and Lieutenant Boyer, and the light company of the Virginia infantry, under Captain Parker, not one third of his force, reached the road about twelve o'clock at night, just as the front of Browne's column, moving in close order, came in view. The order to charge was immediately given, and such was the panic with which the British army was affected, that the whole broke before one fifth of their number, and fled with such precipitation, that Wayne's main body could not get up in time to take any part in the action.

The enemy dispersed in the thickets, and the darkness of the night saved them or Wayne, from utter destruction. Colonel Douglas, and about forty men, were killed, wounded or made prisoners; and a valuable accession of dragoon horses and fire arms, fell into the American hands, with the loss of five men killed and two wounded.

The American army refreshed themselves, and marched in view of the British lines early the ensuing morning; but, the enemy not accepting the challenge, it resumed its station at Ebenezer.

It is not easy to conjecture, from what source Colonel Lee has drawn his narrative of this affair, but, it is obviously related without reference to the official account. He represents it as having occurred in the day, and Wayne, as having been in the rear, with the main body, too far to have partaken of the honours of the decisive charge. Such an attempt by day, so near to Savannah, it is obvious, would have been nothing short of madness; and the error

deprives Wayne of his only vindication, (independent of success; which cannot be better expressed than in his own language—"I was properly impressed with the difficulty attending a night march over such ground, as well as the delicacy of a manœuvre which placed me between the whole of the enemy's force in Georgia; but, when I came to reflect upon the experience and gallantry of the officers, and the steady bravery of the troops, they were directed to advance from a conviction that the success of a nocturnal attack depended more upon prowess than numbers. *At twelve o'clock at night*, our van arrived at the Ogeechee road, four miles south-west of Savannah, when the enemy also appeared advancing in close and good order. Notwithstanding this circumstance, and the great disparity of numbers, (our rear being yet at a considerable distance) as success depended on the moment, I ordered the vanguard to charge, which was obeyed with such vivacity, as to immediately terminate in the total defeat and dispersion of all the British cavalry, a large body of infantry picked from the 7th regiment," &c. &c.

From the same source, it appears also, that Colonel White was, at the time, in person with the vanguard, and actually led the charge.

Not long after this brilliant little affair, the Georgia legislature moved down to Ebenezer. This measure had been suggested by a recent occurrence, which strongly proved the prudence of General Greene, in pressing the meeting of the South Carolina legislature, under the immediate protection of his army. The deranged state of the militia, on the South Carolina side of the Savannah, left but few obstacles to a free communication with Augusta by that route. The eclat acquired by McNeil and Fanning, in capturing the governor of North Carolina, suggested the practicability of the same attempt upon the Georgia legislature. Fanning was then present in Savannah, and the attempt was actually made. By some fortunate accident, the attempt failed of success; but, the actual capture of some prisoners of distinction, proves how near it was to have terminated otherwise.

Soon after, the legislature extended its liberality to Wayne, as well as Greene; and pursuing the idea of attaching them to the soil, ordered the Mulberry Grove, and the adjoining place, as has been before suggested, to be purchased and conveyed to them.

A law also was passed, offering two hundred acres of land to every British deserter; and the Governor's proclamation having been industriously circulated in the town, produced such a spirit of disaffection in the soldiers, and such a distrust of them in the officers, that they no more ventured to take the field.

Another event furnished just ground, or a plausible pretext for this state of inactivity.

The people of England had become heartily tired of the war. The brilliant events of the campaign of 1781, had opened their eyes to a just sense of the progress of their armies towards conquest; and policy suggested, that the best use they could make of their late splendid naval victories, would be, to negotiate a peace.

An attempt had been made, to detach the United States from the alliance, through the agency of Sir Guy Carleton; but, the unanimous vote of congress, on that occasion, put down every hope of involving the states in dishonour, and thus placing them at the mercy of their enemies, by depriving them, for ever, of foreign support. And nothing remained, but to petition the king to put an end to the war.

On the 27th of February, 1782, a resolve, to that effect, was adopted by the British parliament, and forthwith transmitted to the British commanders in America. Propositions, for a cessation of hostilities were, thereupon, about the same time, tendered to Washington, Greene, and Wayne, and by the latter, of course, transmitted to his commanding officer; but, not without a characteristic wish, that instead of it, a force could be furnished him, to take possession of Savannah, "*vi et armis*."

The propositions for a cessation of hostilities were, of course, referred to congress. Whether they were made in good faith, or only to lull Wayne into security during the negotiation, cannot now be determined upon. That a deadly attack upon him, by a large party of Indians, was then in forwardness, is clearly ascertained.

Rumours still prevailed, of the approach of a strong war-party of the Creeks, headed by their celebrated chief Emistasego. The Indians, who had been made prisoners with the interpreter Cornel, had been dismissed with a friendly talk; and something in nature of a reward, for future services, held out to Cornel. The hope was entertained, that this act would be productive of a general pacific temper; and the long delay of the approach of Emistasego, was well calculated to put Wayne off his guard.

The precautions against a civilized enemy, are known to be wholly inadequate to security in savage warfare. And the experience, sagacity, and daring character of the Indian chief, was probably directed, at this time, by the skill and prudence of Colonel Browne. Between them, it is certain, that they succeeded, in the month of June, in stealing upon Wayne's mid-night repose. He was encamped at Gibbon's, on the Ogeechee road, on the night of the 24th, and every avenue by which it was probable that the human foot

could approach, was duly guarded. But, the near approach of a savage enemy, was wholly unsuspected. The wily Indian had stolen past the American Colonel Clarke, who was on the look out for him to the west, and by every spy and patrol who watched his approach in other quarters. Yet the position which Wayne occupied was expressly taken to intercept this enemy.

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Those who are unacquainted with Indian habits, can form no idea of the persevering patience with which they steal on the security of an enemy. Their attack is always by surprise, under cover of ambush, or the night; and by crouching and creeping where there is the least danger of discovery, they often succeed in enterprises which the whites would not attempt.

By practising all their arts,—avoiding every road and frequented place,—moving only by night,—making no fires, but subsisting altogether on their parched meal, they had succeeded in gaining the rear of Wayne's encampment. Without the least noise the sentinel was dispatched with the tom-hog; and that yell which, when first heard, often strikes terror into the bravest, was the first notice given of their approach. A close fire succeeded it; and the rear-guard awaking, finding the enemy close upon them, retreated, and formed under cover of the houses. This left the artillery in the power of the enemy; and their exultation at possessing themselves of this, the great object of an Indian's fears, probably saved Wayne the loss of many a brave soldier. Had they pressed on, and prevented the infantry from rallying, they must have been in the midst of the main body before it could form; as its distance was but a few hundred yards from the point of attack. But, whilst engaged in an awkward effort to turn this weapon upon their enemies, Wayne was on horse-back, his infantry formed, and the irresistible bayonet was among them.

They soon fled in confusion, leaving their chief, his white guides, and seventeen of his warriors dead on the spot. As an Indian will halt in the midst of a flight of bullets, unmindful of the greatest dangers, to take a scalp, those of Wayne's men, who had fallen in the onset, had been subjected to this barbarous usage. The consequence was, that no prisoners were taken; all whom the broad-sword or bayonet could reach in the pursuit, were indiscriminately sacrificed to the indignation of the soldiers.

Wayne had twelve men killed and wounded, and his own horse was shot under him. The number of the enemy ascertained to have fallen, was about thirty. But the number of dead found on such occasions is far from determining the number of their slain. As it was among some ancient nations, every Indian warrior has his friend, and infamy follows him who will not risk his life to bear off the body of a fallen friend. To have been scalped in this world they deem disgraceful in the next: it is the mark which the victor puts

on the vanquished. The savages who sacked Troy, triumphed also over the bodies of their enemies; they wounded the hearts of the living, by indignities shown to the dead.

The surprise of Wayne rather increased than diminished his military reputation. It was the reply of General Greene, in answer to his communication respecting it, that "nothing requires greater fortitude, or more discipline, than to stand firm in a night attack." Those who knew the difficulty of guarding against such an event, from such an enemy, were ready to excuse it; and the firmness of his troops; their discipline and valour; and his own promptness and coolness in recovering them from their surprise, commanded the admiration of all.

This was the last military occurrence of the revolutionary war in Georgia. In July the enemy evacuated Savannah, and it became, once more, the seat of government.

The British garrison was transferred to Charleston; and the accession of strength which it was likely to carry with it, produced a pressing order, from General Greene, for Wayne's troops to march to the support of the main army. Colonel Browne, with his loyalists, and much of their plunder, moved along the islands into Florida, and the state was once more suffered to breathe from its sufferings, after being four years ravaged by an unrelenting enemy. Its sufferings were, comparatively, greater than those of any state in the union; for, the animosity between the whig and tory bore an unrelenting, unsparing character, that greatly aggravated the sufferings inflicted by its inhabitants upon each other.

Wayne acquired a very brilliant reputation from the boldness and activity of his measures in Georgia; and among those who were acquainted with the difficulties he had to encounter, his reputation stood still higher. He never had above four hundred men, at one time, in the field, and often not half that number. These he had to subsist at the point of the sword. Pay they had none, not even their bounty; and so miserably were they clothed and provided, as to be always murmuring, sometimes mutinous. His spirits appear never to have flagged for a moment; and even his distresses are always dwelt upon with the *degege* air of one perfectly at his ease. Yet we read accounts of the nakedness of his men, offensive even to decency, and only wonder how men so destitute could be kept in spirits for action. The constant state of activity in which they were kept, was probably among the chief causes of their patient submission. They had not time to brood over their sufferings, or form combinations.

The successes of General Greene's detachments, operating on his left, were by no means as brilliant, or as uniform, as those of that which had so much distinguished itself on his right. A variety of unfortunate incidents, which may all be traced to positive want of strength, combined to subject Marion's command to some vexatious reverses, and to expose the country, from the Edisto to the Santee, to frequent ravages and alarms.

It will be recollected, that when General Sumpter moved down to Orangeburgh, in November, 1781, his advanced parties fell in with a body of loyalists, commanded by General Cunningham, from which they sustained a repulse, and some loss. It appears, that General Cunningham was then engaged in organizing an expedition against the interior settlements of the state, and had only halted in the neighbourhood of Orangeburgh, to increase his force from the numerous loyalists in that vicinity.

Being joined by Hezekiah Williams and one Lawrence, both enterprizing leaders, General Cunningham detached a party of about three hundred men, well mounted, to ascend the Saluda, under the command of William Cunningham, familiarly known by the epithet of murdering Bill Cunningham. This movement, it appeared afterwards, was made in concert with the Cherokee Indians, who were once more sacrificed, without remorse, to the enemy's views; and was connected in the general movement which gave Wayne so much occupation, soon after, in Georgia.

The movements of this party were rapid, and lasted but a few weeks; but, their bloody tracks could, long after, be traced. They literally left the country, through which they passed, in tears. The barbarities practised upon the parties of Turner and Hazle, have often been related. We shall content ourselves with observing, that the narrative is supported by the authority of Colonel Le Roy Hammond,* and is stripped of some of its most atrocious circumstances. There is, however, one part of their exploits which never has been related, and which rests upon the credibility of General Pickens. In their passage up, they intercepted a convoy of wagons dispatched by Pickens to the army; the whole guard was captured without opposition, and both the guard and the wagoners felicitated themselves on being made prisoners, for they looked for a different fate from such hands. The total want of ammunition in the country, put it out of the power of the whigs, to present any opposition to Williams and Cunningham's ravages, until a supply of about ten pounds of powder, from the governor of Georgia, enabled Colonel

* December 2, 1782.

Hammond and Purvis to take the field against them. Pickens was then absent having been called away to the frontiers, to watch the movements of the Indians.

Upon being pursued by the whigs, the loyalists separated into several parties, and two of them, under Cunningham and Williams, made good their way through the woods, passing between the posts of Orangeburgh and Round-O, in safety to Charleston. A third party, that which had charge of the prisoners, being far advanced towards the mountains, and apprehensive of being cut off if attempting to retreat, pushed on and joined the Indians.

Two of the unfortunate prisoners, youths of about sixteen, who were adopted into Indian families, and who, having accompanied them to Savannah, enlisted with Colonel Browne, to escape the Indians, lived to rejoin their families, and to relate the fate of their less fortunate companions. They were, in the language of General Pickens, "delivered up to the Indians, to be tortured."^{*}

The mothers of these unfortunate young men, (for their fathers are supposed to have been among the victims) threw themselves at the feet of General Leslie, in Charleston, to obtain their discharge. Their names were M'Murty and Smith.

These occurrences took place at a time, when all the American commanders were making the most signal efforts to reclaim and protect the loyalists; and these, more than any other causes, produced that individual persecution of the loyalists, which agitated the country long after the peace.

No other military occurrence, of any importance, happened with relation to General Sumpter's command during the war. He continued to receive the submission of the loyalists, and to incorporate with his command, such as he could arm; and to watch and repress their movements, wherever a hostile spirit prevailed. His brigade was soon after reduced to two regiments, one of cavalry, under Colonel Wade Hampton, the other of infantry, under Colonel Middleton.

In this measure, and in some others relative to his brigade, which was originally all enlisted as cavalry, the general conceived himself injured by Governor Rutledge; under whose instructions it was done, although by orders immediately emanating from General Greene. How far the latter shared in the indignant feelings of General Sumpter, we are not aware; but, the follow-

^{*} Letter 7th September, 1782. A brother of General Pickens' was among these martyrs.

ing passage in a letter of the 4th of January, 1782, was the prelude to General Sumpter's retiring finally from service.

"In my last, I took the liberty to request permission to withdraw from this place upon private business, or rather, to prepare to attend the assembly. I hope to be indulged, and beg not to be honoured again with any of your commands, until a proper inquiry can be made, whether I am worthy of them." From the answer to this letter, we infer, that Greene was wholly unaware of having given umbrage to General Sumpter, and that his allusion is altogether to matters of a civil nature. The persecution which it is known, General Sumpter rose triumphant over, at a subsequent day, with relation to the pay promised to his troops, had probably had its inception at this time.

Soon after the Jacksonborough assembly met, General Sumpter resigned, and General Henderson was appointed to succeed him.

Very soon after General Greene had taken post at Round-O, and extended his parties to the southward and eastward, General Leslie began to feel the effects of being straitened in the extent of his foraging ground. One consequence of drawing in his detachments, and collecting the refugees, was a very great accumulation of horses within his lines; and one of the first disagreeable effects of the present change of circumstances was, subjecting him to the necessity of putting two hundred of these useful animals to death. Strong parties were always kept on the alert by the enemy, to seize opportunities for collecting provision from the surrounding country; and posts were established at Haddrell's and Hobcaw to facilitate the movements of these parties. The situation of these posts, on the extreme end of tongues of land, from which retreat was difficult to an attacking enemy, and to which re-enforcements could easily be conveyed by water, secured them from attack. While galleys, anchored in the rivers at convenient distances, covered and commanded the access by water.

When the alarm was excited in the American camp, on the rumoured approach of strong re-enforcements, Marion was ordered to repair to head-quarters, with all the force he could draw after him. The command was promptly obeyed; but a detachment of mounted infantry was left to watch the motions of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Monk's Corner.

For the purpose of destroying this party, and taking advantage of the absence of Marion, a detachment of about three hundred and fifty men, cavalry and infantry, were transported from Charleston, by water, to the north bank of the Wando River. But the sudden return of Marion, upon the passing over of the storm that had seemed to threaten the American army, in a great measure, disappointed the success of the enemy's enterprise.

Marion's force scarcely equalled that of the enemy, but he resolved to advance for the purpose of attacking them. In order, therefore, to detain them, while he advanced with his main body, he dispatched Colonel Richardson and Scriven, and a part of Mayhem's horse, with orders to throw themselves in front of the enemy, and engage them until he could come up.

The order was gallantly executed; and upon the appearance of the enemy's advance, near St. Thomas' Muster-house, they were charged by Captain Smith, of Mayhem's cavalry, and their leader, Captain Campbell, and several others, killed in the pursuit. But the pursuit was urged too far, and the pursuers charged and dispersed by Captain Coffin, at the head of his cavalry. This event left Marion too weak to hazard an attack, and the enemy were content to pursue their march, without attempting to force him to it. He retired to Wambaw, and they marched up to Quinby Bridge, and having gathered some stock, retired across Wappataw to Haddrell's Point.

It is certain, that in all the movements of the enemy, much importance was attached to the presence of Marion. This was not only a tribute of respect to his vigilance and courage, but because that his presence only, could, at this time, keep in harmony the discordant materials which constituted his force. An irreconcilable dispute existed between Horry and Mayhem, on the subject of rank. Horry had been much longer in service, and held a much higher grade prior to their being appointed by Greene to raise their present corps. Horry contended, that his prior rank gave him precedence, and Mayhem that his command was an independent command, in which he was subject to no one but the general. Fruitless attempts had been made, both by Greene and Marion, to reconcile them; and to exercise absolute authority over them was dangerous to the service, as personal influence had very much to do in organizing and keeping their corps together.

It was not long before their dissension exposed the whole brigade to ruin, and laid open the country to the enemy's ravages. In this affair Colonel Mayhem was, unquestionably, in fault.

General Marion, Colonel Mayhem, and several of their officers, had been elected members to the Jacksonborough assembly. The importance attached to the meeting of that body, and the delicacy of depriving it of its members by military authority, rendered it impossible for General Greene to withhold his permission to them to be absent from their commands, for the purpose of taking their seats as representatives. The detachment then lay at Strawberry; but Marion, fearing the consequences of his absence, made arrangements for falling back near the banks of the Santee, that his command might be somewhat aloof from the sudden movements of the enemy.

Colonel Horry, who as senior officer, was left in command when Marion went to Jacksonborough, accordingly retired to Wambaw; but Mayhem separated his corps from the brigade, and posting them higher up the river, attended also at the meeting of the legislature, positively refusing to be commanded by Colonel Horry.

This act of Colonel Mayhem's was duly reported to Greene and Marion, and the most earnest discussion ensued, in which Mayhem insisted on his rights as a legionary corps; and Marion requested, if such were Mayhem's right, that the latter should be withdrawn from his brigade, as he wished to have no one under him who would dispute his commands. On Mayhem's part the discussion was conducted with perfect respect, but in a manner which manifested that, pressing on him the superior command of Horry, would terminate in his resignation, and the probable dispersion of his corps. His value, as a cavalry officer, was too well established not to excite regret at the probable loss of his services; and Greene, who had established those two corps to create, as he expresses it, "a head to the militia of the brigade," saw, with extreme anxiety, the augury of present and future ills in a dispute maintained with such vivacity.

The subject had, some months before, been brought to his notice by Colonel Horry; and he had then, unequivocally, declared in favour of his pretensions. Before leaving camp, the letter from Horry had been submitted to Mayhem by Marion; and the latter had acted upon it in giving the command to Horry. But Mayhem requested and obtained a hearing from General Greene, and refused to submit until he had himself received a personal answer upon the subject.

The answer was, "you express a wish to have your corps on an independent footing, similar to that of Lee's legion. I have always considered it exactly on that footing. Lee acts independent of any one's command, except the commander in chief, in the first instance, but always subject to the order of the officer he may be placed under. There can be no other independency but this, and never was, in any service. I would wish to grant you all the indulgence in my power, consistent with the public safety. But our measures must be so conducted as to be able to combine our forces; without which we may be ruined in detachments. Where liberties are granted independent of these principles, some officers and some corps may get reputation, but it will be at the expense of the public welfare. It would be a poor consolation to an officer, to have acquired a little extraordinary military fame, and laid the foundation of his country's ruin by it. You have exerted yourself with a noble enthusiasm in raising your corps; and I have only to recommend that you let the public good, and your private wishes walk hand in hand, and then I am persuaded

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you will not wish a single indulgence incompatible with the principles I have laid down."

As Mayhem had also complained of the hard services to which his corps had been subjected, General Greene further observes:—"With regard to General Marion's having made too free use of your cavalry, you are to consider how extensive the country is he has to guard, and how much he depends upon your corps. This will account for the hard service you have been put to. The general is a good man, and when you consider his difficulties, and make just allowances, perhaps you will have little to complain of, but the hard necessity of the service. Our force is small, and our duty extensive. Let me intreat you to think properly on these matters, and to endeavour to accommodate yourself to the circumstances of our affairs; and I will again endeavour to impress the general with the necessity of giving you as much repose as possible.

"General Marion has been very useful, and is very necessary; and your corps can no where be as usefully employed as where you are."

It does not appear, that this earnest appeal was productive of the desired effect; for, in a subsequent letter, addressed to General Marion, General Greene observes—"I will also write to Lieutenant Colonel Mayhem, decidedly, upon the dispute respecting his rank. I am sorry the colonel carries that matter to so disagreeable a length. Rank is not what constitutes the good officer, but good conduct. Substantial services give reputation, not captious disputes. A captain may be more respectable than a general. Rank is nothing, unless accompanied with worthy actions."

Pending these discussions, the most serious alarm was produced by intelligence from Charleston. A detachment of two hundred horse, five hundred infantry, and two pieces of artillery, under the celebrated Count Rumford, then Colonel Thomson, had moved up the Cooper River, obviously, with designs upon Horry. The earliest information had been communicated by the numerous and vigilant confidants in Charleston; and Greene had repeatedly hinted to Marion, the necessity of his return to his command. The latter was equally desirous to place himself at the head of his brigade, but urges, in his answers, the pressing necessity of his remaining, lest the assembly should be broken; and promises to move off the moment the most pressing business is disposed of.

When the British detachment was actually in motion, Marion's departure could no longer be delayed; and, accompanied by Colonel Mayhem, by a circuitous route, and a very rapid ride on the 24th February, he reached the ground on which Mayhem's regiment was encamped. Here they were informed, that the enemy was retiring; and while Mayhem paid a visit to his

own plantation, Marion remained to rest and refresh himself, before they resumed their journey for the encampment of the brigade. In five hours after Mayhem's departure, an express arrived with the alarming intelligence, that the brigade had been surprised and dispersed; and Marion, placing himself at the head of Mayhem's regiment, hurried on towards Wambaw, the scene of the surprise, to collect the fugitives, and check their pursuers. Arrived within five miles of the enemy, he halted at the house of Mrs. Tydiman, to refresh his men and horses; and the latter were unbitted and feeding, when the whole of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance.

It would seem, from the indecisive conduct of the British commander, that he was no less surprised at falling in with his enemy, than was Marion at his sudden appearance. Had the charge been ordered immediately on coming in view, it was Colonel Mayhem's opinion, that the whole regiment must have been lost, as they had no retreat, but by the river and the lane by which they had entered the plantation, and which the enemy had now the means of obtaining the full command of. But, the latter not only halted, but exhibited appearances of alarm; and Marion, though not counting half their numbers, resolved to issue by the lane and attack them. The indecision of the enemy had furnished sufficient time for the Americans to bit and mount their horses; and they moved to the extremity of the lane with a firm and promising countenance. Though the enemy greatly out-numbered them, he was badly mounted; and the American cavalry, at that time, felt a confidence in themselves, which prepared them to encounter any practicable odds in battle.

But, the Americans were destined to lose, as General Marion observes in his dispatches—"a glorious opportunity of cutting up the British cavalry."—Fortune, as usual, asserted her dominion over the field of battle; and the swelling hopes of Marion were blighted by one of those occurrences, which so often in war, turn aside the point of the sword from the throat of the victim.

The front section was led by an officer of approved courage, who, in the very recent affair at St. Thomas' muster-house, had signally distinguished himself. Yet, the moment he reached the extremity of the lane, he dashed into the woods on the right, and drew after him the whole regiment in irretrievable confusion. Marion himself, who was near the head of the column, was borne away by the torrent, and narrowly escaped. Many of the men had to quit their horses, and disembarass themselves of swords and boots, to pass a deep creek which lay on their right. Fortunately, not many were killed or taken; for such was the state of alarm in the hostile ranks, that some

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time appears to have elapsed, before they could persuade themselves, that they had not only escaped destruction, but gained a bloodless victory.

It was too true, as had been reported, that the brigade had been wholly dispersed the day before. Horry, labouring under severe indisposition, had left the command to Colonel M'Donald, and retired across the Santee River. By some unaccountable neglect of the patrols, videttes, or pickets, Coffin, with the cavalry of the enemy's detachment, had stolen upon them unexpectedly, and the whole retreated precipitately. Many crossed the river by swimming, and some, among whom was Lieutenant Smyser, of Horry's cavalry, were drowned in the attempt. A considerable party, under command of Captain James, took down the river-road, and by lifting the Wambaw bridge, arrested the progress of the enemy, and rallied at a short distance from their late encampment. The enemy made no prisoners, for they gave no quarter; the number of the slain was, by no means, equal to what might have been anticipated, for the thickets saved the infantry, and the British cavalry had been too long pent up in Charleston, to be in the highest order. But, Major Benson and Mr. Broughton, both very much esteemed and lamented, were among the slain.

Thus was Marion's force, for the present, annihilated; and, although the loss of men was not great, yet the loss of horses and arms, and above all, of that confidence which he had so successfully cherished in his men, were not easily to be surmounted. But, no sooner was his actual presence known, than his men gathered round him. M'Donald collected about two hundred beyond the river; Mayhem, sadly vexed and mortified, and not a little offended with his commander for marching without him, also gathered up his dispersed corps; and the greatest efforts were made once more, to regain the tract of country now in the undivided possession of the enemy.

But, the enemy's triumph was of short duration; fearing for the result of the expedition against the brigade, General Greene, immediately on hearing of the actual movements of the enemy, ordered Colonel Laurens to march to its relief; and, on the approach of a detachment on his rear, Colonel Thomson, after gathering some stock and provisions, retired to Cainhoy, where he was securely posted, and could retreat, or be re-enforced, in perfect safety. Laurens then returned beyond the Ashley.

Some idea of the importance attached to the success of this enterprise, perhaps we may say, of the habits of vain-boasting of some military commanders, will be formed from the perusal of an extract from the gazettes of that day.

"Things bear a better prospect than they did. Colonel Thomson has defeated General Marion in South Carolina, killed one hundred men, and Marion was drowned attempting to escape."

Captain John Caraway Smith, who had led the front section of Mayhem's regiment on this occasion, and acted so unaccountably, thought proper to resign the next day; and popular opinion has attributed his conduct to one of those incomprehensible panics, which ancient poetry assigned to supernatural causes. But, Colonel Mayhem attributes his conduct to another cause. He says—"That Marion, (who was an infantry officer) gave the order to *file off from the house to the right*, instead of giving it, *to charge*, which induced his officers to believe, that they were to retreat, and not to fight; and the previous dissatisfaction which General Greene had, in a great measure, succeeded in allaying, was not a little irritated by this day's occurrences. It is but little satisfaction," says Colonel Mayhem, "to me, to keep up the regiment, when others can expend its strength, without giving me the satisfaction of being present."

An event soon after occurred, which put an end both to the altercation, and to Mayhem's military career.

After the late unfortunate occurrences, Marion found Horry's regiment so crippled and deranged, that they were ordered to fall back to the Pee Dee, to recruit, and recover their confidence. Only sixty of Mayhem's horse could be brought into the field; and as the time for another of Marion's military *avatares* had arrived, he could muster but forty militia-men—adherents, whom no toil, or danger, could sever from him. Thus reduced, he was compelled to retire beyond the Santee, until he could return, in force, to repossess the country from which he had been driven. The interval of his absence was too successfully improved by the enemy, in predatory incursions. The cattle had been previously driven across the Santee; but provisions and slaves, to a considerable amount, were carried off.

Nor was it in General Greene's power, at this time, to detach a force sufficient to cover that country. Recent occurrences had raised his anxiety for his own security; disputes about rank and privilege had convulsed his own army, and the machinations of the enemy, joined to the real distresses of his soldiers, threatened it with dissolution.

It is a very remarkable fact, that in three if not four of the most southern states, the first use of their restoration to the exercise of civil authority, was to pass laws which had nearly ruined the army that suffered so much in delivering them from the enemy. To charge these states with having legislated with that design, would be the height of folly and injustice; but we relate facts, and

CHAP. XVII. while we admit the best of motives, venture to maintain that such was the direct tendency of the measures we allude to; and their effects were severely felt.

In these measures Virginia* took the lead, by passing laws to suspend her specific contributions to the war, and subjecting any one to imprisonment, who should exercise the right of impressment under any other authority than an act of the *state legislature*; at the same time a stop was put to the circulation of paper-money, and the heads of departments were left without power to take, or money to purchase, the supplies requisite for the southern army.

The causes of these measures are to be found in a variety of recent occurrences, in the progress of the war.

In the undefined state of the powers of the general and particular governments, the power of impressment had been asserted and practised by congress to save the army from dissolution, when lying at the Valley Forge. In various instances it had been practised by the commanders of the continental troops, when pressed by necessities which could not otherwise be relieved. Precedent seemed to have established the opinion, that the right to exercise it existed in the general government; and it had hitherto been submitted to without opposition from the state government.

But Virginia had recently felt, in a more than ordinary degree, the inconveniences which must always result from the exercise of this, in common with every other arbitrary power.

Her governor's had liberally sanctioned the exercise of the right of impressments, magnanimously casting themselves upon the patriotism of the state, and resting for their justification upon the purity of their motives, and the necessities of the service. Scarcely had the ferment excited by Mr. Jefferson's impressment of horses subsided, when the advance of Philips, Arnold and Cornwallis, drew into the state an army for its defence, for the subsistence of which no resources had been provided. Without money, without magazines, and with very limited means of transportation, such was the rapidity and uncertainty of La Fayette's movements, that to subsist his army without impressments was impossible. Governor Jefferson, and after him Governor Nelson, liberally supported him in the exercise of the powers necessary to the very existence of his army; and wherever the army moved, the country, in its immediate track, felt severely the sacrifices it was called upon to make to the general welfare. Afterwards, when an army of fifteen thousand men was

* Virginia war office, January 21, 1782.

assembled before York Town, the demands for contributions, of course, accumulated on the state, and Governor Nelson, duly estimating the importance of the crisis, resolved to risk life, fortune, reputation, every thing, rather than leave Virginia to be disgraced, and the army to suffer whilst prosecuting its present enterprise. The consequence was, that the state rung with the clamours against the arbitrary conduct of the governor; and although obliged, from ill health, to retire from service, he felt himself called upon to demand a public investigation of his conduct, as soon as the legislature met. That body did justice to his merits; but resolved to put to rest, for ever, all repetitions of the exercise of the power of impressment, either by its governors, or the United States, unless sanctioned by state laws.

There was another motive which operated, at this time, to induce the adoption of this course of measures. It had been foretold to the minister of finance, that difficulties would arise among the states relative to the impartial distribution of his solid favours. He began now to experience this inconvenience; perhaps he furnished cause for it.

The sums required of the states this year, for the support of the war, were made payable in specie; but the financier exercised the power, still to permit the specific contributions wherever he thought proper. To subsist the *northern* army, and the various naval and other establishments of the United States, contracts had been entered into, payable at the treasury of the United States, and a military chest furnished; whereas, the southern army, Mr. Morris proposed, to leave to be subsisted by the southern states. But General Greene was vested with very extensive powers to draw their quotas to his aid, in any way he could negotiate with them. Foreseeing that they could not afford him any present aid in money, Greene suggested the idea, that each state should become contractor with the army for such amounts as they had to contribute, and such articles as they could command. This arrangement had all the appearance of fairness and justice, and had been successfully resorted to in Pennsylvania; but it was thought, by Virginia, to operate injuriously on the southern states, inasmuch as they were supposed to be creditor states in the general account, and ought to share in the benefits of drawing money from Morris' supposed redundant treasury, and of that circulation which would take place in the purchase of provisions; and which, by reviving commerce, would enable those states, not only to raise their quotas by taxes, but supply many necessities, which the total want of a circulating medium then subjected them to. Some discussions took place between Virginia and the financier, which ended with a determination to discontinue her specific contributions, to maintain her own artificers and recruits by contract, and to do nothing more.

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The following letter from Governor Harrison, presents a striking view of the state of things in Virginia, for the year 1782 :

“ VIRGINIA—IN COUNCIL,—*January 21st, 1782.*

“ SIR,

“ Your favour of the 27th ultimo, by Captain Ragsdale, came to hand a few days ago ; the subject of it is so extremely interesting, that the executive thought it necessary to forward it to congress.

“ Your situation is so truly critical, that it behoves every man, who is either a friend to you, or to America, to exert himself to extricate you out of your difficulties. I find this disposition, from both those motives, most strongly in myself ; and am happy to inform you, that every member of my council, seems impressed with the same sentiments ; but, what will all that avail, where both power and ability are wanting ? *We are, at this time, the poorest, and most impotent executive, perhaps, in the world.* The credit of the state is lost, and we have not a shilling in the treasury. The powers formerly given, to embody and march the militia out of the state, are no longer continued to us ; nor can we impress what may be necessary for you, or even for ourselves ; and the late invasion has nearly drained us of our stock of provisions and refreshments, of all kinds necessary for the army. As this is not an exaggerated, but a true state of our situation, I leave you to judge, whether any great dependance can, for the present, be placed on this state. The little that is in my power, you may be assured of ; and I think of immediately calling the assembly, to lay before them your letters, and press for their exertions. These, I am sure, you may expect ; but, our situation is such, that their best endeavours will be but feeble efforts. It has long been matter of wonder and indignant surprise to me, that congress, and its ministers, have not taken the measures for supplying your army, that they have taken in every state to the northward of us ; that is, by contract. With us, they depend on this state for every thing, though they know it can only be obtained by force ; and when their wants are supplied, they even refuse to give us credit for what they have obtained ; but insist on our full quota of money being paid into their treasury. It is this kind of partial conduct that is the true cause of our distress, and that will, in the end, if not amended, be attended with ruin, both to you and us. Colonel Carrington, I make no doubt, will fully inform you of the situation of the continental quarter master and commissary departments. I shall, therefore, say nothing more on the subject, but only beg you to represent your situation fully to congress, and to insist, that the same mode be used for

supplying you, that they use for supplying other armies. Should you succeed, it will give new life to every individual in this state, and will, I trust, place you in a much more flourishing condition than you ever yet have been.

"We have determined to feed your officers, and what few troops we have, by contract; if we succeed, some cattle may be spared when they are fit to eat," &c.

To pass from one system of supply to another, was the work of time; and during its progress, the various military depots, and the army itself, were exposed to the most serious evils—evils which were alleviated by the excellent dispositions of Governor Harrison and Colonel Davies, and the personal influence and energy of Colonel Carrington, but which still fell very heavily upon the army. It left them often to suffer for the want of animal-food; for which, much depended on the supplies to be drawn from Virginia; while the revival of the dispute, whether she was to deliver her recruits naked or clothed, left them also to suffer for want of covering; and did the most serious injury to the recruiting service—against which, no cause was found to operate so strongly, as the rags, and bare, scorched shoulders of those who obtained their discharges from the army. A soldier will sooner submit to withholding his pay than his clothing. Nor does any cause operate more powerfully to destroy that tone of mind—that soldierly pride which must exist, to excite them to acts of fidelity, or valour. What has the mercenary to fight for? And what is to be expected of the officer, who is deprived of the indispensable means of giving animation to the mass which he has consolidated by discipline?

Nor is it only from conscious degradation and personal suffering, that the want of comfortable clothing, and other privations, do injury to military service; the mind of the soldier is wrought up to despair, by that against which "the worm will turn" a sense of injury, of injustice; against which his condition deprives him of all remedy, and for which, he has no hope for indemnity—a feeling that disposes him to acts of pilfering, or violence; and to seek safety, and a change of condition, in the ranks of the enemy. All this was sensibly experienced, about this time, in the southern army.

To North Carolina, General Greene next addressed himself; and the better to press his application to that state, sent on his commissary, Major Forsyth, with full powers to make arrangements with the proper authorities, for supplies to the amount of the quota of money required of that state. But, North Carolina, in common with Virginia, had fastened her eye upon Morris' hoarded treasures; and adopted the opinion, that in an arrangement altogether prospective, she ought to have credit for advances already made. She voted men.

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and continued her specific taxes to support them until in service ; but, no means were adopted to raise money for her quota ; the quarter master general had no means of transporting provision ; and excepting sending a few cattle, nothing more was done in that state for the support of the army.

Thus, was the subsistence of the southern army thrown altogether upon South Carolina, (for Georgia could do nothing towards it ;) and for the last eighteen months of the war, its subsistence was drawn altogether from the state of South Carolina. She did not adopt the proposal of doing this by contract ; but, took it upon herself to supply the army, without reference to the inquiry, whether it would amount to more or less than her quota.

At the close of the war, South Carolina was found to be the largest creditor state in the union ; and when it is considered, how many years she had been the seat of active war, (not locally as other states, but in every rood of her extent :) how long she had supported two armies, and suffered every interruption that agriculture could be subjected to, it will rather be matter of surprise, that it should have been done at all, than that it should not have been done in a better manner.

But, South Carolina also passed a law to prohibit impressments ; and in the midst of unparalleled sufferings, General Greene submitted, for a long time, to its consequences ; it will be found, he was compelled, at length, to assert the right which necessity, and the authority of the union gave him, and to resort to that mode of subsisting his army, in opposition to an authority which had been vainly exerted, (although in good faith) for that purpose.

When General Greene first entered South Carolina, he found it destitute of civil government, and uniformly exercised the right of impressment, for the subsistence of his army. In this, there was found no difficulty, for Mr. John Rutledge had joined him on the Pee Dee, and was ready to support the military authority by the dictatorial powers vested in him.

As far as General Greene was concerned, not a complaint was uttered against the latitude that had been assumed. The purity of the motives with which every act was performed, was unquestionable ; and while the legislature sanctioned all that had hitherto been done, it passed laws for confining to itself, exclusively, the exercise of this power for the future. For this purpose, the new governor, Mr. John Matthews, was instructed to "take order for subsisting the southern army ;" and a law was passed, requiring "that a sufficient number of fit and proper persons shall be, from time to time, appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the privy council, in different parts of the state, as agents or commissioners to procure those supplies." And enacting, "that no other persons

than those who shall be appointed by the governor, for that purpose, as aforesaid, shall be allowed, or permitted, to procure supplies for the army."

This law, it is obvious, was calculated to make the army altogether dependent upon state authority for subsistence. But, whilst executed in good faith, no injury could result from it; and it was time enough for the United States' authority to interfere, when the necessities of the army required it. The zeal and candour of the governor and council, as well as of the legislative body, were too conspicuous to admit a doubt of their intentions; and the greater the responsibility they voluntarily assumed, the greater were the hopes, that the army might reasonably rest upon their exertions. General Greene, therefore, made no complaint against these measures, as he was satisfied they were intended, as a candid effort to furnish supplies, without exposing the citizens to unnecessary vexations.

The quantity of provision, in bread and flesh, necessary for the daily allowance of the army, being communicated to the governor, he undertook, without hesitation, to furnish it; and, with the advice of his council, having nominated Mr. William Hort commissary and forage master general, in behalf of the state, the new system went into operation under the most favourable auspices.

Short, very short, was the time of its duration, before the distresses, disappointments, and wants of the army, plainly demonstrated that there was a defect some where. Murmurs soon began to run high, and General Greene was constrained to address himself to the governor, to solicit his attention to discovering and removing the cause. "I am much afraid," says he, in a letter of the 1st of April, "that Mr. Hort has not the activity or industry requisite for the duties of his appointment. We are from day to day kept uneasy for want of regular supplies of provision. One day we are without beef, the next without rice, and some days without either. Supplies coming to the army in this way, keep the men continually murmuring and complaining. Men will bear disappointments for two or three days at a time, but when the supplies are continually irregular, and frequently deficient, the soldiers will get impatient, and that will soon grow up into a disagreeable discontent. To produce these frequent disappointments, there must be a defect in the arrangements, or a want of industry in the execution. I am not acquainted with Mr. Hort, but I am afraid he has more method than dispatch. To fill the place he is in, activity is no less requisite than method and integrity. Your excellency knows of how much importance it is, to have the army constantly and well supplied; and, in our situation, how dangerous a failure. I beg you will, therefore, explain to Mr. Hort the necessity of being punctual. The service must suffer if the troops are without provisions; and God only knows what may be the consequences should the enemy avail himself of one of these unfortunate moments to attack

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us. We are very near the enemy, even within surprising distance. It is dangerous, therefore, hazarding the least discontent in a matter which never fails to produce ill humour in an army. Our troops were never without provisions so much during all last campaign, as they have been since Mr. Hort has undertaken the business, and the provisions not more than twenty or thirty miles off," &c.

Never did man make more earnest efforts than Governor Matthews did, to keep the troops supplied; but his confidence in Mr. Hort's industry and capacity were not to be shaken, and the army went on suffering and complaining, at intervals well fed, and at times almost in a state of mutiny, and kept to duty only by alternate soothing and severity.

Their discontents on account of subsistence were greatly aggravated by other privations, which they had at this time to submit to. Rum and tobacco, two articles of indispensable necessity to American soldiery, could seldom be commanded; and a very large proportion of the army were in a state of disgusting nakedness. A tattered remnant of some garment, clumsily stuck together with the thorns of the locust-tree, formed the sole covering of hundreds. The clothing that had been obtained with so much pains and difficulty, in the early part of the winter, had been impartially distributed throughout the camp; and a very large proportion of the soldiers who received it had, before this time, been discharged and gone home. Many of the sources of supply on which General Greene had counted with confidence, he had been disappointed in; the articles purchased in North Carolina were much less than he expected; those coming on from the north, could not get on from Virginia, because of the derangements in the quarter master's department; and the insatiable hope of peace, which had prevailed in the winter, had rendered the exertions of those at the head of departments, languid in their efforts to supply him.

The disgusting details of the wretched state of the army are in piles before us; we will select but one paragraph as a specimen of their contents.* "Your officers are in distress, having drained every private resource for support; your soldiers are complaining for want of pay and clothing; and though both have shown as much merit and virtue, as much patience and forbearance, as can be found in history, yet you cannot but be sensible that this is a dangerous foundation to build upon,—though it may last for a time, it will have an end. I shall use all the address and influence I am master of to gain time; but some fundamental alteration must take place, or opposition will fail; and wherever a

* To the President of Congress, March 9th, 1782.

general discontent begins to discover itself, a dissolution will follow—a temper I dread the approach of, and a consequence I fear much more than the force of the enemy. CHAP.
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“Great part of my troops are in a deplorable situation for want of clothing, and they would have been much worse, had it not been for some small supplies from the people at large, and from the merchants of Charleston, by the advice and approbation of the governor and council of this state, who have, upon every occasion, done every thing in their power for our relief and support.

“Not a rag of clothing has come from the northward, except a small quantity of linen for the officers. A considerable quantity has been in Virginia all winter, and a number of arms which we have been, and still are, in great want of. *We have three hundred men without arms, and more than a thousand men are so naked for want of clothing, that they can only be put on duty in cases of a desperate necessity.* Men in this situation, without pay or spirits, it is difficult to tell what charm keeps them together. I believe that nothing but the pride of the army, and the severity of discipline, support them under their sufferings.”

Besides a specific contribution, voluntarily collected among the inhabitants, all the relief that could be administered to the sufferings of the army, was drawn from a contraband trade with Charleston, carried on under the concurrence of the governor and council, either directly, with an agent near the army, or circuitously, through the port of Georgetown; or from the trade which a few adventurous merchants carried on between the latter port and the West-Indies.

Mercantile cupidity, which seldom wants a pretext, and is hawk-eyed in discovering the means of eluding restraint, very soon brought to the consideration of General Greene, certain offers of goods, in return for rice to be suffered to enter Charleston. They were readily embraced, and supplies for the more immediate and distressing wants of the army were received through that channel, under the eye of Colonels Lee and Laurens.

When the Jacksonborough assembly adjourned, the army moved from Colonel Skirven's, down to Bacon Bridge, at the head of Ashley River: and thus, a boat communication, direct with Charleston, was established, and this commerce much facilitated. Still, however, its produce was small and precarious.

Georgetown, and the ports of North Carolina, presented a more ample field for enterprise; and in Mr. John Waties, (the present Chancellor Waties of South Carolina,) General Greene found a young, but active, intelligent, and honourable agent for drawing supplies from those sources. Rum, blankets, hospital stores, and some clothing, were purchased at these places, by means of bills drawn on the financier; and particularly, the indispensable article of

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salt, was altogether obtained through this channel. This article, the best quality of which had occasionally been purchased for the army, at nine hard dollars the bushel, was absolutely indispensable to an army, which subsisted altogether on rice and fresh-beef; and the difficulty of obtaining it, was so embarrassing, that we find the general, at last, actually boiling it for himself on the sea-coast, through the agency of Mr. Waties.

It was in one of the excursions of this gentleman to North Carolina, that General Greene was led into negotiation with John Banks, with whom he afterwards formed those contracts, which so much embarrassed the latter years of his life, threw a cloud of calumny and suspicion over his reputation, (not yet totally dissipated) had nearly exhausted all the wealth which the gratitude of the southern states had heaped upon him, and left his family to want.

The house of Hunter & Banks, was established at Fredericksburgh in Virginia. Having adventured largely in privateering, their prizes were generally, when practicable, run into the ports of North Carolina. This circumstance had before led Mr Banks into some pecuniary transactions with Mr. Clay, as agent of the army; and his conduct had acquired the confidence of that gentleman. Captain Pendleton, also one of General Greene's aids, had recognized in Banks an early acquaintance, whom he had always considered as highly worthy of esteem.

Having made some considerable purchases of Banks, at Newbern, on the 2d March, Mr. Waties received from him, and transmitted to General Greene, a proposition to supply the American army, agreeably to invoices, from time to time, with such articles as should be ordered, to be paid for in bills on Mr. Morris, or some one of the southern states, at the rate of ten per cent. upon the cost at the place from which they should be shipped; the goods to be at the risk of the United States—the vessel at their's; and, as compensation for this part of the contract, that Banks should be permitted to load with rice in Georgetown.

The offer was decidedly recommended by Mr. Waties, as an excellent bargain when compared with the prices current of the day. The prospect, therefore, of an ample and regular supply, was not the only recommendation to prompt acceptance by General Greene. It was the cheapest method of obtaining those supplies.

Banks, it seems, had in contemplation, a trade in Charleston. From causes then operating, the scarcity of provisions, in that place, had probably induced General Leslie to wink at, or license a trade, carried on by exchanges of British goods for provisions. The advantages of it were reciprocal. He, accord-

ingly, some time after, and without receiving General Greene's acceptance of his offer, made his appearance in Georgetown; and making known his views to Colonel Lushington, at that time in command at that place, he obtained from that officer passports, under which he obtained access to Charleston, to prosecute his commercial schemes. But, this was wholly without General Greene's knowledge; although, had the application been made to the commanding general himself, in March or April, it is, by no means, improbable, that the passports would have been granted, in the hope of expediting the relief of his wants; yet, this certainly did not enter into the views of the parties in the original contract, since the risk of *his own vessel* could only be brought in view by Banks, with reference to a trade to some port not British. The Havana, the great depot of European articles at that time, was certainly in contemplation of the general.

The prospect of even a distant relief, brought with it some alleviation of the commander's anxieties; but it was not sufficient to allay the ferment in the army. The wants of his soldiers were felt continually, and were ever urging their discontents. They had too often been deceived—their hopes too often flattered and disappointed, for them to confide implicitly on contracts for relief. And there were other causes now operating on some individuals of the army, which had grown out of the discontents previously excited. This was corruption. It was not to be expected, that the state of the army, or the sentiments of the soldiers, could be concealed from an enemy within twenty miles distant; and, unfortunately, the army, at this time, had in it, a mass of materials too easily to be worked upon.

This was in the Pennsylvania line, composed of the very mutineers who had triumphed over government in the insurrection in Jersey; and who, as La Fayette observed—"had been well paid, and well clothed in consequence of it." There was even in it one of the sergeants who had been put in command of the regiments in the mutiny, and a number of others of the same description, who had deserted from the enemy whilst he lay in Philadelphia.

It is confidently believed, that this man, (of the name of Gornell) and several others, including the general's steward, had been brought over by some secret emissary; and had their zeal not prompted them to make an attempt on the fidelity of the Maryland line, the most fatal consequences might have ensued.

But, the sound principles of that body of men, the quick ears of one of their camp-women, and the vigour of Colonel Harmar—furnished the evidence for fastening the crime on their leader. The night of the day he was taken up, every soldier who apprehended he had committed himself, to the

number of at least a dozen, broke away and joined the enemy, then advanced in force to receive them; for this, it appears, was the very day the plot was to be executed. For many days previous, symptoms of mutiny had appeared in the American camp; and movements had been made in that of the enemy, which put the American commander on his guard, against some approaching event of considerable moment.

On the 22d April, Sergeant Gornell was executed, and four other sergeants of the Pennsylvania line, were sent into the interior under guard. The appearances of a mutinous temper ceased; but it was confidently believed, that the plan in such forwardness, was for the purpose of seizing the person of the general, and delivering him to the enemy. It is certain, that such was the evidence on Gornell's trial, and for some days previous, the forward movements of the enemy so strongly indicated an attack, that Marion was ordered up from beyond Santee, with all possible dispatch, and the army held in constant readiness for battle.

Lieutenant Colonel Harmar, after noticing in his journal the execution of Gornell, could not refrain from remarking, "I hope it will give a good effect, and, in some measure, quell that mutinous spirit, which has hitherto prevailed amongst the troops. Their complaints, however, are too justly founded; great things cannot be expected from troops who are neither paid nor clothed, and but badly fed."

Such are the painful duties to which a general is exposed when his men are driven to discontent by neglect or injustice, or the failure in a government to fulfil its contracts with them. Under penalty of death, on their part they must still be held bound to obey, and to combat, whatever injuries they may have to murmur at.

There was one circumstance which, at this time, rendered the mutinous spirit of the army peculiarly dangerous. General Greene was no longer surrounded by the tried and devoted friends, who had borne with him "the heat and burthen of the day." Besides the immense loss which had been sustained at the Eutaws, a large proportion of the superior officers of the army had been, necessarily, indulged with furloughs, and others had been detached with the troops that had been marched home. Although he was still surrounded by officers of unexceptionable merit, they were comparatively, new to him, and to the arduous service of the southern campaign. Williams had been drawn home by the exigencies of his private affairs, and the hopes of filling a vacancy of brigadier, at this time existing in the Maryland line; Howard was yet scarcely recovered of his wounds, but actively employed in promoting the interests of the army at home; Wayne was gathering laurels in Georgia; General St. Clair had ob-

tained leave of absence, and Colonel Lee's legion was almost stripped of its officers. Armstrong and Lieutenant Carrington had fallen into the hands of the enemy; Egleston had requested a furlough, which his gallant services richly merited, and the colonel himself had retired to Virginia in the deepest disgust.

From the time of the attempt on Johns' Island, Colonel Lee had been employed, as usual, in advance of the army. His communication with the city was regularly kept up, and he conducted the transportation to camp, of all the supplies which General Greene drew from Charleston. But his good fortune appears, in a great measure, to have deserted him, or the confidence of his officers in their own prowess, and the speed of their horses, had been too much elevated by previous successes; for his small parties met with several severe rebuffs, and, as has been mentioned, several of his best officers fell into the enemy's hands.

The colonel's request for leave of absence, bears date the 26th January, and is couched in terms strongly expressive of the excitement under which it was written. "I must at length ask permission to absent myself from the army. Disquietude of mind and infirmity of body unite in giving birth to my request. The first arises from the indifference with which my efforts to advance the cause of my country is considered by my friends, the persecution of my foes, and my consciousness that it is not in my power to efface the disagreeable Impression. The second owes its birth to the fidelity with which I have served, and is nourished by my continuance in the same line of conduct.

"However disgusted I am with human nature, I wish, from motives of self, to make my way easy and comfortable. This, if ever attainable, is to be got only in an obscure retreat.

"I have nothing more to say, and will but add, my prayers for the honours and prosperity of your arms."

The answer will best express the feelings with which this communication was received. "I have beheld, with extreme anxiety, for some time, a growing discontent in your mind; and have not been without my apprehensions, that your complaints originated more in mental anxiety, than the ruin of your constitution. Whatever may be the cause of your wounds, I wish it were in my power to heal them. You say, your friends were not disposed to do justice to your exertions. If you mean me, and any thing has appeared in my conduct to confirm it, it has been owing to an error in judgment or accident, and not want of inclination. From our earliest acquaintance, I had a partiality for you, which progressively grew into friendship. I was under no obligations to you, until I came into this country; and yet, I believe you will

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do me the justice to say, I never wanted inclination to serve you. Here I have come under the greatest obligations—obligations which I can never cancel; and if, in this situation I should be unwilling to do justice to your exertions, I should not only be guilty of the basest ingratitude, but a strange contradiction in my own conduct.

“I am far from agreeing with you in opinion, that the public *will* not do you justice, or that they *do* not do you justice. I believe, few officers, either in America or Europe, are held in higher estimation. Substantial service is what constitutes lasting reputation; and your own reports this campaign, are the best panegyric that can be given to your actions. For me, therefore, to have passed any extraordinary compliments upon them, might have made me ridiculous, but could have given no dignity to you. My character has been much misunderstood, and subjected to much calumny. In this situation, any thing that I might have said, would have only served to discover my partiality, without benefitting your reputation. There is no inconvenience I will not submit to, to oblige you; nor length I would not go, to serve you within the line of truth and honour; but, I wish you not to think of leaving the service. Every body knows I have the highest opinion of you as an officer; and you know, I love you as a friend. Whatever may be your determination, whether to retire or continue in service, my affection will accompany you; and as far as my little influence will go, I shall always take a pleasure in paying a just tribute to your merit,” &c.

The reply is too full of the finest feelings, to be altogether omitted. It professes the most ardent and inviolable friendship for his commander; but, he says—“I candidly told you, that I read some of your public reports with distress, because some officers and corps were held out to the world with a lustre superior to others, who, to say the least, deserved equally. But, this I attributed to accident of expression, or to the temper of the moment, and, therefore, regarded as nought. My attachment to you will end only with my life. I am bold to use this expression, from my confidence, that your conduct will always claim the support of those who try to be virtuous. Could I suppose, my leaving the army now was a breach of private friendship, I would not hesitate, in my decision, a moment, although unceasing affliction would be my portion. But, the prosperous train of your affairs, puts this matter beyond a doubt.”

“I communicated to Major Pearce, the causes of my distress. I am candid to acknowledge my imbecility of mind, and hope time and absence may alter my feelings.

"At present, my fervent wish is, for the most hidden obscurity; I want not private or public applause. My happiness will depend on myself; and if I have but fortitude to persevere in my intentions, it will not be in the power of malice, outrage, or envy, to affect me. Heaven knows the issue. I wish I could bend my mind to other decisions. I have tried much, but the sores of my wounds are only irritated afresh by such efforts. My poor soldiers are dear to me, most dear. I shall pray your patronage to them if I must part. Through them I am open to feelings of pleasure, and their woes will add to my misery. The subject of this letter is so affecting, that I cannot be correct or hardly consistent."

It concludes with pressing Captain Eggleston's request of leave of absence, though he should himself be obliged to remain until no inconvenience should arise for want of officers. Several other letters passed, equally creditable to the heads and the hearts of the correspondents; but finally, Lee and Eggleston both took their leave of absence from camp together.

The colonel's intermarriage with a lady conspicuous for merit and fortune, which took place soon after he reached his native land, leaves a doubt whether his late visit to Virginia had not been productive of some of these severe mental distresses under which he appears to have suffered previous to his leaving the field of Mars.

Be that as it may, he left the service with the reputation of an able officer, highly regarded for his talents by all who were capable of estimating them, and censured and suspected only, because no consideration could ever induce him to expose his cavalry to a capital misfortune. With regard to his own person also, he was in the habit of asserting the prerogative of a commander, in directing the efforts of others, and duly economising his own safety. But it was the prudence and self-command of courage, not the offspring of fear. A more intelligent, zealous, and indefatigable officer never existed, and so wary was he in all his multiplied enterprizes, that he never was, for a moment, found off his guard. Not the smallest instance of surprise ever occurred where he was present. His attachment to his general was cordial and devoted: and his supposed influence over his councils was the object of envy and animadversion. Singular fatality! that he should at the same time cherish the firm belief that the general treated his merits and services with injustice, or his councils with inattention! In a letter of a private nature, to Colonel (then General) Williams, General Greene makes this remark, when speaking of Colonel Lee, "It is said by some of his friends, that he thinks the public have not a just idea of his merits, and that I have not done justice to his services in my public

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accounts. *I think whoever reads my letters, and know the facts, will agree that I have done ample justice both to the friend and to the officer."*

To the absence of so many excellent officers, we regret to add, that the service, at this time, suffered materially from the bickerings of some who remained; and, in more than one instance, the tranquillity of the general was disturbed by the groundless remonstrances and discontents of his officers.

The first instance occurred in the Pennsylvania line; and it is impossible to compare the date of it (the 23th of March) with the execution of Gornell, without recollecting the remark of Wayne, on the means by which the discontents of officers are communicated to their men.

The captains and subalterns of the Pennsylvania line, it seems, had taken umbrage at some circumstances occurring on the detaching of Captain Wilmot, of the Maryland line, on a critical service. It was a desperate attempt to be made to carry one of the enemy's posts on Coles' Island.

Wilmot was designated for the enterprise, and permitted to select his men and officers, to the number of fifty of the former. In the order, as well as in the execution of it, the Pennsylvania captains and subalterns thought themselves aggrieved, in not being permitted to share in the perils of the enterprise. The feeling was highly honourable to them, but the manner of its expression equally unmilitary. It was made the ground work of a remonstrance to the general, which touched very close upon the doctrines on which the revolution had been justified. "When the subjects of a state," say the remonstrants, "conceive their rights infringed on, they readily suppose it arises from some mistake in the executive part of the government, or that the governor means to adopt a mode of governing altogether new, and what the subjects have hitherto been unaccustomed to," &c. Although the professions of the remonstrants were strong on the point of loyalty and obedience, yet the principle assumed looked too much like calling the executive to account before the legislative part of the government, to be tolerated for a moment in an army. The general, therefore, in his answer, tells them that the constitution of an army is totally different from that of civil society; therefore to argue from analogy, of the rights of men under those different governments, is confounding things that have no relation, and reasoning on principles that never can be admitted in an army. That he would always be as tender of the feelings of officers as possible, but if they go into refinements, and urge injuries which have no foundation but in improper modes of reasoning, he cannot sacrifice the public good and the reputation of the army at large, to accommodate military operations to their way of thinking. "You must consider yourselves," he adds, "as officers of the continental army, bound by its laws, and governed by military maxims. You

are under military and not civil government. If you feel any injury, it must be as officers of the line of the army, and not those of any particular state. You may be assured, I have the strongest disposition to oblige, and to do justice to the merit and services of every officer, but I must confine myself to such maxims of military government as are necessary to do justice to the public, and to the army at large."

The remonstrants would not quit the contest without a reply, in which they affirm, that the answer "is not so satisfactory as they could have expected, but that they are induced, from the peculiar situation of the army, and their zeal for the public good, *to decline any further steps* on the occasion."

No farther notice was taken of the affair; but, it is obvious, that a deep wound must have been inflicted on the morals of the army by the knowledge, that both men and platoon officers, of so large a portion of the army were ready, and asserted the privilege, in vulgar language, "to right themselves."

The wisdom of the laws of the United States, have made it a military offence in officers, to form these cabals; and even in civil society, in cases of less immediate evil, and in the state to which that line belonged, such associations are looked upon as offences. What follows, when such remonstrances are not attended to? Though the many may have been unwarily led on thus far, by the few, all are committed, and none can retreat. But for the critical situation of the army at that moment, General Greene would have sought out the means of putting a stop, for ever, to a practice so dangerous in its consequences.

Nor was it long before it was followed by other occurrences, which developed its evil tendencies.

It was soon after this time, that General Greene got involved in those disputes with some of his officers, which, finally, it became necessary to refer to congress, and one of which hung on him to the day of his death.

Considerable irregularities had crept into the cavalry, in the appropriation of public horses. By the constitution of the corps, each officer was bound to provide his own horse, and an allowance was made him in money to mount himself. As the government had failed altogether in making payments to the troops, the officers of cavalry got into the habit, when they lost their own horses, of dismounting their troopers who rode the best horses, or otherwise mounting themselves by the appropriation of the horses purchased or impressed for the public service.

Congress had now a secretary of war in the person of General Lincoln, and an inspector general had also been created in that of Steuben. Colonel Tennant, an officer of Steuben's, was, at this time, with the southern army, going

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through the duty of inspecting it. The inquiries emanating from, and the returns necessary to be made to these officers, developed to General Greene, the prevalence of this practice among the cavalry officers. The necessity of checking it was obvious; for, however justifiable in its origin, abuses had grown out of it, and the laws did not sanction it. That the evil had spread to an alarming extent, is conspicuous from the following passage of a letter from Colonel White of the 3d regiment, justifying himself for having, in some measure, sanctioned it, by exchanging one of his own for a public horse, ridden by a cavalry officer. "I believe," says he, "I am the only officer in the cavalry, from Colonel Moylen to the youngest cornet, that does not possess, at this hour, from one to three public horses."

It happened, unfortunately, for Captain Gunn, of White's regiment, that in a very recent transaction, he had exchanged a public horse with Captain Armstrong of the legion, for which he had received a slave and two other horses.* This, of course, was among the first instances of the practice brought to the notice of the general; and the addition of the slave to horses given in exchange, was positive evidence, that the good of the service, or mutual accommodation among officers, had not been the only inducement to the transaction. It bore the aspect of corruption, and he felt himself bound to notice it. Gunn was, accordingly, ordered from Georgia, (where he was serving under Wayne,) to explain or justify his conduct.

He contended, that he had lost a horse of his own in the service, and was, therefore, justifiable, under a practice long acquiesced in, to take one of the public's in exchange; that he had, accordingly, appropriated the horse in question to his own use, and considered him as his own property.

Not wishing to bring Captain Gunn to a court-martial, under the conviction that he would be cashiered, (and he was too brave an officer to be lost,) General Greene referred the consideration of Captain Gunn's justification, to a court of inquiry; not doubting, but they would decide against his plea, and intending then to make it the subject of a general order.

But the practice had been too long prevalent, and too far extended, to be easily put down. Gunn knew the ground he stood upon before a court of inquiry; and to the general's utter astonishment, the court decided in justification of the practice. This was immediately followed up by a demand from Captain Gunn, of the confirmation, by the general, of the decision of the court, as a matter of right. Such a decision, followed up by such a demand, in what

* Colonel White, May 26th, 1782.

appeared to Greene so flagrant a case, appears to have generated in him a resolution to test, at once, the temper of his officers, and ascertain whether law and authority were to be surrendered. The decision of the court was disapproved of in general orders, positive notice given to both Gunn and Armstrong, that the horse must be restored, and the subject laid before congress.

Had the business stopped here, it is probable that the general would never afterwards have heard of it; but as the two officers implicated, belonged, one to each of the two corps of cavalry serving in the army, Gunn presumed too much on the support those corps would afford him, and demeaned himself with something like haughtiness, both in his personal address and correspondence with the general. Certain it is, that the letter addressed by the general to Captain Gunn, on this occasion, is expressed with a biting severity, absolutely unexampled in his correspondence. We would palliate, but cannot justify the want of temper which it displays. Corruption and insubordination, in his opinion, openly vindicated in the army, were the objects of his anger. But there was another, of an individual nature, that had its due influence. All the United States have heard of Amy Dearden's horse Romulus, which, for thirty years, occupied, each winter, so much of the time of congress. This horse had been impressed, in the first instance, by a Lieutenant Rudder, of the cavalry, and restored upon General Greene's express order. But he was too fine an animal to escape the notice of the cavalry officers; and Captain Gunn was the man who afterwards seized the horse, and appropriated him to the service, with such circumstances of oppression as to form the subject of much discontent, and finally, of the interference of the governor of Virginia, in council. The horse, it appeared, had been some how disposed of, so as to have passed into the hands of a third person, and poor Dearden was ruined.*

The horse sold to Armstrong was returned, and the matter, for the present, blew over; but Gunn was far from forgiving it, as will appear in the sequel; and the disgust of Armstrong was probably among the causes which operated soon after, in bringing the legionary corps to the brink of dissolution. And it is not easy to decide how far the disgust of the cavalry officers may have led to that state of insubordination which led to the subsequent revolt of the cavalry, under Sergeant Dangerfield.

Colonel Lee's recollection has entirely failed him in relating the circumstances which led to the cabals that agitated the legionary corps. It was long before the establishment of General Gist's command, that they had their incep-

* Governor Harrison's letter, 24th December, 1782.

tion; and some of the arrangements in that command had in contemplation the removal of their avowed causes. The discontents at Colonel Laurens' command were thought to have originated with Colonel Lee himself. . . . Laurens' commission being anterior to his, when their detachments acted together, Colonel Lee necessarily acted under Laurens' command. This had been particularly the case in the attempt on John's Island; on that occasion, it would seem from dates, Colonel Lee conceived that disgust which made him determine to retire from the army. As to Laurens' exchange out of course, having caused discontent, the occurrence had long been forgotten, for Laurens had since been to France, and fought at the capture of Lord Cornwallis.

General Gist's command was not formed until the middle of June; whereas Colonel Lee had relinquished his command early in February; and, on that occasion, the two detachments were united under the command of Colonel Laurens. This confounding of dates, had made Colonel Lee bring the capture of the galley in Ashley River, by Rudolph, within the time of his own command, whereas it happened long after his departure, and was executed expressly under Laurens' orders. His official account of the affair bears date the 20th of March; and the eclat acquired on the occasion, was probably among the causes that induced Rudolph to conceive the wish, to share the undivided honours of his own enterprises.

We find it repeatedly mentioned by General Greene to his private friends, that Laurens was not popular with the legion; and that an opinion prevailed, unfavourable to his talents as a cavalry officer. Though he uniformly maintains, that the imputation was unreasonable, as he had never had an opportunity of exhibiting his talents.

There were many reasons for giving Colonel Laurens the command of the light detachments, in preference to any other officer in the army. His knowledge of the country, was far beyond that of any other; and his intimate acquaintance with many persons in Charleston, and the confidence with which all were ready to trust to his honour and discretion, gave him decided advantages in gaining intelligence, encouraging desertion, drawing out supplies, and executing confidential duties; to which may be added, strong private attachment, compliment to the American commander in chief, as a favourite aid; and, above all, the zeal and anxiety expressed by Laurens, to serve under him: as soon as he was assigned to the southern department. As to the fear of giving umbrage to General Washington, we will not assign such a motive, where there exist so many good reasons.

There was also one reason, why the light corps should no longer act independantly.

After the passing of the confiscation act, and the seizure of the loyalist's estates into the hands of commissioners, General Leslie had declared his resolution to retaliate; and the strength of the detachments which he, from time to time, sent out from Charleston, exposed the American detachments to misfortune, in their previous independent state. This induced General Greene to unite them under Colonel Laurens; and by this union, less waste of force was necessary in patrols and reconnoitering parties.

But, a change of circumstances soon made it necessary to give still greater strength to his flying camp, or moveable detachment. When the vote of the British parliament, for discontinuing aggressive war in America, was communicated to General Leslie, he proposed to General Greene, a cessation of hostilities, and that he should be permitted to receive and purchase from the planters, such subsistence as he stood in need of. The cessation of hostilities General Greene referred to congress; but, other subjects he referred to the governor and council. But, their views on this subject had already been communicated to General Greene, in a request, "that he would, by all means in his power, prevent supplies from going into Charleston, except so far as his contracts respecting clothing made it necessary." The cause is obvious. The state had undertaken to supply the army, and had declined imposing the taxes necessary to raise its continental quota in specie. To have opened a market with Charleston, would have been, to drench the country immediately, and perhaps have protracted the stay of the enemy, by lessening his inconveniences. Therefore, although several writers cast the odium of this restriction upon General Greene, it really emanated from the governor and council, and was indispensable under actual circumstances.

General Leslie's offer was, of course, rejected; and he thereupon intimates, that, however anxious he was to discontinue the horrors of war, he would take provisions by force, wherever they could be obtained; and immediately commenced preparations for that purpose. General Greene also prepared to oppose him; and Marion was requested to strengthen himself, so as to meet the enemy in the quarter in which he commanded, whilst a strong detachment was formed under General Gist, to cover the country lying south and west of the army's position. The cavalry of the legion, and that of the 3d and 4th Virginia regiments united under Colonel Baylor; the infantry of the legion, the dismounted dragoons of the 3d regiment, the Delaware regiment, and one hundred men detached from the line and commanded by Major Beale; the whole infantry under command of Colonel Laurens; formed the brigade placed under the command of General Gist.

In this arrangement, General Greene flattered himself with the hope, that the murmurs of the cavalry, as they were no longer under Laurens, would subside, and the infantry would serve with pleasure, under an officer who had more than once led on the infantry to honourable service. But, the late arrangements had been death to the hopes and views of Major Rudolph, who was anxious to succeed Colonel Lee in the command of his corps—a command to which, with all the high opinion Greene entertained of Rudolph's gallantry, he did not think him possessing all the requisites for. Their discontents fastened then on the separation of the infantry from the cavalry of the legion; and a very strong remonstrance on the subject, in which they plainly charged their commander with injustice and breach of the privileges of that corps, was sent in, signed by all the officers, accompanied with the resignation of their commissions.

Previous to the actual delivery of this remonstrance, it was intimated to General Greene, that the thing was in agitation; and being really proud of the corps, and attached personally to the officers, (though he usually designated them as his pretorian-band, spoiled by indulgencies) he sent for Major Rudolph, and explained to him, that by the tenor of his orders, the two parts of which the legion consisted, were never, in fact, to be separated; it being given expressly in charge to General Gist, to regard the habits and constitution of the different corps in his command, wherever it was necessary to detach. He then pressed upon the Major, that the arrangement was perfectly consistent with the nature of the service, and the rights of a legionary corps, to be so disposed of. But, notwithstanding, the letter and commissions were sent to head-quarters; General Greene, thereupon, in the mildest and most flattering terms possible, endeavoured to dissuade them from their purpose; but, at the same time, begged they would not mistake the thing so widely, as to suppose, that their services could not be dispensed with; and concluded with proposing, that the subject should be referred to congress. The reply was short and petulant; and General Greene, after vainly giving them a private hint of his intention, briefly signified, that their commissions were accepted. This was a thunderbolt, to a set of men who prided themselves, above all things, in their corps and their commissions; and they quietly returned to their posts, signifying through a friend, that they accepted the proposition to refer their claims to congress.

On both these references the congress gave the most prompt and explicit support to the commanding general. To sell or dispose of public property, was made highly penal in a commissioned officer; and the legionary corps were

expressly subjected to such disposition, in part or in whole, as the commanding general may deem necessary to the service.

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But for the distressed state of the army, and the bickerings of the officers, there were at this time, surrounding the general and those officers, many circumstances from which might have been extracted much enjoyment.

From the encampment at the Round-O, to that near Bacon's Bridge, the country was covered with the establishments of wealthy planters, whose hospitable habits, and gratitude to their deliverers, spread every board for their comfort or entertainment. On the 28th of March, Mrs. Greene joined her husband in camp, and the attentions lavished on the lady of the man whom all wished to honour, contributed greatly to enliven the monotonous scenery of an army in a state of inactivity.

In modern ages and nations, the transition from war to love has ever been direct and uniform. The army abounded in gallant young officers, and the country in wealthy, elegant, and accomplished women. The laurels of the former were readily laid down at the feet of the latter, and received with approving smiles. Those who had reconquered the country were liberally admitted to a participation in its wealth and treasures; the feudal service exacted was, a willing submission to that power who conquers all. Many were the matrimonial connections which this period gave rise to between the officers of the army and the heiresses of Carolina and Georgia; and it is needless to add, that they yielded a valuable acquisition, both to the population and the society of the country.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Marion returns over Santee River. Loyalists excited. North Carolina troops discharged. Weakness of the Army. Bold adventure of a young loyalist in capturing Mayhem. Expedition against Ganey. Leslie seizes provisions on Santee. His fleet sails for Port Royal. Affair of Watboo terminates Marion's military career. General Gists' expedition to Cumbahee. Fall of Colonel Laurens. Kosciusko takes the post of Laurens. United States and state rights come in collision. Wilmot's death. Pickens' last expedition against the Indians. Great accession of territory to the state of Georgia. Army takes post at Ashley Hill. Fall fevers. Irregular supplies. Great distress. Army again subsisted by impressments under United States authority. Clothed by contract with Banks. Consequences. Charleston evacuated. Army halted on James' Island. Dispositions for protecting the two states. Army grows unpopular. Is cast upon South Carolina, exclusively. Banks' contract for rations.

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WE will close the military memoirs of this period by following Marion, Pickens, and Gist, successively, to the termination of the war.

The first, we left beyond the Santee, collecting his militia, and covering Georgetown from insult.

Still pestered by the dispute between Horry and Mayhem, respecting both equally, and as conscious of Horry's superior claims, as of Mayhem's superior talents as a cavalry officer, both General Greene and General Marion were much embarrassed between the wish to retain Mayhem at the head of the cavalry, and to avoid giving just cause of umbrage to Horry. At length it was

resolved to place Horry in command at Georgetown: to dismount his cavalry, as being useless in that service; and to permit Mayhem to recruit from the dismounted cavalry, if they were dissatisfied with the change of service.

The issue was such as generally attends indecisive and temporizing measures. Mayhem got but few recruits, Horry submitted with murmuring to their being drawn from his command, his men became dissatisfied, the officers indifferent, and desertion and disease soon reduced his command to a skeleton.

It was not until the 5th of April that Marion found himself, once more, in a condition to recross the Santee River. In the mean time the country south of it, had been so completely foraged by the enemy, that he was obliged to dismount his infantry until the natural growth of the grass should enable him again to support their horses. He had under him only two hundred militia, and Mayhem's horse, to the number of about one hundred and twenty. It was General Greene's wish that he should take post as near the enemy as possible, in order both to straiten his limits beyond the Cooper, and to enable Colonel Laurens to pass the Ashley River, and close upon the enemy between the Ashley and Goose Creek. But not being able to mount his infantry, it became necessary to take post at Mr. James Sinkler's, on Santee, for the double purpose of securing a retreat, and forming a junction with any party when necessary, either at Huger's Bridge, over the west branch of Cooper River, from which he was twenty miles distant, or at Strawberry Ferry, which was twenty-five from his position. His cavalry in the mean time patrolled the country, within view of the enemy's posts at Haddrell's and Hobcaw, to check the incursions in that quarter, and obtain the earliest intelligence of the enemy's movements.

In the mean time a scheme was preparing, by General Leslie, to relieve himself, once more, from the presence of this inconvenient neighbour. A messenger, under the feigned character of a deserter, was dispatched into the Scots and loyal settlements, to prepare them to make a movement that must, necessarily, recall Marion to that quarter. The unfortunate agent was intercepted, on his return, and executed by Marion; but the poison was disseminated, and the only reward of Marion's vigilance was, obtaining timely notice for preparing to meet the event.

On the 1st of May, a large proportion of the North Carolina troops were entitled to their discharge; and as the army would be greatly weakened by this loss, and no recruits from the north were expected, it became necessary to draw together all the force that South Carolina could muster.

The government of South Carolina, from its first organization, had been sedulously engaged in an effort to re-establish the South Carolina line; but

having no money, nor the means of raising any, all the efforts of the officers had been crowned with very limited success. Some few were obtained by means of leave granted by the general to recruit from the troops entitled to an early discharge, but still the actual sufferings of the service had too effectually disgusted them, to admit of much success in that quarter.

It became, therefore, indispensable to draw together the militia; and Marion, Pickens, and Henderson were ordered to repair to head-quarters.

Scarcely had Marion reached Dorchester, when the loyalists, beyond the Pee Dee, with the celebrated Major Ganey at their head, once more appeared in arms. The timely notice given to Colonel Baxter to be on the alert against the enemy's designs, saved the whigs from sustaining any very extensive evils from the attacks of the loyalists. But their force was so large, both in cavalry and infantry, that it became necessary to detach General Marion on that service. At the head of Mayhem's cavalry, he proceeded to execute the command, but Mayhem himself was no longer at liberty to head his corps.

The colonel had been left sick at his own place, and confided to the care of a militia guard, posted in advance to watch the enemy, with instructions to apprise Mayhem of any danger that should threaten him. The news of Mayhem's absence from his corps, and confinement at his own house, could not long be concealed from an enemy—so much in the habit of attaching importance to the presence of particular leaders. And an adventurous young lieutenant of Cunningham's loyalists, undertook and executed the bold enterprise of penetrating sixty miles into the country, and of making Mayhem prisoner. Among the negroes taken from Mayhem's neighbourhood, he found guides to conduct him through the woods, and into the house of the colonel, whilst he sat at supper with his physician and one of his lieutenants. The surprise was too complete to admit of resistance. From the conduct of Cunningham's parties in recent instances, and the known hostility of the loyalists to Mayhem, nothing but death appeared to await the prisoners, when Robins (for that was the name of the young man) demanded their surrender to an officer of General Cunningham's. Robins could neither read nor write; and his conduct, as related by Mayhem, proves his ignorance of the forms of service; but, true bravery is seldom unaccompanied by humanity, and the apprehensions of his prisoners were soon dissipated, by his telling them—"We shall do you no injury; treat my men with humanity when you meet them in the field." How much blood and suffering would have been saved, had a similar spirit animated all who had borne a part in this dreadful drama!

Mayhem was parolled to his own house; but the original parole was left in his possession; and Robins, though requested, had exhibited no commission.

The suspension of exchanges, and Mayhem and Marion's anxiety, that the former should return into service, and that spirit of casuistry which ever besets men in their own cases, induced them, simultaneously, to consult their commander, whether Mayhem was bound by his parole. The reply was prompt and decisive—"I am clearly of opinion, that the parole you have given is binding. It is *the declaration* of a man of honour, that binds him; and *the writing* is nothing but an evidence of that declaration. A parole is of a sacred nature, and equally binding with or without evidence."

Marion entered upon this expedition against Ganey, under express instructions, "to spare the unnecessary effusion of blood;" and much to his relief (for the order was congenial with every feeling of his heart,) he found circumstances favourable to a pacification. Ganey, it will be recollected, had, in the preceding year, entered into a treaty of neutrality with Marion; and it needed only to add to that treaty a clause, permitting all who wished it, to retire with their property out of the country. This was the ground taken, but it was obviously a pretext; and the true cause was to be found in the original letter which General Greene had furnished Marion with, proposing a cessation of hostilities.

They saw that they were abandoned, and yielded, with the best grace, to the necessity that pressed upon them.

As usual, Marion's absence was the signal for renewing depredations between the Cooper River and the Santee. Colonel Ashby had been left in command of the infantry, but he had been pressed upon and compelled to retire, so that the general was recalled the moment he had quelled the insurrection of the loyalists, to spread his shield once more over the country which had so long been the object of his protecting care.

But had he not been joined by a new raised corps, under Major Conyers, he must have come alone. His movements had been so rapid, that Mayhem's corps were broken down with fatigue, and, necessarily, left in his rear to recruit; and the militia of that country, to the number of one hundred and fifty, he had thought it advisable to leave under Colonel Baxter, to hold the loyalists in check—as he doubted their sincerity, and feared they would rise in force, plunder the country, and move down with the spoil to a fleet of the enemy, at that time preparing in Charleston for some enterprise directed northwardly.

At Murray's Ferry he halted to collect his militia, and awaited the arrival of Mayhem's corps, and having, under an order of the governor, consolidated the two commands of Mayhem and Conyers into one regiment, about the middle of July he was enabled, once more, to cross the Santee at the head of a

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respectable cavalry, and about three hundred dismounted infantry. With these he took post on the Wassmasaw, in a position secure from sudden attack, and calculated for easy co-operation with the detachments of the main army, in covering the country.

But General Leslie was now prepared to carry into effect his threats of seizing provisions wherever he could find them; and late in July, a numerous fleet of small vessels, conveying eight hundred men, and convoyed by galleys and armed brigs, issued from Charleston, destined, as it was thought, against Georgetown.

Marion was immediately ordered to that place, and every possible arrangement made for moving the stores, purchased for the army, to a place of safety up the Black River. Black Mingo was the place recommended by Marion for that purpose, "for it is," says he, "a settlement of good citizens, and of my earliest and most faithful followers."

But, the enterprise of the enemy was directed to another point. The collection of rice was their object; and the greatest quantity, most securely obtainable, was to be found upon the Santee. The enemy succeeded in carrying off, from the banks of that river, about six hundred barrels, without interruption. Marion's force was thrown over Sampit, so as to intercept their march to Georgetown; but it was utterly impossible to annoy them in their movements up the South Santee, and against the plantations which could be plundered under the guns of the galleys.

Having completed their lading, receipts were left for the quantities taken at all the places, except of those of Lynch and Neal—the former had been a member of the continental congress, and the latter fell in battle at the siege of Charleston.

The enemy having left the river, and every disposition being made for transporting and defending the public stores at Georgetown, and removing provisions, Marion once more returned across the Santee, and was ordered to take post at Watboo, as the return of the enemy's fleet into port, suggested the probability of some enterprise up the rivers communicating with Charleston. But, their views were directed against Combahee; and after depositing the spoil of the previous expedition, they set sail and arrived a few days after, in the port of Beaufort.

In the mean time, however, a party of infantry, posted at Watboo, drew the attention of the enemy. Marion was thought to be absent in Georgetown, and the American cavalry was known to be with him.

The rapidity of his movements, it seems, had prevented the knowledge of his return, and the party were supposed to be that under Ashby.

Early on the morning of the 29th of August, Marion received intelligence of the advance of Major Frazier, at the head of above an hundred dragoons, with intent, as it was reported, to surprise his pickets, above him, at Biggin Bridge, and below him, at Strawberry Ferry. It happened, unfortunately, that his cavalry was, at the time, absent patrolling down the river; but, messengers were immediately dispatched to call in both the cavalry and pickets, and some of the latter had joined him before the enemy appeared.

It was not without some uneasiness, that Marion prepared to receive the enemy, for the greatest part of his force consisted of what were then called, *new made whigs*. These were men who had left the enemy in consequence of Governor Rutledge's proclamation, offering pardon to all (with certain exceptions) who should leave the enemy within a specified time, and join the American forces. But, perhaps, he could not have had a description of men to command, more deeply interested in securing themselves against the British sabre. It is not probable, that any one, if recognized, would have escaped military execution.

The enemy having taken some of Marion's out-centinels, and proceeded by an unfrequented route, advanced upon him in full confidence of all the advantages of a surprise; but, they found him ready drawn up to meet them—his main body in an avenue of trees before the house of Dr. Fayssoux, and his left, by which the enemy must approach, advanced a few paces under cover of some small buildings. The latter were ordered to reserve their fire until the enemy approached within thirty yards: and the main body to reserve their's until further orders.

The enemy came on at a full charge; but Marion's troops behaved with coolness; and when the left delivered their fire as ordered, it made the enemy recoil in confusion, leaving a captain, and several men and horses dead upon the field. They soon rallied, and attempted to turn first his right, and then his left flank; but, by changing his front, and availing himself of the cover of the buildings and fences, he rendered it too hazardous for the enemy to attempt a second charge, and they retired on the route which leads by Quinby to Daniel's Island.

A single fire terminated this action; but, it has seldom happened, that a single fire has done equal execution on the same number of men. One officer and eight men were killed; three officers and eight men wounded. Five horses fell dead on the field, a few were taken, and many wounded. Only one prisoner was taken.

The Americans sustained no loss in men, but a very serious loss of another kind. The driver of their ammunition wagon took fright, and made off with

his charge, in a direction which discovered its flight to the enemy. A small detachment was sent after it and took it. Marion soon discovered his loss, and was destitute of cavalry to retrieve it. But, five of his men, armed with the broad-swords of those who fell, and mounted on the captured horses, resolved to recover their ammunition. They actually succeeded in recovering it, but could retain it only until the fugitives could reach the enemy, and return on the American party, to overtake them with a force that was not to be resisted.

It was certainly the distinguishing attribute of Marion, always to extract good service from the militia. They thought themselves invincible under him; and in the present instance, he declares, not a man faltered; that he even had to check their anxiety to move out into the open field, and receive the charge of the cavalry. But, Marion's coolness never deserted him; in the absence of his cavalry, a defeat, would have been converted into a rout, and both corps would have been sacrificed in detail. Had his cavalry been present to improve the impression first made upon the enemy, there can be little doubt, that the result of this affair would have depended upon the fleetness of their horses.

In an hour and a half after the enemy moved off, Major Conyers arrived with his cavalry, and immediately pursued. But, ere he could overtake them, Major Frazier had formed a junction with a detachment of infantry, that had advanced up the Wando to support him; and Marion's loss of ammunition, obliged him to retreat once more towards the banks of the Santee, to draw a supply from Georgetown.

It was with no small mortification, that General Greene was compelled to look on and see Marion retiring before this detachment, without being able to afford him relief. Leslie's measures had been planned upon the best information; General Gist, with his brigade, had been ordered to oppose the foraging fleet on the Combahee; the American army had been greatly reduced by the discharge of two hundred more of the North Carolina line, and of many individuals of other corps, as their terms expired; and such was the sickly state of those who remained in camp, that it is confidently asserted, one half of the army was on the sick list. It could hardly be otherwise in that country at that season. Fortunately for the security of the American army, the state of the enemy's troops in Charleston, and its vicinity, was not much better.

A heavy firing off the bar, on the morning of the 6th of September, announced the arrival of Sir Samuel Hood, with a convoying fleet to cover the evacuation, and recalled Major Frazier to Charleston.

Marion, after this, resumed his station at Wathoo. The loyalists, who had surrendered themselves under the governor's proclamation, were mustered under Colonel Lushington, for the defence of Georgetown; and nothing more occurred to disturb his tranquillity for the remainder of the war.

The light brigade under General Gist, took a position soon after it was formed, in advance of the army, near the Stono. Colonel Laurens, still charged with conducting the intercourse with the corps of intelligence in Charleston, had a guard assigned him, at his own request, by order of General Greene,* and took a position without the pickets of the brigade, near to Wappoo Creek. Here they continued comparatively inactive, until intelligence was received of the sailing of the foraging fleet to the southward.

As General Greene had other channels of communication with Charleston, besides those kept open by Laurens, he received the intelligence of that event a day before it reached Colonel Laurens. Orders were immediately dispatched to General Gist, dated the 23d of August, to march to the protection of the country on the Combahee, where a quantity of provision, both public and private, was then lying. Not thinking it advisable to withdraw Colonel Laurens from a post so highly confidential and important, as that which he then filled, and in which he was acting under the immediate orders of General Greene, General Gist moved on to the southward, without issuing orders for Colonel Laurens to join him. But, the ardour of the latter was not to be restrained, when the long-wished for opportunity for enterprise presented itself. In a hurried scrawl of the 24th, probably the last Colonel Laurens ever wrote, and covering the intelligence of the Combahee expedition, he says—"I forward you the enclosed, which I have just received—vague intelligence reached me of the march of the light troops—will you be so good as to inform me, whether any thing is likely to be done?" &c.

It was enough, that General Gist was ordered "to strike at the enemy wherever he might meet them." Laurens, though labouring under an ague, and actually in bed with it, when he heard of Gist's march, hurried away to the southward, and overtook the brigade on the north bank of the Combahee River, near the ferry.

The enemy had landed on the opposite side of the river, and the cavalry, under Major Call, had been ordered round by the Saltketcher Bridge, to join the militia who had collected in that quarter, and seek an opportunity for striking at the enemy.

Twelve miles below the ferry, on the north side of the Combahee, the extreme end of Chehaw Neck approaches the bed of the river, which generally, between those points, is bordered by extensive swamps and rice-fields. At this point General Gist had ordered a work to be thrown up for the purpose of annoying the enemy in their retreat, and Colonel Laurens solicited the command of the enterprise at that post. Fifty infantry, with some matrosses, and a howitzer, were ordered out under his command: and on the evening of the 26th he moved down the river, as far as the place of Mrs. Stock, near enough to take post at Chehaw Point by daylight the ensuing morning.

That night was spent in all the enjoyments of hospitality and female society, and the company did not separate until two hours before the time when the detachment must be put in motion. The expected rencontre was the subject of the gayest badinage; and Laurens, with characteristic fearlessness of the event, warmly solicited the ladies to accept of the accommodation of a scaffold to enjoy the sight of the action, in which they were forbidden the superior enjoyment of taking part.

Ere the sun rose upon him the next morning he was "a stiffened corse;" and the companions of his evening festivity, Captain and Lieutenant Smith, lay wounded on the field.

The enemy were disappointed in their expectation of collecting rice on the south side of the Combahee; all that could be spared from the subsistence of the people had been drawn from that side of the river, for the subsistence of Wayne's army in Georgia, which had been supplied altogether from Carolina. The light brigade arrived in time to prevent their foraging on the north side; and upon the advance of the militia and cavalry, and the commencement of the work below them, their troops were silently embarked in the night, and by slipping their anchors, and dropping down with the tide, the departure of the vessels from their moorings was not perceived until four o'clock in the morning.

General Gist immediately anticipated the danger to which Laurens was exposed and dispatching an express to him with the intelligence; and being joined by his cavalry, which had swum the river the preceding evening, he moved off with all possible expedition, at their head, to the support of Laurens, leaving orders for his infantry to hasten after him.

But the mischief was already done. The enemy had either received intelligence of the marching of the detachment, or had rightly concluded that the brigade, or a detachment from it, would be hastened on to Chehaw Point, to annoy them in their retreat. Landing, therefore, on the north bank of the river, and pushing into the road that communicates with the Point, they lay in

ambuscade, in a place covered with fennel and high grass, and were undiscovered until they rose to fire on the unsuspecting Laurens.

At three o'clock in the morning he had commenced his march, and altogether unsuspecting of danger, he was on horse-back with his advanced guard, when the enemy was discovered. His decision was promptly taken; next to a retreat or surrender, the only alternative the case admitted of, was a daring charge; this might throw the enemy into confusion, or excite an opinion that they had the whole brigade to contend with. He, therefore, dashed forward himself, calling on his men to follow. But he fell at the first fire, as did also, Captain Smith, of the artillery, and the men were thrown into confusion.

The howitzer fell into the enemy's hands, and the infantry had retreated in confusion about a quarter of a mile, when they were met by General Gist. The enemy soon discontinued the pursuit, and drew up under cover of a wood, near the border of the river. An attempt was made to dislodge them from this after the infantry came up, but it failed, and was attended with some loss; their front was covered by logs and brush, so as to be inaccessible to cavalry, and their force in infantry was much beyond that of Gist's command. Nothing was recovered on their debarkation, except the horses of the artillery.

The enemy sustained no loss on this occasion, that is known of. That of the Americans was, for their small force, very serious. Besides Colonel Laurens, a corporal of the legion cavalry, was killed; three commissioned officers, and sixteen rank and file, were wounded, and three missing, probably made prisoners.

It was with extreme affliction that General Greene heard of the fall of Colonel Laurens. He had been chagrined (and had expressed it) at his leaving a post and an employment so critically important, at this juncture, to the safety of the army; for it was when Marion had his hands full with Frazier, and the enemy was threatening an attack on their weakened army; when intelligence from town was all important, and honour required that the personal security of his secret agents should not be confided to any other man than him, whom they had trusted; and when the direct route to surprise Greene, or throw troops in the rear of Gist, was by Wappoo, that Colonel Laurens had left his post, simply contenting himself with announcing, "that he would return with all possible expedition." But every other feeling, with the general, was absorbed in profound grief for his loss: for, it was not only a gallant soldier and tried patriot that had fallen; an amiable companion, a fast friend, and one of whose influence and popularity in the state, his army had great need, had been cut off at a most critical period.

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In announcing his fall in general orders to the army, he says—"His fall was glorious, but his fate is much to be lamented. The army has lost a brave officer, and the public a worthy citizen."

In his private communications he expresses extreme regret, that such a man should have been cut off in so trivial an affair. "Poor Laurens," says he, in a letter to General Williams, "has fallen in a paltry little skirmish. You knew his temper, and I predicted his fate. The love of military glory made him seek it upon occasions unworthy of his rank. This state will feel his loss." To which he adds, "he has been rather unhappy in his command, in the opposition he met with from the officers of the legion. The pride of the corps, from long indulgence, and from their great reputation, made them not unlike the pretorian guards,—difficult to govern, and impatient of subordination."

General Gist did not leave the ground without rendering the last tribute of respect to his fallen companion in arms. The body of Laurens was deposited in the earth with the honours of war, at the plantation of Mrs. Stock, where a small enclosure of the simplest structure, kept up by the proprietor, serves to excite, not answer, the inquiry, "what undistinguished stranger lies buried here?"

Let tombs and mausoleums be built for the factitious great. The long grass that sighs over the grave of this youthful hero, shall give to the heart of ingenuous youth a more sensible touch than the pompous eulogy of venal praise, or the gorgeous structure which the vanity of the living rears to the memory of the dead.

The eulogies which all the American writers bestow upon this distinguished young man, are in a great measure copied from that so eloquently pronounced by Dr. Ramsay. Let it not be supposed, that the pen of that historian was guided either by the doating admiration of a countryman, or the affections of a near connexion. It is in our power to furnish original and spontaneous effusions of two men equally worthy of their country's admiration, which cannot be suspected of heightened or unnatural colouring.

The late General Alexander Hamilton,* writes thus to General Greene:—"I feel the deepest affliction at the news we have just received, at the loss of our dear and inestimable friend Laurens. His career of virtue is at an end. How strangely are human affairs conducted, that so many excellent qualities could not ensure a more happy fate! The world will feel the loss of a man who has left few like him behind; and America, of a citizen whose heart realized

* Letter to General Greene, 12th October, 1782, private.

that patriotism of which others only talk. I feel the loss of a friend whom I truly and most tenderly loved, and one of a very small number."

General Williams, with his usual talent of compressing thought and feeling into language equally elegant and laconic, expresses himself thus:—"That sensible, gallant, elegant fellow was one of the very few whom I loved and envied."

From the Combahee the enemy passed into Broad River,[†] and, successively, ascended the smaller streams, which communicate with that stream, carrying off with them all the provision and live-stock they could collect. From thence they put into Beaufort harbour, and laid the islands of Beaufort and St. Helena under contribution.

General Gist, although re-enforced by a six pounder, with some matrosses and infantry, did not venture to cross the Combahee until, by the enemy's landing his troops on those islands, he was satisfied that it was not a feint to draw him off from covering the provisions on the north of the Combahee. On the 2d of September, he proceeded to cross that river, and press down to Port Royal Ferry. There he found the Balfour, and another galley, lying; and having gained an advantageous position for his field piece, Lieutenant Bocker, who commanded it, soon made the gallies slip their cables, and attempt to make off. In this attempt the Balfour galley, of two double nines, ran aground, and was abandoned by the crew. They did not leave her without scuttling her and spiking her guns, but it was done so hastily, that she was easily repaired, and secured under the guns of the brigade.

The enemy was recalled on the 6th, by the arrival of the convoying fleet; and the galley placed under the command of Lieutenant Adams, with twenty-five picked men, served afterwards to defend these waters from the picaroons which sometimes infested them; and to cover the transportation of provisions to camp.

This fortunate capture, served to keep up the spirits of the commander, which had drooped greatly under the pressure of recent misfortune, and the very general sickness which soon became prevalent in the army.

As soon as the enemy passed the bar of Beaufort harbour, General Gist hastened back to re-enforce the main army; and nothing more occurred during the war, in which his brigade was engaged. But, this expedition among the

* Letter to General Greene, 2d October, 1782, private.

† There are two rivers of that name in the state, this on the coast, and that which, with the Saluda, forms the Congaree River.

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rice-fields, in the months of August and September, had nearly ruined the light troops. The general himself did not escape; and the number on the invalid list, was greatly increased on their return to camp.

The confidential services on the lines before committed to Colonel Laurens, were, from the time of his departure, committed to Kosciusko; and his innumerable communications exhibit the industry and intelligence with which he discharged that service. They exhibit also, his anxious search after opportunities for enterprise; and it was from the successful issue of one of those, that originated the first cause that disturbed the perfect harmony previously existing between General Greene and the governor and council of South Carolina.

After the enemy had retired under the guns of their redoubts, they were obliged daily to drive their cattle to pasture on Charleston Neck, under a strong guard. A number of their cavalry horses also, particularly those of the loyalists, were placed on James' Island, where they were secured at night near the fort, and by day driven out to pasture. Kosciusko attempted to carry off both these convoys, if they may be so called; and although he found the cattle too effectually guarded for his small force, succeeded in bringing off a number of very fine horses.

Agreeably to standing orders, and the laws of congress, they were committed to the quarter master general to be sold; and after making a compensation to the soldiers who had taken them, the balance of the proceeds to be placed in the public coffers.

But, it happened, that among the captured horses, were a number that were claimed by citizens, as horses that had been plundered from them by the enemy. For this case, there was a law of the state existing; and the governor was instructed by the council, to demand, that the horses of that description should be restored to the owners on a salvage of one-fourth.

This gave rise to a very learned discussion on the postliming question, in which the southern commander displays a perfect acquaintance with the best civilians; and it certainly presented a point of intrinsic difficulty—to wit: How far the army of the United States, when operating within a state, was bound by the state laws, as to the loss or acquirement of property in war. It was obviously a struggle between state and United States' powers; and probably, the first party-question, smacking of federalism and republicanism, ever agitated in South Carolina: no collision had yet occurred on the subject of impressment. Greene convened a numerous council of war, to whom he referred the subject; and it stands recorded, that an eminent character of this

state, then a colonel,* and then and now not less esteemed for profound law-knowledge, than for every quality that can render man amiable and estimable, stood alone in support of state rights—no small ground of claim, (we respectfully suggest) to be the acknowledged protosire of South Carolina republicanism. Habitual deference would incline us to side with the minority; but, we cannot help thinking, that the only difficulty lay in the ill-defined tenor of most of the grants of power under the old confederation. The general power of conducting the war, would seem to have vested in congress, the right to legislate on captures, whether they had legislated with a view to postliminy cases, is what we are not able to decide. It is probable they had not.

The governor's council, on this occasion, appear to have assumed a very positive tone; but the representative and delegate of congressional power, would make but one concession; he permitted those who claimed their horses, to receive them on stipulation, according to the practice of prize courts, and referred the subject to congress.

His letter, containing this reference, is a masterly exposition, both of the law and the policy of the question.

Captain Wilmot, with a small command, still continued to cover John's Island, and to watch the passage by the Stono; and his love of enterprise, led him, occasionally, to cross the river and harass, or watch the enemy on James' Island. In one of these adventures, undertaken in conjunction with Kosciusko, against a party of the enemy's wood-cutters, on the 14th of November, he fell into an ambuscade, was himself shot dead, and Lieutenant More, his second in command, and a servant, severely wounded and made prisoners.

This was the last bloodshed in the American war. General Pickens' expedition against the Indians, had terminated before the date of this event.

We left this active patriot wounded at the battle of the Eutaws. Scarcely was he able to return to service, when the expedition of Cunningham and Williams claimed his attention; and the escape of the latter into the Indian territory, prepared the way for new troubles. General Pickens' brother, Mr. John Pickens, was among the victims delivered by Williams, into the hands of the Indians. This was a welcome sacrifice to the indignation of the Indians, for the injuries their nation had sustained from the attacks of the general. The loyalists knew the propensities of the Indians, and that the blood of the prisoners would be required at their hands by the whites. The

* Colonel Charles C. Pinckney.

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war-dress was once more assumed by numbers of these unhappy people; and the expedition to Savannah, and attack on Wayne, followed in due succession. The season of the year would have rendered an expedition against them then futile, for their provision and families could be concealed in the mountains; and the burning of their miserable wigwams, was but imposing a day's-work upon their women and children. Nor could the whites, for some time, venture to be absent from their own settlements. The Tories and outlaws, as they were called, were still numerous and active, and called their attention to the defence of their own firesides.

Men went armed into the field, to labour. The storm had too recently passed over their own heads. The sea was still agitated; and to clear the wreck of his own bark, commanded the attention of the individual. Besides which, the weakness and distresses of the army, under protection of which all were sheltered, called, as has been seen, for large detachments of the militia. The hour of vengeance was, therefore, deferred until the usual season of Indian expeditions, when the crops were in the field.

In the mean time, General Pickens, with a detachment of his brigade, repaired to the standard of General Greene, and took the place of Marion, near Dorchester, when the latter was ordered off to the protection of Georgetown.

In the hope of recalling the enemy from that enterprise, the day the fleet crossed the bar, General Greene put his whole army in motion down the Ashley road, feigning a design on James' Island; while Pickens, at the head of his militia, was ordered down between the Ashley and Cooper, to draw the attention of the enemy to his post at the Quarter-House. The feint did not succeed in its principal object; but, the fears of the enemy were excited for their more remote posts; and both that at the Quarter-House, and those on the island, were drawn immediately under the protection of his redoubts. From that time, General Pickens continued in command of his own brigade, and General Henderson's, until September, when he proceeded to organize and conduct the projected expedition against the Indians.

In this, he was to be joined by detachments from North Carolina and Georgia, and the day of rendezvous was appointed for the 5th of the month. Some delays having taken place in the assembling of the force he was to command, he did not get in motion until the 10th of September. On that day, he marched from the Cherokee Ford, on the Savannah River, at the head of four hundred men, collected from the three states, and commanded, the North Carolinians by Colonel White, the South Carolinians by Colonel Robert Anderson, and the Georgians by Colonel Clarke.

Among the plunderers who had distinguished themselves in their excursions from the Indian country, was a Colonel Waters, who, at this time, lay with his party, and their plunder, at the mouth of Long Swamp Creek, upon the High-Tower River. To destroy this party, was to exterminate a cause which generated hostilities against the whites. Secrecy and dispatch alone could effect this purpose.

With his men well mounted, and carrying nothing with them but their arms and saddle-bags, Pickens struck directly across the country, for the Beaver Shoal, on the Chatahouchy, and crossed that river on the 24th. He was now within twenty miles of Waters, and had reason to suppose his approach undiscovered, though the delay of his march could not have left it unexpected. Above him and below him on the river, lay many Indian settlements, and to act with effect it was necessary to strike at all at once. For this purpose Colonel Anderson, at the head of an hundred men, was ordered up the river, while Colonel White, with the same number, descended the stream, and General Pickens and Colonel Clarke pressed directly on to Waters' settlement. But the game had flown; the fords of the river had all been watched, and Waters and the Indians, with a few exceptions, had effected their escape.

The work of destruction, however, was commenced among the towns, and a party of one hundred men, under Clarke, hastened forward in pursuit of Waters.

General Pickens being rejoined by Anderson and White, remained at Long Swamp Creek, and having taken some Indian prisoners, they were treated mildly, and sent out in search of the chiefs, to invite them to a treaty to be held on the 17th of October, at that place. In the interim, the troops were moved from town to town for the double purpose of subsistence, and to guard against those surprises to which a permanent station is greatly exposed, in Indian warfare.

The horses found here abundance, among the corn-fields and cane-brakes of a very fine country, but the men were compelled to subsist on parched corn, and beef without salt. But for the want of that indispensable article, to an European palate, they might have feasted luxuriously upon the cattle of a country, which has since contributed to supply the Atlantic markets with animal food.

Colonel Clarke lost no time in pressing the pursuit of Waters, nor did the latter urge his flight with less assiduity. But at the Estanably town, about sixty miles from the Long Swamp, Waters was obliged to abandon a part of his booty, in order to make good his escape through the Creek nation, into Florida. A number of negroes and horses were recovered and restored to

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The Indian chiefs held a meeting in the mountains, and sent in eight of Waters' party to General Pickens, with an acknowledgment of their fault and folly, and promised to meet him at the time appointed. Twelve chiefs and two hundred warriors accordingly attended; and a treaty was concluded, by which they ceded a large extent of territory, and entered into very favourable stipulations on the article of a monopoly of the Indian trade.

The objects of the expedition being thus obtained, General Pickens returned and disbanded his men, on the 22d of October, in less than five weeks from the day of his march.

It is a very remarkable circumstance, that although Georgia acquired, by this treaty, all that fine country which lies between the upper waters of Savannah and Chatahouchy Rivers, (and she has seldom forgotten her public servants,) there never has been made to this brave and excellent man the least acknowledgment of respect or gratitude. Many who, from accidental, not to say trivial circumstance, have acquired an ephemeral celebrity, have had marks of public respect engraven on her towns and counties. But Pickens, who won so large a portion of her territory, and who had often before commanded her troops and fought her battles, has remained unnoticed, perhaps unremembered.

It is with pleasure that we can account for it without impeaching the gratitude of Georgia. The treaty, as it stands on the records of the state, does not bear the impress of his name. It was reduced into form the following spring, under Lyman Hall, John Twiggs, Elijah Clarke, William Few, Edward Telfair, and Samuel Elbert, as commissioners in behalf of the state; and although General Pickens attended and produced the original treaty, and it was recognised and confirmed by the chiefs, his name does not appear for either of the contracting parties. New settlers, emigrants of other states, are the principal occupants of the upper counties of Georgia, and these facts, relative to the early acquisition of that country, have probably been forgotten, or are unknown.

There is still another reason. General Pickens was one of the most unambitious and unostentatious of men. Public applause he never sought or regarded; an opportunity to serve his country he seized on as a blessing sent from heaven. The service rendered, he scarcely seemed to think of it more. His simple, unassuming, rather diffident, even taciturn habits suggested no idea of the energy of his character. It was only in the hour of command, or of battle, that his mind animated his figure, and exhibited its latent vigour

and resources. In times of repose such a man easily passes away from public recollection. Indeed, he always rather shunned than courted public attention. Content with the competence which his own industry had acquired for him, and devoted to the care and education of a numerous family; in the independence of his country, the cultivation of his farm, the comforts of his own fireside, and the exercise of the most vital piety, he seemed to have summed up the fruition of all his wishes. Yet he was often called into public service in the councils of his country. There he was not calculated to shine; and an over-weening humility of temper placed him somewhat in the back-ground. But important occasions sometimes brought him on the floor, and then, his strong good sense, great weight of character, and clear full conceptions, seldom failed to bear away opposition.

Such a man may merit public expressions of gratitude, but they will be oftener heaped upon the noisy demagogue or assiduous intriguer.

In a letter from General Greene to Colonel Lee, written during the siege of Augusta, we find the following eulogy upon Pickens. "I am happy to hear that you and General Pickens are upon a perfectly good footing, and I beg you will cultivate it by all the means in your power. He is a worthy, good man, and merits great respect and attention, and no man in this country has half the influence that he has."^{*}

With the Indian expedition terminated General Pickens' military career.

After the arrival of the convoying fleet, General Leslie gave out, in general orders, his intention to evacuate Charleston, and all eyes were thenceforth turned to that event as the termination of their privations and sufferings. But the vigour with which the late enterprizes had been pushed in quest of provisions, and the uncertainty whether peace would follow, forbade relaxation on the part of General Greene.

Ever since the 6th of July, the army had removed from the neighbourhood of Bacon Bridge, eight miles down the Ashley River Road, to Ashley Hill. That position afforded good springs of water, and a high and dry situation. Great pains were taken to preserve the health of the troops; and it was, obviously, better at this place than the former. But such is the reputation of even that neighbourhood in respect to salubrity, that no one resides there in the summer who can possibly avoid it. Yet here the army must necessarily remain during the autumn months, or the enemy recover the low country. The general's presence could not be dispensed with, and he did not escape an

* May 29th, 1781.

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attack of the fall fever. Many of the officers shared the same fate; but the asperities of war were fortunately much smoothed down by the mutual consideration which the adverse commanders entertained for each other. It is a tribute of respect, which we bestow with pleasure upon General Leslie, to acknowledge that his conduct, while in command, secured to him the esteem even of his enemies.

Many of the American officers were permitted to retire, under safe conducts, for the recovery of their health; and to the salubrious ocean air was Mrs. Greene also indebted for the preservation of hers.

It is with no small disgust that we resume the thrice-told tale of the army's distresses. Who will believe, after the sufferings they had already gone through, and while now, seemingly, only waiting for their labours to be crowned by the evacuation of Charleston, that the acme of their sufferings had not yet been attained! But we will hurry through a story rendered doubly disagreeable by its implicating a people and a government having every claim that local circumstances can give, upon our individual attachments.

General Greene's strong remonstrances, and reiterated solicitations, for the relief of his army, brought upon him the charge of having exaggerated their sufferings; what, then, are we to expect when detailing them to those whose eyes and ears were not witnesses of the army's distresses? But he had the misfortune of addressing himself to those who could not divest themselves of a sense of reproach; we address readers who will coolly examine and judge of the evidence of facts.

The truth of his representations does not rest upon his own assertions, it is supported by circumstances which forbid doubt. To whom were his complaints uttered in the first instance, before they were repeated to congress? To the governor and to the commissary,—to men who would have repelled, and could have disproved his assertions, if not indisputable. Did they ever deny them? When his famished soldiers broke in upon the market of Charleston, and bore away, at the point of the bayonet, the food that was necessary to keep them from starving, was not this enough to call the attention of the public to the question, whether their wants had been well supplied?

The facts, where they could best be known, never were controverted.—“My late public station,” says Governor Matthews, “gave me an opportunity of knowing some of the wants and distresses of this army. But, my present one affords me but too painful and intimate a knowledge of their extreme sufferings. And that they bear all their aggravated misfortunes with unparal-

leled patience and resignation, I am also a witness. I wish to heaven it was more in my power to relieve them."

It was by the occasional bursts of feeling, that the sufferings of his troops forced from him, (particularly that to congress in March;) and the forcible measures to which he was ultimately driven to subsist them, that General Greene finally made himself enemies; and predisposed too many, to receive with readiness, the calumnies which were afterwards circulated to his prejudice.

In one of those moments of feeling, he writes to Colonel Horry—"We have hundreds of men almost as naked as they were born; and it is painful to the last degree, to behold their deplorable situation. The southern army seems to be doomed to sufferings. I wish it were otherwise; but it is not in my power to help it.*" To General Barnwell he writes—"It is high time the enemy were out of this country;† the people appear to have far greater attachment to their interests, than zeal for the service. They begin to think, the army can live on air. Our troops are more than one-third of their time without provisions. I believe cattle are scarce; but, I cannot imagine the scarcity as great as we feel it. The army have spilt their blood freely in the service of this country; and it wounds their feelings, to be left to suffer, when nothing but negligence, and too great a love of property, is the cause of it. The governor exerts himself all he can; but, the embarrassments which are thrown in the way, from natural obstacles and partial views, are too great to accommodate our wants, either in time or substance. How the matter must end, and without a very material charge, I can readily foresee. The patience and forbearance of the army, under their sufferings, have no equal; but, despair will, in time, break through the best disposition, and all the force of discipline. I wish that something may happen, to better our condition, before this disagreeable crisis shall take place."

The following letters will further explain the actual state of things, at this period, and the causes of it:

To His Excellency Governor Matthews.

"Inclosed I send you a copy of a letter from the quarter master general. I have written so much upon the difficulties of obtaining necessary supplies for

* July 8th, 1782.

† July 31st, 1782.

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“The army cannot feed themselves, without multiplying the calamities of the people; and to leave them without support, is cruel and unjust. I need not mention to your excellency, the very great deficiencies which we have felt, nor the patience with which they have been borne; but, our prospects grow worse and worse. Mr. Hort certainly has it in his power, with the aid which I have offered to give him, to afford us more ample supplies; but, it seems, he has dropped all kind of arrangement, if the quarter master general’s information is just. You know our situation; and you must be sensible of the consequences of a starved army. I hope, their past exertions for the deliverance of this country, will induce the well disposed to give a willing aid to relieve our distresses; and such as have neither principle or gratitude, the law of necessity should compel to do their duty. I am persuaded of your excellency’s inclination to remove our difficulties: and I hope the necessity of the case will suggest the means of removing them. We are out of rice at this time, and have been alternately out of meat, or rice, for several days past. Colonel Carrington thinks there is no difficulty in obtaining teams, by proper arrangements and vigorous exertion; and that he could effect it under your authority with great ease.”

Governor Matthew’s Reply.

“I can truly say, no part of my administration has caused me so much anxiety and trouble, as that of procuring supplies for the army; and which has been greatly aggravated by the extreme backwardness—indeed, it may, with propriety, be said, to the unwillingness of the generality of the people, to contribute their aid towards the support of government.

“The further transportation of provisions to Stono by water, will be impracticable, whilst the enemy are in the state. There are now two galleys lying at the mouths of Combahee and Ashepoo Rivers. We must, therefore, necessarily have recourse to land-transportation. This circumstance, at once, brings to view the reluctance of many persons, to contribute their aid for the effectual supply of the army, and other purposes. When the army was lately distressed for rice, Mr. Hort sent out his people to procure teams. As soon as the people

in that part of the country, were acquainted with it, they either disabled their carts, or drove their oxen into the woods; and the few teams which were obtained, were reluctantly collected from the few patriotic persons, on whom the burden has always fallen; but, who now begin to grow uneasy, finding that others, from their infamous conduct, can exempt themselves from almost every part of the burden.

"I beg leave, without reserve, to mention, that one essential cause of the distress of the army, is the prodigious quantity of provisions that are daily carried into Charleston. This infamous traffic is carried on by the persons who will contribute nothing for the army, because they can get an enormous price, and the cash, for what they send to town. This gives great discontent to the good people of the country; and has, at length, produced even a backwardness in them. This trade is principally carried on through the plantation of William Harvey, at Wappoo, and at Old-Town. I must, therefore, most earnestly request of you, to establish a party thereabouts, to prevent this traffic—not to turn them back, but to seize them and have them condemned, under my proclamation of March last.

"I am not acquainted with the nature of the aid you have offered Mr. Hort; but, this much I am thoroughly convinced of, that unless you can afford us a military aid, in collecting supplies, it is impossible, from the present temper of the people, to promise either regular or effectual supplies to the army. You must suppose, sir, it greatly wounds my feelings, to make such a communication to you; but, it is founded in fact, I should think myself wanting in candour, were I to conceal it at the hazard of obliging men, with arms in their hands, to carve for themselves, which I am sensible, must ultimately be the case, without a proper remedy can be applied.

"I shall conclude, with requesting the favour of an interview with Colonel Carrington, when I will give him all the necessary authorities to procure an immediate supply; and, perhaps he may be able to put things in such a train, that we may be able to prosecute it without giving you or him further trouble.

"I beg leave to repeat, that I feel more than I can express, for the distresses of the army; and nothing would afford me higher satisfaction, than to see them regularly and well supplied."

In addition to piles of official evidence before us, we have also a very authentic source of information in the journal of Colonel Harmar. This could furnish no motive for misrepresentation; and continually we meet with the

complaint occurring, of the scarcity and badness of the provision furnished, and deficiency of the article of salt.

For a few months after the grass had sprung, the food furnished the army was better, and their temper greatly mended with it; but, towards autumn, when the grass became coarse, or was killed by the summer's sun, and the fall fevers raged generally, every thing got once more into confusion.

It was not in the course of nature, for troops half-naked, badly fed, never supplied with salt food, but uniformly with rice and fresh beef, and the latter generally of an inferior quality, with a very moderate quantity of salt, not to be affected with other diseases than those incident to the climate. Accordingly, to add to their miseries, the dysentery began to make dreadful havoc among them. To this distressing disease, many fell victims; and to the real suffering and loss which it occasioned, was added, that depression of spirit which general affects an army attacked by it—an effect not a little aggravated by the state of listless inactivity, to which the main army was subjected.

The deaths, at this time, were alarmingly frequent. Scarcely an officer, it is believed, escaped entirely from sickness; and the report of Colonel Menges, of the inspector's department, when he mustered the men a short time afterwards, presents a dreadful return of the mortality that had prevailed. Who can contemplate this scene of suffering, without recognizing the debt of gratitude that it gives rise to? Nothing but the simplest supports of nature, were required by the suffering soldier; and that could not be afforded him. Nor were the officers much better provided for. Destitute of money, they could command nothing but what the camp afforded; and even in sickness, owed the ordinary attentions and comforts of an hospital, very generally, to private benevolence.

It may seem surprising, that after the many prospects of supplies of clothing that had presented themselves in the spring, the army still should remain in the greatest want of that article. But, scarcely had the whole been clothed, when it became necessary to discharge five or six hundred of the troops; and when their places were supplied, by an accession of near six hundred from North Carolina, who arrived in the fall of this year, the work of clothing was again to be renewed. Besides, the winter was approaching, the clothing received had been adapted to the summer, and orders must necessarily be taken, to provide the whole in a manner proper for the approaching season.

By the unfortunate interception of the general's answer to John Banks, accepting his proposal, that plan for supplying the army had totally failed.—Months had elapsed before the general's acceptance reached him; and when he repaired to Georgetown in the fall, a new arrangement must necessarily be

made. Some new propositions were submitted to the general: but, as he disapproved of them, Banks made his way into Charleston again, and having there found some friends, to favour his views, obtained a passport of a very liberal kind, from the commandant of that place, authorizing his egress and regress; and with this passport, he came out to the American camp.

He arrived on the last of October, when every thing there was literally at its worst. The winter had commenced early, and the naked and houseless troops had the dreary prospect before them, of shivering through the cold season in their comfortless huts. Comfortless in the last degree, as the following extract from the orderly-book, of the 29th of October, explicitly proves:—"The general sincerely sympathizes with the army in their sufferings for want of provisions, and cannot but express the high sense he has of the dignity and patience with which they bear it; but as their sufferings are of a much longer continuance than he had the fullest assurances should happen, he is obliged, in order to relieve the present distresses of the army, to send out military parties to collect beef and hogs. Each brigade, therefore, will furnish a subaltern and twelve men to make an immediate collection; and that it may be done in the most regular manner, the parties will take order from Major Forsyth, at the magazine, both as to the places of collecting, and the mode of delivery.

"As this mode is always disagreeable to the inhabitants, and creates animosities between them and the army, nothing but the last necessity can render it eligible, and when adopted, it should be conducted with the greatest prudence, delicacy, and equality among the people. The general desires the officers, therefore, who go on this duty, to regulate their conduct accordingly, and prevent, as far as possible, any insults and impositions upon the inhabitants; and such as neglect it may expect complaints will most assuredly follow them to camp," &c.

As this measure was one which brought the authority of the state and United States into direct collision, it was not adopted until urged by the choice between impressing or disbanding; nor until the most explicit warning given to Mr. Hort, the state commissary, that such must be the consequence if the troops were not supplied.

After some correspondence, in which Mr. Hort really writes in the manner of one who was earnest in the discharge of his duty, to the utmost of his means and talents, General Greene, on the 21th, replies to him:—"By your letters to me, and from Colonel Morris' report, as well as from the letters you have written to Major Forsyth, and others in the commissary's department, it appears but too evident you have by no means that certainty of furnishing the

army with provisions, which is necessary for my justification, in trusting to the present mode alone for supplies. The army have had but a few days' rice for more than a month. Our prospects of beef are not less alarming than our supplies of rice have been deficient. The discipline and temper of the army are ruined, from the irregular manner in which they are subsisted; and a continuance, not to say an increase of the difficulties on this head, will soon reduce things to a state of desperation. My duty obliges me, therefore, to call on you to give me a decisive answer, whether you can, by the present mode, afford certain and effectual supplies for the army or not. If you cannot, some other measures must be adopted. The provisions and forage required for the army will not amount to this state's quota of the continental expense, and if the people have not the virtue and patriotism necessary for our support, we must do one of two things, either leave the country, or subsist ourselves by force. These are dreadful alternatives, and in giving your answer, you should well consider the resources you have, and the resources necessary to obtain them. Colonel Morris tells me you say you could obtain plenty if you had money. This proves there is no scarcity; but money you cannot hope for. If the states would pay their taxes in specie, we should want no specifics. Our subsistence would be easy, liberal, and certain. But if they cannot or will not pay in money they ought to be made to pay in specific articles, without all those difficulties you complain of. It is true, there is no proportioning the burthen equally, and there is the hardship; but in your situation you must lay aside delicacy, and all the fear of offending, in obtaining supplies, where so much depends upon success."

When General Greene adopted this style of authority, no one ever doubted what was to follow. Mr. Hort submitted this letter to the governor and council, and the affair ended, for the present, with a shrug of the shoulders. But from this time it is obvious that a spirit of hostility lurked in the governor's council, ready to manifest itself wherever occasion permitted. Impressments went on whenever supplies were deficient, and the general subsisted the army at the hazard of having a certain grant repealed, which had not yet been realized; some of his friends thought it madness, but the service was his great concern.

But something more was necessary to tranquillize the army. Clothing must be procured for the winter; and General Lincoln had given General Greene a *carte blanche* to procure it from Charleston, if practicable. Difficulties had now begun to appear in negotiating bills upon the financier. None of the states had complied with those requisitions of congress, upon which the funds of Mr. Morris' system were to be realized; out of six millions required, only one had

been paid. A terrible disappointment also had occurred in Europe; the loan negotiated by Dr. Franklin, on the credit of France, had been exhausted in the advances made by that government, or in the purchase of articles which Dr. Franklin thought more needful for war than money. The venerable doctor had counted too largely on unpurchased services, and patriotic sacrifices, (*his funds in America*;) and the more calculating financier had counted too largely upon *his funds in Europe*. Mercantile men are never fond of trusting where there is a want of power to coerce taxes, or contributions; and very serious doubts began to be entertained on the sufficiency of Mr. Morris' bank to meet his engagements.

If the actions and opinions of the men of that day be as much an object of curiosity with the reader as they are with the writer, the following extract of a letter from Mr. Morris, portending the present state of things, will not be unacceptable. * "I have observed, by the tenor of several of your letters on the subject of the confederation, that your sentiments coincide entirely with my own. The insufficiency of that instrument is daily felt, and the want of obligatory and coercive clauses on the states will probably be productive of the most fatal consequence. At present they content themselves with the assertion, that each has done most, and that the people are not able to pay taxes. Languor and in exertion are the offspring of this doctrine, and finally, the people that are said to be incapable of taxation, actually pay double the sum that would be necessary in the first instance. Nothing on my part has been omitted, that I could think of, to stimulate them to exertions, and I have given them every encouragement to support my arrangements, that could be derived from regularity, system, and economy. But all this does not produce the effect it ought; there are in every legislature, characters too full of local attachments and views, to permit sufficient attention to the general interests. I am perfectly sensible, and was, the day I became superintendant of finance, of the difficulties that are to be encountered. I know full well that it requires much time, more patience, and greater abilities than I claim, to bring the finances to the order they ought to be in, in every well regulated country. But I apprehend this knowledge ought not to deter either you or me from continuing the struggle with those difficulties. If I had been deterred by their appearance from the acceptance of my appointment, our affairs would probably have been worse than they now are; or if you had declined to oppose the British arms in the southern states, Virginia might now have formed the boundary line. You,

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therefore, my dear sir, *must continue your exertions with or without men, provisions, clothing, or pay, in hopes all things will come right at last, and I will continue mine until somebody more competent shall be found to relieve me.*

“With respect to the pay of the army, we have abolished the system of partial payments; the officers with you will be furnished monthly with their subsistence money; and let their distance be what it may, they shall have the same payments with those that are nearer. How much pay I shall be able to make, depends absolutely on the collection of taxes in the several states,” &c.

It is too well known, that this resource, in a great measure, failed; and, consequently, no subsistence money was furnished the famished officers. The abolition of partial pay amounted, in effect, to a total abolition of pay; the states not being permitted to pay their own troops exclusively, paid nothing. But, still the appearance of mutiny, exhibited in the Pennsylvania line; the palpable uncertainty of subsistence through the state commissary; the precariousness of the sources from which clothing must be drawn; the total stop to transportation in Virginia and North Carolina; the approach of the sickly season; and the close neighbourhood of a retreat for a discontented army: had been so strongly pressed upon the superintendant, that he not only sanctioned the purchase of clothing, by bills to be drawn on him, without limitation of description or sum; but, actually confided some of his hard guineas to Mr. George Abbot Hall, to be expended mysteriously, as it would seem, for the money was placed, perhaps, for safe-keeping, in the hands of the governor. Mr. Hall may have been the secret agent, of whom Mr. Marshall speaks; and if so, the mystery of his scruples, when General Greene demanded money of him, is explained. The fact, certainly, by some means, got wind, that he had money for the use of the army. General Greene appears to have drawn it from him, never, we believe, but on one occasion, and then by force of authority. He held (we are to presume from Mr. Marshall's note) a secret military chest, in miniature, for the use of the army. If so, it soon became obvious, that a detachment of his guineas was indispensable to prepare the ways for launching the bills on the financier into circulation.

Mr. Hall appeared in South Carolina, as the *receiver in behalf of the United States*, authorized, we presume, to receive from the state, the quota to the eight million contribution, which had been required of the states in November, 1781, and of the five per cent. duty proposed to be levied on imported and prize goods. If the money, at this time deposited in his hands, was intended for the occasional use of the army, he certainly did great injustice to the views of Mr. Morris; for, his having money of the United States, or of Mr. Morris', in his hands, for the use of the army, appears to have come accidentally to

the knowledge of General Greene; and when the latter, on the 6th of November, required of him an advance of twelve hundred guineas, he intimates in his answer of the 8th, *"that the money had been confided to him by Mr. Morris, to take up his notes, or those of his bank;"* we presume, at their depreciated value; for he says—*"should I part with it, I shall be exceedingly censurable, particularly after Mr. Morris' instructions to me, wherein he says, that every shilling of it to him is worth pounds."* He admits, however, *"that he was authorized to let General Greene have small sums upon the most pressing occasions."*

General Greene conceived, that this pressing occasion had arrived, and, notwithstanding Mr. Hall declared that he should be bankrupted by the demand, insisted upon, and obtained the twelve hundred guineas. "For," says he, *"I cannot conceive that it can be appropriated by the honourable Mr. Morris, for any use but the service of this department; and, as I have received orders from the secretary at war, to obtain clothing for the army (which the financier must be acquainted with;) and knowing that I shall be obliged to make use of every resource to obtain the supply, he will not, I think, order this cash to be applied to any other purpose. The season is so far advanced, as to render an immediately supply absolutely necessary. No measures can be effectually taken, without the aid of twelve hundred guineas; and with the cash, I shall get the articles thirty per cent. below the current price; when, indeed, I fear they cannot be procured, at any rate, without it."*

Whether true or false, such was the representation that had been made to General Greene by Banks. He had been admitted to a personal interview, and submitted to him an offer, as from the merchants in Charleston, to take his bills on Mr. Morris, at par, for the cash, value of the clothing, could the sum of twelve hundred guineas be obtained as a cash payment. Those bills constituted the only resource confided to Greene, for purchasing the clothing; and the intrinsic difficulty of getting any one, much less the merchants of Charleston, to receive them in payment, satisfied him, that if the present opportunity were lost, it would be long before he found another of furnishing winter clothing for his troops.

In addition to the many causes operating at this time to excite anxiety on the subject of clothing, was one which could not fail of creating the most serious discontents in the minds of the troops. Their commander had been obliged, by circumstances, to make a partial distribution of all then on hand, to the direct prejudice of the troops in service.

Under the recommendation of General Greene, and the approbation of congress, the army had just gone through an entire change in its organiza-

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Banks complied with his undertaking, and the army was in a few weeks comfortably clad, and, as General Wayne says, "better clothed than he ever saw American troops." Nor was there any reason to believe that the articles to be procured were charged to the government at higher prices than what might reasonably have been expected, although the advantage of thirty per cent. on the purchase should have resolved itself into the saving of the discount, which would have been exacted on the bills without the cash. In this view the bargain was by no means a hard one.

But this unfortunate negotiation, in the sequel, involved Greene, (through a course of consequences the most remote and improbable) first, in the most injurious suspicions, (suspicions still resting on the minds of many,) and then, in pecuniary embarrassments, vexatious, distressing, and ruinous.

After a lapse of near forty years, the piety of his friends has accumulated in our hands, the most triumphant proofs of his innocence, but to virtuous sensibility, forty years of calumny and suspicion appear an eternity. Yet let virtue remain confident, that though calumny and envy will attack, and villainy beset, time will lift the veil that covers truth, and Providence provide the instrument for doing justice to the memory of the benefactors of mankind. The virtue that purposes to itself no motive more sublime than wealth, or contemporaneous fame, has no claims to the higher attributes or incidents of virtue.

Of all the officers at this time attached to the army, there were none who shared more largely in the personal confidence of General Greene, than Major Burnet and Major Forsyth. The former had been in his family ever since the movement of the army from Boston to New-York, and had ever proved himself an honourable, intelligent, and assiduous aid. He was often employed in that capacity, in services of the most laborious and confidential nature, and ever acquitted himself in such a manner as to command the entire approbation of the general, as an officer and a friend.

Major Forsyth had also, from a very early period, served in the army, in the Virginia line, and signally distinguished himself by his gallantry and good conduct. His talents, urbanity of manners, and gentlemanly deportment, had attracted the early notice of General Greene, and when appointed to the command of the southern department, he resolved to attach Major Forsyth to his command. With this view he recommended him strongly to the appointment of deputy commissary general of purchases, for the United States, and commissary general for the state of Virginia. He received the appointment from the United States, with permission also to act in that capacity for the state of Virginia. It was General Greene's wish to unite the two offices in the same person, as he had done in North and South Carolina, as a measure well calculated to subserve his views in drawing the resources of the state to the use of the army. But the government of Virginia, probably foreseeing the effect of such an union, decided that the two offices were incompatible, and in the person of Major Claiborne, appointed an officer to fill that post, every way, otherwise, entirely satisfactory to General Greene.

When the southern army was retreating from Ninety-Six, Major Forsyth assumed his post, and relieved Major Davie from an office which he had previously filled with unusual applause. Major Davie, from that time, discharged the duties of commissary general to the state of North Carolina.

In an unguarded hour, and unknown to General Greene, both Major Burnet and Major Forsyth had entered into a commercial connexion with Banks, or the house of Hunter and Banks. When this connexion took place is not certainly known, but from Bank's information, it would seem to have been entered into previous to his going into Charleston the last time. It is known, from Major Forsyth's correspondence, that he had had some commercial transactions with Hunter and Banks, at Fredericksburgh, in the spring of the year 1782, whilst pursuing his duties in Virginia; and it is also known, that when Banks repaired to Georgetown, and submitted his second projet of supply to General Greene, that he was directed by the latter to Major Forsyth, as to so much of the proposed contract as had relation to subsistence, to which alone the office of Major Forsyth was properly confined.

Banks, it has since appeared, had already, whilst in Charleston, made very large purchases on the joint account, as he asserts, of Hunter and Banks for one half, and Major Forsyth and Major Burnet each one fourth. And when he entered into contract with General Greene to supply the clothing for the army, the purchase had been already made to the amount of near twenty-three thousand pounds sterling. For officers in the American army to engage in traffic of any kind, with a place in the hands of the enemy, admits of no pallia-

tion, not even that of the poverty to which their faithful services had reduced them. But it becomes still more exceptionable when it is considered in what relation these officers stood to the American commander. And then, to draw a part of the profits of that traffic, from a contract made with him through the agency of a third person, without communicating to him their interest in such a contract, was exposing him to suspicions and imputations, from which either of them ought to have been ready, and would have been ready to lay down his life to defend him. Men seldom follow out the consequences of a first false step, or are too much the slaves of casuistry to open their eyes to those consequences, when under the dazzling influence of interest. It is a monstrous folly for man to act upon the presumption, that there is any thing human so effectually concealed that it cannot be brought to light. In the present instance, a communication made to Hunter, in Fredericksburgh, under circumstances of the most refined precaution, proved the means of discovering the existence of this secret copartnership between them and Forsyth and Burnet.

As Banks had presented himself to General Greene as an agent, not as a seller, it, of course, became necessary to supply him with funds. This was the purpose for which the twelve hundred guineas had been drawn from Mr. Hall; and for the same purpose, bills to the amount of eight thousand pounds, were drawn on Mr. Morris, and committed to his hands. That it was not unreasonable to repose this confidence in Mr. Banks, results from the consideration, that he had been brought to General Greene's notice, by such men as Mr. Clay and Mr. Waties—was recognized as an acquaintance by Captain Pendleton, and connected with a house of considerable standing in Fredericksburgh.

Banks had no sooner received the bills, than he forwarded them, under the agency of Mr. Forsyth, to his partner in Fredericksburgh. As far as Cumberland Old Court-House, the packet which contained the bills, were forwarded by a Captain Shelton, connected with the wagon master's department; and to insure their further transportation, they were inclosed in an envelope, to Governor Harrison at Richmond, with a request from Mr. Forsyth, that they should be forwarded to their direction. Induced by a hint from Shelton, founded on the honourable act of looking over Major Forsyth's shoulder, while making up the packet, General Scott, through whose hands they passed from Cumberland, was induced to adopt the resolution of breaking open the envelope directed to the governor, "in order," as he expresses himself, "to do justice to the public, and detect any species of speculation, that might be on foot at the public expense."

The envelope contained a packet directed to Hunter, and a small note from Forsyth to the governor, requesting him, as has been mentioned, to forward it. Scott proceeded with his scrutiny, and in the packet found a letter, dated 7th November, from Forsyth, and another from Banks, giving a full account of their connexion in this traffic, and conveying the bills, as the first fruits of it. Major Burnet is mentioned as one of the copartners, with a particular request, that his interest be kept secret. The next day, another note to Hunter was brought to Cumberland by the line of expresses, which, at that time, was the only substitute for mail-conveyance, and franked by Major Forsyth, who, as commissary of purchases, had a right to transmit dispatches by that conveyance. General Scott made no hesitation about opening this letter also. It was from Banks; and from it, it appeared, that Banks, during his residence in Charleston, had been dealing largely in those corrupt practices, which a state of war never fails to introduce or develope in commercial communities. He had formed connexions for carrying on a trade, under double papers, for the purpose of importing salt and shipping tobacco. All this, although giving a complete insight into Banks' character and habits, suggested no imputation on General Greene. But, Banks' letter also contained the following passage:—"I find General Greene an exceedingly agreeable man; and from hints dropt already, expect his proposals for an interest in a house we may establish in Charleston." It also, in speaking with reference to a former letter, the contents of which do not appear, contains this passage:—"I then gave you a hint of an advantageous plan I had in contemplation, which I hope time will convince, I have not been mistaken in. By the superior interests of my friends in Charleston, I have a passport, not only to come to camp, where General Greene recommended my spending a few days, previous to evacuation; but, have also leave to return to town, an indulgence not obtainable by any person in either party."

Taking the whole of these letters together, General Scott thought that he had made a discovery of the last importance; and immediately inclosing them to the governor and council, he sent them off by the same individual who had brought the parcel first received, intending to add his private information to the import of the letters; for the contents of them, it appears, General Scott confided to him. But, Governor Harrison was far from approving of the conduct of General Scott; and after writing him a reproachful letter, he forwarded the letters of the 7th of November, covering the bills, to Hunter, according to their direction, without perusing their contents. To General Scott's reply, therefore, forcing a knowledge of their contents upon the governor, are we indebted for the substance of the two letters of Banks and

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Forsyth, of the 7th of November. The entire copy of the one last received, which bears date, Ashley-Hill, October —, is now before us.

By some means, (and we can perceive no probable means but through General Scott and Shelton) the subject soon became public in Virginia; and the governor, in council, thought it proper to inclose copies of General Scott's communications to General Greene:

The official letter, accompanying the copies of General Scott's two letters, and of the one of October from Banks, show, that although now treated as a matter of state, the communication was an offering of sincere good-will and respect, in Governor Harrison and his council.

“ VIRGINIA—IN COUNCIL—*December 24th, 1782.*

“ SIR,

“ The inclosed copies of letters from Mr. John Banks and Major Forsyth, discover a dangerous partnership entered into by those gentlemen with others, to carry on an illicit trade within the southern states, entirely injurious to them, and contrary to the strongest recommendations of congress, and the good faith so solemnly pledged to our good allies the French, that I look on it as a duty incumbent on me, to acquaint you with the particulars, in order that such steps may be taken, as well to prevent the scheme's being carried into execution, as to call to account the officers of your army, who have so imprudently entered into a connexion derogatory to their characters as officers, and abusive of that confidence you have been pleased to place in them. The letters will so fully explain the whole transaction, that I need not trouble you with any comment of mine, further than to observe, that Mr. Banks has endeavoured to involve you in this business, by hinting, a desire in you to become a partner; and that he had liberties granted him, by your connivance, that could not be obtained by any other person. These insinuations, I assure you, sir, have made no impression to your disadvantage, either with me or any member of my council. Your character stands in too exalted a point of view with us, to be aspersed by any thing that can fall from so trifling an individual. Yet, it may not be amiss, to let him feel the weight of your resentment for his presumption, lest the uninformed may differ with us in sentiment. You will see, that the letters are public here, and by what means they became so.”

This letter, although dated in December, did not reach head-quarters until the 1st of February; and in the mean time, rumour was careering on all the winds of heaven, dropping her venom into every ear. The report spread far

and wide, that the American general, employing the funds of the public, had, through the agency of Banks, opened a lucrative commerce with Charleston; and in a short time, it was superadded, that Mr. Robert Morris particeps in the iniquity, had given him an unlimited right of drawing, in order to furnish a capital for speculation. The reader will not be surprised to understand further, that rumour should appeal to official documents, in possession of the governor and council of Virginia, for support; and allege, that the distresses of his soldiers, and the abused faith of a confiding country, already produced an abundant harvest of profit. The facts were all such as were just calculated to give currency to such misrepresentations.

It will be less surprising, that such rumours got abroad, when it is noticed that, with the most benevolent intentions to direct them, the governor and council had, themselves, palpably misinterpreted one passage in Banks' letter. They suppose him to lay claim to extraordinary privileges, derived from the connivance of the commander of the southern department; whereas, Banks expressly attributes them to the influence of his friends in town; and had it been understood, for what purpose his return was sanctioned by his employers out of town, General Lincoln, who had expressly directed the attention of Greene to this channel for procuring clothing, would have been unequally proper as an object of these injurious suspicions.

From the first opening of this trade with Charleston, through Colonel Lee and Colonel Laurens, General Greene had acted with the greatest circumspection, from a full perception of the extreme delicacy of the transaction. Nothing had been done in it, without a direct reference to the governor and council of the state; and under their *surveillance* had every previous purchase been made. Their superintendence was no longer thought necessary, after the instructions received from the war department, to avail himself of that method, as the only possible one of clothing the troops.

But it happened, most unfortunately, that the public mind in Virginia, was, at this time, prepared for unfavourable impressions, both against Mr. Morris and General Greene. Against the former for causes which appear in Governor Harrison's letter, of the 21st of January, 1782; and against the latter, from occurrences which have already been narrated. Most of the cavalry officers had taken part with Captain Gunn; nor is it wonderful, if the assertion of Colonel White be recollected, "that there was not one of them who had not from one to three of the public horses in their possession." These gentlemen were all from Virginia, and that state rung with complaints against the arbitrary and ungrateful conduct of a general, who, after taking care of himself, had deprived his officers of the only indemnity they had ever been able to get for their

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losses. From north and south complaints had been, at the same time, pouring into Virginia against the same object; for in congress also, it will be recollected, great umbrage had been given by General Greene's complaints of a want of support in March preceding.

Before we can reach the sequel of this disagreeable affair, it is necessary to go back to the events that had occurred prior to the receipt of Governor Harrison's letter.

The enemy had pressed their preparations for evacuating the town with spirit and effect. The distresses resulting from his confined situation had been greatly relieved by the wise measures adopted by General Leslie. By giving permission to the loyalists to return and make their peace with their countrymen, he had relieved himself of great numbers; even the celebrated General Cunningham, (in the main a man of principle,) with a body of one hundred of his followers, had availed himself of this license. A swarm of others, who carried with them a swarm of plundered slaves, had been furnished with transports to take them to St. Augustine; and finally, after he had advanced far in levelling the works of the town and Fort Johnson, he ordered all who were well affected to the American cause, to quit the city in twenty-four hours, under penalty of being considered spies. This measure, whilst it disembarrassed him of a number of useless mouths and suspected friends, was ingeniously calculated to give pretexts to many for casting themselves upon the mercy of their country, who had not availed themselves of the governor's proclamation, or had been excepted from its benefits.

Having nearly completed his preparations for sailing, he opened a communication with General Greene, on the subject of his peaceable departure. As there were still many persons in his train whose hearts were swelling with revengeful feelings, and from whom he really apprehended some attempts to fire the town, his views appear not only prudent but benevolent; and as no possible advantage could be taken of him, but by an attack upon his rear-guard, an injury that could amply be revenged on the town from his shipping, an agreement took place, in which it was understood that the Americans should take possession as the enemy's rear-guard retired; that no attempt should be made upon the latter, and no injury done the city either before or after their departure.

Saturday, the 14th of December, was the day fixed for the evacuation; and the morning gun as the signal for the enemy's rear-guard to abandon their advanced redoubts. These crossed the neck a little beyond where the King and Meeting-street roads now unite.

General Wayne, at the head of three hundred infantry, the cavalry of the legion, and a detachment of artillery, with two six pounders, passed the river at

Ashley Ferry, the evening before, and moved within a quarter of a mile of the enemy's pickets. CHAP.
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At the appointed signal the two parties got in motion, and, at the assigned distance of two hundred yards, moved down the King-street road, the only avenue, at that time, to the city.

After passing the lines, the enemy filed off to Gadsden's Wharf, where boats attended their arrival, and there they were immediately embarked. Wayne moved on, and halted at the intersection of the two principal streets, about eleven o'clock.

In the rear of the American advanced party came the governor, escorted by two hundred cavalry, and attended by the general in person; his council, and a number of officers and citizens, following mounted. This gallant cavalcade did not pass through the streets unnoticed. Scarcely any but the aged and the women remained in the town, but no language can express the exhibition of feeling which burst from all as they passed. It was a sentiment which found expression only in kneeling and in tears. It was at the THRONE OF GRACE, that it vented itself, but its object was to invoke blessings on their deliverers.

Arrived at the centre of the city, the governor, the commander, and their retinue, alighted to exchange congratulations. The whole was a scene of mute thankfulness; not a lip was steady enough to venture on a word.

Many prudent precautions had been taken by the governor and council, to prevent the consequences that might have attended the hour of this transition; and the vigilance of Wayne's patrols, preserved the most perfect tranquillity and order in every part of the city. In the course of that day, and the next, many hundreds of the citizens who had approached the city in all directions, waiting the evacuation, many of whom had passed through all the vicissitudes of distress that three years of exile could produce, arrived to revisit their desolate mansions. Many were found stripped, and often soiled and abused; but, it is a tribute of justice to the enemy, and particularly to General Leslie, to acknowledge, that it is only wonderful they were not much worse.

The next day the enemy put to sea, and South Carolina was once more delivered from her invaders, after being two years and seven months, sometimes partially, sometimes wholly in their possession; and having suffered every thing that civil rage, contemptuous tyranny, and the ravages and necessities of war could inflict.

One of the most striking incidents of the evacuation, was the astonishing number of deserters left behind. We are in possession of the names of three hundred and fifty, who reported themselves during the year 1782; but, this was whilst it was necessary to surrender themselves to the army. After the

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evacuation, this was unnecessary, and was not done. Hundreds made their appearance from cellars and chimneys, as soon as it could be done with safety. Not a Hessian went back but under compulsion; and even of the other troops, few appeared disposed to adhere to their colours, but those who had previously deserted from the American standard, or enlisted in the country. Of these, the number was, by no means, small; for, wherever the enemy got possession of the country, it is so true, that they were very successful in recruiting. Perhaps it was discovered, that the cowardly American changed his character when dressed up in the royal red.

General Leslie has been severely censured, for taking off at the evacuation, a great number of slaves plundered from the inhabitants. On this subject, we possess no other information than what is derived from the writers of the day. Being a subject altogether of a civil nature, all the negotiations relating to it, were conducted by the governor and council. The number said to have been lost to the state, is from twenty to twenty-five thousand. We know not upon what data this information is founded; but, if from a comparison of the tax returns, prior and subsequent to the evacuation of Charleston, the result cannot be relied on, it must be determined, whether the slaves of the country multiplied by natural increase, more than they diminished by the effects of their condition. There were two causes that must have produced a more than ordinary mortality among them. The prevalence of the small-pox, which carried off thousands, particularly of those who were brought into Charleston, and the absence of their owners, for whose care, in infancy and sickness, there was no adequate substitute provided.

When it was well ascertained, that the evacuation would take place, Governor Matthews addressed General Leslie, on the subject of the negroes then under his control, assuring him, that if they should be carried off, British debts, and marriage settlement claims of British subjects on confiscated estates, which had been exempted from confiscation under the acts then passed, should be seized upon as reprisal. Commissioners were mutually appointed to discuss the subject, and a treaty finally entered into, stipulating for the return of all the negroes in the power of General Leslie, *except such as had rendered themselves obnoxious by services rendered the enemy, and such as had been expressly promised their freedom.*

It is easy to foresee how a treaty encumbered with such a saving clause, would be executed. Edward Blake and Roger Parker Saunders, Esqs. were nominated, on the part of the state, to reside under a flag in the city, to superintend the execution of the treaty. When the fleet of transports for St. Augustine was about to sail, the commissioners were permitted to inspect the negroes

on board the transports, but the captains of the convoying ships substituted their word of honour instead of a search of their vessels. Near one hundred and fifty plundered slaves were found in these transports, who could be identified, and the delivery of them was promised for the next morning. But no more than half the number was then produced, and the delivery of these refused upon a pretext so frivolous, that the governor declared the treaty at an end, and no more was heard of these slaves. If Governor Matthews had a distinguishing fault, it was a hasty temper. A little more temporizing in managing this affair would either have secured a number of slaves, or put the enemy so much in fault, as to furnish strong ground for demanding indemnity of their government after the peace.

Yet the saving clause in the treaty furnished abundant ground for taking off a considerable number. Scarcely an officer, or his wife or mistress, was without one or more of the planter's slaves, to whom no doubt they would all have promised freedom; and there were many who, if they had not been actually in arms, had been employed in various services that relieved the British soldiers. By assigning them to a thousand of those services for which General Greene had to take men from his ranks, such as servants, wagoners, barmen, &c. the enemy were enabled greatly to relieve, and, indirectly, to re-enforce their army.

Thus five hundred were shipped to New-York for pioneers;* and Colonel Moncrief is said to have had eight hundred employed in all the numerous duties of the engineer and ordinance departments, and to have taken them all off with him when he sailed. It is also confidently asserted of this gentleman, that after shipping them as the king's men, he sold them in the West Indies as his own men.† If this be true, it exhibits a lamentable picture of fraud and depravity.

It is highly probable, that after entering into this treaty, General Leslie found it exceedingly difficult to carry it into execution. Opposition must have met him in every quarter, not only from avarice and private interest, but from thousands of amorous connexions well known to have existed. And finally, there can be little doubt, that multiplied evasions of his authority took place to effect the shipping off of innumerable individuals. Every one knows that the body of a suffocated slave, headed up in a rice-barrel, drifted into the market-dock the day that the fleet crossed the bar.

* Moultrie.

† Montrie.

Those of these people who had not the misfortune of being taken to St. Augustine, the Bay of Honduras, and the West India Islands, but were transported to Nova Scotia and Great Britain when New-York was evacuated, are said to have formed the basis of the colonial establishment at Sierra Leone.

After the evacuation of the city, the greatest part of the army were marched down to James' Island, and there halted for the winter. The Virginia cavalry to the number of two hundred, under Major Swan, were posted near Combahee, as well to be at hand, for the protection of Georgia from the force at St. Augustine, as for the convenience of forage. Here they remained until April, when the want of forage, and the approach of peace, caused their removal to the Congarees.

The legion was posted for similar purposes, and at the instance of the legislature, in the vicinity of Georgetown, where it remained until ordered on to the north, after the conclusion of the war.

But one military movement of any kind was made after the evacuation of the city.

General Greene, as soon as that event took place, proceeded to Georgia, and having ascertained that the enemy in St. Augustine were fourteen hundred strong, and the inhabitants to the south under some apprehension of an attack, ordered on a detachment of the Virginia cavalry, for their protection. Some time afterwards, understanding that two regiments had sailed from New York for St. Augustine, he dispatched Major Finley, at the head of the Virginia infantry and artillery, to take post in that state; and there they remained for the residue of the war.

We have seen, that the army was now comfortably clad; and for the first time, enjoyed regular supplies of liquors, which were readily procured in Charleston for drafts on the financier. But, will it be believed, that they were compelled to collect their food at the point of the bayonet! Since the last communication with Governor Matthews, an arrangement had been made for sanctioning that mode of collecting subsistence, through the agency of Colonel Carrington; and the army was, of consequence, becoming more and more unpopular.

But, the legislature was shortly to meet, and the hope was fondly cherished, that some steps would be taken by that body, to raise funds on account of the continent, that might be applied to the maintenance of the army.

Just the reverse was the case. The whole state became indignant at having the maintenance of the army, thrown exclusively upon it, when it was known

how much it had already contributed, and how it had suffered. Congress was charged with deserting them in their distresses; and the financier with dealing ungenerously, in casting them upon North Carolina and Virginia, from whom nothing was to be expected. They were sensible, that they could not dispense with the army, and that it ought not to be left to starve; but, to leave them to maintain it exclusively, was to throw too much of the general burthen upon a small and exhausted state.

The height to which murmurs had risen, will be imagined, when General Greene wrote—"The inhabitants are so soured by this mode, that it will almost create a civil war to continue it."* And the privations of the troops, will be judged of from the following extract from Colonel Harmar's journal: "25th of December, 1782. Poor christmas—no beef nor rum for the men." For all, beside, it was a day of plenty, or of waste.

Authority had now been given, to contract for the subsistence of the troops; but, the utmost efforts of the general, persevered in for months, could not prevail on any one to undertake it; the price offered by the contractor, which was limited to that of the northern contracts, was too small; Philadelphia, the place of payment, too remote; and the bills of the financier not very acceptable; and, unfortunately, they were daily growing worse and worse. Two of the states had refused the duty of five per cent. claimed by congress, and very few of them had paid any portion of their quotas; most of them had paid nothing. At length, Mr. Morris, disgusted and distressed, tendered his resignation, and the bills of the southern department were no longer paid when due. Still, however, the confidence of the public, in Mr. Morris' assurance that they would be paid, kept up their sickly credit, and although unwelcome, they were esteemed safe.

Among the holders of these bills, there was no one so deeply interested as John Banks. After the evacuation of the town, Major Forsyth had resigned his office in the army, and embarked in trade with Banks, under the firm of Robert Forsyth & Company; and Banks did business under that of John Banks & Company. In neither firm did the name of Major Burnet appear, though it has since been ascertained, that he was a copartner as well as Banks, of Robert Forsyth & Co. as well as of John Banks & Co. His interest was, for some months, altogether unknown to General Greene, and probably to all others, except through the medium of the discoveries made in Virginia.—Major Burnet had intimated to General Greene, his intention to go into a

* Major Egleston, 2d April, 1783.

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business to which he was bred, as soon as the town should fall; and it appeared afterwards, that the mention of this intention to Mr. Banks, at Ashley-Hill, together with the suggestion by the general, that he would be flattered by any assistance afforded Burnet, was the ground work of Banks' surmise, that proposals would be made in behalf of General Greene, for an interest in the trade. Banks, probably, had been recently in the circles in Charleston, in which such hints led to such consequences; and having mingled much in the corruptions of trade and power, drew his inferences from recent experience.

It appears, however, that General Greene never believed (the Virginia letters notwithstanding) that Major Burnet had ever connected himself with Banks, until after the town was evacuated; nor then, until after he had visited his friends in Jersey, and obtained their approbation. This opportunity was afforded him, by his being dispatched with the communications on the evacuation, and charged with waiting, in person, on the commander in chief, to advise upon ulterior measures, an uniform practice of General Greene's, upon every great change in the posture of public affairs—intended to obviate the delays attendant on a correspondence; as the aid so dispatched was competent to answer the inquiries which such changes would suggest. His absence from the army, which was protracted until the middle of April, precluded that personal intercourse which might otherwise have led to a knowledge of his interest on Banks' commercial establishments.

Until the receipt of Governor Harrison's letters, which was on the 3d February, General Greene had every reason to feel himself under much obligation to Mr. Banks. The countenance and support of his house, kept up the credit of the government bills; and in a recent instance, he thought he had experienced a striking proof of his liberality and public spirit.

When the Pennsylvania and Maryland lines were reduced into one full regiment, the troops of the other states underwent a correspondent reformation. The number of officers remaining with the army, was, of consequence, greatly reduced. After the length of service that these gentlemen had been subjected to, without a cent of pay, and no clothing, (but one small supply of linen and a pair of boots, when the manufacturing establishment in Georgetown could afford them) it will be readily supposed, that the state of their wardrobes was but ill-adapted to mingling in the society of Charleston. Nor was their personal appearance unaffected by the contrast with the neat and soldier-like appearance of the troops, after passing from their rags to a state of comfort heightened by a smack of taste.

General Greene was so impressed by the necessity of affording them some relief, that he resolved to draw on the financier for two month's pay to each of

them, and trust to the justice of the effort, and the known influence and friendship of General Lincoln, to vindicate the measure.

The bills were accordingly drawn; but, so many circumstances had concurred to reduce the credit of the financier, that nobody would take them—they began to be considered as of the same progeny with continental money. Nor was it without cause; for though the whole sum amounted only to four thousand dollars, Mr. Morris' answer to the communication which announced the draft, contains a declaration—"that it was four thousand times as much as he knew where to get money to meet the payment of."

In this state of things, the house of R. Forsyth & Co. came forward, and offered to receive the bills in payment of purchases made at their store; and, although there can be little doubt, that some advance was made upon their goods, to countervail the inconveniences that might result from the mode of payment, yet General Greene was certainly led to consider it as an act of great liberality, and a personal gratification, intended to his own feelings. Will it be believed, that this was afterwards made the ground-work of the most mortifying calumny, which the general had to encounter—to wit: that he had speculated on the necessities of his own officers. Never was man the victim of such distorted misrepresentations!

Before the receipt of Governor Harrison's letter, the house of J. Banks & Company, had become contractors for the subsistence of the army.

Not a month elapsed, after the evacuation of Charleston, before a crisis approached, which had nearly placed the army that delivered it, in a state of open hostility with the country and its government.

Nothing is more common in actual life, than for those who, in war, are regarded as the pillars of a nation, to be regarded in a very different light, when danger removes to a distance. The departure of the enemy, had been looked forward to by all classes of men, as the era of their deliverance from every care, and more especially, every circumstance of oppression. But, finding an army among them still subsisted at the point of the bayonet, many began to exclaim—"that they had gained nothing by the change—that their enemies paid, but their friends exacted gratuitously;" or for certificates to which they attached little value.

The legislature also, which met in Charleston soon after its evacuation, took up the subject with much animation; and the anger excited against congress, the financier, and the states comprised in the southern department, from the latter of whom, at least, they had claims for relief, had very near eventuated in starving the unfortunate and innocent army.

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After the 10th of January it was communicated to General Greene, that the power to impress could no longer be allowed to be exercised; and the consequence would have been, that after that date all impressments would have been punishable under the state laws, as individual trespasses.

The necessity to find a contractor became now imperative, or the choice must be made between the alternatives of the general's rendering himself the object of civil suits, public prosecution, and general odium; or of turning loose the soldiery to support themselves by the bayonet. In fact, the resources of supply of beef, by impressment, had nearly failed, for no one would bring their cattle within the limits to which the state of things necessarily confined it, and, in more than one instance, the painful measure was resorted to of drawing upon the beef in the public market for the subsistence of the army.

It was in vain that letters and advertisements had been circulated to find a contractor; no one offered but J. Banks & Company, and they would not take it at the prescribed prices; no other seemed disposed to take it *at any price, payable in government bills.*

This affair, so important under present circumstances, was committed to the zeal, intelligence and public spirit of Colonel Carrington; and to avoid all imputations of partiality or favouritism, he adopted the precaution of communicating the offer made by Banks to Mr. Hugh Rutledge, the speaker of the house of representatives, then in session, and to solicit that he would lay the subject before the house, and request their advice on any means that could be pointed to, to obtain another contractor and better terms.

To this Mr. Rutledge replies, "I have laid your very polite letter to me before the house of representatives, agreeably to your desire, where it has received that attention which the importance of its subject demanded; however, no competition with Messrs. Banks & Company has been excited in consequence of it. Their terms are thought too high, but as no others have been offered, and the pressing necessities of the army call for immediate relief, it is thought that it will be needless to keep open the contract any longer, under the idea "that more advantageous propositions will be received."

Colonel Carrington then closed with Banks; and the following extract of the communication, in which he announces it to General Greene, shows the fidelity and candour with which the negotiation was conducted. "The contract has now been kept open nearly three months. The gentleman who has undertaken it, is the only one who has made any offer at all. His first proposals amounted to thirteen and a quarter pence sterling per ration. The excess of which was so great that we could not, at every hazard and incon-

venience, accept them. After a long time he fell, by several steps, to something less than eleven pence, equal to seventeen and a half, Pennsylvania currency, per ration; and the difference between that and what would have been a due price, was not an object so great as to lose a contract for, under the pressing distresses of the army, without another resort for relief. *This Mr. Banks knew too well to be reduced lower, while he stood alone for the business."*

CHAPTER XIX.

Banks' affair continued. Secret service. Disputes with the State authorities. Army mutinous. Preliminaries of peace. Preparations for disbanding. Cavalry revolt. Newberg Letters. Evidence of a Conspiracy. Journey to the North. Honours bestowed by the States. Cannon voted by Congress. Returns to Rhode-Island. Sequel of Banks' affair. Posts offered by Congress. Returns to South Carolina. Sacrifices. Appeal to Congress. Visits Georgia. Challenged by Gunn. Duelling.

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NOTHING could exceed the astonishment of General Greene when he received Governor Harrison's communication of December 24th. He sought, instantly, a personal interview with Mr. Banks, and silently submitted the letters to his perusal. Banks admitted his connexion in trade with Majors Forsyth and Burnet—expressed the utmost contrition for this unhappy hint respecting the general—and offered to accompany him, immediately, to a magistrate, and repel it by the fullest recantation. They, accordingly, proceeded to the residence of Mr. Henry Pendleton, then senior associate justice of the state, and Banks made the most positive oath, that General Greene was wholly unconnected in trade, directly or indirectly, with him in any branch of his commercial connections. This oath the general immediately transmitted to Governor Harrison, inclosed in the following letter, which those who are familiar with the features of truth, will readily decide upon :

“HEAD-QUARTERS, *Charleston, February 3d, 1783.*

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4 SIR,

“Your favour of the 24th of December, with the several enclosures, I have had the honour to receive. I am much obliged to the council and yourself, for your generous confidence in my integrity; and hope, every part of my conduct will continue to merit it. I am sensible with you, of the necessity of checking unjust suspicions, and of the impropriety of the liberty Mr. Banks took, even in a confidential letter. There is nothing but the surmise that applies to me. If you will read his letter, you will see, that the special privileges granted him, were by the enemy, not by me. He never had a flag from me, nor any other indulgence whatever. He went into town from Georgetown, under Colonel Lushington's flag, and came out of town under the enemy's flag, with liberty to return again; and this obtained by his friends in Charleston, at the time that it was refused to every body else.

“When it was known, that the enemy intended to evacuate this place, a number of merchants made application to the governor and council, for liberty to remain here with their goods. The perilous situation of the country, induced them to grant it. Before the evacuation, Mr. Banks made large purchases of these merchants; and some little time before it took place, he came out to camp, where he was introduced to me; before which, I had never seen him. Having received orders from General Lincoln, to procure clothing for the army almost at any price, as you may see by his letter, and foreseeing it would be impossible to get it from the northward, and the troops in a suffering condition, I consulted Mr. Banks upon the practicability of procuring an assortment for bills on Mr. Morris. He offered his services, and told me, that if I could advance him the sum of about twelve hundred guineas, he thought he could procure the goods twenty per cent. lower, of the same merchants, before the enemy left the town, than afterwards. I advanced him the money, and drew him a set of bills, the same mentioned in his letter, and forwarded by Major Forsyth; and wrote to General Lincoln, the steps which I had taken to procure the clothing, as you will see by a copy of my letter to him, of the 11th of November. I have been thus particular, that you may comprehend the whole transaction; and that you might have it in your power to inform General Scott, that the intrigue he imagines he had discovered, has no foundation, for the bills were drawn for the public service, and the secretary of war advised thereof. How far Mr. Banks has dealt generously in the prices of the purchases he has made, I cannot tell, having never examined the invoices. Notwithstanding the agreement made with Mr. Banks, I gave the

clothier orders, as you will see by a copy of his instructions, to try all the merchants generally, intending to purchase of him who would serve the public on the best terms. But, unfortunately, the merchants would not sell *for bills* on any terms; and this made our obligation greater to Mr. Banks, who furnished us with all the articles of clothing necessary which we wanted. I have been obliged to draw bills for two month's pay of the officers—Mr. Banks has given those credit also, when few or no other merchants in town would. Every merchant will make his advantages; and I suppose Mr. Banks has done it on the price of his goods furnished the officers. I did not know that Major Burnet had engaged in business with him until a few days ago. I know he had it in contemplation, and intended to leave the army, and go into business, his friends approving thereof; but, I understood him, every thing would be conditional until he consulted them. However, all his engagements have taken place after the evacuation; and it was my intention, he should have been out of my family, before he entered into any business. Lest there should remain a shadow of doubt as to Mr. Banks surmise, I herewith inclose you a copy of a certificate, sworn to before Henry Pendleton, judge of the superior court of this state. I am not conscious of having done any thing in my whole life, that should render a measure of this sort necessary; but, as I cannot tell to what lengths jealousies may run, and knowing that public officers should be like Cæsar's wife, not only innocent, but free from suspicions, I take the liberty of troubling you with this certificate; if any thing of the kind should be insinuated, that you may do me the justice, to which Mr. Banks' imprudence, and General Scott's indelicacy, have exposed me. Mr. Banks took a very improper liberty; nor can I imagine what he should ground it upon, unless it was from my saying to him, that Major Burnet had thoughts of leaving the army and going into business, if the enemy should evacuate Charleston; and should he go into business, as he had long been in my family, he would oblige me by rendering him any service in his power.

"Mr. Banks has entered into contract with Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, for the subsistence of the army; and he was the only person who could be found to make an offer, although the army was near starving, and subsisted at the point of the bayonet. I only mention this, lest you should have a more unfavourable opinion of Mr. Banks than he deserves. How far his going into town, in the first instance, was justifiable, I cannot determine. The transaction was known to the civil authority of this state; and it lay with them to punish him, if he had exceeded the privileges of a citizen belonging to another state."

But, it was soon made known to General Greene, that the calumny had taken too wide a spread, to admit of its resting, uncontradicted, with the public. CHAP.
XIX. He now learnt, that it had preceded the communication from Governor Harrison; and what mortified him in the most sensible degree, had gained ground with too many of his own officers. The late advance of bills for two month's pay, a benefit in which no other officers in the United States participated, and which, on his own responsibility with Mr. Morris and General Lincoln, he had ventured to confer on them, had furnished a new ground for calumny to work upon; and it was, as before hinted, now rumoured, that being interested with Banks in his mercantile transactions, he had cruelly speculated on the necessities of his officers, in their transactions relative to the passing of those bills in the purchase of necessaries. Upon this, he sent for General Wayne and Colonel Carrington, and laying open the bureau of the southern department, requested them to pursue such measures, as they thought the exigencies of the case required—telling them, that the good of the service required one of two things, either, that he should be publicly exposed, if guilty, or restored to the confidence and affections of his officers and the army, if innocent.

The result of this reference, was, a measure which many of General Greene's friends decidedly disapproved of, but which, others justified upon the ground of the official communication from Virginia—the wide-spread of the calumny before it reached his ears—the predisposition to favour it, which had been produced, as well by the bickerings which his attempts at reformation had involved him in with some of his officers, as by the disputes which he had been drawn into with the state government; and still more, by that envy and jealousy, which, to the disgrace of the human heart, his eminence and improved fortunes, could not fail of generating. The measure was, a publication, of which the following is a copy:

“Whatever opinions prevail with the public, either from misconstruction or misrepresentation, operating to the prejudice of an individual, have ever been thought a sufficient apology for giving a state of facts, as an appeal to the people. I should feel less solicitude if I stood alone in this matter; but as my letter, lately opened by General Scott in Virginia, has given grounds of suspicion to the prejudice of others, I feel an obligation to give a full history of the transactions mentioned in that letter.

“Some few weeks before the evacuation of Charleston took place, (but then hourly expected,) I was at Georgetown on business, when I was informed the governor and council of South Carolina, from the deplorable situation that the inhabitants and their negroes were in for want of clothing, and the impossibility of getting any before winter came on, but in this way, had granted permission

CHAP. XIX. to a number of the British merchants, with their property, to remain six months in Charleston after the evacuation. Persuaded that goods would immediately rise after this event, from the increasing demand, and that any contracts made before, to take place after the evacuation, was not counteracting either the views or wishes of the state, I determined to become a purchaser: for this purpose I obtained a flag from Colonel Lushington, who commanded the militia at the post of Georgetown; and with this flag I went into Charleston and made some purchases, to take effect after the enemy were gone. While there, I was taken very sick, and detained much longer than I expected. After I recovered, in some measure, from my indisposition, I obtained a flag from General Leslie, through the interest of the British merchants, to visit some of my friends in our army, which lay between sixteen and eighteen miles from town, and to return into the garrison again, a privilege at that time granted to no others, and is the same expressed in my letter opened by General Scott.

"On my arrival at camp I was introduced to General Greene, who asked me many questions respecting the garrison, and, among other things, the practicability of purchasing clothing for the army. I told him, that it was not only practicable, but that if the goods were engaged before the enemy were gone, and before the country demands came on, they might be had on much better terms, of the same people, than they would afterwards, and offered my services in the business. The general closed with my offers, and advanced me eleven hundred guineas, and gave me a set of bills on the honourable Robert Morris, Esq. for eight thousand dollars, to secure the clothing; and those are the bills forwarded by Captain Shelton. I procured the clothing, and have negotiated the whole business with Captain Hamilton, clothier to the army.

"That I proposed a profit in this business, I readily agree; but I flatter myself, when the risk and mode of payment I am to make for the goods purchased, are compared with those I am to receive, it will be found that I have not only dealt justly, but generously with the public, in the supplies of the army.

"Before my return to Charleston, in conversation with the general, on the commerce of this country, he told me Major Burnet had thoughts of leaving the army, and going into trade after the evacuation; and that if he should, as he had been long in his family, and as he felt a friendship for him, should be much obliged to me for such services as I might have it in my power to afford him. It was from this conversation, I took the liberty of hinting to my partner the probability of the general's taking a concern with us, not considering his peculiar situation, and how dangerous a measure of this kind would prove to public confidence.

"During my stay in camp I had several conversations with Major Burnet, relative to his future plans and prospects; and finding his genius formed for business, I offered him a concern in the house I proposed to establish in Charleston after the enemy were gone, which he consented to engage in, provided his friends to the northward concurred in the measure, and approved of his leaving the army; and it was on this principle, I understood, he wished his name kept secret, until he had succeeded, and settled the matter with his friends, as well as the conditions of retiring, with the secretary at war.

"My conduct was known to the governor and council of this state; and if I had exceeded the limits of propriety, or taken an improper latitude, I should not have escaped their censure or punishment. My views were mercantile—upon just principles—and have contributed not to my own emolument alone, but also to the convenience of the inhabitants, as well as accommodation of the army.

"I am only sorry in this whole business, that I took an improper liberty with General Greene's name, but cannot suppose that an idle surmise can affect a reputation so permanently established; especially, as I have already published to the world, under the solemnity of an oath, that he neither has, or ever had, any commercial connexion with me, of a private nature, or intimated a wish or desire of the kind; and also, that he never granted me a flag in his life, or any other privilege or indulgence, for commercial purposes; I say, when these facts are known, I flatter myself every imputation, both with respect to the general and myself, will be removed.

"JOHN BANKS."

"It cannot be supposed that a character, stamped with so many marks of public integrity as General Greene's, will receive an injury in the minds of generous men, from the incautious expressions of a private letter, communicating to a friend the surmises of the writer; nor would it be thought necessary to regard the opinions of those of another cast, did the general stand in a private capacity alone; but as it is the duty of public characters to preserve the full confidence of all orders of people, so it is requisite that, whenever any circumstance shall happen, admitting of constructions and interpretations, which may tend to impair the general confidence, such explanations be immediately made as to remove every possible ground for suspicion. Upon these considerations, General Greene, having received from Governor Harrison, copies of letters wrote by Mr. John Banks to Mr. James Hunter, which had been opened by General Scott, wherein the writer had mentioned, that he had reason to

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think the general had some thoughts of proposing a connexion with him in a house to be set up in Charleston, after the evacuation of that place, immediately called on Mr. Banks, and laying the letters before him, in our presence, requested we would hear his explanation of the grounds on which he had taken up such an opinion; from which it fully appeared to have arisen in mere conjecture, from the general's having taken an opportunity to recommend Major Burnet, who had long been in his family, and had some views of quitting the service to go into business. And as the letters also, mentioned some indulgences of flags, and advancements by the general to Banks of moneys, and bills on the superintendant of finance, which, under the impressions of a private connexion, might undergo some misconstructions as to their objects, the general requests us to investigate those points. As to flags, it appears that Mr. Banks never obtained any from General Greene; and what is said in the letters on that subject, alludes altogether to those obtained from the British general to come out of town. As to the advancement of moneys, and the bills on the superintendant of finance, the general, for our information, laid before us the whole papers relative to them; from which we find that the secretary at war, early in the fall, apprehending the evacuation of Charleston to be near at hand, requested him to take measures for procuring from thence clothing for the army, by drafts on the superintendant of finance; that those advancements of eleven hundred guineas, and eight thousand dollars in bills, were made to Mr. Banks for that purpose, at an early period, on account, for procuring the clothing on the most advantageous terms; that due notice of the bills was given to the secretary at war, with a full state of the steps taken for accomplishing that object—that he fully approved of them, and thanked the general, in the warmest terms, for his prudent attention to the business, informing him, at the same time, that the superintendant of finance was perfectly satisfied with the drafts, and was ready to take them up. We are happy in being able to add to this state of the affair, that, in consequence of these measures, the southern army is now better clothed than we have ever seen any American troops since the beginning of the war.

“What we have said on this subject, together with Mr. Banks' candid and full narrative, will, no doubt, remove every impression those letters may have occasioned to the injury of General Greene, to whom it must be mortifying to have his conduct made a subject of public discussion, from a transaction which had the public good, and the relief the suffering soldiers for its objects; nor can this explanation be necessary to support his reputation, unless the people have lost all sense of a generous confidence, which would too strongly mark a general

corruption ; but as private jealousy saps public confidence, we think this explanation may be of public utility.

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“ANTHONY WAYNE.

“EDWARD CARRINGTON.

February 15th, 1783.

Although among his superior officers, and those who knew the general intimately, these calumnies had always been rejected with indignation ; yet, they had extended too far not to leave traces behind, even to this day. His most conspicuous friends treated them with silent contempt, and took no pains to remove them. And although whispers could come to the ears of all, the circulation of newspapers, at that time, was very limited, and the publication was read by few beyond the city. And as to the hand-bills, which Colonel Carrington had also struck off and circulated, they, as in all such cases, were inclosed only to those with whom it was needless to repel the calumny.

The relief afforded the army, by the contract for subsistence, was very short-lived. Banks had ventured so largely on government bills, drawn on a credit not yet expired, that his funds soon proved inadequate to the undertaking he had entered upon. To raise money by the sale of those bills, was impossible, without a ruinous discount, and the evil, unfortunately, was daily increasing.

The rumours of peace also, soon began to check the sale of goods, and this cut off the only remaining fund on which he had calculated to fulfil his contract. His creditors now became clamorous—he had made purchases to more than thirty thousand pounds before the evacuation ; and having given an assignment of those purchases to ~~secure his creditors, they threatened~~ to enforce it by a sale at auction, and cut him off, at once, from the only means in his power of raising money. Supplies began once more to fail, and the army to suffer.

In Georgia, every thing was in confusion ; the detachment under Major Finley, sent to protect Savannah, after bearing patiently until hunger became imperious, resumed the practice of purveying for itself. The inhabitants began to murmur, and the governor to remonstrate. In South Carolina, it was very little better. General Gist, who was in command at James' Island, declared, that he could no longer undertake to restrain the troops ; and the cavalry at the Eutaw, broke into open mutiny. Major Swan, their commander, was absent at the time of this occurrence, having waited on the general in Charleston, on the subject of subsistence. On his return, he met the whole corps under the command of their sergeants, moving in order to

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take up the line of march for Virginia; with their officers in a body, moving some distance in their rear. They could not resist the eloquent intreaties and reproaches of their commander; and a promise of indemnity brought them back to their duty; but, it was only to repeat the offence a short time after. For the present, they were removed to the Congaree, where the means of subsistence for themselves and horses, were more abundant. Nor were General Gist's apprehensions without good cause; for, to such a height did the discontents of the troops arise, that, on one occasion, General Greene actually drew out all the sound part of the army in order of battle, to keep the rest in subjection.

Under these circumstances, it was communicated to General Greene, that the creditors of Banks would relinquish their assignment, if the general would become personally responsible to them for the debts of Banks. And Banks, at the same time, offered to give an order, in favour of the creditors, for all the bills drawn on Mr. Morris, including those drawn under the contract for clothing, and then in the hands of an agent in Philadelphia, to be applied exclusively for the payment of the debts so assumed; and also, that all future bills for subsistence should be made payable to those creditors. As the agent of the contractors was Mr. Petit, in whose honour and friendship General Greene knew he could repose unlimited confidence—as he now knew that Forsyth and Burnet were concerned with Banks, and could not neglect his interest or security in a transaction intended to relieve them from incurring the penalty in which they had bound themselves to fulfil their contract—as he knew that it would be impossible to find another contractor, and the alternative must be a system of violence that would endanger the union, whilst yet engaged in a war not terminated, and which (as far as was then ascertained) such an occurrence might tend to counteract, he resolved to risk his personal responsibility, and trust to the justice of his country for averting the consequences.

General Greene, accordingly, executed an instrument of writing, guarantying these debts of J. Banks and Company, and the creditors released their interest under the assignment; but, unfortunately, he trusted to the honour of Banks for the rest.

It afterwards appeared, that Banks had previously diverted the funds in Mr. Petit's hands to another purpose. For the present, General Greene remained in contented ignorance of the volcano beneath him; and one of the creditors,*

* Mr. Warrington.

acting as the agent of all, was dispatched to Philadelphia, with an order from Banks, to receive the bills supposed to be in Colonel Petit's hands.

In the mean time the war was drawing to a close, but the persecuting demon, that had hitherto attended the steps of the southern commander, was not yet satiated or discouraged. Notwithstanding all his efforts to avoid it, he was destined to be seriously embroiled with a government for which he felt the highest sense of gratitude, and to give umbrage to a people among whom he had come as a deliverer. Was he in fault?

The governors of South Carolina are, by their constitution, commanders in chief the militia of the state. Until the reorganization of the government at Jacksonborough, General Greene had never experienced any thing like clashing or interference with state authority. But from the time Mr. Matthews came into power, we several times meet with attempts, in the executive, to exercise military authority over the state officers. But no inconvenience resulted from it, as Greene went on steadily in the exercise of military power, and so much personal harmony existed between him and Governor Matthews, that no serious opposition ever reared its head, except in the case of the captured horses. Once, on the subject of subsistence, some hints were exchanged, but with what effect let this passage, from the pen of Mr. Matthews,* exhibit:—
“I come now to that part of your letter which has most surprised and pained me. You say ‘I am sure there can never happen a dispute between you and me.’ I am utterly at a loss to conceive what could have given rise to such an observation! I should betray a want of candour, did I not, on this occasion, declare that I have ever found a disposition, on your part, to preserve the most perfect harmony between the civil and military departments. I flatter myself, the long intimacy between us has generated a friendship, as private men, that cannot be interrupted by those embarrassments that will unavoidably arise from a want of a proper organization in our respective departments. The possibility of such a thing's happening, gives me real pain; and God forbid it ever should happen.”

But “there arose up a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph.” Governor Matthews' office, expired with the year; he was not re-eligible by the constitution; and Mr. Benjamin Guerard was called to his place. A legislature also convened, not a little tinctured with the prevailing discontents, and torn to pieces by the factions which grew out of the confiscation laws. At its first meeting, it was Greene's misfortune to run counter to the tenets of the strongest

* May 28th, 1782.

party, and incur the charge of throwing the weight of his influence into the scale of the loyalists. This leaning of his heart and judgment had been uniformly and openly avowed, and had been cheerfully seconded in the army. But it now became his duty to advocate the cause of some of the most obnoxious among the proscribed, before the legislature. This debt descended upon him from poor Laurens, and it was taken up with zeal and effect.

The great use derived from that officer's character, talents, and knowledge of persons, in opening a communication, by secret channels, with Charleston, has been before remarked upon. He was immediately pushed forward, near the lines, with unlimited discretion to make the necessary arrangements. There were men enough in the city whose hearts were with the Americans, some of whom had taken protection, at the request of their friends, to protect the families of those who were banished; but they were not in the confidence of the enemy, nor were their lives to be exposed in such an undertaking. Neither would he trust the safety of the army to inferior individuals, who could only detail *what had occurred*; the great object was to anticipate the intentions of the enemy, and guard against *what would occur*, if not counteracted. With such views, he actually succeeded in converting the celebrated General Williamson, and even the secretary of Colonel Balfour, into his most useful intelligencers. The late Mr. Edmund Petrie also, engaged in the same undertaking, and executed it with a zeal that would support the opinion, that, as far as it served the United States, it was no unwelcome office. The magic by which General Greene appeared to anticipate all the projects of the enemy was thus the work of Laurens, and his word had been passed to exert all his influence to obtain from the state the pardon of these individuals, thus employed. This his fall prevented; but General Greene was privy to his engagements, and thought it a solemn duty to make every effort to fulfil these contracts. Had Laurens, in person, pressed this subject upon the legislature, no umbrage could have been given, but in Greene it was viewed as the first step towards assuming an influence over the state councils, which, in an armed agent of the United States, was not relished.

Soon after, their slumbering discontents were blown up into a violent flame. The question was under consideration in the legislature, whether they should permit congress to collect the five per cent. duty on importations.—This constituted one of the principal funds on which Mr. Morris had calculated to fulfil his engagements. Eleven out of thirteen of the states, had agreed to the recommendation the preceding year, but Georgia and Rhode Island had hitherto refused it. Virginia had, this year, repealed the grant. Mr. Morris, verging towards despair, began, very seriously, to apprehend, that he must

stop payment. Intelligence had also been received, that, although the negotiations for peace were in a fair way, as far as related to the claims of America; yet, as to those of some of the allies, many serious difficulties still existed. General Lincoln also, had written, that the northern army had manifested very serious discontents, and believed, that their present quietness would only last until it was ascertained, what provision the congress would make on the subject of their pay. That subject had, for some time, been agitated in that body, and every thing appeared suspended on the means which the general government could command. That this was the case in the southern army, General Greene had the strongest reasons to believe; and to what extent the prevailing murmurs would be carried, if no provision should be made, it was impossible to discern. The army was no less discontented with the state, than the state was with the burthen of maintaining the army; and the former exclaimed loudly against the privations they were exposed to, in the midst of comparative plenty, when it was known, that they were detained expressly at the instance of the southern delegates, for the protection of Charleston. Under these considerations, in an evil hour, General Greene adopted the resolution, to try the force of his representations upon the deliberations of the house. This practice, it will be recollected, he had uniformly been pursuing as to all the measures of the state governments within his department, from the first hour of his entering upon his command. But, men in public life must watch the changes which feelings and opinions undergo, as consequent upon changes in political interests and necessities.

The letter addressed to the governor, (with a request that it be laid before the house) bears date the 8th of March, and is couched in terms perfectly respectful and decorous. The topics of it are, the great necessities of congress—the little to be apprehended from its powers—the injustice that had been done the army—its mutinous temper—the withering state of the treasury—and the imperious duty of enabling the general government to fulfil its contracts. All this would seem to be very harmless; but, the letter contained the following heterodox passages:—"I confess I am one of those who think our independence can only prove a blessing under congressional influence." This, in the actual state of public opinion, was political heresy; and an assertion which followed it,—“That if we have any thing to apprehend, it is, that the members of congress will sacrifice the general interest to particular interests in the state to which they belong; that this had been the case, and from the very nature and constitution of that body, more was to be dreaded from their exercising too little than too much power”—was considered as approaching an attempt at imposition. But, he went on to observe—"The financier says, the affairs of

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his department are tottering on the brink of ruin ; the army to the northward, are in the highest discontent ; and the same may be expected to the southward. It must be confessed, the soldiers have given noble proofs of virtue and patriotism, under almost every species of distress and suffering. But, this has been in full persuasion, that justice would be done them in due time. The distresses of a suffering country, have been urged with success, to silence their present demands ; but, these arguments will have no weight in future—the present repose affords a prospect of permanent revenue. The eyes of the army are turned upon the states, in full expectation of it. It is well known, that congress have no revenue ; and the measures of the states, will determine the conduct of the army. I need not tell your excellency, that the moment they are convinced they have nothing to hope from that quarter, they will disband. Nor will they be satisfied with general promises. Nothing short of permanent and certain revenue, will keep them subject to authority. I think it my duty to be explicit, because I know the sentiments of the army. Men will suffer to a certain degree ; beyond which, it is dangerous to push them. My influence shall never be wanting, to promote the tranquillity of government ; but, this will have little weight when opposed to the demands of an injured soldiery. My heart is warm with good wishes for this country ; and I cannot contemplate future dangers that threaten it, but with pain and anxiety. I am sure I shall never turn my back when troubles overtake her ; but, it is much easier to prevent evils than correct them. *This country is much better calculated for revenue than for war.* It may lose by every new convulsion, but can never gain where liberty is not the object. Your wealth and weakness are a double temptation to invite an invasion, and are the strongest argument for uniting in the closest terms, your interest with others. View but for a moment, the vast property you have exposed, and the little permanent force for its defence.—Again, consider how unhealthy your climate, and the prejudices prevailing against it. Should you add new difficulties in matters of finance, the war continue, and the army disband, your ruin is inevitable,” &c.

The impatience of some of the members, could scarcely be restrained to the conclusion of this letter. Popular oratory found in it, topics for violent declamation. “Are we to be dictated to by a Cromwell?” said some. “Can we not manage our own concerns ? Are we to be terrified by threats of mutiny and violence ? Let us first be paid our advances, and then let congress, or its swordsmen, require this duty. If we are to pay a duty, we can collect it ourselves, without having the placemen of congress swarming among us.” By these, and similar arguments, did the members of the house work each other up to the belief, that the house had been treated with indecorum by the

southern commander, in addressing to them this letter. Nothing could exceed his astonishment, that such a view should have been taken of it; but, he thought proper the next day, upon the advice of his friends, to address another letter to the governor, exculpating himself from the charge of intending to dictate or offend; but, we are inclined to think, it was not calculated much to allay the ferment, as there is a taste of stubborn vindication, and a cast of satire in it, which, of all concomitants, are least adapted to make apologies palatable.

The state, however, repealed the law granting the five per cent. duty to congress; and the governor had his full share of the credit of that measure; for, he had ushered General Greene's communication to the notice of the house, preceded by a note from himself, full fraught with all the popular arguments of the day against the duty. And it was not long before another opportunity occurred, to exhibit a striking instance, both of Governor Guerard's opposition to the exercise of United States' authority, and of his incapacity to exercise it himself.

Captain Ker* of the British army, a gentleman who had formed a matrimonial connexion in Charleston, and was well known for his correct conduct, had arrived with a flag from Governor Tonyn of East Florida, directed regularly to the military commander of the southern department. By him it was duly received and acknowledged, and the usual etiquette, on such occasions, regularly observed. But, the governor thought proper to construe it into an indignity to state-power and his own military attributes, to deliver the flag to any one but himself, as commander in chief; and charging the bearer of the flag with a breach of duty, issued his mandate to arrest the whole party, even the crew of the vessel which brought the British officer. Captain Ker immediately claimed the protection of General Greene; and to himself it was effectually extended; but, the sheriff, supported by the governor, insisted on detaining the crew as prisoners, under civil process. The case now became one of extreme delicacy, as Governor Guerard refused to listen to General Greene's remonstrances; and there remained no means but force, to compel the observance of the laws with regard to flags. General Greene, though resolved to carry his point, first called a full council of war, and submitted to them the question, whether Ker had committed any violation of his flag, so as to put him out of military protection. They unanimously determined, he

* Ker is said to have been the officer who saved Colonel Washington's life at the Eutaws. We do not vouch for the fact.

CHAP. XIX. had not; and troops were ordered to take possession of Fort Johnson and Wappoo-Cut, and to permit no one to pass or repass, under flags, without permission from head-quarters. Seeing that Greene had taken his resolutions, and knowing that he would adhere to them, the governor called together his council, and they concluded to discharge the prisoners from confinement, but to order Ker to leave the city immediately, and the state in three days. From this new indignity, Ker again appealed, and received from the general the following reply :*

"The order sent you by the governor, you will pay no regard to. When I am ready to discharge your flag, I will inform you. The time and manner of your leaving the state, shall be made as agreeable as possible. I confide in the honour of the flag, and will not impose impossibilities. I shall have my letter ready for you, to leave this the day following the time the governor has set for your departure. I am exceedingly unhappy at this further instance of indelicate treatment you have met with. Instead of an apology for the injury past, you are subjected to further indignity; and instead of being dismissed with the politeness due to a flag, you are ordered out of the state like a criminal, and threatened with the vengeance of government. Nothing but my wishes to preserve the tranquillity of the people, and the respect and regard I have for their peace and quiet, could have prevailed on me to have suffered your flag to be treated in the manner it has been. And, although I do not think this a sufficient apology for the indignities to which the flag has been subjected, yet I hope some allowance will be made for my truly delicate situation. I know it was my duty to afford you complete protection at every hazard; and was the same insult to be offered to one of my flags, I must be silent after what has happened here. However, I shall write to Governor Tonyn. I hope you will relate the peculiarity of the case, on your arrival, with the same liberality you speak of it here," &c.

In General Greene's communications to General Lincoln on this subject, he requests the latter to lay it immediately before congress, as he is resolved not to submit to a second attack on the United States authority, "as precedents for such encroachments shall not be founded upon his failure to resist them." He further observes, "this is not one of those cases where the right was doubtful, or public safety the object, but appears to be a matter of temper, and pursued without regard to either."

What these jealousies and bickerings might ultimately have eventuated in, can rest only in conjecture. It happened, fortunately, that in the midst of them the news of peace arrived. This was on the 16th of April, and on the 22d a general illumination of the town took place on the joyful occasion. *On that day, and for several before it, the army had no bread, not even rice to eat.*

We cannot avoid copying the following extract from Colonel Harmar's journal. "April 23.—The glorious event of peace, celebrated by the army on James' Island with a *feu de joye* and fire-works. The war being happily terminated, gratitude must certainly inspire the citizens to do the soldiery justice!" Alas! how far was this ejaculation from being universally verified.

Never did peace come more opportunely to the relief of a country, an army, and its commander.

The army had now become very unpopular. The people regarded them as little else than the last enemy to get rid of. Mutual discontents were exacerbated by mutual reproaches. The former considered the latter as ungrateful protégés, who, after being delivered from their enemies, would leave their protectors to starve; the latter denied the obligation to maintain them, urged their liberal advances in the common cause, and referred them to congress for subsistence. The reply was, why then withdraw from congress the only means to enable them to subsist us?

Every article of the produce of agriculture now commanded a price, and the people were resolved to suffer it no longer to be taken without compensation. In Georgia, Major Finley, after starving two days, proceeded to the plantation of the sub-contractor, and seized the food his men could not dispense with. It was followed by a civil suit; and when General Wayne proposed to remove the detachment into the upper country, an association was formed among the people to protect each other from impressment.* In South Carolina, no contractor could ever be found to supply the cavalry horses, and forage had always been obtained by impressment alone; at length the people shut their doors against the commissary. The governor and council complained; and General Greene could only reply, "neither policy nor humanity will justify us in suffering our horses to starve. Congress has provided no means for their subsistence; and we will cheerfully relinquish this, if the state will point out the means of subsisting them without it." The legislature then took up the subject, and complaining of being burthened with the support of three hundred horse, requested that they should be distributed in just proportions among the three

* Major Finley.

CHAP. IX. southern states. To this General Greene* returned a truly parental answer; in which, after making a full *exposé* of all the dangers which might yet assail the state, (for there were, at the date of that letter, many obstacles to peace, and American politicians† wrote doubtingly about it after St. Augustine was re-enforced,) he offers to send off the cavalry, but solemnly warns them against measures calculated to produce a disgust that might deprive them of future support, should future necessities press upon them.

Thus, every day the general's situation became more and more disagreeable. With all his nursing also, and repeatedly re-enforcing the funds of the contractors with bills which ought, by agreement, to have gone to their creditors, whose debts he had become liable for; he found it difficult to enable them to keep pace with the wants of the army. New difficulties were daily presenting themselves; the rumours of peace checked the sale of goods, and the plundering small craft from St. Augustine, so infested the coasts and inlets, as often to intercept the provisioning vessels. No other means of transportation did the country furnish or admit of. Yet, if this supply failed, impressment must follow; and he knew not what consequences might have ensued. He might have found himself cooped up in his military territory of James' Island, or forced to open his way from it with the bayonet. Suits, both civil and criminal, against himself would certainly follow; and from the latter he must defend himself by force of arms, or be immured, perhaps, in a prison; and against the former, all he could promise himself was indemnity from a government, which could scarcely pay for its own candle-light.

In fine, opposition to the minions of congress became popular; it was countenanced by men in power; the people were really persuaded that their state sovereignty was in danger, and rallied round it with the characteristic ardour and enthusiasm of the day.

One would almost imagine, that we had proposed to trace the origin and progress of anti-federalism; to develop the causes that led to the adoption of the federal constitution, or the distribution of parties into federal and republican.

It is not easy to conceive, how it would have been possible for the southern commander, perhaps for the United States, to have maintained another campaign. The people were utterly worn-out, and disgusted with this system of impressments and specific contributions; and the refusal, in some states, to contribute their quotas in cash, or permit the collection of a duty, must have

* 29th February.

† R. R. Livingston, Lincoln.—Marshall, vol. p. 610.

produced, (and finally did produce) a general resolution of the states to the same effect. The soldiers in the southern army, who were enlisted for the war, were now reduced to a handful; and such was the terror which the late ravages of the climate at Ashley-Hill had inspired, that no consideration on earth would have induced men to enlist again to serve in the low country of South Carolina. That state had now been trying, in vain, for a year, to procure men at an enormous bounty, with very little success. North Carolina had relinquished the attempt altogether; and Virginia had literally been lying on her oars, until a flood of cash should flow in upon her from some quarter, God knows whence. When money was furnished to her officers to recruit upon,* it was found, that the dreadful accounts propagated of the last campaigns, particularly the nakedness and privations of the soldiers, and the sickness of the climate, had almost banished every hope of obtaining men.

Drafting, therefore, was the only method that remained for raising an army; and Virginia had already proved, that her government had not energy to effect it; whilst North Carolina, more successful, could only obtain from it one-third of the number ordered into service, and those inferior substitutes, and for so short a period, as must have paralysed every effort of a campaign.†

Happily for the people of the United States, Great Britain desisted from the contest exactly at that point of time, when she ought most to have pressed it. She had gained the mastery of the ocean; Charleston lay exposed without a piece of cannon to defend it; a few frigates could, at any time, have repossessed it; and three thousand men had only to move forward to regain, also, the mastery in the three southern states. But, the dreadful ravages of the climate, for the last two years, probably did more to discourage the enemy's efforts to the south, than any other cause. While his troops were posted in the upper country, or on the sea-islands, the loss of men must have been comparatively small; but, when stationed between the Santee and the sea-coast, or compelled to remain in Charleston, the effects of the climate must have been dispiriting and destructive. The immense burial-grounds that they had crowded with their European soldiers, too plainly proved the mortality that had prevailed among them.

Even the intelligence of the peace, brought with it new cares and troubles to the commander of the southern department. Along with it arrived, accounts of the occurrences at Newberg; and probably, some secret communications from the promoters of the disturbances in the northern army. That

* Governor Harrison and General Muhlenberg.

† Colonel Lyles' Letters.

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The author of the Newberg letters has hitherto lain concealed. Popular opinion has attributed them to an individual who has been satisfied to compound for the doubt cast upon his morals, by enjoying the eclat of giving birth to such brilliant productions. But those who have examined the question will ask, would a simple officer in the line, of inferior grade, have ventured, unsupported, on such an attempt? and where is the production at all comparable to the first of those letters, which has been the acknowledged offspring of the same pen?

We think ourselves in possession of a clue to trace out the leader of the boldest, and most portentous intrigue that ever threatened the liberties of this country—an intrigue, which had for its object the substitution of a military despotism for our present free institutions; and was more deeply and dangerously combined than historians appear to be aware of.

If there was in the United States a man whose bold and decisive character,—whose popular eloquence, nerve of style, and vigour of conception, qualified him more than any other for the author of these letters, and the leader of that undertaking, it was the author of the following letter to General Greene.

“PHILADELPHIA, *February 11th, 1783, (PRIVATE.)*

“DEAR SIR,

“I cannot omit so good an opportunity of communicating to you my thoughts on the present situation of affairs. Knowing, as I do, that your heart is actuated by the same principles of justice, and the same sentiments of policy, which influence my own, I can venture on a freedom of communication which, to most men, would be imprudent. The approach of peace cannot but give very serious thoughts to every officer and soldier of the American army. The promises made by the public, will, if performed, be of beneficial importance, and if broken extremely injurious. The main army have had anxieties on this subject; and though I do not pretend to guess, precisely, at their sentiments, I am convinced they will not easily forego their expectations. Their murmurs, though not loud, are deep; and I do not think that the committee* they have

* General M'Dougal was chairman of that committee. We are in possession of a letter from him to General Greene, signed Brutus, which bears the characteristics of an honest man, much excited, and somewhat inclined to a strong assertion of his rights. We only know it to be from him by an endorsement of his name, in the handwriting of General Greene.

sent hither will, from their report, allay the apprehensions which were excited. From this committee, however, I learnt that they were precipitating themselves in the road to ruin. I mean by pursuing a recommendation to the several states for compensation, &c. This, which would have divided them into thirteen different parts, could have made it easy to elude the force of their applications, or after their compliance, to have resumed any grants made in consequence of them, when the army should have been disbanded. At present, however, the committee have become so thoroughly persuaded that the army will be defrauded, unless they unitedly pursue a common object, that I believe it will soon become the general sentiment. *If the army, in common with all other public creditors, insist on the grant of general permanent funds for liquidating all the public debts, there can be little doubt that such revenues will be obtained; and there can be no doubt that when they are obtained, they will afford to every order of public creditors a solid security. The half pay promised the officers is estimated to be worth five and a half years' full pay in hand. Thus, for instance, supposing an officer entitled," &c. "Admitting, then, that the proper revenues were obtained, the officer would be able always to sell his stock for the value. It is needless to say that the United States have no other mode of paying the arrearages due to the army. It is also unnecessary to mention, that this kind of provision ought to be made for debts of every description. The effect of it, in all its parts, you will (I am sure) be at no loss to trace; and you will agree with me in opinion, that congress can, by that means, obtain a degree of influence essential to the happiness of this country.* Now, my dear sir, I am most perfectly convinced that (with the due exception of miracles) there is no probability the states will ever make such grants, *unless the army be united and determined in the pursuit of it; and unless they be firmly supported, and as firmly support the other public creditors. That this may happen must be the entire wish of every intelligently just man, and of every real friend to our glorious revolution."*

But General Greene was not to be deceived by this specious affectation of disinterestedness and public spirit. The object was a coalition between the army and the public creditors; the end, to compel the states to do them justice. But could it end here? the power that forced compliance in the first instance, must be continued to enforce obedience. It happened also, that he was fully apprized of the writer's intimate connection with the public creditors, to a greater amount, probably, than any other man in the union; and moreover, knew him to be an avowed advocate of monarchy.

The following extract is from the same pen:—"I cannot, however, omit the present opportunity of lodging in the bosom of friendly confidence, my sen-

CHAP. ^{SIX.} *ments of our interior political situation. That congress have not proper powers, I see, I feel, and I lament.* Their ministers have the arduous task before them, to govern without power, nay, more, *to obtain the power necessary to govern.* They must persuade where others command; and the strong phalanx of private interest, with the impetuous sallies of private politics and party, encounter them at every step. These features of our character and situation, are very disagreeable; but, are not these the distinguishing marks of government in its infancy, in every age and every climate? *To re-enforce the reasonings, to impress the arguments, and sweeten the persuasions of the public servants, we have that great friend of sovereign authority, a foreign war.* Conviction goes but very slowly to the popular mind, *but it goes.* The advantages of union and decision in carrying on the war—the disadvantages which flow from the want of them—the waste, the expense, and inefficacy of disjointed efforts over the face of an immense region—the incompetency of determining what is best for the whole—through thirteen different communities, whose rulers are yet ignorant what is best, even for the single one, that they govern—these, with the thousand others which it is hardly in language to enumerate, and which, certainly, it is not in genius to conceive, nor in any thing but experience to show—these must, at last, induce the people of America, (if the war continues) *to intrust proper powers to the American sovereign, as they have already compelled that sovereign, reluctantly, to relinquish the administration, and intrust to their ministers the care of this immense republic. I say, if the war continues; for, if it does not, I have no hope, no expectation, that the government will acquire force; and I will go further, I have no hope that our union can subsist, except in the form of an absolute monarchy.*"

The residuum of this ingenious piece of sophistry, when separated from its gaseous constituents, is, "that monarchy is indispensable to our union, a foreign war, the proper time for acquiring it, and this war must be continued until it is acquired; that we must not wait for the decision of the people, or the states to come to the conclusion; but, it is the duty of the officers of government, to assume the power, and trust to the slow reasonings of the people, or improved knowledge of their representatives to approve the act."

These communications were happily addressed to a virtuous citizen, who never, in a wish or action of his life, had separated his own views from the public good, and held monarchy, under any disguise, in utter abhorrence. We are not in possession of the answer to either of those letters; they are to be found in the bureau of him to whom they were addressed; but, the following reply to the answer to that of the 11th of February, conveys both the sense of that answer, and additional evidence of the views of the writer of the letter of

the 11th:—"I have received your letter of the 3d of April, and I entirely agree with you in sentiment as to the consequences, which must follow from any unconstitutional procedure of the military. The boundary between their humble petitions, and their most forcible demands, is shadowy and indescribable. *I did hope from their influence*; and I know, that if congress had taken manly and decisive measures, America would have been united and happy. I was content, on this ground, again to labour and to hazard; but, neither time nor circumstances *will permit any thing now*. We must, therefore, leave to circumstances and time, the management of that great business, on which is to depend, the felicity and grandeur of our country."

To understand the full import of these letters, it is necessary to recur to the dates of intermediate events. The committee, who had been appointed by the officers of the army, to solicit a commutation for their half-pay, had written to Newberg, and reported their failure early in March.* On the 10th day of that month, appeared the famous Newberg letter, which so strongly incited the army to assert their rights, while they still retained their arms in their hands. Before the date of the last letter, which was the 18th of May, not only had the discontents in the army been subdued by the firm, yet fatherly conduct of General Washington and his officers, but the preliminary articles of peace had been received, and a cessation of hostilities proclaimed, so that *the continuance of a foreign war, and the ferment in the army*, the two great machines on which the writer calculated, having failed him, he very properly remarks:—"Neither time nor circumstances will permit any thing now."

We cannot omit drawing the readers attention to one or two remarks suggested by this letter of the 18th of May. It is obvious that General Greene understood the writer as hinting at *unconstitutional means* for carrying into effect his measures. And when he says, "*I did hope from their influence, (the army's,) and I know that if congress had taken manly and decisive measures, America would have been united and happy,*" it is, in other words, declaring, "*I wanted but the countenance of the army, and some decision in congress, to have established an absolute monarchy;*" for this, he had declared, was his only hope of union and happiness. And when he further says,—"*On this ground I was content again to labour and to hazard,*" what else is to be understood, than that, with this view, he was willing to enter upon measures fraught with toil and danger.

* Marshall.

The combination, between the public creditors and the army, to establish a monarchical government, (or if only to strengthen the arms of the existing government,) was a daring and brilliant project, worthy of the genius which, probably, planned it. We regret to see him writing with so much confidence of his *knowledge* that it would have succeeded, for we trust, there was still virtue enough in the country to have defeated it, notwithstanding his opportunities of knowledge were inferior to no man's.

Yet the combination, it must be acknowledged, was a natural and a powerful one. The general government was verging fast towards bankruptcy; every thing conspired to prove that there was no safety in trusting it, unless power could be thrown into its hands to extort, from individuals or the states, the funds essential to fulfil its engagements. Its creditors of consequence, had become gloomy and apprehensive; and it is too much to hope from man, that their virtue could have resisted the temptation to seize on the corresponding interests, and the support of the army, to vest those powers in congress, or in a king, which so many deemed essential to the good of all. The violence done to principle, and the rights of the states, would have been too easily glossed over by the ready ingenuity of which we have given a specimen in one of the foregoing letters.

That it was not attempted, must be attributed to the honest forbearance of the army, and the impregnable virtue of those who commanded it.

Let not the tribute of national gratitude be withheld from their memory. How great the debt cannot now be estimated. Numerous, wealthy, discontented, and every where diffused, as were the public creditors at that time, had some ambitious leader placed himself at the head of the army, and raised the standard of rebellion under the specious pretexts which so many circumstances conspired to afford; with the numerous loyalists to support them, and a powerful enemy at hand to encourage or even aid them; where would the career of rebellion or usurpation have been arrested? Not in Pennsylvania, for many causes; their army was already mutinous, and half their people disaffected. And had nothing but a protraction of the war resulted from it, who can estimate the consequences? for never did the circumstances of a country call more loudly for a peace.*

When the news of the approach of peace, and the mutinous state of the northern army, was received in Charleston, the effect upon the temper and discipline of the southern army was immediately felt. As none of the soldiers

were enlisted for a period beyond the war, they began all to clamour for their discharges, contending that they had an immediate right to be released from duty. In the Maryland line, particularly, it required all the energy of their officers to prevent a general insurrection, and their moving off in a body. Nay, such was the alarm excited on one occasion, that the general had actually to draw up the troops in whom he could confide, charge his artillery with grape, and post the artillerists with lighted matches, to awe down the mutinous spirit which had indicated itself by the most unequivocal signs. The cavalry at the Congaree broke through all control; one hundred of them, placing a sergeant Dangerfield at their head, moved off in a body, and actually seized the best horses of those who would not join them, and appropriated them to their own use. As soon as the news of this daring outrage reached the ears of the general, he sent after them an offer of pardon if they would return; but they refused, declaring their confidence that the state they belonged to would pardon them, and render them that justice which had hitherto been refused them. And, unfortunately for the cause of discipline, their expectations were realized. Captain Pendleton, who was sent after them to Virginia, to seize and punish their ringleaders, found them dispersed through the country in safety, openly selling their horses. And such was the effect of example, that it was by management only that any of that class of troops were held to their duty in the south. They were soothed by the promise that they should be permitted to purchase their horses on account of their pay; and that kind of attachment which is generated between men and their horses in the cavalry service, detained many, who would not otherwise have been withheld from following the example set them.

Orders were received from Mr. Lincoln, for furloughing the troops to the signing of the definitive articles of peace; and it was immediately carried into effect among the few troops of South Carolina and Georgia; but, those of North Carolina and Virginia, were ordered to their respective states to be furloughed; and those of Maryland and Pennsylvania, it was proposed to send home by water. A trifle of pay had been voted them by congress; and as soon as that could be distributed, the troops of North Carolina and Virginia were promptly dispatched; but, such were the delays which attended the collection of transports, that the other troops did not get off until July. Nothing could exceed the uneasiness that this delay occasioned. A contract had been entered into by Mr. Morris, with some merchants of Philadelphia, to furnish the necessary transports; but, from the delays in collecting these transports, and an unusually long passage, was the stay of the army protracted until the diseases of the climate began to reappear among them. Their murmurs then

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ran high; they charged the government with having deceived them; and hundreds who had served, some for seven years, deserted in groups, and forfeited their pay, rather than remain once more to encounter the horrors of the last campaign. Near one-third of their number were already on the sick-list when the transports left Charleston.

It was a pleasing incident to the feelings of these men, on their arrival in Philadelphia, to be received with the ringing of bells, and every other testimony which a grateful people could render to their merits and services. But, alas! what had they reaped but laurels! And even these they soon after disgraced, by outrage and mutiny.

It would be endless to relate all the congratulations that poured in upon General Greene, both on the recovery of Charleston, and the return of peace. The meed of military fame, even the most envious, could not refuse him; and those who were intimately acquainted with the difficulties he had overcome, regarded his conduct with enthusiastic admiration. But, these were by no means the gratulations that conferred on him the most refined pleasure. No soldier was ever unambitious of public applause; and it would have argued affectation or insensibility, not to feel or acknowledge the gratification which the honest pride of one, who felt that he had been faithful and assiduous, gave to public plaudits; but, that which went to his heart, was the humble, half-suppressed, "God bless you, general," which came from the poor soldier. Every one who served under Greene, will acknowledge, the unlimited confidence, and strong personal attachments, which his old soldiers felt towards him. He was rigid in his discipline, but just and humane; and his men bore their privations under him with unexampled patience, because they saw he spared no pains to relieve their wants. The last act of his command, was an effort to serve them.

By the middle of July, General Greene had completed all his arrangements for dissolving his command; the troops were furloughed or sent home; the artillery, munitions of war and muskets, deposited in the state arsenal, at the request of the legislature; and the remnants of stores and equipments of the different departments, disposed of at auction. Nothing now remained but to bid adieu to public life, and turn his attention, for the first time in eight years, to his private affairs.

In a letter addressed to the executives of the different states, he intimated his intention to retire from command in the southern department; and in those letters, after expressing an earnest wish for their future prosperity, and grateful acknowledgments for their favour and support, he earnestly solicits their attention to the claims of the soldiers. "Often," says he, "in the worst of

times, have I assured them, that their country would not be unmindful of their sufferings and services; and humbly, yet confidently, do I hope, that their just claims will not be forgotten." CHAP.
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As he had anticipated that some indispensable arrangements, respecting his property acquired in the southern states, would detain him until the sickly season should commence, Mrs. Greene had taken her passage, by water, to Philadelphia, about the time that the fleet of transports sailed; but, some arrangements, connected with the affairs of his commander, required that he should himself pass through the southern states, and he, therefore, could not accompany her.

In the adjustment of the grants made by the southern states to General Greene, he experienced a degree of liberality, which proved, that the successors of those who had made those grants, rather wished to increase than curtail them, notwithstanding the independent course he had pursued in his official conduct. The beautiful and highly improved place of the late Governor Graham, in Georgia, called Mulberry Grove, (the *la plus belle* of the conquered lands) was ordered to be conveyed to him; and with a most delicate attention to the comfort and known personal attachment to himself and Wayne, the adjoining plantation was conveyed to the latter.

In South Carolina, Boone's Barony, a very valuable body of land to the south of the Edisto, with a proportion of the slaves attached to the land, as the property of one of the confiscated estates, were ordered by the legislature to be conveyed to General Greene. As there were a number of other slaves, constituting a part of the same gang, he made application to the legislature, to have a value set upon them, and give him credit for a few years, that he may be enabled to purchase them. This, also, was immediately acquiesced in.—The slaves were valued and transferred to him. And thus, he became, not only a slave owner, but a slave purchaser, a characteristic which gave no little umbrage to his quondam friends, the Quakers, and which has been often dwelt on with some surprise, by those who were acquainted with his early enthusiasm in the cause of human freedom. We shall have occasion, hereafter, to recur to this subject. With the fatality which attended almost every action of his life, this is also one of the heavy charges that exist against his memory. A simple exposition of the circumstances which led to it, will be found, wholly, to change its aspect.

The necessary arrangements for giving employment to his slaves, and providing for their protection and comfort, detained General Greene until the middle of August. Few men, at this day, would venture upon this journey north at that season of the year; but, the necessity of visiting the several

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states of his command, required him to make the journey; and anxiety to embrace his children, whom he had hitherto scarcely ever held in his arms, induced him to venture upon it, though just recovered from an attack of the fever. But, his excellent constitution, pleasurable anticipations, and relief from an incumbent mountain of public cares, soon restored him to health, and enabled him to pursue the journey without inconvenience. Yet, not without interruption, for the news of his progress preceded him; and the anxiety of every one, and of the inhabitants of every place through which he passed, to express their gratitude and respect, repeatedly imposed upon him delays, which he submitted to rather than give offence. In the capitals of Virginia and Maryland, through which his route lay, the most flattering addresses from the state governments, seconded by the enthusiasm of private feelings, bestowed on him every expression of gratitude and admiration, that could crown the services of a virtuous citizen and brave soldier. Nor were the enjoyments of these moments a little heightened, by reciprocating the cordial embraces of many of his most distinguished officers, and many others of the eminent characters with whom he had toiled through the varied incidents of this eventful war.

But, his principal business lay in Philadelphia. Accompanied by Major Hyrne, his private secretary and treasurer, furnished with the accounts and vouchers of his family, and Major Mentges, who had acted as inspector of the army, and of contracts, his object was, "to render an account of his stewardship." Burnet and Pearce, in succession, and after them Hyrne, had kept the accounts of the family with accuracy and precision, and they had never been incumbered with cash. By affidavits and vouchers, these officers had exhibited all his private expenditures with so much perspicuity, that but two items remained to be accounted for. A sum stolen from Major Pearce by a servant, who broke open the family chest, and deserted with its contents; and a sum received and expended by Major Burnet, on their journey south in 1780, the vouchers for which remained among the latter's private papers. He, unfortunately, was now labouring under the diseases of a constitution broken down in the service, and was absent on a voyage to the Havana, from which he never returned. The first of these items, required a resolution of congress to admit it; and the last was held under advisement by the accounting officer, until Burnet's papers could be referred to. But, the government, finally, made no scruple about admitting both upon the certificate of the general.

The reception which General Greene met with at the seat of government, was not less cordial and flattering, than that which had awaited him throughout this journey. The outrageous conduct of the Pennsylvania troops, had

compelled congress to discontinue its sessions at Philadelphia, and repair to Princeton. On his arrival at that place, which was not until the 7th of October, General Greene reported to them his arrival, in a letter, in which he expresses his hope, that he had closed the affairs of his southern command to their satisfaction; and after stating, "that it was now going on nine year since he had had an opportunity to visit his family and friends, or pay the least attention to his private fortune," he requests of congress, "permission to return to Rhode Island, having already obtained the consent of the commander in chief."

This modest and reasonable request was followed by a resolution, "that a committee inquire and report a suitable expression of the approbation of congress, of the general's conduct in his late command." Upon the report of which committee, the following resolution was adopted:

"By the United States, in Congress assembled, October 18th, 1783.

"On the report of a committee, to whom was referred a letter of the 7th, from Major General Greene—

"Resolved, That two pieces of field-ordnance, taken from the British army at the Cowpens, Augusta, or Eutaw, be presented, by the commander in chief of the armies of the United States, to Major General Greene, as a public testimonial of the wisdom, fortitude, and military skill which distinguished his command in the southern department, and of the eminent services, which, amidst complicated difficulties and dangers, and against an enemy greatly superior in numbers, he has successfully performed for his country. And that a memorandum be engraved on the said pieces of ordnance, expressive of the substance of this resolution.

"Resolved, That the commander in chief be informed that Major General Greene hath the permission of congress to visit his family at Rhode-Island."

If any thing could add to the honour of this vote, which we believe was unexampled during the war, it was the obliging manner in which it was carried into execution by the commander in chief. The two pieces that were taken at the battle of the Cowpens, had been transported in wagons into the interior of Virginia, and they were sent for, engraved, and presented agreeably to the resolution. But the early death of him for whom the honour was voted, prevented their being transported to his own residence. They now lie in their original cases, in the military store at West Point, and had long been unnoticed and forgotten, until lately hunted up on the application of the youngest of his children. Why do they not support a monument in honour of him to whom they were dedicated? But no stone has ever been engraven with his name;

a borrowed sepulchre, in common with an infinitely greater deliverer, of whom he was ever the devout though silent worshipper, received his body; and even the place where it was laid has been brought into doubt.

Having accompanied the war-worn veteran to the termination of his military career; the reader will follow him in anticipation to the termination of a journey of triumphs, until he gather his little family around him in his paternal mansion; amidst their smiles and caresses, to find the purest consolations of life. He will perhaps call up the feelings excited by the scenes of early youth; the recollection of the time when the gem of knowledge first shot a ray through its earthy crust upon his unconscious eye. The venerable mill, and long abandoned forge of Potowome may be made tributary to the enjoyments of his retirement; and the tears and embraces of numerous and adoring relatives, fill his bosom with unalloyed transport, all heightened by the grateful consciousness, that a generous country had placed him far above want,—on the verge of splendour. Alas! how unlike the reality. He did, indeed, reach that goal; and was conducted to it by the hand of triumph; but it was with a brow clouded with care, and all a father's feelings alive to the dangers that threatened the interesting objects around him *with penury*.

General Greene's eldest son, George Washington, having been placed with the late Dr. Witherspoon for his education, the father's anxiety to see him, after a lapse of three years, made him hurry on through Philadelphia, intending to return to that place for a few days to close the business of his accounts. There, one of the first pieces of intelligence communicated to him was, that of Banks' unaccountable conduct in having withdrawn from Mr. Petit's hands the bills which he had pledged for General Greene's indemnity. His situation now became truly alarming. For, the most refined plot of the dramatist or novelist, could not have produced a dilemma more painful and embarrassing than that in which he found himself. How was he now to be extricated from these debts? And for his property to be sacrificed to the payment of the very contracts in which he had been accused of being concerned with Banks, must indelibly stamp on him the disgusting charge. The very idea of reviving the subject in popular conversation, or of being forced into new explanations to the public, was what his pride shrunk from. His only hope rested on the known honour of Majors Burnet and Forsyth, and a gleam of confidence still resting on Banks.

The truth is, this gentleman had managed greatly to insinuate himself into the confidence of the general, by means which were thought delicate and liberal: this was by rendering supposed services to those who were dear to the general, and whom he possessed not himself, the means of serving.

It has been remarked before, that General Greene was exceedingly happy in the choice of his aids; they served him with filial solicitude, and he regarded them with parental fondness. The following brief sketch of character, in a letter to General Williams, will show who they were, and give some idea of the easy terms on which he lived with those who possessed his confidence. **"Our family is much as formerly; Pearse and Pendleton as polite as ever, Morris as careless, Burnet as cross, and Shubrick as independent."* To these was afterwards added Mr. Alexander Garden, on the particular recommendation of Colonel Laurens; and his own merits soon after recommended him to a cornetcy in the legion.

It was not without paternal solicitude that General Greene looked forward to the time when some of these interesting young men, should be thrown upon the world without the means of subsistence. Major Shubrick was sick, and a lucky turn in Mr. Garden's fortunes, to which General Greene contributed largely, had placed him also in affluence. Pendleton had an education and talents which left little doubt of his bustling through the world; but Pearse and Burnet had their fortunes to seek, and the course in which it must be pursued not very plain before them. The single mention of the latter's intentions, in the event of the evacuation of Charleston, to engage in trade, had struck Banks with a view of the means of entwining himself round the general; and when the army was to be disbanded, and Pearse left without employ, he made proposals to him also, thought, at the time, to be very flattering and advantageous. Afterwards, when involved in extreme difficulties about subsisting his troops, and finding no one from whom he could derive the least aid but Banks, General Greene could not avoid feeling a sense of obligation for the relief afforded him here also, which disposed him to reject all evil surmises. As to his mercantile intrigues and double papers, Banks had the ingenuity to represent them as laudable deceptions practised on the enemy, and such as it was the interest of the country to wink at; perhaps it was a correct view.

These circumstances may extenuate the indiscretion General Greene had been guilty of in placing his reputation, and the subsistence of his family, in the power of any man; and they may be supported by the reflection, that having spent his life among men of high honour and integrity, the thought never occurred to him of the possibility that the government bills, placed in Mr. Petit's hands, might have been withdrawn before notice had reached Petit of this transaction; and, of consequence, he had never reflected on the manner in

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which his good name might be incidentally affected by events growing out of it. Yet to those who know the embarrassment and distress to himself and family, which, for twenty years, grew out of it, and that, long after his death, it was made the ground work of a charge against his reputation on the floor of congress, it is not easy to vindicate his prudence or foresight, in this transaction. But the greatest men in all ages have often proved themselves mere children in the pecuniary world.

Nor were those growing out of Banks' affair the only pecuniary embarrassments into which General Greene was drawn by the necessity which the poverty of congress, and the measures of the states, laid him under, of gratifying the wants and relieving the distresses of those who were placed under him. And the numerous applications before us, from his officers, for the loan of small sums, when turned adrift on the world without a penny in their purses, some of them on crutches, and others on the bed of sickness, present a melancholy proof of *their* filial confidence, *his* parental kindness, and the unmerciful drafts made upon his private purse. Whom else had they to look to? the prime of life exhausted, individual resources expended, friends far distant, and too recent evidence afforded by the state, of a desire to shake them off as soon as they were no longer wanted!

The winter was far advanced before General Greene could reach, at last, his native state. Nothing could be more flattering, than the reception he met with there—as well from a state which prided itself in claiming him as a cherished son, as from the numerous and truly affectionate companions of his earlier days, dispersed through every part of it. The most touching incident of this kind, occurred at East Greenwich, where he was met and welcomed by the companions of his tyrocinium in arms—the members of the Kentish Guards; they proudly laid claim to his early education, and with no small marks of sensibility were the hours recurred to, when they mutually cherished and communicated the feeble spark of liberty and military emulation.

A new obligation now grew out of the high standing which General Greene had acquired in the eyes of the world; his acquaintance was unbounded, and among them were innumerable friends, who had fastened upon his affections in the hour *which tries men's souls*. Visits of ceremony, of respect, and curiosity, must also be frequent; and the southern states had been bounteous in providing against the necessities which grow out of celebrity. It was true, these gifts had, as yet, produced nothing but expense; yet, he resolved rather to live upon anticipating his revenues, than not maintain the dignity of his station.

A simple, but respectable establishment in New Port, was, from this time, the favorite resort of his military and political friends; and for the residue of this winter, he devoted himself to social pleasures and the novel delights of being encircled by his children. Had his mind been entirely at rest on the subject of his private affairs, and those of some of his friends, he might now have enjoyed as many of the delights of life, as fall to the lot of mortals. But he was still doomed to experience the malice of fortune.

It will be recollected, that when General Greene embarked in the war, he had committed all his funds to the care, partly of his elder brother, and partly of his cousin, Griffin Greene, with a *carte blanche* to both, to pursue such schemes of improvement as they might think advisable. Both these gentlemen appear to have been drawn off from their mills and forges, to embark in privateering and commerce; and in these pursuits they were both unfortunate. It was no small mortification to the general, to learn from them both before he left Charleston, that the state of their affairs was such, that they could afford him no aid in his projected purchase from the state. The latter also solicited his patronage and credit in a trade which he proposed to embark in to Bordeaux; a request which the general imprudently complied with, and gave him not only power to draw to a large amount upon himself, but letters to some of his political friends, soliciting their patronage, and even advances of money, should it be necessary.*

Thus, at the moment when all his efforts and wishes were directed towards establishing himself as a planter in South Carolina, General Greene found himself involved in two intricate mercantile concerns, from which, as well from interest as affection, he could not immediately withdraw his funds.

This circumstance, when it came to be known, affected his reputation not a little in the eyes of his foreign friends, among many of whom, according to received opinions, a military man, of his high standing, could not engage in commerce, without soiling his epaulets; and all of whom, as well as all America, would view his embarking in such pursuits, as indicative of avarice; and, therefore, derogatory to the high station he now occupied in the public eye. Some of the voyages of both Jacob and Griffin Greene, were made to Charleston; and the letters of introduction, of recommendation, and even of credit,

* General Greene, having been educated in a country in which the mercantile class are as respectable as any other, seems never to have studied those factitious distinctions which exist in other countries. It must have appeared rather *outré* to French noblemen, to receive letters of introduction from the hands of a trader, or a ship-master. All his intercourse with the great world, never entirely eradicated the original simplicity of his habits of thinking and acting.

which accompanied them from the general, gave currency to the opinion, of his having recently adventured in a commerce, which nobody knew the origin of. Yet, nothing was ever farther from his wishes than such a pursuit; and not for a moment would he have maintained any connection with trade, but from an unwillingness to embarrass a brother and a cousin to whom he was affectionately attached, by too suddenly withdrawing the capital engaged in it, or forcing them to bring to a close, a business which they were every day flattering themselves with the hope, would prove profitable. In a letter to Griffin Greene, of the 7th of June, 1783, in answer to one soliciting him to embark in trade, he observes—"My landed property in this country, I am endeavouring to put in a way of improvement, which, if I can effect, it will afford me a genteel independence. To put this in the power of fortune, may leave me in the decline of life, with a shattered constitution, to struggle with difficulties painful to contemplate."

What was the final result of these mercantile concerns, we are not informed; but, judging from the correspondence before us, we are induced to believe, that he took no other part in them, than what he would have taken to promote the views of his friends, without a view to interest; that they remained unclosed at his death, and, finally, were productive of nothing but loss. It was not long before his own affairs became so involved, as to engross all his attention; and to add to his own personal distresses, that of being deprived of the power of relieving those of two men, who were personally dear to him.

The only subjects of a public nature that intruded on General Greene, during the relaxations of this winter, were, a call from congress to act as one of the commissioners for treating with the Indians, and the clamour that had been raised on the establishment of the Cincinnati.

The unsettled state of the relations between the United States and the Indian tribes, determined congress, at a very early period, to appoint a board of commissioners, with full powers to visit them from north to south, and endeavour to effect a general pacification.

On the 8th of March, an election took place, and General Greene, with Mr. George Rogers Clarke, Mr. Oliver Wolcot, Mr. Richard Butler, and Mr. Stephen Higginson, were returned.

The election was not only unsolicited, but unknown to General Greene; and the state of his private affairs, put it wholly out of his power to accept of the appointment. Indeed, he had resolved to retire, for some years, altogether to private life; and hence, when General Lincoln, soon after, intimated a wish to resign, and the public eye was again turned upon General Greene to fill the

war office, he assured his friends of the utter impossibility of his embarking in public employment; and from that time, he was generally consigned to retirement by public opinion. CHAP. XIX.

Few occurrences, of so little importance, have ever given rise to so much excitement as the establishment of the Cincinnati. It affords another proof of Montesquieu's assertion—"that a people will submit to any thing except insult." The hereditary principle and the badge, the alleged mimicry of royal orders, were the avowed objects of the attack; but, there can be little doubt, that the excluding rule, which shut all the rest of the world out of the society, except commissioned officers of the United States, was the real object of offence. It could not be tolerated, that any order of men, however virtuous and meritorious, should assert an exclusive claim to the guardianship of the vestal fire, and constitute themselves an hereditary priesthood at the altar of liberty. The Marquis La Fayette, unfortunately, in his zeal to give the order eclat in the eyes of the French court, presented himself at the throne, to request permission of his sovereign, to "wear the eagle of the illustrious order of the Cincinnati." The introduction of its symbol into the courts of Europe, and its association with the distinctions conferred by royalty upon aristocracy, completed the *real* alarm of some, produced by the *affected* alarm of others. Judge Burke of South Carolina, in a pamphlet signed Cassius, in which the assassin of Cæsar is, by an odd incongruity, introduced with, "blow ye the trumpet of Zion," made an unmerciful attack upon the society, in which he insists, that the object is, and the effect of the institution will be, to divide the people of the United States into Patricians and Plebians, and throw all the power of government in the hands of the former. The tocsin was now sounded from one end of the continent to the other; and it is asserted in the records of the day, that one of the states had it in contemplation, to disfranchise the whole race of usurpers who dared to assume the patrician badge. Certain it is, that General Washington became seriously alarmed; and we are in possession of several of his letters to General Greene, soliciting him to attend the meeting of the society called in May, 1784, with a view to take into serious consideration, the propriety of removing the odious hereditary principle.

The state of his family and private affairs, and a complaint of the breast, remains of the two fall fevers General Greene had already encountered, prevented his attendance, and we are unadvised of the part he would have taken on the occasion. He never attended a meeting of the Cincinnati; nor can we ascertain, from any of his letters, his opinions respecting the institution. AD

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that is known on this subject is gathered from Mr. Gordon,* who affirms, "that General Greene had acknowledged to him in conversation, that there was not in the society, as then constituted, a delicacy with regard to the general body of American citizens."

This declaration is easily explained; General Greene had the sagacity to perceive that the objects declaimed against were not the most offensive of the society's rules; but that, writers eluded the charge of personal feeling, by not touching upon the exclusive principle as the great ground of complaint. That the hereditary principle, or even the bauble at the button-hole, were not the real cause of alarm, has since been satisfactorily established: for the one was never relinquished, and the other has been silently resumed, without giving any alarm, or doing the least sensible injury. The truth is, that under our republican institutions, all claims to hereditary distinction are so perfectly puerile, that no one ought ever to have imagined, that the son of a hyde-master, a barrack-master, or accountant, would ever become formidable to the liberties of a country, by a harmless indulgence of his vanity once or twice in the year.

The people have since had the good sense to find out, that they have the same right to form societies, and exclude, if they will, the Cincinnati from them; aye, and wear badges, and assert the honours of hereditary perpetuation, and they now bestow an unfeigned tribute of respect on the hoary heads of the few venerable survivors of the revolutionary officers. When they shall have passed away, it is easy to foresee what will be the fate of the society.

We will venture upon one remark on this institution. Though folly only, could have entertained, or vindictiveness asserted an evil design in its founders, we cannot help believing that it was an injudicious and injurious measure. It was not to be expected, that a people buoyed up with all the pride of recent victory over prerogative and usurpation, would look with indifference upon self-assumed or self-created, or exclusive distinctions of any kind. The murmurs and exclamations which actually did arise against the society, and the real apprehensions excited, by demagogues, in the breasts of the suspicious and ignorant, soured and offended the officers on the one hand, while it served, on the other, to detach from them popular confidence; and deprived the country, in a great measure, of their wisdom and experience, by excluding them from public councils. When the great separation of parties subsequently took place,

it is believed that, comparatively, few of the members of the Cincinnati were found on the popular side. CHAP.
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In the month of June, 1784, General Greene returned to South Carolina, to complete his preparations for a final removal with his family, a plan of life which he looked forward to with the more delight, as many of his officers had now established themselves there, and some of his most valued friends, particularly Mr. Joseph Read, proposed soon to join him, and seat themselves beside him for life. Independence, a select society, and a beloved family, were the enjoyment that imagination fondly grouped in the picture before him. How his anticipations were realized, let him describe in his own language.

General Greene to Mr. Jacob Greene.

CHARLESTON, August 12th, 1784.

"My heart is too full, and my situation too distressing, to write much; but from a wish that you may not feel more inconvenience than is unavoidable, I embrace the earliest opportunity to make you acquainted with my situation. You may remember I told you last winter of some heavy embarrassments which hung over me from becoming security for Banks, Hunter & Company. They being public contractors, and the feeding of the army depending upon supporting their credit, I was obliged to guarantee sundry of their debts. But that I might be secure, they engaged that all the contract money should go to the discharge of my guarantee bonds. This they have found means to avoid; and their affairs have grown desperate, and I am and shall be involved in heavy and unavoidable losses. And although it will not reduce me to a state of poverty, yet it will put it out of my power to do any thing for you and Griffin. Indeed, it will oblige me to sell considerable part of my estate. My situation is truly afflictive! to be reduced from independence to want, and from the power of obliging my friends, to a situation claiming their aid. You and Griffin must do the best you can, and God grant you better fortune! My heart faints within me when I think of my family. I have only one consolation—it is not the fruits of extravagance."

The apprehensions which General Greene entertained from the discovery of Mr. Banks' conduct, in withdrawing the government bills from the hands of Mr. Petit, had been, hitherto, greatly alleviated, from two causes; the reputed solvency of the house of Hunter, Banks & Company, and his confidence in the

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 XIX. dead, and the deranged state of the company's affairs was well calculated to awaken all his fears. He resolved, however, to leave nothing untried on which a prop could be founded; and as Banks had left the city with some precipitation, on his arrival, (for who can bear the eye that reproaches him,) he mounted his horse, and with his pistols, his saddle-bags, and a servant, resolved to overtake him. As the opinion was prevalent that he still possessed the means of indemnity, there remained a hope that the presence of the man he had thus injured, might extort from him the application of those means to his relief.

The pursuit was urged over the same ground that Greene had traversed at the head of his army, and every step was calculated to awaken some painful recollection. But there were none so painful as his present reflections, and the distressing anticipations which crowded on his view. For four hundred miles the pursuit was pressed, and for that distance had Banks travelled with a fever burning in his veins. But the distance he had gained had, probably, lulled his apprehensions, and the disease, irritated by travel, forbade his proceeding further. He was overtaken, but it was in the hour that he breathed his last; and with a heavy heart the general retraced his steps to Charleston. In what state of mind will be judged of when he writes,—“my distresses are sufficient already to sink me almost under water—a little more, and I am gone.” This, for a mind so long schooled by adversity, and which had never before flagged under the severest trials, was strongly expressive of his mental agony.

But some relief was now derived from the exertions made by Major Burnet's family, to extricate the general from his present embarrassments. A brother of the major's was expedited to Charleston to adjust the affairs of the concern; and by his efforts, aided by the good will of Major Forsyth, and of the relatives of Mr. Banks, a variety of debts, and some other effects of the concerns, were appropriated to the satisfaction of the creditors for whose debts the general had become liable; and some property in lands mortgaged for his further security. Thus, a gleam of hope, for a while, lighted up his prospects, but its duration was momentary. Every one knows the obstacles at that time existing, to the recovery of debts; and while obliged himself to have recourse to legal process to recover from others, he was pressed by his own sense of honour, and the desire of maintaining his reputation, to make every sacrifice to gratify the creditors. Thus was he kept constantly poor, harassed, and teased, while every shilling he could gather from his planting interest, went to pay the annual interest on these debts. He feelingly laments his situation in a letter to one of his friends. “Since my arrival here I have written you nothing but

the most melancholy accounts. I wish I had less reason than I have to dwell on the same subject still. However, I am not as apprehensive as I have been. But it is a painful situation, to be held responsible for heavy debts, subject to all contingencies, and have your redress to look for from different people, and from various kinds of property. This will be my situation for some time to come. The gentlemen of the bar tell me I am safe, yet I cannot feel easy, nor ever shall, until I get entirely disengaged from this business. My wishes are very strong to be helpful to all branches of the family, and, if I am not distressed in the infancy of my affairs, I hope I shall have it in my power to serve you. But at present I seem to be in the dark; nay, I am in deep distress, and know not how to accommodate payments to the many demands upon me. I shall not return to the northward until I can get myself in a securer situation, respecting these guarantees. My own matters would be easy, were I not perplexed with other people's."

In fine, these difficulties ended but with his life. His anxiety to pay the debts that he had assumed, induced him to make attempts to borrow money in Europe, on a mortgage of his property; and when that failed he was, at length, obliged to sell his lands in Carolina, and remove his slaves to his Georgia estate. The price he obtained was, probably, not one tenth of its present value.

In all these difficulties, the soothing and friendly attentions, and professional aid of the late Mr. Edward Rutledge, commanded from General Greene the warmest gratitude; and a more intimate acquaintance impressed these gentlemen with a mutual and ardent friendship, which ended only with their lives.

For two years, General Greene bore all the losses and embarrassments resulting from this distressing affair, without turning his eye to the general government for relief. At length, on the 22d of August, 1785, under the advice of his friends, and after making every possible effort to extricate himself without calling upon the government, he resolved to lay a memorial before congress, presenting a simple narrative of the case, and to refer it to their sense of justice, to determine whether, if finally, he should be involved in the losses which threatened him, he was not entitled to claim indemnity from their justice and liberality. The letter claims no immediate interference from congress; it was a measure of precaution against the accident of death, to which, his projected removal to an unhealthy climate, he was aware, exposed him; and to commit his family to their munificence, if he should not live to provide for them, or to bring this affair of Banks' to a determinate result. It was the last official communication of this great and good man; and being preferred at a time when events were recent, and facts known, or easily ascertainable, may be con-

sidered as challenging inquiry into the correctness of its statement. It also presents a view of the movements of a mind, half-humbled by misfortune, modestly preferring a claim which it yet disdains to solicit.

After narrating the occurrences relative to the contract for clothing, he proceeds :

“ There are no transactions in life which are more vexatious, than when our zeal to serve the public, is made a subject of private accusation. It is no less mortifying than injurious to our character. I despise popular prejudices, and disclaim vulgar suspicions. But, lest the army might be tainted with the rumours on the subject, and sap their confidence so essential to military operations, and the prospects of peace uncertain ; I got General Wayne and Colonel Carrington to look over the original papers, that the army might be convinced it was a public, and not a private transaction ; and such they found it. Their report has been made public.”

The letter then proceeds to narrate, with brevity, the events which attended the contract for subsistence, the diversion of the funds pledged by Banks, and his many efforts to recover, or secure the debt ; and concludes—“ Part of what now remains due is in dispute ; and I have a bond of indemnity, and some mortgages for the rest. But, after every precaution I have taken, if I should suffer, I hope congress will indemnify me. I have been much perplexed with the business ; distressed to the greatest degree in my private affairs ; and have already travelled some thousand miles upon it, and am still involved in a law-suit, and sundry other difficulties concerning the payments which have been made. Thus, have I given your excellency a short narrative of the origin and situation of the matter. And have only to add on this subject, that I never held any connexion with this company, other than what concerned the public, either directly or indirectly ; or ever received one farthing profit or emolument, or the promise of any from them. And my bond of indemnity expressly declares, that I have no interest, connexion, or concern in the debts for which I became bound ; all which, I am willing to verify on oath.

“ Another instance of private loss has attended my command, which, in many instances, has been rendered more difficult and distressing, than can be readily conceived. Baron Glasbeck, an officer created for special merit in the action of the Cowpens, was in Charleston, without money or means to get to the northward, and a foreigner, and without credit. I had no money to advance him, and endorsed his bills, which returned upon my hands with damages and interest to the amount of near a thousand dollars, which I have been obliged to borrow the money to settle, and still owe it. My public station imposed the business upon me ; and although I would not have done it, had I

known the fellow to have been as great an imposter, as I have reason to believe him since ; yet, at the time, being commanding officer, I could not well refuse it." CHAP.
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Having pressed his measures with decision during the winter, General Greene found himself, early in the spring of 1785, prepared to make his projected movement into Georgia. But, here new persecutions awaited him ; for scarcely had he passed the threshold of his seat at Mulberry Grove, before he was waited upon by Colonel Jackson, with an invitation to an affair of honour from Captain Gunn.

This gentleman had now established himself in Georgia. Having commanded the detachment of horse sent into that state in 1783, he had insinuated himself into the good graces of a lady of fortune, and his bold and martial character soon procured him rapid advancement in the honours of the state. He availed himself of this opportunity, to demand of General Greene, satisfaction for the supposed injury done him in the affair of the cavalry horses ; and according to the received opinions of *honourable men*, as well of that as the present day, it was incumbent upon the general to accept the challenge to mortal combat, or assign a sufficient reason for declining it.

General Greene's decision was promptly taken ; he addressed a letter to Colonel Jackson, on the express ground of individual respect for him, in which he gives a succinct account of the occurrences that took place in 1782, respecting the horse ; and ends with declaring, that he will never set the example of sanctioning the call of an inferior officer upon his superior, for supposed injuries done in the course of command. Colonel Jackson, upon the receipt of this communication, retired from the affair ; but, Captain Gunn, not satisfied, renewed his application through the late Major Fishburne ; to which, General Greene refusing to return any answer, but that communicated to Colonel Jackson, Captain Gunn declared his resolution to follow up the routine of the "*amende honourable*" by a personal attack. And the general, in consequence, gave him to understand, that from that time, he went provided with pistols. Neither shunned the other ; but, by good fortune, no personal rencontre ever took place, or the issue would, probably, have been fatal to one or both. The general, however, fully aware of the delicacy of military reputation, and not quite at ease on the result of this affair, addressed General Washington privately on the subject, requesting his opinion on the course to be pursued. "If," says he, "in his letter,* a commanding officer is bound to

* Private, April 25, 1785.

CHAP. XIX. give satisfaction to every officer who may pretend to be injured, (and this pretence would not be wanting to try to wipe off the stain of public trial and condemnation) it places him in a more disagreeable situation, than ever had occurred to me before. But as I may have mistaken the line of responsibility of a commanding officer, I wish for your sentiments upon the subject. It is possible you may be placed, by the ignorance of some, or the imprudence of others, in the same predicament, though I believe few will be hardy enough to try such an experiment. If I thought my honour or reputation would suffer in the opinion of the world, and more especially, with the military gentlemen; I value life too little to hesitate a moment to answer the challenge. But when I consider the nature of the precedent, and the extent of the mischief it may produce, I have felt a necessity to reject it."

To this General Washington replies,*—"Under the state of the case between you and Captain Gunn, I give it as my decided opinion, that your honour and reputation will stand not only perfectly acquitted for the non-acceptance of his challenge, but that your prudence and judgment would have been condemned for accepting it, because, if a commanding officer is amenable to private calls for the discharge of his public duty, he has a dagger always at his breast; and can turn neither to the right hand nor the left without meeting its point. In a word, he is no longer a free agent in office, as there are few military decisions which are not offensive to one party or the other.

"However just Captain Gunn's claims upon the public might have been, the mode adopted by him, according to your account, to obtain it, was, to the last degree, dangerous. A precedent of the sort once established in the army, would, no doubt, have been followed up, and in that case would, unquestionably, have produced a revolution, but of a very different kind from that which, happily for America, has prevailed."

The reader has no doubt been struck with the observation, that both these extracts contain, what the special pleader would pronounce a negative pregnant. A denial of the obligation to meet an antagonist in single combat, in a particular case, but, by implication, admitting the objection generally, as asserted in the fashionable world.

The opinion entertained by General Washington, on this subject, we have nothing, at present, to do with; they have repeatedly been remarked upon by others, but we rather suspect erroneously. We cannot deny that General Greene admits the obligation, and acknowledges obedience to the laws of

* Private, 20th May, 1785.

duelling, in professing to set less value on his life than on the good opinion of the military world. It is but another instance of that tyranny of fashion or opinion, which no army will ever be brought to undertake to overturn, because no military commander will be the first to set the example of submitting to insult without thus resenting it. Yet, we can assure our reader, that our hero held the practice in detestation; and regretted the slavery of opinion which sustained it. Pursuing our practice of asserting nothing without evidence to refer to, we will cite the following passage of a letter, written after the fall of a valuable officer, Colonel Malmady, who commanded the North Carolina militia on the day of the Eutaws. It is taken from a letter to Governor Martin, of the 28th of November, 1781. "The fate of Colonel Malmady, I suppose, you will have heard of before this can reach you. He lost his life by that stupid custom which has, in many instances, disgraced the history of the American war, and deprived the public of the services of several valuable men."

It is thus, that all the respectable men who ever were involved in duels, yield to the usurpations of fools over the practices of the times. It is the same weakness that crimsones the ear of Jugernaut, or precipitates the unfortunate widow upon the pile that is lighted under the body of a husband she despised. Can the folly be named, which has not, at one time or other, tyrannized over man, under the auspices of impudent usurpation on the one hand, and the too slavish deference that governs our actions on the other? How few dare to act from their own convictions of rectitude, and set at nought the obligations which have no foundation but in fashion or popular opinion!

CHAPTER XX.


*Miscellaneous.*CHAP.
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RESOLVED to pursue a course of the most rigid economy, General Greene returned to Rhode-Island in the fall of 1785, and brought out his family, in October, to Georgia. At his residence, at Mulberry Grove, fourteen miles from Savannah, on the south side of the river, the prospect of enjoyment once more dawned upon him. His time was altogether devoted to the education of a charming family, the cultivation of his land, and the paternal care of his slaves. The intervals of his more serious employments were agreeably filled up by a select library, and a spirited and endearing correspondence with his numerous friends, as well in Europe as America. His late arrangements had greatly narrowed down his plans in life, but he still had the prospect of competence, and gave himself up, without reserve, to the enjoyments of a social fireside, and the interchange of civilities with his numerous and wealthy neighbours. It is obvious, from the correspondence of this date, that his spirits were raised; his residence was a delightful one, and he describes it with all the vivacity with which a Roman voluptuary would describe his villa. In November, soon after his arrival, he writes,—“We found the house, situation, and out-buildings, more convenient and pleasing than we expected. The prospect is delightful, and the house magnificent. We have a coach-house and stables, a large out-kitchen, and a poultry-house nearly fifty feet long, and twenty wide, parted for

different kinds of poultry, with a pigeon-house on the top, which will contain not less than a thousand pigeons. Besides these, there are several other buildings convenient for a family, and, among the rest, a fine smoke-house. The garden is in ruins, but there are still a great variety of shrubs and flowers in it." And again, in the month of April following,—“This is a busy time with us, and I can afford but a small portion of time to write. We are planting. We have got upwards of sixty acres of corn planted, and expect to plant one hundred and thirty of rice. The garden is delightful. The fruit-trees and flowering shrubs form a pleasing variety. We have green peas almost fit to eat, and as fine lettuce as ever you saw. The mocking-birds surround us evening and morning. The weather is mild, and the vegetable kingdom progressing to perfection. But it is a great deduction from the pleasure we should feel from the beauties and conveniences of the place, that we are obliged to leave it before we shall have tasted of several kinds of fruit. We have in the same orchard apples, pears, peaches, apricots, nectarines, plumbs of different kinds, figs, pomegranates, and oranges. And we have strawberries which measure three inches round. All these are clever, but the want of our friends to enjoy them with us, renders them less interesting.”

It was the will of Heaven that his body should be laid in the tomb before the fruit then blossoming had attained to maturity.

On Monday, the 12th of June, 1786, General Greene's presence was required in Savannah to transact some business with a Mr. Collet, one of the creditors of Banks. His lady attended him, and they spent that evening at the house of Captain Pendleton, his late aid. The next morning, on their way home, they called to spend the day at the house of Mr. William Gibbons. After breakfast the gentlemen walked into the rice-field together, to view the progress of Mr. Gibbon's crop. The sun was intensely hot, but General Greene had been too long a soldier to use an umbrella, and began to be too confident in his capacity to sustain the southern suns. On his way home in the evening, he complained of a pain of the head, and on Wednesday it still continued, but not in any alarming degree. On Thursday the pain increased greatly, particularly over the eyes; and the forehead appeared inflamed and swollen. Major Pendleton fortunately arrived on a visit; and an obvious depression of spirits, and reluctance to join in conversation, which marked the conduct of the general, exciting his apprehensions, a Dr. Brickel was sent for. In the morning of Friday the physician arrived, took a little blood, and administered some ordinary prescriptions; but the inflammation obviously increasing, another physician, a Dr. McCloud, was called into consultation. The disease had now assumed an

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The melancholy incidents that succeeded, are in ample detail before us; but, death-bed scenes are, unhappily, too familiar to all, to require description. One thing only we will remark—in addition to the widow, frantic with grief—children prostrate and weeping, and friends bowed down with sorrow, the back-ground of the picture is filled up with a group of disconsolate beings, lamenting in artless and unaffected strains, the loss of a master, who had endeared himself to them by his beneficence and kindness. Those who are unacquainted with the temper of the simple African, can form but an inadequate idea of the devotedness with which he attaches himself, when treated with mildness and kindness.

When intelligence reached Savannah of the melancholy occurrences of the grove, an universal gloom overspread that place. Business, pleasure, care, all seemed absorbed in a sense of the public calamity. All the usual symbols of public mourning, were spontaneously assumed; and preparation for the solemnities of the ensuing day, seemed the only care that engrossed the attention of the citizens.

It was not only the great and good man whom they proposed to honour. He had greatly endeared himself to them during his short residence, by his unaffected urbanity of manners, and indiscriminating affability and kindness.

On the morning after his death, his corpse was brought down by water, and received on the River Bank by the military and municipality of the place. The citizens all followed in procession to the grave-yard, which, to the honour of christianity, is, in that place, common to all sects, or all mankind; and the funeral ceremony of the church of England, was read over the corpse by the Honourable William Stevens; as there was not, at that time, a minister of the gospel in the city. The body was then deposited in a vault, but the identical vault still remains a subject of inquiry. The graves and vaults are all disposed in regular rows; and there are four contiguous vaults in one of those rows, one of which four, it is ascertained the body was deposited in, but which of them still remains in doubt. A committee was appointed in 1820, by the mayor and aldermen, to search for the remains, and deposite them, with due solemnity, in a fit receptacle; and the committee have made diligent researches in several of the four designated vaults, but were prevented, by unavoidable obstacles, from extending the search to all. The coffin is distinguished, wherever

it lies, by a plate of silver or brass, engraven with the name and age in the usual manner; and it is confidently hoped, will yet be identified.*

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The public regret at the death of General Greene, was echoed through America and Europe; and the congress, when it was announced to them, passed a resolution—"That a monument be erected to the memory of Nathanael Greene, Esquire, at the seat of the federal government, with the following inscription:

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
NATHANAEL GREENE, ESQUIRE,
WHO DEPARTED THIS LIFE ON
THE NINETEENTH OF JUNE, M,DCCLXXXVI,
LATE MAJOR GENERAL
IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES.
AND
COMMANDER OF THE ARMY
IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT.

THE UNITED STATES, IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED,
IN HONOUR OF HIS
PATRIOTISM, VALOUR, AND ABILITY,
HAVE ERECTED THIS MONUMENT.

It is well known, that from that time to the present, it has been impossible for the government to carry this vote into effect, and the ground adjacent to the capitol, is scarcely yet prepared for that purpose. There cannot, however, be entertained a doubt, that this *acknowledged debt* of gratitude will shortly be paid.

Thus, at the early age of forty-four, died the soldier of nature, the distinguished patriot, the gallant restorer of southern liberty; in the very prime of

* Judge Stevens, who performed the funeral service, has repeatedly told the author, that the body of General Greene lay in the tomb of the Jones's. That tomb has not yet been searched. But, there is much evidence to prove, that it was placed, at first, in that of the Graham's, as an appendage to the confiscated estate conferred on him by Georgia. This vault, afterwards, passed to the family of Mossman, who married a sister of Mrs. Graham. From which, the author's inquiries induce him to believe, that it was removed under the orders of Mrs. Mossman, but whither is unknown. There is still a possibility, that it may have been removed to that of the Jones's.

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life, and almost at the first moment when he could have said, "Now will I rest from my labours, fortune! I am aloof from thy persecutions."*

We mean not to attempt his eulogy; it is enough to furnish the materials to others. The gaudy perorations that fill the latter pages of biography, furnish a pretext for exhibiting the orator, or invading the prerogative of the poet; but they have nothing in common with the calm comparisons of the father of biographers.

In a faithful narrative of his life and actions, we are content to exhibit the character we would commemorate; and shall dismiss the subject with a few obvious remarks, resulting from the preceding pages, founded on the testimony of those who knew him well, or of written documents, as to his habits, opinions and social virtues.

As a public character, General Greene was cut off too soon to be known to the world in any other light than as a military commander; in that capacity, the reputation he acquired, was splendid. There was not in the American army, an officer of high rank, who was so incessantly and variously employed. From the march to Boston up to the promulgation of peace, he had never one hour's respite from active service; and if we follow him through his career, we find him advancing, by regular progression, in public confidence and admiration.

But, it was not until he took command of the southern department, that scope was given to the exercise of his talents, sufficient to exhibit their full range. Here we see him, first with uncommon vigilance and foresight, drawing together all the resources which, either congress, or the states in his department, could possibly afford him. His progress to the south, is marked at every step by some prudential arrangement for procuring ammunition, stores or men; and every measure which, a mind fruitful in resources, and not uninstructed by experience could devise, is carefully adopted, to guard against disappointment. All along his course are stationed, men of known talents, and of zeal, quickened by private friendship, to collect, arrange, and forward on, whatever the country in his rear afforded. Arrived at the army, he finds it in a state wholly unfit for enterprise. Yet, a powerful enemy is before him,

* The disease to which he fell a victim, has generally been pronounced, a case of phrenetis, produced by the action of the sun, commonly termed *a stroke of the sun*. Whether the inflamed and swollen forehead, and the gradual extension of the swelling, may not seem to indicate some other cause, will rest with the skilful in medical practice, to decide. It is known, that there are insects, of the spider kind, in the southern country, whose sting will prove mortal, if their venom be not arrested by proper application.

equipped in every thing for action, and pausing, only for the junction of overwhelming re-enforcements. Repose was indispensable to give consistency and discipline to his troops; and respite from action, must be obtained for the advance of his re-enforcements. This is effected, by judiciously drawing the attention of the enemy to the north-west of the state, while he occupied, in person, the only unexhausted country to be found in the present seat of war, and which lay in the opposite direction. Here he awaits events, watching the movements of the enemy, upon which, depended his resolution to fall back into North Carolina, or penetrate into the enemy's rear. The affair of the Cowpens gave the impulse to his movements. To secure Morgan, and throw himself in the front of the enemy, to fall back upon his re-enforcements, and cover Virginia, were the subsequent objects of his manœuvres. All this was effectually done; and with it was connected, the exhausting and wearing-down of his adversary; and a battle was successfully avoided, until he found it his interest to offer it to his enemy. The issue of that battle, although the field was relinquished to the enemy, was exactly that which he had proposed to himself; his enemy, crippled and disappointed, was compelled to fly before him: and must have been ruined, and probably captured, had not the defection of the militia put it out of the power of the American commander to follow him to Cross-Creek.

The celebrated movement into South Carolina, (the honours of which have since been claimed by two generals, as well as one colonel, and God knows by how many more) then followed. The leading object of this movement was, to draw Cornwallis back into South Carolina; for Greene clearly foresaw the embarrassment that would fall upon himself, if his enemy should penetrate into Virginia; but, he also saw, that the most beneficial uses might be made of his absence from South Carolina, and that most of those benefits could be secured, before he could possibly return to counteract the movement. Nor were his eyes shut to the dangers that awaited Lord Cornwallis in Virginia; he early suggested to General Washington, and to the French minister, the advantages to be derived from directing the operations of the French fleet, then at Newport, or that expected on the coast, against the British forces in the Chesapeake.

The advantages contemplated from the return into South Carolina, were, finally, all realized; notwithstanding the many disappointments and distresses brought upon the army, by causes, which he neither could have anticipated, nor guarded against. Had the Virginia militia joined him before Camden, Lord Rawdon could not have escaped from that place; and the war in the south, would, at once, have been confined to Charleston and Savannah; or even, in-

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stead of being recalled, had they joined him before Ninety-Six, Lord Rawdon would not have dared, notwithstanding his re-enforcements, to march to the relief of that place; and thus, also, would the country have been recovered.

Yet, by a movement, the merits of which have never been duly weighed, notwithstanding his total disappointment in re-enforcements from every quarter, he contrived to alarm Lord Rawdon for the country below the Congaree, and compel him so to divide and harass his troops, as at length, to be obliged to relinquish every advantage anticipated from raising the siege of Ninety-Six, except that of saving the garrison; an advantage, which nothing but the most unexpected events prevented him from counterpoising, both by intercepting Colonel Stewart, and capturing the whole force at the post of Monk's-Corner.

Thus, by the most brilliant manœuvring, with an inferior army, unpaid, fed by force, and destitute of every thing but excellent officers, and the discipline and ardour kept up among the men, he managed, in a few months, to worry the enemy out of all the country lying beyond the limits of the Santee, the Congaree, and the Edisto. And he retired but to breathe for a moment, in order to reduce them to a state which put it in his power to compel them to relinquish that also, whenever he chose to advance.

The necessity of disengaging himself from the presence of Colonel Stewart, that he might be able to throw himself in front of Lord Cornwallis, should he attempt to escape to the south, brought on the bloody battle of the Eutaws; one of the hardest fought actions in the annals of warfare: and in which, victory, and an entire army, were rescued from his grasp, by the false seductions of a well stored camp, and the signal gallantry of a corps of about three hundred men. Had not the infantry, in the ardour of pursuit, left the artillery unprotected, the whole army must have surrendered under its fire. A more gallant action than that of Majoribanks, on this occasion, has seldom been recorded. Boldness, promptness, and self-devotion, were its characteristics; and the covert to which he had retreated concealed the danger until it could not be avoided.

But although obliged to retire from the field, he, in this affair, prostrated the power of the enemy in the south; and at the approach of the American army, the latter retired to its fastnesses, and gave up the struggle for possession. Then it was, that the greatest trial of the army commenced. The summer spent in the neighbourhood of the Ashley, was a summer of self-devotion: the contest with disease was a thousand times more trying to the constancy of the troops, than the severest conflicts with the enemy; and the patient resignation of the officers and men to the fevers and agues which raged among them, and triumphed over innumerable victims, ought never to be remembered by the

citizens of Carolina without placing themselves in the situation of their defenders. To cover the country while it re-organized its civil government and to preserve it from plunder and devastation, as well as the fatal operation of the *uti possidetis* principle, then insisted on in the negotiations for peace, were the objects for which hundreds of gallant young men, drawn together from the most healthful regions of the north, lay exposed, the entire summer, to the suns and dews of a destructive climate.

It is with confidence we maintain, that this was the severest probation that the patriotism of our armies was ever subjected to in the revolutionary conflict. To have compelled a northern army again to brave the horrors of that fatal summer, would have required the power of a superior army. But not a murmur ever escaped the officers, and their own feelings and sufferings were forgotten when they saw their general shivering like themselves under a tartian, or glowing with the fever which raged in his veins.

How will the candid and liberal regret, that the sufferings of such men had not terminated with the retirement of the enemy! If it be possible to excuse the privations to which they were subjected even after the peace, Carolina could urge the strongest excuses; but a just posterity will regret the unfortunate circumstances which conspired to produce that result, and regret still more that it cannot be recorded of their fathers, "that their last crust was cheerfully divided with their brave defenders."

It will ever be an object of attention among military men, in considering the events of the southern war, that General Greene, though often pressed, was never compelled to fight. His measures were always taken with so much precaution, that he was never without the means of retiring from his enemies, or of checking their advance. So also, he never offered his enemy battle, without carefully providing against the necessity of a retreat. Hence, although he never remained undisputed master of the field of battle, his enemy always found himself obliged to relinquish every advantage gained in the Carolinas; and in every battle that he fought he ultimately gained all that he proposed to himself as the end of fighting. Even at the unfortunae affair of Camden, his enemy could not pursue him; and was reduced to a state of torpor until set in motion by the acquirement of re-enforcements; and even then, found himself so exposed by the subordinate measures going on below him, which Greene did nothing but cover by his position, that he was obliged to abandon Camden, and retreat even to Charleston; from thence, to look on and see all his posts fall in succession, nor dare to venture out until the arrival of the Irish regiments.

Among all General Greene's military transactions in the southern war, the severest criticism has never been able to find but three subjects for animadversion.

The battle of Camden, and some events preceding and attending it, are those which have met with the most censure. But, we trust, we have satisfactorily shown, that in nothing that preceded it, when the facts and motives are correctly stated, was there ground to support a charge of a want of military prudence in the affair. Greene believed himself strong enough to cope with his adversary in the field, and anxiously desired to draw him out of his fastnesses. To cut him up was an important object, before he could receive re-enforcements; for, besides that under Watson, he had received intelligence of the intended embarkation of the Irish regiments which, so soon after, raised the siege of Ninety-Six, and confidently anticipated the return of Lord Cornwallis.

The movement to the south of Camden, was indispensable to cover the artillery ordered to Marion, and was well calculated to alarm the apprehensions of Lord Rawdon, both for himself and his detachment, and draw him from his fastnesses. And the uncertainty of the duration of the siege of Fort Watson, by a force without artillery, made it prudent, both to detach the artillery, and to take a position, which would cover both Marion and the artillery, from a *coup de main* from Camden.

As soon as the arrival of his artillery and re-enforcements, enabled him to pursue a more certain course, it was promptly adopted; and Lord Rawdon was compelled to adopt a measure, which, notwithstanding the success that crowned it, was essentially a measure of despair.

With regard to the battle of Camden, we, with confidence, repeat the language of General Davie—"that it bore not one feature of a surprise." The attack was hourly expected, and was made exactly at the point where preparations had been made to receive it. It is true, that the well-meant precaution of Colonel Carrington, in moving on, contrary to orders, to Upton's Mill, had occasioned a temporary distress in the army for want of provision, and nearly deprived it of the use of its artillery; but, neither the one, nor the other, had any definite instrumentality in the issue of the battle. The time that the entire lines of the two armies were opposed to each other, was scarcely greater than that which it requires, to read the events that passed between them. The fire of the artillery produced disorder in the enemy's ranks, and the weapon applied to improve it to advantage, was the bayonet from his centre; while the folding of his wings upon their flanks, excited a jealousy for their right and left at the same moment. The manœuvre failed; but, it was because of the retrograde

movement of the Maryland regiment, which revived the hopes of the enemy's troops.

It has been said, that sending Washington into the enemy's rear, was hazardous and unmilitary ; and, perhaps it must be acknowledged, that it savoured more of boldness than of prudence. Yet, it must be admitted to have been well calculated to cut off the retreat to the forts, which he had no means of battering down, and in which a very inferior force might expose him to much loss and fatal delay—the object was worthy of the cast.

But, what end could the presence of Washington's cavalry have answered, that was not finally attained ? The artillery was saved, and the troops rallied ; and these, alone, could have been the benefits to be expected from the presence of the cavalry. It is true, the saving of the artillery occasioned the loss of some brave men, and was, with some difficulty, effected ; but, this is the total of the injury sustained by a measure, which held out great benefits when it was adopted, and threatened fatal consequences, only from events which could not then have been anticipated. The British writers, more liberal than his own countrymen, gave General Greene the highest credit for the ability with which he retrieved the misfortunes of the day.

The next charge upon his military conduct, was one made on the floor of congress, when the subject of Mrs. Greene's memorial respecting Banks' affair, was before them. This was, for not following Lord Rawdon in his retreat from Camden ; by doing which, it has been maintained, his army could have been captured. General Greene, it will be recollected, preferred pursuing his plan for the reduction of the posts.

This subject was fully discussed by Williams, Lee, and Carrington, before the public, in 1792 ; and it was fully proved, that the movement in pursuit of Lord Rawdon, would not only have been visionary and hazardous, but impossible.

To have descended the east side of the Wateree, would have been in vain ; for the enemy had gained at least a day's march ; had command of all the means of transportation the country afforded ; and could sweep along with him, or destroy, all the provisions. Having gained the banks of the Santee River, a few field-pieces could have stopped the advance of a very superior army, through the passes of the River Swamp. But, the American army was actually inferior ; and when separated by the river from its detachments, would have been exposed to the greatest danger. And what was to be expected from the descent on the west side of the Santee ? The route is so circuitous, that the British army must have passed the Santee long before the American army could have thrown itself in their front ; nay, re-enforcements might have ad-

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vanced from Charleston to Nelson's Ferry, in the time that the American army could have reached the latter point. What then would have been Greene's situation? The re-enforcements from Ireland might have arrived and joined their forces to Lord Rawdon, while Greene was moving down the south bank of the Santee, after crossing the Congaree; and the consequence would have been, that he must have risked every thing on a battle with a superior enemy. On the one hand, Lord Rawdon could evade him, or meet him, as he pleased; on the other, he might precipitate himself into embarrassments, from which there was no escape. Nay, had he succeeded in reaching Nelson's Ferry, with his cavalry, and General Sumter's mounted infantry, and Marion's and Lee's commands, before Lord Rawdon crossed, which he might have done, what would have been the result? The enemy had a fort at Nelson's Ferry, which it would have been indispensable to carry by assault, or reduce by approaches, before any serious obstacle could be opposed to the passage of the river; and it is not probable, that either Lord Rawdon's light troops, or artillery, would have been idle during such operations. Finally, had Lord Rawdon been intercepted and prevented from passing the river, what was to prevent his descending its left bank? and who would have dared to move down the right, with Charleston in his rear? And all this, with an army miserably provided with the means of transportation, and which would probably have been compelled to carry with it, all the meal that it subsisted on.

Colonel Williams concludes with averring, that the officer who ventured to advise such a measure would have made himself ridiculous. Military men will draw their own conclusions, we only furnish the arguments for their consideration.

The last charge against General Greene, in his official, rather than military character, has relation to his heavy charges against the states for not affording him support in his pressing necessities, in the spring of 1782, when his forces were diminishing daily, his troops distressed and mutinous, rumours of British re-enforcements approaching, and a superior enemy within a day's march of his camp.

The principal ground of this charge is contained in a letter to the honourable Richard Henry Lee, written in March, and which, though private, was, with the best intentions, communicated either to congress or the state government, or both. We will give it *in extenso*, and then say, with Patrick Henry, "if that be treason make the most of it."

"This letter will be handed you by our good friend, Mr. Izard, who will give you a full history of our affairs in this quarter, which are deplorable enough. Our army is ragged, naked, without pay, spirits, or any thing else to

comfort them. Their distresses have excited a degree of discontent, little short of mutiny. One serjeant, in the Pennsylvania line, has been executed, and four others are in confinement. Nothing comes to our relief from the north; and had it not been for a little clothing got out of Charleston, by the advice and consent of the governor and council of this state, we could not have kept the field. Our condition is truly deplorable. As danger retires exertion ceases. I was in hopes the states to the northward, would have given more effectual support when they felt themselves secure from danger; but, so far from that being the case, they have totally neglected us. Although in the greatest distress for want of arms, we have not been able to get one from Virginia since the reduction of York, notwithstanding there is a plenty at Richmond. The governor of your state says he is left without the power or means to afford us the least aid.

“Oh! improvident people! how unwise and unjust to your suffering army, and distressed sister state! No part of Saxony last war felt greater ravages than this country. An army in such a country, so remote from support, so deplorable in condition, opposed to a very superior enemy, and within surprising distance, can be in no very eligible situation. When an army can be employed actively, it can be kept in better temper than when lying still.

“The tyrant of Britain appears but little disposed to give us repose. Whatever may be his fears, his obstinacy gets the better of them. We had great exertions to make last campaign, but I am afraid we shall have greater this, unless our northern brethren condescend to pay some attention to us. No army was ever left in such a situation—no country so unsupported.”

Similar complaints were repeated to the president of congress, and a copy of Governor Harrison's letter, of the 21st of January, 1782, was inclosed; and it must be acknowledged, that if these complaints were groundless, it was a very singular circumstance that they should be made to the very persons who had it most in their power to repel them. And why, if just, should they have been suppressed? To have remained silent and passive, and let the country lie exposed, would have been no less culpable than the total disregard which it would have argued to General Greene's own reputation. At least, these complaints were free from one striking picture of misrepresentation,—they were not uttered in whispers, but at once challenged investigation. Alas! those who were best acquainted with the actual situation of the southern department, had cause only to admire their moderation. Yet these communications were the cause, or the pretext, for severe animadversion by those who knew nothing of the exertions that had been made to draw forth support, and the little effect those exertions had produced. The world saw the whole country, from the

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Delaware to Florida, assigned to the support of the southern war, the great sacrifices and exertions which each state had made was the favourite subject of declamation by their respective orators; and when the little that some of them had done, in proportion to their supposed capacity, came to be exposed, the commander of the department was charged with misrepresentation. But, among the dangers which man has to encounter in actual life, is that of imposing an inconvenient load of obligation; the receiver is not always insensible to the relief to be derived from finding or making cause of offence against his benefactor. It was also, a most unfortunate time to urge topics that could diminish the pretensions of the states, or check the flattering speeches of their orators. Who had done most, and who should pay least, were the favourite discussions of the day. The period of boasting too, had just then succeeded to the period of peril; and wo to him, who wounds individual self-love, or national vanity.

There is also much reason for believing, that the people of the United States were very imperfectly informed of the difficulties that were to be encountered in the southern department. It is now known, that the ministry of Great Britain took credit for eighteen thousand men employed against the southern states, exclusive of the loyalists. This will go far towards accounting for the sneers with which Sir Henry Clinton received Lord Cornwallis' account of the diminished number with which he fought the battle of Guilford. But it is most probable that many continued on the pay-rolls, who had either died or deserted.

Had the one-fifth, perhaps the one-tenth of the contingents of the states, assigned to the southern department, been kept in the field, there would have been little difficulty in recovering the country from the enemy; and the war would have been simple and speedy in its progress.

But, when General Greene succeeded to the command, he found the states, south of the Chesapeake, either altogether in the hands of the enemy, or so exhausted, dispirited, and divided, that it required all the efforts of their leading men, to keep up a vital action in them.

Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, had not an enlisted man in the field; on the contrary, they were affording the pabulum of a growing force to the enemy, who had been successful beyond the utmost bounds of calculation, in recruiting men in both the latter states. The more determined whigs had nearly all been driven off; and a military organization of the loyalists, was spread over the whole of two, and a part of the third, of the three southern states.

What added tenfold difficulties in the conduct of this war, was, that the approach of their deliverers, was to the inhabitants of the country, not unlike that of the locusts of the desert. It portended leanness to their corn-cribs, and thinness to their flocks and herds. The British army scattered guineas in its progress; their commissaries and quarter masters, could pay for every thing, and did pay, (some classes of them, at least) for most things. Whereas, the American army, without a military chest, not even, for a long time, a guinea for secret services, was subsisted and moved, altogether on exactions, or on charity. Military men, only, will be enabled to conceive a just idea of the consequent embarrassments; but, those only who were present, and involved in the necessity of conducting the war, yet preserving the good-will of the people, could feel the full weight of the undertaking. And by an unfortunate, yet natural consequence, and one which Greene early predicted to General Washington, the very means intended to obviate this difficulty, brought about a still greater. While there appeared to be no other means of supporting the war, the people and the states yielded to necessity, and submitted to these exactions; but, the moment measures were adopted for providing a public treasury, the states, without supplying the funds necessary to fill that treasury, withdrew the substitute by which the army had been hitherto subsisted. A just and candid posterity, will vindicate the murmurs that were uttered, while they admire that magnanimity which towered above such accumulated embarrassments.

To command universal respect and esteem in an army, and yet maintain the character of a strict disciplinarian, could result only from the happiest combination of the qualities of the head and heart. A feigned or overrated character, cannot be maintained among men, who pride themselves upon a characteristic frankness; and who, in the rivalry for glory, look with no little scrutiny into the conduct of their superiors. Hence, in armies, among officers, as in schools among youth, there generally prevails, a very just estimate of talents and character; and the observation is equally applicable to temper and the qualities of the heart. To determine the standing which General Greene occupied among his brother-officers, at the time he was appointed to command the southern army, there could not have been a stronger proof given, than the general anxiety exhibited to obtain commands under him. It was a service which, at that time, was so forlorn, that nothing but the highest personal confidence could have excited a hope of its success.

Of the opinion early formed, and generally diffused in favour of General Greene, we are in possession of numerous and respectable proofs; but, why

CHAP. cite any proof beyond the known unbounded confidence which the commander
XX. in chief reposed in his talents and virtues ; a confidence which never failed to display itself, when he was left at liberty to manifest it ; and which, we can with truth assert, was never disappointed, or returned with ingratitude. Indeed, we find it among Greene's avowed grounds of his greatest exultation, at the close of the war, that he had ever preserved that confidence—" I beg leave to congratulate your excellency," says he, " upon the returning smiles of peace, and the happy establishment of our independence. This important event must be doubly welcome to you, who have so successfully conducted the war through such a variety of difficulties, to so happy a close. If universal respect, and the general affections of a grateful country, can compensate for the many painful hours which you have experienced in your country's cause, you are richly rewarded. Every heart feels, and every tongue acknowledges the merit and importance of your services. The polite attention which I have experienced, since I have had the honour to serve under your command, claims my particular acknowledgment ; and I feel a singular satisfaction, in having preserved your confidence and esteem through the whole progress of the war."

But, it was not only the *confidence* of this wise and good man, that General Greene had acquired ; it is a parental or a brotherly-affection, that his letters breathe towards him.

Of hundreds in our possession, we will cite but one example :

" PHILADELPHIA, December, 15th, 1781, (PRIVATE.)

" MY DEAR SIR,

" Your private letter of the 22d ult. came to my hands the day before yesterday : and giving fresh assurances of your attachment and regard for me, was received with gratitude and affection. As I feel myself interested in every thing that concerns you, it is with unfeigned pleasure I hear the plaudits which are bestowed on your conduct by men of all descriptions, public and private ; and communicate them to you with heart-felt pleasure. There is no man that does not acknowledge your eminent services ; nor is there any one that does not allow that you have done great things with little means.

" Mrs. Greene is now in this city, on her way to South Carolina—she is in perfect health, and in good spirits, and thinking no difficulty too great to be encountered in the performance of this visit. It shall be my endeavour "to strew the way over with flowers. Poor Mrs. Washington, who has met with a most serious stroke in the loss of her amiable son and only child,

Mr. Custis, is here with me, and joins me most cordially in every wish that tends to your happiness and glory. Most sincerely and affectionately, I am," &c.

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When invention shall have exhausted the language of eulogy upon Greene, let it be inscribed upon his tomb,—“he was beloved by Washington.” As it was his consolation under every trial, so shall it strike calumny dumb to be told, that the man who was never deceived,—who, of all others, possessed the fullest means of looking into his very heart, and from whose presence, vice and perfidy shrunk with instinctive terror, thus loved him, and wept over his untimely death, as David wept over Jonathan.

Washington always pointed to Greene as his successor in the public confidence, when he should be removed in the order of nature; and the unbridled freedom with which he always unbosoms himself, in their correspondence upon public affairs, in a degree which it is confidently believed he indulged in to no other, proves a reliance on his sincerity and honour as a friend, not less than that which he felt in his talents as a soldier, or his virtue as a citizen.

Yet, in the height of the enjoyment of an intercourse of feeling and of thought, which never was checked by an unworthy suspicion, the malign spirit of envy, existing among the remains of Greene's early persecutors, was insidiously endeavouring to promote that distrust, which it affected to apprehend. Governor Read anxiously inquires of him, if he has been careful to avoid giving cause for such surmises; and General Williams, after his return to Maryland, writes, “I have many times been asked whether a good understanding is maintained between the commander in chief and his friend, (the hero of the south,—the enterprising—the fighting—the fortunate,) General Greene? And similar questions, which I have always clearly answered in the affirmative. I believe these questions are, generally, put by very good friends, who wish it may be so; but I cannot help suspecting that are men who would be highly gratified by the confirmation of the contrary.”

It is a well known fact, that these surmises were circulated through the regions of politics and party, towards the close of the war; but if ever they reached the ears of the commander in chief, they were despised. With those only who did not know of the private as well as official intercourse kept up between these two commanders, could they receive a moments notice.

Indeed, General Greene appears to have been uncommonly felicitous in winning the affections of men wherever he extended his intercourse. It is not upon the concurrent testimony of surviving friends that we rely for this opinion; we have before us, in piles, evidence of the most unquestionable nature, for

CHAP. ascribing to him this most enviable of all human attributes. This is found in
XX. the letters of all the most distinguished men of what we will presume to denominate our *heroic period*. Foreigners of high standing particularly, who took part in our revolution, attached themselves to him with singular ardour. La Fayette, Steuben, and Kosciusko, were devotedly his friends; their letters have no redundancy of profession, but they breathe that vital warmth, which the heart acknowledges for the language of sincerity. In congress, Mr. Robert R. Livingston, Mr. Samuel Chase, Mr. John Matthews, Mr. Richard H. Lee, and many others of equal standing, were his regular correspondents; and their letters abound in professions of the deepest interest. But it was in the army that his happiness in this particular shone most conspicuously. There, until forced into the measures of reform which brought him into collision with Captain Gunn, and a few others, he does not appear to have had more than one enemy. Not even those who might have been suspected of being touched by the feelings of rivalry, (with the one exception alluded to,) ever withdrew their friendship from him. Knox, Sullivan, Wayne, Howe, Morgan, Lincoln, Gist, Muhlenberg, Weedon, Marion, Pickens, Henderson, were among his warmest friends; even General Lee, after being dismissed from service, and disgusted with all the world, maintained a most friendly correspondence with him; and the period of General Gates' disgrace, was that of General Greene's reconciliation with him, after a difference fomented, most probably, by officious friends; and which had grown up into personal hostility. But, in the language of General Williams, "the army were edified by the noble frankness" with which General Greene conducted himself towards General Gates, when superseding him in command; and for the impression made upon Gates, we may appeal to testimonials under his own signature, in which he subscribes himself,—“With every sentiment of high regard and esteem, and every wish for your future glory and success. Yours, affectionately,”* &c. There cannot be a doubt that their reconciliation was cordial and sincere; and it is known that General Greene was ever after the zealous vindicator of Gates' fame.

Among the officers of inferior grade in the army, it will not be too much to assert, that until he entered upon his measures of reform, they were, one and all, devotedly attached to him; and there were not many who, even after that event, did not continue so. Among the colonels he counted many of his most intimate and confidential friends. His aids it is needless to enumerate; but Hamilton, M'Henry, Laurens, Williams, Lee, Carrington, Davy, were distin-

* December 4th, 10th, and 15th, 1780.

guished by his particular regard; and with what ardour they returned it, the numerous effusions of feeling in their letters conclusively exhibit. Not many years after his death, an opportunity occurred which served to manifest the filial piety with which they cherished his memory.

Banks' affair, which had hung so heavily on the general in his life time, threatened, after his death, to weigh down his family to the earth. Mrs. Greene had managed his estate with great prudence, and made every possible exertion to reduce the assigned funds into possession, and relieve the estate, by paying off Banks' debts. At length, however, it was fully ascertained, that a great loss must fall upon the estate, and Mrs. Greene resolved to throw herself on the magnanimity of congress. This was in the year 1792; and it happened, that there were, at that time, in congress, members who called into question, both his private character and military conduct.

But, it also happened, that General Washington was president, and General Hamilton secretary of the treasury. A violent opposition was raised against the petition; and the attacks made upon the reputation of General Greene, rested upon the old charge, of a connexion in the speculations of Banks.—General Washington, fortunately, had been the depository of all Greene's distresses, arising out of that affair; and General Hamilton's affectionate remembrance of Greene, was, in no wise, abated. But, the attention of Lee, Williams, and Carrington, was immediately attracted by the debates in congress, and a correspondence ensued, replete with indignation at the attack on the reputation of their beloved, and as they sometimes expressed it, "dear, much-injured commander." Connected with this charge of peculation, were those severe strictures made upon his military movements during the year 1781, which also drew the attention of these gentlemen, who, of all others, were best calculated to correct the errors of those who had animadverted upon the conduct of the southern campaigns. This they promptly did; and a succession of publications issued from their pens, which could not be resisted. The pecuniary affair was committed to the secretary of the treasury; and Pendleton and Carrington, who were privy to every thing, hastened to present themselves for examination. The result was, a most triumphant report in favour of the petition, and a final discharge of the balances of the debts assumed. But, where was the indemnity for the sacrifices of property he had made? for the many distressing and laborious hours he had suffered? for the mortified feelings of a soldier, and the anxious cares of a parent, when approaching his dying hour?

This attack could only have been renewed at this time from the want of information, of some occurrences which had taken place in the courts of South

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Carolina, subsequent to the general's death. Major Rutledge, whose attachment to the father was bountifully transferred to his family, had advised a suit in equity, to injoin the suits of Mr. Warrington, the representative and agent of the creditors, on the ground of some supposed *lachesse* of their's towards Banks as the principal, to the prejudice of the general's interests as security. This directly led to a judicial investigation of the question, whether Greene had been originally interested in Banks' speculations. The bill and answer are to be seen on the files of the court of equity in Charleston, and give a finish to the testimony in favour of the general's innocence. There cannot be a doubt, that had there been the least shadow of a ground for implicating the general in an original liability, irritation, not less than interest, would have impelled the creditors to seize upon it. On the contrary, under oath, the defendant declares—"that he verily believes, that the late General Greene, in becoming responsible therefor, [the debts of Hunter, Banks & Company] was actuated by the most laudable, pure, and patriotic motives; and laments, that his disinterested zeal for the service of his country, should expose his estate to the large balance now due on the bond given to Harris & Blachford. He also admits, that it was stipulated by Hunter, Banks & Company, that the money granted for the supplies of the troops, and that which was due for their clothing, should be applied to discharge the debts due by them to Harris & Blachford, and Newcomen & Collet, and himself; and that he went to Philadelphia for the express purpose of receiving the same, but to his great mortification and injury, found that their funds were otherwise appropriated, by the express order of Mr. Banks."

Incredulity, itself, could not have resisted the joint testimony of Banks, of his creditors, of Colonel Carrington, and Major Pendleton, the latter of whom was privy to the most minute of his transactions. But, unfortunately, with that fatality which ever attended Greene's reputation, the debates of congress had been already published; and before the testimony to rebut the charge could be collected, the house adjourned, and the report could not be rendered in before the ensuing session. In the mean time, the authority of the names that had revived the accusations, gave a currency to it, which is felt to this day.*

* There were two applications made by the widow of General Greene to congress, for relief from these debts. The first act for her relief, bears date the 27th of July, 1792; this was passed for relieving his estate from a debt of Newcomen & Collet, amounting to eight thousand six hundred and eighty-eight pounds six shillings, sterling, with interest. The second act was passed the 1st of June

The wonder was, that a report originating in so trifling a cause as a surmise of Banks, founded upon no ground whatever that could give it sanction, had ever been listened to by men of understanding. Unfortunately, however, the

1796, and makes provision for the payment of a debt of eleven thousand two hundred and ninety-seven pounds nine shillings and eight pence, sterling, due to Harris & Flachford. It appears, that when the first application was made for relief, there were still hopes entertained, that the estate would be relieved in equity against the latter debt.

Prior to the first application, an occurrence had happened, which, probably, contributed to animate the opposition which the application met with, and which should warn eminent men, how they indulge themselves in censure, even in corresponding with their most confidential friends. It may also suggest a salutary caution against trusting the correspondence of our friends, to those who come after us.

Mr. Gordon's history of the revolution, made its appearance about this time. General Sumpter's circular to his constituents, of the 24th of August, 1789, concludes with this paragraph—"The following is an extract of a letter from General Greene, to Governor Read of Pennsylvania, dated May, 1781, taken from Gordon's history of America, just published.—Generals Marion and Sumpter, have a few people who adhere to them, perhaps, more from a desire and opportunity of plundering, than from any inclination to promote the independence of the United States. View this and suppress your indignation if you can."

We have looked into the original correspondence, and find, that there is actually such a passage in the letter alluded to. Mr. Gordon, it appears, was permitted to have access to Governor Read's bureau, after his death; and very unadvisedly published an extract, which was safely deposited in the hands of the general's dearest friend, but, certainly, was intended for the eye of no other. Had General Greene lived to peruse Gordon's work, there is no doubt that he would have made the most ample apology to all who were undeservedly affected by the imputation. An imputation made five months after he came into the southern department, and which was never intended to fall upon a body of militia, whom he repeatedly declares to be "the best, the bravest, and most enterprising in the United States."

But, both Colonels Sumpter and Marion, had adherents of a different cast of character. The soldiers of Sumpter's brigade, were little superior to mere mercenaries; and we have seen from General Henderson, some representation of their moral habits. Nor could it be expected, that the militia of so extensive a tract of country as General Sumpter's brigade comprised, could be uniformly unexceptionable. Even some of his officers, we have seen from the general's own communications, "had been made prisoner in the prosecution of disgraceful enterprizes."

But, it is well known, that at the time Greene took command of the southern department, there were small parties prowling through the country, and passing themselves off as Sumpter's and Marion's parties, who were really pursuing a system of the most disgraceful plunder. The complaints against these, from persons really believing them to be as they professed to be, acting under Sumpter and Marion's command, naturally led General Greene into the belief, expressed in the letter to Governor Read, until he had opportunities for acquiring more correct intelligence.

Even Marion had in his service, a corps of intelligence, into whose moral habits no one looked scrutinously, as long as they served the purposes of the general. But, he had also a few enlisted

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XX. strong personal attachments of Greene had furnished a ground for its currency, which savoured something of plausibility.

This was, that he never altered his deportment towards Major Burnet and Major Forsyth. And here, perhaps, was the weak point of General Greene's character; that, scrupulous and rigid as he was in every action of his own, he could with difficulty be thought to think unkindly of any thing done by another. Without regarding the suspicions into which his own conduct had been brought, he freely received the vindications of those gentlemen, on the

soldiers, saved from the wreck in Charleston; and the unprepossessing figure that his retinue made, when his militia were at home, and he dodging from pursuit, is, not unhappily, touched off in Colonel Williams's narrative.

As the opposition to Mrs. Greene's petition was, at the time, attributed chiefly to General Sumpter, we should be sorry to have it surmised, that we mean to intimate, that it proceeded, in the least degree, from private pique. General Sumpter has always been too much above disguise, to disavow his unfavourable opinion of General Greene. But he, in common with many others, had imbibed the opinion, that Greene had disgraced himself in the affair of Banks, and in some other transactions of the same period. Impressions which, we fondly hope, we have had the happiness to remove from the public mind for ever. But, thinking as General Sumpter did, he could not have acted otherwise, than to oppose the prayer of the petition.

From the style and manner of General Sumpter's letter of resignation, we are induced to believe, that he left the service in disgust with the commander of the southern department. That General Greene had taken offence at his disbanding his brigade, just before the battle of Eutaw, and had expressed himself with some emphasis on the subject, is well known, and has appeared in this work. But, however the influence of such occurrences must be admitted to operate upon opinion, it is due to General Sumpter's known character and conspicuous services, to believe, that his opposition, on that occasion, was founded on a conscientious discharge of duty to his constituents.

General Greene, himself, was somewhat to blame, in not taking more pains to correct the unfavourable opinions which had gone abroad, respecting his conduct at the close of the war. Colonel Williams, and some others, had urged him on the subject; but, there is a haughtiness in military integrity, which generally disposes the soldier to hurl defiance at public opinion, rather than convince or sooth it.

Yet, the fair fame of eminent men, partakes too much of the character of a public property, to leave the individual at liberty to indulge his own proud feelings on such a subject. It is, in fact, the principal element of national pride and honour; "the light set on high" to animate and guide the footsteps of after ages.

In General Greene's answer to Colonel Williams, we find the following passages:

"I thank you for your friendly hints respecting the reports propagated to my prejudice. Perhaps, some officers may harbour such suspicions as you mention: but, it is impossible that others should, unless they possess both hearts and principles, far less candid and just, than I am willing to think of them. Mr. Banks' officious conjecture, in a letter to his partner, and Major Burnet's connexion in business, gave rise to the report. To remove any impressions that Mr. Banks' letter might give, I made him go before a magistrate and swear, whether I had any connexion in business with him,

ground that the merchants from whom they purchased, had been licensed by the state government to remain and dispose of their goods after the evacuation, and the government had itself set the example of making purchases in the town. But, moreover, that the purchases had really been made by Banks alone; and letting them into a share of the speculation was an act subsequent and contingent. The easy temper of the general towards those who had served him with great zeal and affection, yielded, without reproaching them with the inevitable construction which would be put by the world, upon clandestine transactions of such a nature.

We could cite various instances of the same blind propensity to consult his benevolence rather than his prudence in private life, yet, in his public transactions, this leaning appears to have been duly counterpoised by a devotion to duty.

That General Greene was a strict disciplinarian all his contemporaries acknowledge; yet his conduct was never tinged with undue severity. The murmurs extorted from his soldiers by their sufferings and privations, sometimes imposed upon him the necessity of doing acts of severity which wrung his heart; but his feelings, on those occasions, were completely subdued to his duty. It is reasonable to conclude, that the rule of his own conduct was that which he proposed to others. This we find in a supplicating letter to Governor Dickenson, in favour of a proscribed loyalist:—"It is the lot of mortals to err, and it is the mark of an enlightened policy to forgive where examples are not essential to the public good.

How his army was kept together, without pay altogether, almost without clothing, or distilled spirits, and, generally, but ill fed, sometimes actually starving, must ever remain a subject of curious inquiry. It is certain that his old soldiers were personally attached to him; but the proportion of these in his army was very small. His army was continually fluctuating; almost all the troops from Virginia and North Carolina were enlisted for such short periods,

directly or indirectly; and he declared upon oath, that I had not. I got General Wayne, and Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, to examine the whole transaction, relative to the clothing I got Mr. Banks to engage for the army; and by authentic documents, proved, that all I did was by the order of the board of war, and for the benefit of the army; and I have the secretary and financier's letters of thanks for the steps I took to get clothing for the army. Never was a benevolent transaction returned with such ingratitude! It is impossible to govern vulgar suspicions; but, if the officers harbour any to my prejudice, on that subject, I despise their low suspicions, and feel a conscious superiority. I defy all the world to tax me with injustice, with doing any thing contrary to duty, or the public good. I expect to see you soon, and will give you a full history of the affair."

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XX. were entitled to, for principle and love of country, we will not determine; with
mere mercenaries and substitutes these motives of action are but slightly felt. Yet the troops were kept together, and generally fought well, and even in their rags, seldom deserted; and generally manifested a due proportion of soldierly pride. This, we presume, must have been, in a great measure, the effect of judicious management; and it is obvious, from the orderly books, that great pains were taken to preserve a high tone of sentiment, and strong sense of subordination among the the soldiers. It is also obvious, that the submission to authority in the men, was enforced by one of the strongest lessons; that of a proper sense of subordination among the officers. From some strong monitory letters before us, addressed to officers who were known favourites, it would seem that it had been adopted as a rule in camp, that those who were most favoured, were held most responsible for their conduct and examples.

There was one principle of government which, by his frequent recurrence to it, was obviously a favourite one with General Greene; that was, to avoid granting indulgences and privileges, and never to refuse what justice required of him:—"The first," he observes, "ends in unreasonable demands, and refusal creates disgust; but if strict justice be promptly administered, though it produce present discontent, that discontent will soon subside, and be replaced by confidence."

Those who are dependant upon us soon discover if they are treated with justice and benevolence; and it was probably of no little consequence to the military service, that the soldiers were in the habit of denominating General Greene "the soldiers' friend."

There were two maxims which General Greene often inculcates on those whom he left charged with promoting his views with the constituted authorities of the several states,—“Be instant in supplication,” and “abundance can do no evil.” He often inculcates on them, “that public bodies should not be permitted to forget you, and will often yield to importunity what they refuse to justice; because some would get rid of the trouble of it, others are forced into reflection by it, and to others it affords a sufficient excuse for doing that which, without your importunity, they might themselves be thought importunate in pressing.” As to the other maxim, necessity forced him into the constant observance of it; for so many were the chances of being disappointed, that whatever he was in want of, he was compelled to require the whole of, from every quarter from which there was a probability of obtaining any part. And thus alone, was he ever able to obtain any thing in adequate quantities.

Although General Greene never appeared, out of Rhode-Island, in any other character than that of a military commander, yet there is every reason to believe that his mind and acquirements qualified him for the most elevated civil stations. His reading appears to have been very general; and from the range of his correspondence with men in political life, there can be little doubt, that had he lived to bring his affairs to a state of arrangement, he would have appeared again in public life. The rapidity and ease with which he wrote, prove that he possessed a rapid flow of ideas, and great promptness in expressing them. We have none of his speeches preserved, although a number of spurious ones have been attributed to him; but we have it from himself that he sometimes addressed his troops; and it is recorded of him by those who heard him, that he spoke in a manly and impressive manner.

General Hamilton, when he first took his seat in congress, addressed him in a letter thus:—"It is an age since I have either written to you, or received a line from you; yet I persuade myself you have not been the less convinced of my affectionate attachment, and warm participation in all those events which have given you that place in your country's esteem and approbation, which I have known you to deserve, while your enemies and rivals were most active in sullyng your reputation.

"You will, perhaps, learn, before this reaches you, that I have been appointed a member of congress. I expect to go to Philadelphia in the ensuing month, where I shall be happy to correspond with you with our ancient confidence; and I shall entreat you not to confine your observations to military subjects, but to take in the whole scope of national concerns. I am sure your ideas will be useful to myself and the public."

The growing symptoms of disunion, which made their appearance about the close of the revolutionary war, and which increased so rapidly afterwards, were to General Greene the cause of the most heartfelt uneasiness. Anarchy, monarchy, and civil wars, exacerbated by that bloody animosity which he had recently seen displayed between whig and tory, were the evils which he trembled to look forward to. "Time and further information," he writes to several of his friends, "may effect what we all wish; but there appears great blindness among the people, of the necessary steps to promote our national happiness." The jealousies of the growing powers of congress, and the rage for the sovereign independence of each state, oppose every plan of just policy for national

CHAP. XX. honour or national revenue." Very early, it will be recollected, he had suggested the necessity of a convention of the states, to organize a government of competent strength to preserve the union; and now that he saw all the evils verified, that he then predicted from the weakness of the existing government, he feelingly regretted the consequences that he anticipated, and sought, by all the influence he possessed, to bring that conviction to the mind of others, which, at length, produced our present happy constitution.

But, public sentiment, acting by a great law in mechanics, though irresistible when it gives an impetus, is proverbially slow in its own movements. It required six years of public apprehension, to bring about that conviction in the public mind, which the enlightened statesmen of the revolution very early attained to. In the year 1783, we find the prospect of bringing about this desirable event, so unpromising, that General Hamilton writes—"There is so little disposition, either in or out of congress, to give solidity to our national system, that there is no motive to a man, to lose his time in the public service, who has no other view than to promote its welfare. Experience must convince us, that our present establishments are utopian, before we shall be ready to part with them for better. I write in congress, and, therefore, cannot enlarge; but, I need not assure you, that no one will, at all times, have more pleasure in hearing from you, than myself; as no one is more warmly and sincerely your friend," &c.

Although the loyalists had reason to consider General Greene as their arch enemy, from the part he acted in stripping them of power; yet, on the other hand, his unaffected zeal in endeavouring to protect them, as well during as after the war, can never be forgotten by their descendants. It was his favourite maxim—"that instead of destroying or harassing them as enemies, both policy and humanity dictated the expediency of converting them into friends." After the revolution, he strongly advised the measure of a general amnesty, and readily lent his influence among his friends, to forward their interests with the state governments. During the war, his measures, in their behalf, were more energetic. He strictly forbade, that any cruelty should be exercised upon them. And plundering, of every description, he not only forbade, but punished, even in the persons of respectable men. The severe orders issued on this subject, had soon a very sensible effect upon the conduct of parties throughout this country—long desolated by the exercise of this right of reprisal. Among his friends in South Carolina and Georgia, after the restoration of civil government, he was earnest in his intercession in favour of mild measures; and it is thought not without effect, certainly, and not without incur-

ring some odium. After his return to his native state, he endeavoured, both by his influence and example, to dissipate that jealousy and animosity, which the struggle had generated between whig and tory. It is an honorable testimonial to his memory, from very respectable authority, "that the subject which he had most at heart, and which has left among his fellow citizens at Newport the most grateful recollections, was his anxious desire, to allay the bitter and resentful spirit of party, which the revolution had unhappily kindled. He believed, that we ought to encourage a generous oblivion of the past; and these sentiments, so honourable to his humane and enlightened mind, he constantly put in practice."

There is another description of persons in South Carolina, who ought never to forget the anxious attention bestowed by General Greene upon their relief. These were the numerous prisoners, as well those in the prison-ships, and at Haddrell's Point, as at St. Augustine. Powers to negotiate an exchange were delegated to him by congress; and it was one of the very first objects of his attention, on his taking command. As early as the 17th of December, he addressed a letter to Lord Cornwallis on the subject; but, being prohibited from giving in exchange, what were called the convention troops, and finding those captured at Ferguson's defeat, unaccountably liberated, or otherwise disposed of, the business went on heavily, because he had no prisoners to give in return. The moment it was established, that those captured at the Cowpens could not be retaken, he renewed the attempt; and the issue was again suspended on the demand of the enemy, "that the militia parolled at their houses, should be the subjects of exchange." This was altogether inadmissible; for they must still remain at their homes, and be as effectually prisoners, as before, or liable to be immediately made such at the option of the enemy. The negotiation was, therefore, again suspended; but, it was renewed, and finally concluded in May, but still, difficulties prevented its being carried into effect until July, when all the prisoners of the southern states, were either exchanged under it, or, where suitable exchanges could not be found in point of rank, they were parolled. The privates were all exchanged; the regulars, numerically, and acknowledgments taken for the balances; but, the militia generally, setting off their numbers against each other, upon an assumed equality.

Under these arrangements, the prisoners of St. Augustine rejoined their families in Philadelphia; where a subscription was opened, for raising a sum of money on the credit of the state, which was liberally filled up; and the sum thus acquired, was loaned to individuals to support them, or assist them,

CHAP. XX. in returning to their country.* Those of the militia prisoners, who had surrendered at the capitulation, and were not sent to St. Augustine, but had continued firm unto the last, were shipped off to Virginia and North Carolina; as were the exchanged soldiers, under an agreement, that the enemy's men should be delivered in that state, where the depots of prisoners had been established.

On this occasion, an instance was exhibited by General Greene, of humane and delicate attention to the relief of the citizens thus exiled from their homes, which merits to be recorded. He wrote to the Marquis La Fayette, then commanding in Virginia, and to his other officers stationed on the line of communication with Philadelphia, to afford all the relief in their power to the exchanged militia, in their progress homeward, "for," says he, "such citizens deserve every thing that we can do for them."

Nor was the recommendation fruitless; for it is known, that assistance was readily granted whenever opportunities offered. The war was, at that time, raging in Virginia, so as to cut off their return to Carolina for the present; but, as soon as the happy termination of the contest there, opened for them a passage with their families through that state, they all hastened to return, to tender him their personal aid or influence in reconquering the country; or, at least, the homage of their gratitude.

These were the men who chiefly composed the Jacksonborough assembly; and these were the subjects upon whom Greene must have practised the intrigues, by which he was rescued from poverty.

The moral, religious, and political opinions of eminent men, are so justly the object of curiosity, and so important to the inquiries of him who studies man, that biography falls short of its most useful ends, when it fails to notice those essential constituents of the human character. As, from the time that General Greene emerged from obscurity to that of his death, he was almost exclusively employed in a military capacity, it cannot be expected, that very ample information can have been preserved on this subject. Yet, there exist many specimens of mental accumen, and correct feeling in their application to general subjects, well calculated to excite public regret at the early loss of one who, unquestionably, had he lived, would have filled some of the most distinguished stations in his country.

* The sum thus raised, was assumed and paid by the state, under Governor Rutledge's instructions; and the individuals who borrowed it, repaid it to the state.

We will beg leave to submit one or two to the judgment of the reader.

In the autumn of 1780, it will be recollected, the congress of the United States was in the most abject state of distress; and the discontents, on all sides, had risen to such a height, that the report got into circulation, of a proposal having been made to General Washington, to assume dictatorial power. That the party said to have proposed it, contended, "that the confidence of the people and the army, in congress, was entirely prostrated, and they must appoint a dictator, and trust themselves to his wisdom and integrity, until the war was terminated."

On these subjects General Greene appears to have been consulted by General Morris, then a member of congress, to whom, as he expresses it, he had promised to "write his sentiments upon several political subjects." He apologizes for want of method and amplitude, on account of "his many pressing engagements," and proceeds,—“The two points which should have been the great objects of attention, have been, in a manner, totally neglected; to wit, establishing an army for the war, and matters of finance. These are the two hinges on which the whole dispute turns.” “While we are without a standing army, and while we pursue the mode of short enlistments, our enemies will never listen to terms of peace, nor shall we ever be able to prosecute offensive operations. The enemy expect that if they persevere, our finances will fail, and the patience of the people will sink under the burthen of the war. A regular army is not half as expensive as the militia, less than half the one will give protection to the country; therefore, upon a principle of economy, as well as the effect it will have upon European politics, economy recommends the use of enlisted troops.”

He then enlarges on the comparative advantages of the two description of troops, militia and regulars, and of short and long terms of enlistment, and proceeds: “The prostitution of national honour and national faith, in matters of finance, has given such disgust, that there is hardly remaining the shadow of confidence in government. Nor do I believe that it will be in the power of congress, say or do what they will, to regain what they have lost. In the winter of 1779, peace was in every body’s mouth. The question was not how we shall support our money, but how we shall get rid of it without subjecting the landed interest to a tax. It was thought a trifling consideration to sport with national faith, where the object was so important to the landed interest. It took effect, and what has been the consequence. The credit of government was lost, and thus led to the plan of transferring the whole business to the states, for them to furnish supplies and establish paper funds. The merchants having been bit by

CHAP. the one, began to be jealous of the other ; and now I am in doubt whether any
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“What is to be done, is the question ?

“I will tell you in a few words. *Call a convention of the states*, and establish a congress upon a constitutional footing. Give them full powers to govern the empire, and make them accountable for their conduct ; and oblige them to establish boards for all executive business, independent of their body. Establish your army for the war, and keep no more men in the field than are absolutely necessary to give security to the country. Negotiate a loan as soon as possible. Let the boundaries of each state be fixed, and the remaining territory held at the disposal of congress. Have no continental business done by state agents ; but make all persons, that are in any line of contractorship, subject to martial law ; and oblige them to do the business, as much as possible, by contract. Fix the pay and subsistence of the army ; and let it be such as will induce gentlemen to serve in your army ; and take all appointments to the army out of the states. Do these things, and your affairs will revive, and not without.

“Congress, upon their present footing, have not powers to govern the empire ; nor will the people ever have confidence in this body of men, upon the present constitution. The army upon its present footing, will become thirteen distinct armies, with thirteen different interests ; and such will be the temper predominant among them, while they remain upon the present establishment, that it will soon begin to be difficult to direct them to one point. Nothing has been more pernicious in its effects than the state appointments, and state provision. It creates great uneasiness in the army ; some faring so much better than others. Besides, it is really oppressive to some states, while others do not discharge half their duty to the common interest. Upon the whole, it is my opinion, that unless we have some supreme power to govern the empire, and that have authority to bring the force and resources of all the states to one point, we can never support the contest ; and that it will be better for the common good of the people to make the best terms we can, than to struggle with such difficulties.

“Many talk of a dictator ; but I freely confess to you I cannot see, what an individual can effect where the empire is so extensive. Were our government compact, a dictator might draw out the forces, and the resources of the country with greater despatch than any other mode that can be adopted. But, as the government is wide, and the people are jealous, and will be more and more if the military departments get the reins of civil government, I am in great doubt whether there would be as prompt obedience from the people at large, under a dictator, as under a congress, vested with ample powers to command the resources of the country.

"To add to the influence of congress, and give their affairs despatch, I would advise to the appointment of a minister of war, and a minister of finance; and let merit, and not family and fortune, direct the choice of these persons. The business of congress should be merely legislative, and not executive, in any one branch," &c.

The reader will perceive, in this letter, most of the measures hinted at, to which, both the congress and the people of the United States, were, at last, compelled to resort; and resorted with such happy consequences.

Among other charges which busy rumour had spread against General Greene, while he was intent on nothing on earth, but the liberation of the country, we find that of his being a man of "*dangerous ambition, and particularly hostile to militia.*" Had the latter charge, had any thing of reality to support it, the many vexations and interruptions he had experienced from the fluctuating nature of that kind of force, as it was then regulated, would have furnished ample excuse for the only proof that ever could have been adduced to support it, viz:—that of his pressing upon congress, and the states, the necessity of employing permanent forces. But, it was a topic calculated to render him unpopular at the seat of government; and the remains of his old enemies, who now bit their lips at his late successes, availed themselves of it to injure him. To a letter of Governor Read's, giving him a friendly caution on the subject, while it ridiculed the shifts to which malice was, at length, driven, in charging him, erewhile, with want of enterprise, and now, with inordinate ambition, he makes this reply*—"You tell me, it is a received opinion with some, that I despise the militia. If this opinion is taken up, from my endeavouring to state the force of the militia in this country, in its true light, it will serve to convince me in this, as well as in many other instances, that people are so wedded to prejudices that flatter their vanity, that they will sooner run to ruin in pursuit of them, than avoid it by embracing truth and conviction. I am far from despising the militia; I have ever considered them as the great palladium of American liberty. It was my duty to state the force of the militia of this country, in its proper light. I was responsible for the war in this quarter, and it was necessary that congress should know what force was here, in order to determine what additional force it would be necessary to send. In my public and private representations of the force of this country, truth has been my guide; and I have only endeavoured to show, that *the militia of these states, are equal or superior, in point of spirit and bravery, to*

* August 6th, 1781.

CHAP. XX. *any on the continent; yet, their force was small, according to their numbers, from being spread over such vast tracts of land, which renders it difficult to collect them.*

"Though we are not altogether successful, I hope the benefit resulting from the operations of the campaign, will be sufficient to satisfy the just and reasonable expectations of the people; and to convince them that my character has been altogether mistaken, for that I am neither a rash man, nor yet wanting in enterprise, which Mr. Mifflin endeavoured to persuade the world was the case. You have been with me in most of the material operations to the northward; heard my sentiments, and seen my conduct, and know how different the insinuation is from truth. But, the war here is widely different from what you ever saw to the northward. Our difficulties, distresses and perseverance, have been greater than you can imagine; and, perhaps no army ever merited more than this; for, had not the officers striven generally to promote the service all in their power, we should have been inevitably ruined. I have much the affection and confidence of the army: as much so as I can wish or desire. *I shall preserve you such materials as may serve you as lights in writing the history of America.*

"I have served my country with an honest zeal, to the best of my abilities, which have been small; and am less solicitous for the applause of the present day, or the panegyric of the future historian, than I am to discharge my duty. Nor am I desirous of rising into great eminence, knowing that it is more difficult to support than to acquire a great reputation. My greatest happiness is to be esteemed by a few friends, and enjoy the approbation of my own mind; not, that I am regardless of matters which concern my reputation. But, I will not mould my conduct, to accommodate it to the prejudices of the people, different from truth; nor will I flatter where the want of merit forbids. It is not my intention to set up for a reformer; I am sensible how fruitless the undertaking. But, when I am obliged to speak of men and things, I must speak of them as I find them. I am exceedingly sorry, that the army treats you so very ungratefully. You have been more their friend than any other man in America. Envy is your worst enemy; but it is the highest proof of your merit. Your administration has been perplexing; but, even your enemies acknowledge it has been honourable. I think with you, that our independence is certain; but, how or when it is to take place, is left in the field of conjecture. No mortal more ardently wishes it than I do. My ambition is too small to balance the love I have for my family; and the gratification I feel from one, is far less than the sacrifices I make in the separation from the other. I am not fit for military life, for I cannot adopt its maxims."

—In February, 1782, when Governor Read's term of service had expired, and he felicitates himself in having got back, once more, to the quiet enjoyments of private life, aloof from the malice and envy which had persecuted him with the most groundless calumnies, General Greene writes to him—"I have taken this opportunity, by Dr. Ramsay, to assure you, of my friendship and attachment in whatever walks of life you may be. You are now in the situation that I have been wishing for, for years past. Nothing could give me greater pleasure than to become the humble citizen. You know, I am not very ambitious, and love domestic quiet. The ingratitude you have been treated with by a party in Philadelphia, and by some of the officers of the army, serves but to disgust me with public life, and as a lesson on the inconstancy of man. The state of South Carolina have treated me very differently. They have voted me their thanks, unanimously; and accompanied it with a vote, vesting me with an estate of ten thousand guineas. No people, I believe, ever felt a stronger impulse of gratitude. Commissioners are appointed to make the purchase. This, with the shattered remains of my little fortune, will lay a foundation for a decent support in the decline of life.

"We are in anxious suspense for the news from Europe; England is obstinate; but, if she can form no alliance, we must have peace. Four great events have taken place the last year, to lay a foundation for it—the advantages gained to the south—the fall of Lord Cornwallis—the exit of paper money without a convulsion—and the completion of the confederation. The hopes of the ministry rested greatly on each of those points." "Notwithstanding the prosperous train of our affairs in the military department, I am exceedingly distressed by the deplorable condition in the civil. The states appear to have a greater disposition to quarrel with congress, and those in authority under them, than they have for affording their proportion of the national expense. Virginia is murmuring and complaining of partiality. The assembly have left the executive without the least power upon the greatest emergency. They have few or no men in the field; nor is there the least prospect of any considerable force. North Carolina is in much the same situation. So little aid does either of those states give us, that we cannot get on the public stores for the army; and such too, as we are in the greatest distress for want of.—Were I to paint our true situation, you would think it deplorable. But, we have been so long accustomed to hardships and difficulties, that we keep up a good countenance. You know I am not subject to despair."

There is much of the correspondence of these two revolutionary worthies preserved, and it breathes throughout, an ardour of friendship, a purity of heart, a devoted patriotism, and dignity of sentiment, that would grace the

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noblest days of Greece or Rome. When the war terminated, it has been noticed, that they resolved not to be separated, and Governor Read had determined to remove to Georgia, and sit down, for life, in the vicinity of his friend. A visit to Europe put off the immediate execution of his design; and on his return, his friend was no more.

Few instances occur, in the ordinary events of life, to prove more strongly than those of General Greene's, how much the course of man's life is the result of unpremeditated and fortuitous occurrences, or of the overruling guidance of a divine will. Genius, which is seldom unaccompanied by an indistinct consciousness of its powers, and its destiny, impelled him to head the armies of his country in defence of its invaded rights; yet, he never relished war; the cries of anguish, the varied sufferings which assailed his ears, even when his eyes were most dazzled by the glare of glory, caused him to sigh incessantly for the return of peace. But, when that wished for event approached, and his attention was called to the means of subsisting a growing family, and in a style which had now become nearly indispensable, he saw before him nothing but the shattered remains of the fruits of many a toilsome hour. The munificence of the states he had served, came to his relief; but, that relief converted him into a slave-holder. How was he to avoid it? The kind intentions of his benefactors were avowed, to attach him to themselves by inducing him to settle among them; and the nature of their bounties pointed directly to that end. Nor was he averse to it; for the cordial hospitality and frank manners of the southern people, suited well to his own feelings and soldierly habits. But, the change was unanticipated; and he felt a qualm at countenancing, what he conscientiously disapproved of, domestic slavery. We find him pondering much on this subject, and consulting his friends, and particularly General Washington, on the course he should pursue. They were unanimous in advising him to establish himself on his newly-acquired property. This resolution once taken, led to another. The slaves purchased for him by the commissioners appointed to make the purchase, (for, although a specific sum in money was voted, it was ordered to be vested in a planting establishment, and conveyed to him specifically) were part of a considerable gang, all attached to each other; and to the place conveyed to him, by all those nameless associations which bind villagers to each other, and to the soil they have tilled together. They were to be sold; and to tear them asunder, and remove them, filled them with painful anticipations. Many a hand and eye were raised to him in tearful supplication; and interest, as well as benevolence, converted him not only into a slave holder, but a slave-purchaser. He foresaw the discussions which it would give rise to, when he assumed this new character; and he was not dis-

appointed; for, scarcely had he reached Philadelphia, before he was addressed by a leading member of his ancient religious associates, with strong but courteous remonstrances, on having abandoned the tenets of his forefathers, and given countenance to both war and slavery. We subjoin his answer to this remonstrance, as the best vindication we can furnish of his conduct:

"SIR,

"I have just received yours of the 21st of last month; and as it breathes nothing but a spirit of good-will, it cannot be offensive. The subject of it demands a fuller answer than I have time to give it. Mortals have limited capacities, and can comprehend but a small part of universal Providence. Whether wars originate from the constitution of human nature, or from lusts which creep into the soul in the progress of human life, is difficult to determine. Customs have their influence, and habits have their force; but passions and appetites have their origin in nature, or how could they operate. We feel in ourselves strong affections and resentments, forcible sympathies and powerful antipathies; and all these inhabit the same soul, and have their operation upon our conduct; they form the dark and light shades of human life, and like the alternate seasons of day and night, may have their use. To say more, would be presumption; and to say less, would be to draw into question the perfection and plan of universal government. To me war was ever a business of necessity. Not that I have a doubt of its being fully authorized from nature and reason, nay necessity, and unavoidable from the plans of our creation; but I am averse to it from its being opposite to my temper and feelings. Nature has linked us together, into different societies, from a social principle; and where the happiness of one is disturbed by the inroads of another, opposition becomes both just and necessary. To submit tamely to imposition, either in private or public life, is to invite oppression and entail slavery. The feeble voice of justice and humanity, affords but little security against power, under the direction of ambition and resentment. Nor will the light of the Gospel, or the lamp of reason, check its rage or control its force. Nature has armed all creation, more or less, with weapons of defence; and when the temper and means are so admirably suited to this end as in man, it is difficult to suppose it was not in the original order of creation. Good and evil, both moral and physical, in the plan of human life, are inseparable; and how far they may operate, by their different influence, to promote the great work of universal Providence, is not for me to say. He must be a fool indeed, who will not allow, that, in this wonderful system, the hand of God is visible in all its parts. The progress of reason is slow, and the light of our moral nature is dim, without great cultiva-

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tion. The business of human life is not to avoid all evils, for this is impossible; but to shun the greatest, and such as will entail the most lasting misfortunes upon ourselves, and upon mankind. War has its calamities; but whether it contributes more, in its consequence, or less, to human happiness and the plan of Providence, is not easy to determine, without a more comprehensive knowledge of all the counter parts of creation than we possess. It is pretty certain the propensity grows up with us; nor can universal benevolence prevail while the present mixture of passions continues to influence human life. Those who feel themselves under religious restraints, have just claims to every political indulgence not opposed to the safety of the people, or the happiness of society. And whether those feelings originate from principle or enthusiasm, it matters not; the obligation from reason and policy is the same. Persecution never pulls down, but often establishes doctrines that have no foundation either on religion or morality. It excites the pity and sympathy of others, and gives an air of merit and confidence to ourselves. From my knowledge of the principles of your society, my influence has never been wanting to soften their sufferings. But it must be confessed, while many of you have acted from principle, there are others whose conduct has been directed by policy. It is such as those who have given birth to suspicions against the whole order; and where it is difficult to discriminate, resentment becomes common. From this cause you have suffered more persecution than from any other; and though it was bad policy from those in power, yet the misconduct of some furnished the pretence. I esteem the people, and admire their moral system; but I think they have many religious prejudices, not suited to the constitution of human life, and by no means adapted to political liberty. On the subject of slavery, nothing can be said in its defence. But you are much mistaken respecting my influence in this business. With all the address I was master of, I could not obtain the liberty of a small number, even for the defence of the country; and though the necessity stood confessed, yet the motion was rejected. The generosity of the southern states has placed an interest of this sort in my hands, and I trust their condition will not be worse but better. They are, generally, as much attached to a plantation as a man is to his family; and to remove them from one to another is their great punishment.

“I am,” &c.

Among the opinions to be gathered through General Greene's correspondence, is one which is not the less true, because it has hitherto met with no one of sufficient hardihood to avow it. It is to be found in a letter to his elder brother, written in June, 1783. “I congratulate you,” says he, “on the happy

issue of the war. Every thing has terminated agreeably to our wishes. It has been a painful struggle, and I remember you entered upon it with fear and trembling. I was always persuaded of a happy issue, if the people had but virtue to suffer, and courage to persevere. Of these I sometimes doubted; and cannot help thinking now, that more has depended on the active zeal of a few, than on the general exertions of the great mass of the people. Be this as it may, it is sufficient for all that we have gained the point, and brought the dispute to a happy issue. The army has much merit, and very many citizens have no less; and all may pride themselves on the revolution, as one of the most glorious and most important that history affords." CHAP.
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This sentiment may have been too unpopular to be avowed by authors; but in the study of eminent characters, we are apt to imbibe their habits of thinking; and we must say, with Greene, "when we speak of men and things, we must speak of them as we find them." If the revolution was achieved by few, the greater is the credit due to those who were active in achieving it. It was not the good wishes of the people, it must be remarked, that General Greene expresses a doubt of, it "was their virtue to suffer, and courage to persevere," that he feared would be insufficient. A very small proportion of the population, in fact, was ever submitted to that test, which alone could be sufficient to determine their courage and virtue. While war is at a distance, and its consequences felt only in the payment of contributions, and occasional brief tours of military service, the trial is trivial, in comparison, to that which assails the constancy of a people, when it passes their thresholds, and imprints its bloody footsteps on their hearths. Those only can correctly boast of having been *severely tested*, who were subjected to these trials; and it is a melancholy truth, that wherever the enemy succeeded in overrunning a country, the defection was humiliating to acknowledge.

But all revolutions are much alike in this particular. Man is prone to consult his ease, and dreads the uncertainty which hangs over the issue of revolutionary attempts. His political conduct is continually controlled by the individual views under which he submitted to the restraints of society. The tranquil enjoyment of his family circle, and the fruits of his labour; the secure and undisturbed pursuit of his peculiar propensities or peculiar pleasures, are the primary considerations which govern his actions. The uncertainties of futurity, the baffling occurrences to which all human designs and human anticipations are subjected, make him, generally, unwilling to relinquish a present tolerable state, for another, however flattering and brilliant, that must be attained by means which may put to hazard, the actual good that he enjoys.

CHAP. The bold and decisive spirits, which rise superior to the influence of these considerations, are, in every society, necessarily but few in comparison.

It is also true, that whatever be the inclinations and convictions of the public mind, the people look around them with cautious apprehensions for leaders. The number of these is, of necessity, but small; and when marshalled under the conduct of leaders, there too often prevails a very evident disposition, in the followers, to give up the honours and the dangers of the enterprise to the few; provided the risk of those who covet not the honours, can be thereby diminished. When leaders are wanted, in whose courage, conduct, zeal, and integrity, unlimited confidence can be securely placed, the revolutionary temper naturally subsides, and the people return to their firesides, satisfied to bear where they cannot resist.

At the commencement of the revolution, the general disposition set strongly in favour of a redress of the grievances then complained of. But great difference of opinion prevailed as to subordinate measures. The declaration of independence disgusted many; an alliance with France many; the parties and squabbles in congress very many; and when the money began to depreciate, and men found it thrust upon them by law: when, finally, it sunk to nothing, and all the defensive force of the country was subsisted, and every operation of the war carried on, by exaction at the point of the bayonet, there was indeed a sifting of the wheat from the chaff, which reduced the numbers of the whigs in a most alarming degree. Then it was that the zeal of their leaders shone forth conspicuously; their exertions were daring and unremitted; but it must be acknowledged, that before the war terminated, their influence was so much diminished, as to admit of the adoption of measures in some of the states, that portended the dissolution of the union; from which Heaven rescued the country by a timely peace. Let the knee of human pride bend at the feet of Him from whom protection came.

Money (under the favour of Heaven) was all that was wanted to render the nation irresistible. But it had been too clearly ascertained that money was not to be had. And in the actual state of distrust and jealousy of the congress, then prevailing, there was not a hope that the states could have been induced to grant those powers to the congress, or establish such a general government, as was indispensable to restore the army and maintain the war.

Among the qualities which shone most conspicuously in the character of General Greene, was an uniform and unabating attachment to his connexions and early friends. Every surviving branch of the family bears the most feeling and grateful testimony to this trait of his character. Nor need it rest upon their

testimony, for every individual is in possession of the most unequivocal evidence of the fact. His letters are all couched in terms of the most unaffected attachment; and in the midst of his greatest embarrassments, he laments his inability to serve them, as the most mortifying incident of his misfortunes. When he attained to a state of eminence, and they found him the constant theme of newspaper eulogy, the companion and correspondent of all the eminent men of the country; by a very natural feeling, some of the most intimate companions of his days of obscurity, manifested a hesitation at approaching him. How to do it without maintaining their wonted freedom of intercourse, was embarrassing; but how to maintain that freedom with one whose eminence may have detached him from his former associates, was still more so. General Greene soon discovered symptoms of constraint in their correspondence, and hastened to remove them by the kindest reproaches, and most cordial assurances of his unabated affection. Far from reproaching the relatives, in whose hands his little estate had sunk to nothing, or expressing sorrows or distress at their ill-success, he uniformly assures them of his unremitting confidence and esteem; and that he regrets their ill-fortune more on their account than his own—"Be assured," says he, in a letter to one of them, "my affection will never forsake you; and in every situation in life, you may hope for every aid in my power to give." Again, he says, "I long to render every branch of the family easy and independent; but, fortune seems to frown upon me. The moment I can help you, my purse shall be as open as my heart is willing." Nor does he unfrequently manifest his solicitude in their behalf, by the most paternal admonitions. On the subject of educating their children, he earnestly presses them. "Fortune," he says, "may be acquired in after life, but seldom education. A just taste for polite arts, and polite accomplishments, gives a relish for noble pursuits." And to one who was about to visit Europe, he writes—"Don't let the glare of Europe induce you to forget the simplicity of America; pleasures but too easily seduce, and passions soon grow ungovernable. Virtue, chastity, integrity, are the only solid foundations for private or social happiness. God bless and preserve you, is the ardent wish of your sincere friend."

Of the authors who have noticed General Greene, all have concurred in attributing to him military talents of a very high order; and some few have spoken in the superlative degree, when comparing him with the military men of the revolution. Thus, the author of the letters from Geneva and France, who is known to have had good opportunities of observation, and a personal acquaintance with General Greene, has said of him—"He was a most amiable

CHAP. and worthy man, and, probably, the greatest military genius which our coun-
XX. try has produced.”*

That the southern campaigns of 1781 and 1782, were attended with the most critical incidents that occurred during the war; that they were calculated to call forth all the resources of military genius, and exhibit every thing that science, valour, and enterprise could perform, is what no one will be so hardy as to deny. But, there is something of injustice to those who were not favoured with equal opportunities, in ascribing to another a superiority that could only be determined upon experiment; more especially where the assertion might be construed to affect the reputation, even of the commander in chief.

It is enough, that the father of his country uniformly performed every thing that his military situation required or admitted; and it is fairly presumable, that in circumstances of equal intricacy, his conduct would have been equally spirited and appropriate. It is certain, that General Greene was far from ever affecting to compare his actions or pretensions with those of the commander in chief; his only boast, was that of a favourite disciple, distinguished by his confidence and friendship.

Those who were well acquainted with both, have pointed out some very striking lines of character, in which they resembled each other. Strong attachments and familiar intercourse, will find men alike in opinion, habits and manners, or leave them so. It will be recollected, that General Greene had still to do much towards forming his mind and manners, when he first came out upon the public theatre at Boston. It cannot be doubted, that he took General Washington as his model, and being then but thirty-two years old, and having very little of the impress of education upon him; and from that time, never separated from the general's person until he was ordered to the south; it is not at all wonderful, if he should have adopted something of the air and habits of thinking and acting, which distinguished General Washington. Thus, it is remarked of both of them, that they never affected to shine in conversation; that while they showed no cold indifference to the social intercourse of others, both, rather declined than asserted that attention which their high characters drew upon them. It is never prudent for men, in high stations, to speak much in mixed companies; but, in General Greene, the habit of listening was not less the conviction of this truth, than the effect of early habit—a lesson of his Quaker education; and of that unconquerable thirst for learning, which he always felt, and something of an humility which always hung upon him,

from the consciousness of his defective education. But, (and we quote the language of a lady who was well acquainted with both himself and General Washington) "when he did converse, there was in him such a fund of good sense, united to a candour so noble, that no man, if we except our own Washington, could awaken a more respectful and affectionate admiration."

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XX.

In temper, General Washington and General Greene were, alike, almost above excitement. It is confidently asserted of the latter, that, during the whole southern campaign, he was never known to be, for a moment, thrown off the most absolute equilibrium, but on two occasions; those were, when he received the intelligence of the execution of Colonel Hayne, and when he received that of Colonel Laurens' departure to join General Gist. But, in the former, he only struck his clenched hand upon the table, exclaiming, "by heaven, I will retaliate!" and the next moment was happily bestowed on a care for the security of the prisoners in St. Augustine; and in the case of Colonel Laurens, he only exclaimed, "how could Colonel Laurens leave me so exposed;" and from that moment, felt nothing more than anxiety to replace him, and to find a sufficient ground to avoid noticing his departure.

In one point, there was a difference which, perhaps, was only the result of ten years difference in their ages. Though many, in corresponding with General Washington, may have subscribed themselves, "*your's, affectionately,*" it was always followed by "and respectfully." This, General Greene's social temper ever endeavoured to put down, in the correspondence of his friends, and the address of his officers. In his tent, or in private society, his intercourse with them was on the easiest footing; yet, it is strikingly obvious in all their letters to him, and in those of every correspondent, that, although many write with great freedom and sprightliness, yet no one ever descends to trifling. So we are given to understand, it was in conversation; a cold look, or a frown, would check levity, or discourage an impure sentiment, too promptly to admit of its repetition. On religious topics particularly, this was the case.

It is almost supererogation, to remark on the likeness of the two men, exhibited in the day of battle. With a calmness that nothing could disturb, General Greene's orders were delivered with a clearness, precision, and consistency, which left nothing to doubt. In all the battles he was engaged in, his person was, at times, very much exposed; but it was a circumstance which never attracted his own attention. He had a horse killed at the battle of Eutaw, but his person never was touched by a wound; yet it was often a subject of surprise that he escaped. Wherever the critical state of the battle, or the necessity of prompt orders, drew his attention, he was in the habit of repairing, whatever were the perils of reaching the point. When in deep

CHAP. meditation, revolving some movement in his mind, his habit was, with the
XX. glove of the right-hand held in the left, to rub his upper lip with the left fore-finger. His aids, on observing this indication, were always ready to execute some important order.*

In their habits of business, there was a striking resemblance between the two generals. Both were very early risers, went to bed regularly, and slept but little. Yet, they were not enslaved by this, or any other habit; and could deviate from it without any inconvenience. During the campaign of 1781, General Greene never slept in a bed for seven months, and every night lay in his clothes. The duties which his command imposed upon him, were infinitely beyond what properly belong to the commander of an army; for he had, not only to command his men, but to recruit them, clothe them, subsist them; and the multiplied but inadequate sources from which he had to supply his wants, greatly multiplied his cares and his correspondence. Yet, he never suffered the business of to-day to be crowded upon the cares of to-morrow. But, the unhappy aids paid the forfeit; for their services became continually necessary, not only in the tent, (when they could command one) but often on distant and fatiguing expeditions which required the presence of intelligent and confidential agents. Yet, it has been remarked of the general, that he never, under the greatest pressure of business, exhibited fatigue or petulance. He possessed an extraordinary facility in detaching his mind from one subject, and devoting it to another. All his letters were written by himself; and in the midst of this employment, when the pen was running with the greatest rapidity, if an express, or a message arrived, it was never detained, but heard and disposed of without hurry, and the pen again set in motion.

There was one striking point, however, in which this similitude gave way to a contrast, which marked a clear distinction of character, without derogating from either. Although both were rather humbled than elevated in heart, by the celebrity they had acquired, and very far above all hauteur of manner; both accessible to the lowliest individual, and sedulous to remove the difficulties of approach surrounding elevated rank; yet all who drew near them perceived this striking difference. The mind was so borne down by respect in approaching Washington, that there was scarcely play left for vivacity of feeling; and such was the commanding gravity of his air and manner, that those who had no opportunity of exploring the benevolent workings of his heart, were ready to pronounce him a cold character.

Greene, on the other hand, was distinguished by a winning kindness of manner, a spontaneous flow of feeling, which has left an extraordinary enthusiasm in the affections of all who knew him intimately; particularly of the officers who served under him; and which never failed to leave an indelible prepossession on the minds of all who approached him. It was the soothing, fascinating effect of genuine benevolence, acting upon an unsophisticated character.

There was one difference also in their military habits, which may have been the result of a dissimilarity of circumstances, as much as of any other cause. It will be noticed in the life of Washington, that he very frequently summoned councils of war. Greene never summoned but two during his whole military career: the first was upon the junction of the army with its detachments at Guilford, when retreating before Cornwallis. The question to be submitted was, whether he should halt and fight. The other was, when the great question which has since agitated the whole United States, arose in the case of the horses captured by Kosciusko. The object was no less than to draw the line between state and United States powers; and at a time when he plainly foresaw, what actually afterwards happened, that his military force might soon have to contend with the civil power of the state; or starve. In both these cases his wish was, at present, to decline the combat; and it is reported by a member of his military family, that it was a favourite tenet of the general's, that this was the only purpose for which councils of war ought to be resorted to. It is probable, that he had been called upon too often to witness, that councils of war give rise to parties in an army; and that pride of opinion may sometimes check, or even give a wrong direction to, military zeal. Nor is it unfrequently the case, that the ablest officer is not the most forward to give, or most eloquent to support, the dictates of his judgment. General Washington's object, at least in the early stages of the war, we are at liberty to conjecture, was to bring together his officers, (but few of whom had any claims to military experience,) to improve themselves by the discussions elicited on such occasions, and perhaps to benefit by the superior acquirement of the few among them who had seen service. It may be also, that General Washington frequently resorted to the cover of a council of war, against that troublesome importunity of public opinion, which was ever urging him to relinquish his Fabian system; a measure which he was scarcely ever in a condition to venture upon with military prudence. If so, then Greene borrowed his maxim from Washington; but that the latter did not act, uniformly, upon the principle involved in the maxim, is proved by the councils of war that were called on the subjects of Fort Washington, and the battle of Monmouth; in both which instances Washington was disposed to fight his adversary.

Yet General Greene, as well as General Washington, very generally availed himself of the advice of his officers; and there is reason to think, not unfrequently, exercised some ingenuity in quickening their zeal, by yielding to them the idea or reputation of having conceived, or advised, a brilliant enterprise. Most of his officers were intimately known to the general; having served with him or under him in the campaigns under Washington; And in every period of the southern campaigns, it is obvious, that they are uniformly employed according to their respective fortes or foibles. Washington, whom General Greene denominated his right arm, and who was ever robed like Hercules, was called to act wherever undaunted bravery and devoted patriotism could direct his conduct. But Washington was seldom ordered to hang upon the skirts of a superior enemy. His station was generally with the army; in him the confidence of the soldiery ran so high, that the infantry were fearless under his protection. At other times he was called upon to act under some leader more wary on a march, and less precipitous in action. Lee, on the other hand, whom Greene denominated his right eye, was frequently detached, and generally employed in watching an enemy, and collecting intelligence. And such was the ability with which he conducted himself on these occasions, that, until the close of the war, when his detachments began to despise their enemy, he never met with the least misfortune.

But, it is certainly an erroneous, although a very prevalent opinion, that Lee was General Greene's confidential adviser in ordinary. It is true, that the latter was very liberal, and not a little dogmatical in giving his advice; but, it is not true, that it carried with it the authority, or even influence, that was attributed to it. And it is not a little singular, that at the very time that it is said, the superior influence of Lee was an object of jealousy with the army, Lee, himself, was actually pained, and complaining at the idea that he possessed less than he laid claim to. Colonel Lee was, unquestionably, an officer of brilliant military talents; but, General Greene knew his foibles, and knew that his inordinate avidity of distinction, rendered him exceedingly unpopular in the army. But, the very selfishness with which he was charged in the appropriation of military laurels, was susceptible of being directed to the most useful purposes. The object of his avarice was military fame; and he sought out every opportunity of acquiring it by brilliant services. Yet, it was accompanied with no rashness; on the contrary, he valued himself on his address; and few men ever possessed more. In his legion, he prided himself exceedingly; it was the car on which he drove after fame; and Greene never entertained any apprehensions for its safety from surprise, for he knew that its commander would never expose it unnecessarily. But, Colonel Lee laid claim

to some privileges that produced no small embarrassment to his commander. It has been seen, that the officers of this corps asserted the right of acting independently; and a question of rank and command, always prevented Washington and Lee from acting together cordially. The former was the elder officer; and a serious injury to the service certainly, resulted from the difficulty of bringing them together, when it was in contemplation to intercept Colonel Stewart on his march to Orangeburgh. General Greene knew also, that suspicions, unfavourable to Lee's personal courage, were entertained in the army. But these he appears to have entirely discarded, or he knew they had no other basis to rest upon, than an habitual resolution not to sacrifice himself unnecessarily—a temper of mind, absolutely inestimable to an army whose safety rested so much upon the strength and vigilance of its light corps. That the opinion did prevail in the army, especially while it lay at the Round-O, that such was Colonel Lee's influence with the general, is very certain; but, it ought to be recollected, how much the prevalence of such an opinion might have arisen from Colonel Lee's own pretensions on that subject.

General Greene's principal advisers were, Colonel Williams and Colonel Carrington, and Generals Wayne and Gist, after these two officers joined him in camp. Williams, particularly, appears to have enjoyed his unbounded confidence; and surely never did man possess a friend of more zealous disinterested fidelity, or an officer of more bravery and conduct. No language can express too strongly, the confidence and affection reciprocally bestowed by these two men; and Colonel Lee certainly shared very largely with both. For the vigilance, ability, and steadiness of Lee, in covering the rear of Williams' detachment, when checking Cornwallis' advance to the Dan, was such as equally endeared him to both these commanders. The disinterestedness of Williams probably constituted the chief difference between these two officers, in the estimation of their commander. There cannot be a doubt, that during the whole of his arduous and painful struggles in the south, he was faithfully and candidly supported by both; but, Williams conciliated all hearts by his noble disinterested demeanor; while Lee produced embarrassment by the assertion of rights, which were, at least, doubtful; and seldom failed to disgust the state and militia officers, whenever he was called upon to serve with them. It has been seen, that General Greene was obliged, at last, to hold out the detachment of Lee as the van of the army, in order to reconcile Lee's differences, by asserting immediate command in himself, even when the detachment was far removed from the main army.

Although General Greene never relinquished his early habits of temperance—never indulging himself in more than one full meal. he always retained his full

muscular form, and that robust health which indicated a full compliance with the demands of nature. From this observation will, of course, be excepted the temporary effects of the attacks of disease, which were altogether the offspring of the climate he had to encounter. Yet he soon recovered his full habit of body after shaking off a fever, and never exhibited the least appearance of delicate health, until the winter of 1783-4, when the change from a camp to a close house, and from a southern to a northern winter, brought on him an affection of the breast, which excited some uneasiness among his friends. All apprehension, however, from this cause, had entirely subsided, long before his death.

The concurrent testimony of all who knew General Greene, and of all his epistolary intercourse, supports the reality of what we find him frequently intimating, "that all his hopes and wishes after happiness, were centred in domestic life." A fonder husband, or more doting father, perhaps never existed. It was with correctness that he said, in one of his letters, "that no one could conceive what he had suffered in his separation from his family." It was not the glare of military glory, ambition, or the love of fame, that separated him from them for so many years, but a sense of duty alone, and an ardent patriotism, that sacrificed every thing to the public service. Mrs. Greene, we have seen, was in the habit of visiting her husband whenever the army went into winter-quarters. As Mrs. Washington uniformly did the same, the two ladies had the pleasure and countenance of each other's company on those occasions; and, we have reason to suppose, shared much of each other's esteem. But General Greene's children were, necessarily, left at home; with the exception of his eldest son, who, having received the name of George Washington, was brought to camp, and, at the pressing instance of General Washington, put at school in the family of Dr. Witherspoon, at Princeton. Of these children we find General Greene observing, at the close of the war, that "three of them he had seen but once, yet the eldest was then seven years old, and one he had never seen." A man must be a father to enter into the feelings of him, who, without ambition, or any selfish purpose to serve, submits to such sacrifices. After his departure for the southern command, he was separated for three entire years from his children, and two from his wife. This was no ordinary sacrifice of feeling in a man of thirty-eight, who could, unaffectedly, write—"I have a family whom I dearly love."

General Greene left five children. George Washington, Martha Washington, Cornelia Lott, Nathanael Ray, and Louisa Catharine.

George Washington accompanied the Marquis La Fayette to France in the year 1785, and pursued his education under the marquis' care, until the revolu-

tion broke out in that country, when his mother's apprehensions induced her to recall him. He returned to Georgia, in 1794, every thing that the fondest parent could desire, but was unfortunately drowned in the Savannah River, a short time after his return. Martha intermarried with John C. Nightingale, Esq. and after his death with Dr. Henry Turner, with whom she is now living, in the state of Tennessee. Cornelia married Peyton Skipwith, Esq. and after his death Edward B. Littlefield, Esq. and is also living in Tennessee. Nathanael married Miss Ann Clarke, and settled in Rhode-Island, where he is now living, at East Greenwich; all these children have large families. Louisa Catharine, who was born a few months after the death of her father, intermarried with Mr. James Shaw, and is now the hospitable and amiable mistress of the mansion built by her mother, on the south end of Cumberland Island.

Considerations of economy induced Mrs. Greene to sell the Grove Plantation, a few years after the general's death. She purchased and improved the place on Cumberland Island, now occupied by Mrs. Shaw. A few years after the general's death Mrs. Greene intermarried with Mr. Phinchas Miller, and retiring from the fashionable world, devoted herself to the education of her daughters, and the fostering of the general's estate. By judicious economy, and vigorous management, she preserved, and transmitted to each of her children, a competent fortune. In this she was greatly assisted by the grant from North Carolina, which has much increased in value, and now affords a respectable establishment to two of her children, and adds much to the wealth of the others.

She died the widow of Mr. Miller, on the second day of September, 1814.

We will now dismiss the reader with these remarks. *To the young* and the lowly, the incidents of General Greene's life, hold out a most valuable moral. They show, with certainty, that there is no condition which may not be improved by virtue and perseverance—that the acquirement of knowledge leads directly to eminence—and that the most persevering labour is not inconsistent with the improvement of the mind, when the mind is steadily bent upon its own improvement. And let no discouraging inferences be drawn from the persecutions which he underwent from envy and detraction. They will fasten on eminence; and to quote the general's own language, "every one but an idiot will have his enemies." These are among the trials incident to human life; and they will attack those most severely, who raise themselves from obscurity. Men cannot bear mortifying comparisons; and, therefore, envy those most, who have risen from among themselves. But, it is a most consoling evidence that truth will never be abandoned; that after such a lapse of time, we find the fame of this great and good man, vindicated by the production of evidence,

CHAP. XX. which cannot be resisted. The plain inference is, that we are to do our duty, and trust to Providence for the rest.

To all, we will take the liberty to suggest another remark. It is related of General Washington, that after the defeat of Braddock, an eminent divine declared from the pulpit, "that heaven had preserved that young man for some great and wise purposes."

If we contemplate the early events of General Greene's life, we perceive in them, a striking aptness of preparation for the part he was destined to act in the revolutionary contest. Subdued, but not broken down under parental authority, he learned obedience and discipline, and how to enforce it on others; but, above all, self-command. Cast on himself for the gratification of every wish of his heart, he learned that great lesson of self-dependance, which he had, so often afterwards, to bring into exercise. With nerves strung to labour, he was prepared for all the fatigues and hardships of war; and habits of temperance, taught him to bear, and by his example, to teach others to bear, all the privations of war. Yet, all this preparation was casual, and less than all things, intended to fit him for a military life!

Nor was his moral and religious education less adapted to the part he was to act on the theatre of the revolution. The religion of the Quakers, stripped of those tenets which unfit it for this nether world, is really the political religion of the United States. Universal benevolence, and unbounded toleration, were their favourite doctrines; and there were few other sects, *at that time*, altogether opposed to privileges or exemptions, when themselves the objects of them. When the bible was made a stumbling block in the way of young Greene's ardent pursuit after knowledge, his mind was naturally directed to the inquiry, whether this was conformably to bible-doctrine; and (by an easy transition) he was led to the investigation of the religious tenets generally, in which he was educated. The consequence was, an early discrimination between religion and the dogmas which sectarians have grafted upon it; and the adoption of a system of opinions, of all others most favourable to religious and political liberty. He still continued a Quaker, as far as the religion of the Quaker's comported with the defence of civil liberty—and thus blended the soldier, with all that stern morality, and simplicity of character, which distinguish the sect he belonged to.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX D.

(See page 193.)

BRITISH CRUELITIES.

“THE amiable” is an epithet bestowed upon Lord Cornwallis by Colonel Lee. We have reason to believe, that it is one which he did not uniformly merit. If the American accounts of his conduct are to be relied on, he certainly did not. Yet it is but justice to this officer to mention, that with regard to his conduct after Gates’ defeat, in a correspondence which took place between himself and General Greene on that subject, he repelled the charges made against him, or greatly softened down the colour laid upon them. A list of names had been furnished General Greene, specifying the individuals who had suffered in Camden under orders of his Lordship. This was forwarded to the British commander a few days after General Greene took command of the southern department, with a threat of retaliation, and a strong remonstrance against the exercise of unnecessary cruelty in the prosecution of the war. At the same time, the breach of the capitulation of Charleston, in shipping off the citizens to St. Augustine, and sequestering their estates, was dwelt upon; and a copy of the celebrated letter to Colonel Cruger was inclosed, with some very spirited animadversions upon it.

To this letter Lord Cornwallis replies, “the order (to Cruger) is essentially altered, which you will see by the authentic copy which I inclose to you,” and on the subject of the executions he says, “I can with truth assure you, that no man abhors acts of cruelty more than myself, or would more reluctantly adopt measures of severity; the proving to the suffering loyalists that I am in earnest to protect them, and to retaliate on their inhuman oppressors, is a duty which I owe to my country.”

“You have been greatly misinformed if you have ever been told that any inhabitants of this country has been punished by us for observing a neutrality; but you will find instances enough of the most inhuman persecutions, and even tortures, inflicted on those who refuse to take arms on your side.”

How far the state of facts support Lord Cornwallis' professions, we regret that we cannot enable the reader to judge from a view of the authentic copy of the orders to Cruger, inclosed in the letter. It has by some means escaped from the envelope, but the copy of the inclosed, of which Lord Cornwallis speaks as being essentially altered, remains, with the words in italics, underscored thus, "I have given orders that all the inhabitants of this Province who have *"subscribed"* and have taken part in this revolt, should be punished with the greatest rigour, *and also those who will not turn out*, that they may be imprisoned, and that their whole property be taken from them *or destroyed*. I have likewise ordered that compensation should be made out of their effects to the persons who have been *injured* and oppressed by them. I have ordered in the most positive manner, that every militiaman who has borne arms with us, and afterwards joined the enemy shall be immediately hanged. I desire you will take the most rigorous measures to punish the rebels in the district in which you command; and that you will obey in the strictest manner the directions I have given in this letter, relative to the *inhabitants of this country.*"

This order it will be observed, was issued, after measures had been adopted for compelling the whole militia of the country into military service in the royal cause; and as, to go to gaol and be deprived of their property, was the alternative to those who declined serving, this measure was calculated to complete the compulsory process upon the inhabitants, to abandon the American cause and join the enemy. Such would be its operations, even after allowing every alteration that the underscoring would suggest. For these words still remain entire, "I have ordered in the most positive manner that every militiaman who has borne arms with us and afterwards joined the enemy, shall be immediately hanged."

We are in possession of a letter from Governor Rutledge to the South Carolina Delegates in Congress, in which he says that after allowing all the alterations that his Lordship contended for, the purport of the letter was in effect the same. That the alterations were corrections of mere clerical errors, or very little more. We are also in possession of his Lordship's own acknowledgment, that he had carried his severity a great deal further than he acknowledges. "That he had inflicted death, for the offence of taking up arms, after giving a military parole to remain quietly at home."

General Smallwood being in advance of General Gates, at the time the executions in Camden took place, had addressed a letter to Lord Cornwallis on the subject; and in the answer dated November 10th, 1780, we find these words, "I am not conscious that any persons have been executed by us, unless *for bearing arms after giving a military parole to remain quietly at home*; or for enrolling themselves voluntarily in our militia, receiving arms and ammunition from the king's store, and taking the first opportunity for joining our enemies. The only persons hanged at Camden, after the actions of the 16th and 18th, except some deserters from our army, were *two or three* of the latter description; who were picked out of about *thirty* convicted for the like offence, on account of some particularly aggravating circumstances which attended their cases."

Here it will be observed, that the charge is fully admitted "that persons had been executed for breach of parole," although those executed at Camden may not have been of that description. But besides the *two or three* admitted to have suffered at Camden for the cause assigned, there were still several others for whose lives it was incumbent on his Lordship to account. Cotemporary historians give the names of five, and assert that there were several others who shared the same fate. Nor do they admit that the sufferers underwent any form of trial to sanction his Lordship in asserting that they were "convicted." The assertion is, "that they were taken out of gaol and hung without any ceremony." Some "it is admitted," were indulged with a hearing before a court-martial, but the

evidences against them were not examined on oath, and slaves were both permitted and encouraged to accuse their masters."*

Whatever may have been the real tenor or intent of these instructions of Lord Cornwallis, certain it is that they served as the justification to many similar outrages upon the unfortunate whites; and nothing but the retaliation of King's Mountain, prevented their more frequent repetition. It may have been a politic, but at least it was an "unamiable" measure. In one of our pages, the reader will find an original anecdote of one not less unamiable, perpetrated in North Carolina, by Lord Cornwallis in person; and it is believed, that the following passage cited from the historian Gordon, has never been contradicted.

There were many amiable men among the officers of the British army, but the reader after perusing this extract, will be inclined to assert that Lord Cornwallis was not one of them.

Gordon, vol. 4. p. 402-3.—"Colonel Tarleton, it appears, when he made his irruption into Virginia and penetrated to Charlottesville, took possession of Mr. Jefferson's house, near that place, but was particular in protecting every thing from injury. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis, is contrasted with his, in the following words, "Lord Cornwallis afterwards proceeded to the Point of Fork, and encamped his army from thence all along the main James River to a seat of Mr. Jefferson's, called Elk-hill; and made it his head-quarters for the ten days of his remaining in that position. Mr. Jefferson happily had time to remove most of his effects out of the house. His stock of cattle, sheep, and hogs, together with what corn was wanted, were used for the sustenance of the army; and all his horses, capable of service, were carried off. This was no other than Mr. Jefferson expected. *But the throats of the horses, too young for service, were cut.* His growing crops of corn and tobacco were burned, together with his barns, containing the same articles, of the preceding year, and all the fences of the plantation, so as to leave it an absolute waste. These things were perpetrated under Lord Cornwallis' eye; the situation of the house in which he was, commanded a view of every part of the plantation. The rest of the neighbourhood was treated in somewhat the same style; but not with that spirit of total extermination which seemed to rage over Mr. Jefferson's plantation. Wherever the army under his Lordship went, the dwelling houses were plundered of every thing which could be carried off. Hundreds of eye-witnesses can prove that *his Lordship's table was served with plate thus pillaged from private houses*; though his Lordship's character in Great Britain forbids the belief of his sharing in the plunder."

But there was a curious latitude of capricious despotism assumed by the British commanders over the revolutionists, until awed into more becoming conduct by the terrors of retaliation or the humility of defeat. Lord Rawdon, in July 1780, finding himself incommoded by the desertion of his men, issued orders from which the following is an extract, "If any person shall meet a soldier straggling without a written pass beyond the pickets, and shall not do his utmost to secure him, or shall not spread an alarm for that purpose; or if any person shall give shelter to soldiers straggling as above

* Ramsay Colonel Williams.

† Should Captain Charleton of the royal artillery, the same who so eminently distinguished himself in repelling the assailants on Savannah, still be living, and these pages ever reach his eye, he will accept as a slight return for obligations which he probably has forgotten, the acknowledgment of the author, that his conduct was such as truly entitled him to be distinguished by this epithet.

mentioned, or shall serve him as a guide, or shall furnish them with horses or any other assistance, the persons so offending, may assure themselves of rigorous punishment, either by *whipping*, imprisonment, or by being sent to serve his majesty in the West-Indies, according as I shall think the degree of criminality may require."

Nor is this to be considered as an emanation from the peculiarly arbitrary temper of Lord Rawdon, for he had the highest sanction for manifesting this contempt for the rights for which the American people were contending.

In a letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Cornwallis, dated New-York, March 8th, 1781, we find this passage, "Lord George Germain, having informed me" as Major Ross was of opinion, that many of the prisoners in our hands in Carolina, might be induced to serve on board the king's ships, or in privateers, or enlist in the regiments serving in the West-Indies, or go as volunteers upon expeditions in that quarter, he had recommended to your Lordship, to get rid of all you could in those several ways or *in any other your Lordship should think fit to be adopted*, "it is unnecessary for me to add any thing upon that subject, but to say, that I leave them entirely to your Lordship's disposal."

Thus it appears that this absolute abandonment of the unfortunate whigs to all the caprice of power, came directly from the British minister; and was supported and confirmed by the commander in chief of the British forces. How this power was executed, let the following practical exposition of its meaning and objects exhibit.

Dr. Peter Fayssoux, a gentleman of the highest respectability, was assistant director general of the American hospitals, in Charleston. The director general, Dr. Oliphant, was put in confinement for some alleged cause, by the British commandant, and the care of the hospital, devolved upon Dr. Fayssoux. The following passages are extracted from a letter of his, dated Charleston, March 26, 1785, a time when feeling must have greatly subsided.

"After the defeat of General Gates, our sufferings commenced. The British appeared to have adopted a different mode of conduct towards their prisoners, and proceeded from one step to another, until they fully displayed themselves void of faith, honour, or humanity.

"The unhappy men who belonged to the militia, and were taken prisoners on Gates' defeat, experienced the first effects of the cruelty of their new system. These men were confined on board of prison-ships, in numbers by no means proportioned to the size of the vessels, immediately after a march of one hundred and twenty miles, in the most sickly season of this unhealthy climate.

"These vessels, were in general, infected with the small pox: very few of the prisoners had gone through that disorder. A representation was made to the British commander of their situation, and permission was obtained for one of our surgeons to inoculate them—this was the utmost extent of their humanity—the wretched objects were still confined on board the prison-ships—and fed on salt provisions, without the least medical aid, or any proper kind of nourishment. The effect that naturally followed was, a small pox with a fever of the putrid type; and to such as survived the small pox, a putrid dysentery; and from these causes, the death of at least one hundred and fifty of the unhappy victims. Such were the appearances, and such was the termination of the generality of the cases brought to the general hospital after the eruption of the small pox: before the eruption, not a single individual was suffered to be brought on shore." If any thing can surpass the above relation, in barbarity, it is the following account:—

"The continental troops, by the articles of capitulation, were to be detained prisoners in some place contiguous to Charleston; the Barracks were pitched on as the proper place—this was agreed to by both parties. The British, in violation of their solemn compact, put these people on board the prison-ships. Confined in large numbers, in these vessels, and fed on salt provisions, in this climate,

in the months of October and November, they naturally generated a putrid fever, from the human miasma. This soon became highly contagious. The sick, brought into the general hospital, from the prison-ships, generally died in the course of two or three days, with all the marks of a septic state. Application was made by Mr. De Rosette, the British commissary of prisoners, the vast increase of deaths pointed out, and he was requested to have the proper steps taken to check the progress of the disorder that threatened to destroy the whole of the prisoners."

The narrative then proceeds with a detailed account of the reiterated but vain efforts made to obtain relief for the unhappy sufferers, and concludes thus :

"The disorder, in consequence, continued until the cold weather; the number of deaths, joined with the number who were compelled by this treatment to enlist, removed in a great measure the cause. Hitherto a number of our prisoners, who were tradesmen, were permitted to remain in the Barracks, or in the city, where they were employed by the British; but in the month of January, 1781, they were all confined to the Barracks, and there, British emissaries were very busy amongst them, to persuade them to enlist in their new corps. About the same time, a supply of clothing and some money, to procure necessaries, arrived from the Congress, for the use of the prisoners.

"Mr. Fisher, our commissary, was prevented from distributing the clothing, and the prisoners were informed it was a deception, for no supplies had arrived for their use. Their motive was, that by the complicated distresses of nakedness and imprisonment, their patience should be exhausted, and enlistment with them would ensue.

"To prevent this, means were found to have several bales of the clothing brought to the piquets, which enclosed the Barracks, and in sight of our soldiers; this measure established the fact.

"Disappointed from this quarter, the British commandant, or his ministers, determined to observe no measures, but what would accomplish their own purposes. All the soldiers in the Barracks, including the convalescents, were paraded, and harangued by Fraser, the British deputy commissary, and one Low, a recruiting officer of one of the British corps. The conclusion of the affair was, that such as chose to enlist with the British, should leave the ranks, and the remainder go on board the prison-ships. A few, who had been previously engaged, withdrew from the ranks; the large majority that stood firm, after three different solicitations without effect, had this dreadful sentence pronounced to them by Fraser, "that they should be put on board the prison-ships, where they could not expect any thing but to perish miserably; and that the rations hitherto allowed for the support of their wives and children, from that day should be withheld; the consequence of which would be, that they must starve in the streets."

The British nation, will blush at the recital of an occurrence so inconsistent with the character, that they are so emulous to sustain in the eyes of the world. But the American people, have just cause to exult in the noble example, exhibited by these unfortunate men, under such appalling circumstances.

"Human nature," continues the narrative, "recoiled from so horrid a declaration—for a few seconds the unhappy victims seemed stupified at the dreadful prospect—a gloomy and universal silence prevailed—this was followed by a loud huzza for General Washington—death and the prison-ships was the unanimous declaration."

And the closing scene of the tragedy, exhibits a trait of character not less flattering to national feeling.

"The hospital at this time," the writer adds, "was reduced to the greatest distress imaginable; the sick were without clothing, covering, or any necessary but one pound of beef and bread per day—very little sugar, no wine, and rarely a small allowance of rum. We had no resource, and the British would only furnish the absolute necessaries of life. The officers of the hospital, on the mildest

representations, were threatened and insulted, *frequently prohibited from visiting the sick*—once I remember, for three days.

“It was scarcely possible for man to support such an accumulated load of misery ; but when least expected, a relief was administered to us. A subscription for the relief of the sick was filled by people of every denomination with amazing rapidity. Several of the ladies of Charleston, laying aside the distinction of whigs and tories, were instrumental, and assiduous in procuring and preparing every necessary article of clothing and proper nourishment for our poor worn-out and desponding soldiers.”

The following facts, taken from a letter of Governor Rutledge, to the Delegates in Congress, dated December 8th, 1780, shall conclude this article.

More than two hundred houses of the most distinguished whigs were burnt, under the celebrated orders of Lord Cornwallis ; and generally, upon the ground of the proprietor's being absent from home, and therefore adjudged to be in arms against the king. In one instance, the infliction of their cruel mandates, was attended with circumstances of peculiar atrocity.

General Richardson, who was then dead, had been an active officer on the American side. He commanded that expedition against the loyalists of Ninety-Six District, which was known in the early history of the war, by the epithet of the Snow-Camp. Subsequent to his death, Lord Rawdon in person called at his plantation, on the route from Camden to Charleston, and partook of the hospitality of his widow. But whilst dining in her house, his men were employed in collecting the cattle, horses, and other stock of the plantation into the barn and buildings connected with it. Fire was then set to the buildings, and the whole, including the crops of the year, consumed together. Lord Rawdon affected to believe that General Richardson was absent on service. I say affected, for the grave of General Richardson, was visible from the house in which Lord Rawdon and his officers had dined.

APPENDIX E.

(See page 274.)

NEGRO SLAVES.

DOMESTIC Slavery must ever be a cause of national weakness. The labouring classes of a country, furnish the materials for armies: and armies cannot be formed when the labouring classes cannot be trusted with arms. But the evil was not so great in the southern states, as is generally imagined. There exists nothing of that personal hostility between the master and slave, that theorists suppose must be the result of the relation they bear to each other. Mildly treated, reared up as the humble companion of the children of the whites, and accustomed from infancy to look up to them for protection, it is generally found, that the slave in those states, bears a strong attachment to the master. Nothing but brutal conduct, on his part, or extraordinary corruptness on the part of the slave, produces an exception. Innumerable were the instances exhibited in the revolutionary war, of the most affecting fidelity of this class of people to their master and his family. The number who joined the British, was comparatively very small, and consisted chiefly of the young and thoughtless, particularly of the female sex. In many instances, they would return, and with repentant tears, solicit to be again received into confidence.

But the number dispersed through these states, was very great. So great, as to render it impossible for the citizens to muster freemen enough to withstand the pressure of the British arms. This evil, it is generally asserted, has been entailed upon the southern states, by the introduction of rice. But, nothing was ever more erroneous. They had been introduced into Virginia, many years before the Carolinas were settled, and had spread into North Carolina, in considerable numbers.

In the original settlement of the Carolinas, it was contemplated to introduce negro slaves; as is obvious from an article in the fundamental constitution. And it was not that the culture of rice

made the introduction of slaves necessary ; but that a valuable staple, enabled the planters to purchase them. This was enough for the Liverpool merchant. As soon as he saw a prospect of a market, he was ready to furnish the article in demand. Before that time, as has already been observed, the inhabitant bought, or trepanned, the native savages ; and either employed them himself, or shipped them off for sale.

About the year 1688, negro slaves were first introduced into South Carolina, by Sir John Yeamans, the second governor over the province, and the first, in fact, who ever presided over it. In 1693, they were imported for sale ; and in 1765, they had already amounted to eighty or ninety thousand, when the white inhabitants were only estimated at seventy or eighty thousand.

But eleven years afterwards, when the war commenced, we find the whole population estimated at 248,139, and the blacks, at 120,000.

The stream of emigration from the north, had then poured into the interior country, and given prepondancy to the white population.

During the whole of the revolutionary war, it is clear that the slaves never once meditated any thing like insurrection. Indeed, it is not whilst their masters have arms in their hands that such an event is ever to be apprehended.

Nor do the enemy appear to have been willing to cherish in them a military spirit. Fortunately, it might have injured interests which they must have been inclined to cherish ; nothing could have less comported with the interests of those who were looking to future confiscation as the reward of their services. One corps of black dragoons, was embodied in Charleston, but it is probable that the officers were neither satisfied with their spirit, nor fidelity ; for they made very little use of that corps. And the members of it, no doubt, soon found that they had exchanged one state of slavery for another less tolerable. But the subsistence of their army, also, depended upon the agricultural productions of the country ; and thus, policy extorted, what would have been in vain expected from a spirit of forbearance. Nor could the enemy, while so many of their adherents were large slaveholders, have pursued a policy so destructive to the interests of that class of people, had no other consideration operated to check the pursuit of measures which would have led to the excitement of the slaves.

APPENDIX F.

(See page 398.)

THESE Letters are from the pen of the late Gouverneur Morris, of New-York. They will serve to illustrate the following paragraph, to be found in Mr. Marshall's 5th vol. (p. 348) referred to in the marginal note, as "Strictures on the conduct of administration, with a view of parties."

Among these Strictures, the author observes, it was alleged, "That the ultimate object of all this was to prepare the way for a change from the present republican form of government to that of monarchy, of which the English Constitution was to be the model. So many of the friends of monarchy were in the Legislature, that, aided by the corrupt squad of paper-dealers who were at their devotion, they made a majority in both houses. The republican party, even when united with the anti-federalists continued a minority."

These observations have reference to the state of party about the year 1792. Mr. Gordon's history of the war had then got into circulation, and in the 4th vol. of that work, (p. 354) where the author is noticing the discontents of the army on the subject of their pay and rations, we find these passages:

"General McDougall and Colonels Brooks and Ogden, were chosen a committee to wait on Congress. While the business was pending, certain public creditors and others at Philadelphia, were contriving how to employ the army for the establishing of continental funds. The financier Mr. Robert Morris, or rather Mr. Gouverneur Morris, is suspected to have been at the bottom of this scheme: the latter is allowed to be a man of great abilities, but is thought to be one of the most dangerous upon the continent. Officers and soldiers were to be thrown into such a paroxysm of rage and resentment, as should drive them into an attempt to compel Congress to comply with their own demands, and those of the public creditors, who are to arm and join them. Letters were sent to certain military persons, in whom the greatest confidence was placed, that so affairs might be in readiness. Mean while, reports were propagated in Philadelphia, that dangerous combinations were

forming in the army; whereas, the troops were apparently extremely quiet, notwithstanding their temper was very irritable on account of their long protracted sufferings. At length, upon the arrival of a particular gentleman in camp, from Philadelphia, about the 8th of March, such sentiments as the following were immediately and industriously circulated—That it was universally expected that the army would not disband till they had obtained justice—That the public creditors looked up to them for redress of their grievances, would afford them every aid, and even join them in the field if necessary. That some of the members of Congress wished the measure might take effect, in order to compel the public, particularly the delinquent states, to do justice," &c.

This was the preparation for the Newberg letter, which made its appearance on the 10th of March. The "particular gentleman" whose arrival in camp, about the 8th of March," was the concerted signal for action, we have it not in our power to state with confidence. Whoever he was, he had, no doubt, been led to believe by the master-spirit in this transaction, that his influence with General Greene, would secure the co-operation of the southern army.

As Gordon was not in possession of evidence to support his charge against Mr. Morris, the accusation appears to have died away and been forgotten; as Mr. Morris afterwards occupied a very high standing in General Washington's confidence. But in the passages quoted, we have the evidence that there was an indistinct rumour afloat, of a conspiracy having been set on foot to combine the powers of the army and the public creditors, to establish a despotic government, or at least to usurp powers never conceded by the people. And hence too, we have the ground, upon which the republican party founded the charges against their antagonists, which are mentioned by Mr. Marshall; and the causes which awakened their apprehension, when they saw the whole phalanx of public creditors wedded to the administration by the operation of the funding act.

From that time, to the present, the only true character of that party, however they may have been misunderstood or misrepresented, has been an anxiety to keep both the general and state governments within the limits prescribed to them by the constitution. It is easy to prove, from a review of historical facts, that the only true causes, up to which the downfall of the former administration is to be traced, were, reiterated attempts, real or imputed, to exercise power not delegated by the constitution, or to stretch the construction of the constitution, wherever it afforded a latitude, to the adoption of measures calculated to give a fearful and imposing strength to the arms of the general government. The jealousy of the monarchical views attributed to their opponents had never wholly subsided; and even that of Great-Britain, as far as it is not attributable to those feelings which are transmitted from father to son, by tales of the revolution, is assignable to the same origin. They feared nothing from their own government, unsupported by foreign aid; and they knew of no power but that of Great Britain, from which such a co-operation could be apprehended. Hence every step towards a connection with, or dependance upon, or even imitation of that power, has been viewed with distrust.

These subjects furnish abundant themes for demagogues to work upon; and happy will it be for the people of the United States, if, while avoiding Scylla, they are not sucked in the vortex of Charybdis. They were not satisfied, when forming the constitution of the United States, to take a guaranty against the general government alone. They have also pledged the strength of the whole, to protect the peace and liberties of every individual against the state governments. In this, they have a common interest, as well as in the other; and every effort to break the bond, which, in uniting them together, gives the only sure pledge of peace, happiness, and security to the whole; if viewed justly, will be viewed as prostrating individual security, at the feet of either the one or the other government.

That such efforts will be made results, from the nature of man; from that very pride of opinion and love of power, against which the citizens of the United States have solemnly pledged themselves to support each other. State rights, or United States' rights are nothing, except as they contribute to

the safety and happiness of the people. For them, both governments are formed ; and made mutually to check and control each other, that they may work solely to the one end, the happiness of the individual.

The reader will have discovered in perusing these pages, that the origin of parties, as distinguished by their adherence to State or United States' interest is clearly to be traced up to the time of the revolution. The author has carefully studied the different phases that party has assumed in the United States, since that time ; and has been led to the most perfect conviction, that the distinguishing characteristics of the republican party, are more popular and general than to be confined to the maintenance of State, against United States' authority. Such has been the view which the federal writers have presented of it, and such it was their interests to represent it ; lest the people should attach themselves too devotedly to their rivals. And such, unfortunately, has been the view in which many well meaning, and some designing men, have held up that party. The object of the latter, is easily detected. They find a greater facility in managing the congregated representatives of the people, than the people at large ; their station is apt to generate a state feeling, too easily wrought upon, and directed to private views.

This subject has employed much of the attention of the author. And the result of his inquiries may one day be submitted to the public. But, it has already swelled to a bulk too large to be admitted as an Appendix.

THE END.

ERRATA TO VOL. 2d.

PAGE.	LINE.			PAGE.	LINE.		
5	31	for west,	read east	130	21	for him,	read himself
6	12	.. east,	.. west	134	10	.. inter necionis,	.. internecinium
11	23	.. 1st,	.. 2d.	177	11	expunge it,	
13	23	.. 1st,	.. 2d.	..	24	.. any,	.. one
..	38	.. 1st,	.. 2d.	189	4	.. knotted,	.. knitted
16	11	.. 1st,	.. 2d.	207	35	.. that all,	.. all that
83	4	.. to,	.. by	210	25	expunge <i>wha.</i>	
48	15	.. his,	.. the	217	37	expunge of	
65	25	.. New-York,	.. New Port	265	11	.. of,	.. on
72	3	.. west,	.. east	267	26	.. of,	.. in
78	24	.. beyond,	.. below	272	28	.. effect,	.. affect
85	6	insert killed after number		281	10	.. board,	.. body
..	7	expunge killed		329	14	.. but,	.. the
90	9	.. <i>qui</i> ,	read <i>que</i>	336	last	.. were,	.. was
..	17	.. <i>d'assi</i> ,	.. <i>d'aussi</i>	344	29	.. postliming,	.. postliming
91	35	expunge of after <i>best</i>		360	30	.. purposes,	.. proposes
95	25	after enemy's, insert <i>retreat</i>		362	28	.. were,	.. was
..	32	expunge (:) after <i>artillery</i>		365	19	.. unequally,	.. equally
99	22	.. with,	read in its	372	20	.. on,	.. in
110	20	.. on,	.. in	384	27	.. counteract,	.. protract
111	14	.. he,	.. Gen. Greene	387	28	.. withering,	.. waning
..	31	.. defect,	.. deficit	401	8	.. commander,	.. command
112	6	.. Sarney's,	.. Sazney's	..	18	.. to,	.. of
...	12	.. cares,	.. course	404	6	.. gather,	.. gathers
...	15	.. The,	.. No	405	13	.. sick,	.. rich
...	34	insert <i>During</i> before <i>The hard</i>		411	9	.. enjoyment,	.. enjoyments
128	31	expunge with		416	31	.. objection,	.. obligation
130	11	.. <i>this</i> causes,	read <i>these</i> causes	425	13	.. tertian,	.. tertian

POSTSCRIPT.

THE object of this Postscript is, to notice certain passages in the "*Anecdotes of the American Revolution*," and Mr. JAMES' "*Life of Marion*," which detract from the just merits of General Greene, while they give lustre to the character of others.

Colonel Lee has enjoyed the high privilege, of talents and opportunity to take care of his own fame: and General Marion's character has in it too much intrinsic brilliancy, to need the facitious illumination that results from throwing co-temporaries into the shade. The author of this work is not among those "enemies of Colonel Lee," noticed by the author of the "*Anecdotes*," "who were not slow in giving currency to opinions injurious to his reputation." This undertaking was entered upon with prejudices highly wrought up in his favour; the author's opinions had been formed upon the "*Memoirs*," a work conspicuous for many specimens of fine writing, and, from perusing which, one is irresistibly forced to the belief that Colonel Lee—was every where—that he did every thing. But, when, upon comparing his narrative with the official documents of the department, it became palpable that others were entitled to a share in the honours of the day, greater than had been assigned to them, and from which, in some instances, they had been altogether excluded, painful as the duty was, it would have been criminal not to have asserted the claims of "the venerable dead," of Morgan, of Williams, of Pickens, of Marion, of Laurens, of Campbell, and even of Greene: nor less, of some still living whom their country "delights to honour."

The author of this work has not proposed to himself the enviable task of writing nothing but what may flatter and conciliate individual and national pride. He has braved the rugged duties of historical justice, and, while following the course of one great man, through his brilliant career, has not feared (though not blind to) the consequences of often halting to fix historical truth relative to men and events as they passed in review before him. He felt the weight of responsibility which the task he had undertaken, and the materials he had collected cast upon him, and resolved rather to lay himself open to criticism, than not communicate to the future historian the lights which had broken in upon himself in the course of his investigations. His objects are avowed in his Preface. He regrets that they had not been in his Title-page.

He has not brought in question Colonel Lee's talents or services as a soldier, but his accuracy as an historian. The high opinion, justly entertained, of his military talents and revolutionary services,

not less than the author's sincere regard for many branches of his family, some of whom have obligingly assisted in this undertaking, left a reluctance on his mind to come to a conclusion unfavorable to his claims to authenticity as a writer, which nothing should have overcome but a solemn determination to speak of men and things as he found them. Acting under this impulse he could not come to the conviction "that Colonel Lee had been shy in claiming merit," as the author of the "*Anecdotes*" expresses it.

As to his having "in various instances withheld pretensions which he might have fairly made to high distinction" it is obviously impossible to give an answer as to any claims which his self-denial has withheld: but, on this subject, he presumes to say, that the author of the "*Anecdotes*" could assert but little more from private knowledge than the author of these "*Sketches*." For the letter from Col. Laurens, which introduces the author of the "*Anecdotes*," to Greene, bears date the 21st of December 1781: when it was that the General appointed that gentleman Cornet in the Legion, does not appear; but as Col. Lee left the army early in 1782, it is presumable that he never served personally with the Colonel; at least it is certain, that as the war was then, in fact, over, he had no opportunity of personally observing Colonel Lee's conduct while in service. Judging from many anecdotes, distributed through this work, we are induced from coincidence to conclude, that the "*Memoirs*," furnish the principal source from which are extracted those anecdotes which relate to events narrated by Colonel Lee. If so, the evidence of the one goes no further than that of the other. But Lee's "*Memoirs*" have been long before the public and considered as a standard work. It is not then to be expected that his friends will surrender the correctness of the author without a struggle.

Far be it from us to wish to derogate from the just claims of the author of the "*Anecdotes*," on the favor of the public. We trust our text has already manifested a contrary leaning. We embrace this opportunity of giving to the public, (in addition to the proofs which his native state long since gave by its justice and liberality towards him) the following evidence of his fidelity and services.

Col. Laurens, in the letter above alluded to, says—"Mr. Garden, who will have the honour of delivering you this, has lately returned from his studies in Europe, and declares to me that he embraced the first opportunity of testifying his attachment to his country by joining the defenders of it. He is a young gentleman of a liberal education and cultivated understanding, and, as such, I was the more happy to learn that I might receive him as a fellow-citizen."—And, on the 31st of Jan. 1783, General Greene addresses a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in which he says, "Being informed that Mr. Garden, who is an officer of the Legion, has some matter coming before the General Assembly of a political nature, on which his whole private fortune depends, I feel myself bound, in honour and conscience, to lay before the house my knowledge of his political principles and military conduct.—Not at his instance, but from my own inclination. He was introduced to me by Col. Laurens, (whose memory cannot but be dear to this country) as a gentleman warmly attached to the American cause." "On this recommendation I gave him a commission in the Legion, and he has, upon every occasion, acted with spirit and gallantry, although frequently oppressed with ill-health. Nor has he ever failed to be with his corps, when either his honour or his duty called him, when it was possible for him to attend. His conduct has been such as to merit my esteem and confirm me in the good opinion given of him by Lt. Col. Laurens."

After this unequivocal expression of the high respect in which we hold the author, we trust that we shall be charged with no dereliction of it, when we undertake to prove that in the following passage it is impossible he can be correct:—

"He (Col. Lee) has not hinted, (says the author of the '*Anecdotes*') in the slightest degree, that the grand scheme for the recovery of the two southern states, when Lord Cornwallis, after the battle of Guilford, retired to Wilmington, was first suggested to General Greene by him; and it would have been afterwards abandoned but for his earnest remonstrances. Such, however, was the truth and perfect the evidence corroborating it." (p. 63.)

The author of the "*Anecdotes*" asserts, upon the authority of Dr. MATTHEW IRVINE, that the first idea of the descent into South-Carolina, was communicated to General Greene by Colonel Lee, through the medium of Dr. IRVINE himself. Mr. JAMES, also, in his "*Life of Marion*," and Mr. CALDWELL, in his "*Life of Greene*," ascribe to Colonel Lee the merit of this suggestion. The two latter authors, it is presumed, had nothing but the authority of Colonel Lee himself, to rest their assertion upon; and all these authors equally admire the self-denial of Colonel Lee, in not taking the credit of the suggestion expressly to himself. But, it is easy to prove, that Colonel Lee was restrained by a sense of truth in this particular; and that Dr. IRVINE was led into error by General Greene's unwillingness to confide a design, to which secrecy was so vitally important, to any one in his camp, until every thing was ripe for the intended movement.

Dr. IRVINE had obligingly favoured the author of these "*Sketches*," with the communication made to the author of the "*Anecdotes*"; but, upon comparing facts and circumstances, it was perfectly clear, that the Doctor was mistaken; and, therefore only, it was not noticed. The following remarks will serve to illustrate this subject:

1st. Directly as Lord Cornwallis passed the Deep River, Colonel Lee was ordered to follow in his rear, and only halted on the ground of the enemy's previous encampment, for the short space of time necessary to repair the end of the bridge, which had been partially broken up after the enemy had passed the river. From that time, he was absent from the main army altogether, until he joined it before Ninety-Six; and, therefore, could have held no conversations, personally with General Greene, upon the subject; although, from the tenor of his "*Memoirs*," it would seem to be otherwise. He takes no notice of Dr. IRVINE's agency.

2d. But, it is not now contended, that his communications with General Greene, on this subject, were personal; and Dr. IRVINE was the organ of communication between them.

This circumstance, which is insisted on as furnishing conclusive evidence of the fact contended for, puts it in the power of the author, positively to disprove it.

We have the most satisfactory evidence before us, that Dr. IRVINE was frequently employed by Colonel Lee, as the active, adventurous, and intelligent agent, of his confidential or most important communications with General Greene. And, in this instance, that as soon as Colonel Lee received his orders from General Greene, to penetrate into South-Carolina, Dr. IRVINE was the messenger dispatched to Greene, to receive a cipher for their future correspondence; and other confidential communications.

"April 5th, 1781.—Be pleased to send by Dr. IRVINE, the table of ciphers; and to inform me of your different stages, that I may know where to communicate precisely to you. I expect to cross the Santee about the time you cross Pee Dee, or a little after. This, I think, will be proper. You have my best prayers. Your's, affectionately."

We will admit, that Dr. IRVINE had been previously dispatched to General Greene on this subject; and it comports perfectly with the unusual precautions resorted to on this occasion to conceal his designs, to believe, that Greene even stated objections to Dr. IRVINE, to the plan proposed; for acquiescence would have betrayed a leaning, or a doubt. But, it is not necessary to do this, in order to support our point. We shall give the positive acknowledgment of Colonel Lee, in a letter which connects this with another subject, posterior in time, and from which we would infer, that Greene had been more explicit, and had not disavowed his intentions to Dr. IRVINE. At present, it is enough to state, that, from the circumstance of Dr. IRVINE's being dispatched to General Greene, it is clear, that it was after the retreat of Lord Cornwallis became determinate; and after Colonel Lee was separated from the main army, by following on the trail of the enemy.

Now, Lord Cornwallis crossed the Deep River on the 28th; that evening, the American army occupied the ground the enemy had abandoned, and Colonel Lee passed on in pursuit. The next day, viz.

29th March, General Greene writes to General Washington, the letter given in the text, declaring his resolution to penetrate into South-Carolina; and in that, and the three succeeding days assigns in successive letters, all the reasons detailed by Colonel Lee, in support of the measure. There was, then, no time for carrying on this conference through Dr. Irvine; for the decision had been taken, and the letters to Washington written, before it could possibly have commenced. The reader will, we hope, give an attentive perusal to the text on this subject, and conclude with us, that the decision had already been taken and acted on before Dr. IRVINE'S mission.

As to the alternative of following Lord Cornwallis to Wilmington, every thing proves that General Greene never tolerated the thought. For, in addition to the strong inducements which tempted him to penetrate to the south, he writes on the 29th to General Lillington, that his want of provisions, and of the means of transportation, and the barrenness of the country below him, rendered it impossible to pursue the enemy to Wilmington; more especially, after being reduced to an actual inferiority, by the loss of his militia. The great difficulty with General Greene, was about relinquishing the other alternative—that of abandoning Virginia to invasion; for he well knew, what actually afterwards happened, that he must, thenceforth, expect little support from that quarter.

General Greene's mind was not of a description, to be taken at surprise by every change of circumstances that occurs. As early as his arrival in Philadelphia, after being ordered on to the south, he had detailed to General Washington, the outlines of his plan of operations.—“To take a position by which he could cover his magazines, and collect his re-enforcements, and in the mean time, to act by detachments, with a view to detain or recall his adversary from his views on Virginia, until he could acquire a force that would justify his penetrating into the country to fight him.” To penetrate into the country, was always the leading object of his measures. When that state of circumstances had arrived, which would justify such a movement, was the only question left for events to determine.

After the battle of Guilford, he presented to his adversary, the choice of alternatives, either to fight him, or to retire. One or the other had then become indispensable. When Lord Cornwallis retired to New Garden, he left it still doubtful, whether his retreat would be directed to Camden, or to Wilmington. The previous possession of the latter place by Craig, and the deposit of stores made there, left it as probable, that he would pursue that route, as return by the other. Greene's mind was, therefore, necessarily drawn to the consideration of the course to be pursued on either alternative. If the retreat to Camden had been adopted, there would have been nothing to do, but return to his original plan—to gather in his detachments, and await the slow movements of his own re-enforcements, in order to enter upon aggressive operations. If the route to Wilmington should be pursued, it must be with one of two objects in view; either to take shipping for Charleston, or to refresh and re-enforce his troops, replenish his stores, and move on to Virginia. In either case, the descent into South-Carolina was the obvious course—whether to meet him, if he sailed for Charleston, and take advantage of his absence, to reduce his posts, before he could come to their relief; or to withdraw him from his views on Virginia, if he contemplated that movement.

It was always General Greene's opinion, that Lord Cornwallis would return into South-Carolina, upon hearing of his own movement into that state. He takes a thousand precautions to meet that contingency; and there can be no doubt, from Cornwallis' own despatches, that he would have taken that course, had he not thought, by his movements, first towards Hillsborough, then towards Virginia, to withdraw Greene from prosecuting his descent into that state.

Colonel Lee, also, in a letter of the 23d April, avows the same opinion. The 2d of May following, he remarks—“It appears dubious what his Lordship intends. His pride will urge him to continue the prosecution of his plan for the campaign, however repugnant to the interest of his king. If he adopts this conduct, we must prove to the world, how futile British conquests are, and force mankind

to admire the *vigour of your operations*. Much will depend on us; and no human exertion shall be wanting. I feel an assurance of brilliant success, which will be pleasing in every point of view: but, especially so, as it must tend to make happy a General, struggling without materials, against a well-appointed veteran army."

Colonel Lee, who always writes with the vigour of one who feels confident in his own resources; and the freedom of one who knows the value set upon his councils, had obviously set his affections upon this attack upon the posts.

After the fall of Fort Watson, he presses upon General Greene, measures calculated to employ Greene and Marion in keeping a look-out upon Rawdon and Cornwallis, while he should, himself, be pursuing the more active, (not to say conspicuous) employment, of reducing their posts.

When he was first ordered upon this enterprise, two months before, and the advance of Cornwallis upon the line of Greene's supplies and re-enforcements, in pursuit of Morgan, rendered his recall indispensable, we have seen, that he remonstrates against it in terms expressive of serious disapprobation. Yet, to have left him to pursue the reduction of the posts at that time, would have been, to sacrifice every thing else to this object, at a time, when success would have been crowned with no lasting benefit: even if success could have attended him, destitute as he was of artillery.

The strong language of his letter, of the 3d of February, on this subject, leaves it unquestionable, that he would avail himself of the first opportunity of reviving the subject.

There is, then, no reason to doubt his having dispatched Dr. IRYNE to General Greene on this mission; and we have the evidence before us, of his having, in some way, communicated his sentiments to General Greene on the subject, at this time. But, it is attended with an explicit confession, that he then learned, that the measures recommended, had been already resolved on. This he expressly avows, in a letter written subsequent to the battle of Camden.

This letter purports to be in answer to one, which, if it could now be produced, would effectually clear up this mystery.

General Greene, who had nothing but the good of the service in view, was very indifferent about arrogating to himself, the merit of measures. It was enough for him, that they tended to the good of the service, and were executed with vigour. To this end, he frequently availed himself of the stimulus given to the exertions of men, by the responsibility of having originated the measures they are called upon to execute.

It is more than probable, that, at this time, when Lee was ordered across the Santee, under Marion, to pursue Watson, and the attack on the posts, that part of the plan of the descent into South-Carolina, (or, perhaps, the whole of it) was called his, in consequence of its having been so ably, and warmly, (though injudiciously as to time) pressed by him in his letter of the 3d of February. But, it appears, that, on this occasion, at least he understood his commander.

My friend, Mr. Edmund Lee of Alexandria, a gentleman, as amiable and estimable in private life, as his brother was conspicuous in the field, has politely procured for me, a number of letters, found among Colonel Lee's papers, after his death; but, the letter alluded to, is not among them. The answer is in the following words:

"Swamps of Black River."

"DEAR GENERAL—General Marion has determined his route towards Santee. From hence we march to Benbow's Ferry on the Black River, thence to Wright's Bluff, near Fort Watson, where we cross the Santee. Whether we move down that river, or up the Congaree, future intelligence will determine. *You do me great honour in calling the adopted plan of operations mine. I have no pretence to such distinction. It gave me great pleasure to know, that my sentiments coincided with your intentions, and this honour I claim.*" I am so convinced of the wisdom of the operations, that no disaster can affect my opinion. Hitherto, all is well, and no body to blame but General

* In another letter of the 20th Colonel Lee writes, "may fortune be propitious to your bold enterprise."

Sumter. I do not conceive how you can assimilate any part of my conduct to this gentleman's, especially when you recollect, that by my own request, I am under General Marion; and that next to the commander in chief, the commanding officer of an expedition has praise. If we are baffled in our schemes, it will be owing to the delay in execution.

"General Marion has wrote you the report concerning Cornwallis."

As this letter bears no date, the author of these "*Sketches*" fell into the error, from its being written from the swamps of Black River, of supposing that it was written on the 15th or 16th of April, when Lee first joined Marion in the swamps of Black River—an error, which was confirmed by the suggestion, that they were to move from that position to Wright's Bluff, near Fort Watson. But, his attention having been again brought to the subject, the mistake became palpable, from noticing, that the letter in which Marion communicates to General Greene, the reports concerning Cornwallis, bears date the 30th of April. As Colonel Lee's letter speaks of that communication as a thing finished, his letter must have been written on the 30th or 31st of April, or 1st of May, as his next letter bears date the 2d of May. A conclusion, which is confirmed by the circumstance, that he here speaks of the same failure, with which he has charged Sumter in his "*Memoirs*," and which he could not have known on the 15th or 16th, when he first joined Marion.

This letter, therefore, was written after Marion passed over from the High-Hills to Black River. It was, of course, written after intelligence of the battle of Camden, which was received on the 28th; and, as such, it is a very important document, not only on the subject now under consideration, but on that of the alleged correspondence between Lee and Greene, after the battle of Camden, in which the former is charged with a design to abandon the country, and the latter credited with the achievement of having prevented him.

When the author formerly reviewed this letter, its importance on both these subjects then escaped him; he passed it over under the impression, that the adopted plan of operations spoken of in it, was that adopted by Marion, as spoken of in the commencement of the letter. But, the charge made upon General Sumter, clearly carries it back to the plan of the descent into South-Carolina. It speaks of a plan already partially executed, and already affected by the supposed defeat of General Sumter, on which Colonel Lee is so explicit in his "*Memoirs*." The letter, also, in which Lee requests to be put under Marion, bearing date on the 23d, is decisive on the point of date.

The truth obviously is, that the policy of the measure of penetrating into the country, breaking up the rendezvous, at which the enemy were forming an army, and presenting a shield for the militia to rally under, while it convinced the world that the country was not conquered, and divided the resources of it with the enemy, were so palpable, as to strike every military mind in the same view. While, to those immediately engaged in the enterprize, it held out the additional incentives of activity and glory. Every thing in General Greene's correspondence, shows it to have been the leading object of all his measures; General Weedon, also, at a very early period after Greene took the command, advises the measure; General Sumter too, when Colonel Hampton was dispatched to Guilford, instructed him to urge it. And if any subordinate officer employed in the Southern Department, could claim the eclat of having originated it, it was General Morgan, and not Colonel Lee. For Morgan and Greene had corresponded on the subject, before Colonel Lee's letter of the 3d of February. Which letter really had its origin in the communication of the plan to him through General Marion, as related in the text. After all, perhaps the only point on which any two minds could differ, was as to the precise time when the measure could be adopted with prudence. At the time General Weedon advised it, it was impossible, from the great inferiority and destitute condition of the American army. At the time Morgan recommended it, Leslie had arrived and Cornwallis' force was too overwhelming to admit of it without a large accession of militia force. Greene was actually engaged in the inquiry, what force of that description he could calculate upon; when the battle of the Cowpens, and the movements of Lord Cornwallis, ren-

dered it indispensable that he should throw his army in front of the enemy. On the 3d of February, when Colonel Lee first pressed the subject, to have adopted the measure (in the language of Major Pendleton) "would have rendered General Greene ridiculous." Either at that time or when General Sumter dispatched Colonel Hampton, he must have abandoned Morgan, the prisoners, and all his resources and re-enforcements on the line of communication with Virginia, to have pursued it. But the moment Lord Cornwallis' movements indicated a retreat to Wilmington, the resolution was adopted; and before General Greene moved from Guilford, he had called out a militia force to support him, in the event of Lord Cornwallis' return to Camden, upon which movement, General Greene would again be reduced to such a fearful inferiority, that he must have fallen back upon the Virginia militia, and tried again the fortune of another day at Guilford. On the 28th, the event actually occurred, on which alone the descent into South-Carolina was suspended, and on the 29th and 30th, we find every engine set in motion that was necessary to favour the enterprize. On no day previous to the 29th, could the measure be definitively resolved upon, for on that day Lord Cornwallis passed the dividing point of the roads to Wilmington and Camden. Provisionally, General Greene informs Congress in his letters of the 24th, (vide the text) it had been resolved on, and troops ordered out from Virginia to support him in the operation sometime previous.

In the text of this work, we have animadverted upon that passage in Colonel Lee's "*Memoirs*," in which he informs us, that after the battle of Camden, General Greene "became discontented with his advance to the South, sent orders to Colonel Lee to join him forthwith, and indicated by other measures, a disposition to depart from his adopted system."

This charge against General Greene, is revived by the author of the "*Anecdotes*," in the paragraph quoted above.

We repeat that we should be sorry to incur the charge of a want of respect for the authority of Colonel Lee, of the author of the "*Anecdotes*," or of his correspondent of Abingdon, but if the reader will consider the following remarks, he will certainly arrive at the conclusion with which we set out, that it is impossible they can be correct, on this fact.

It happens here again, that the paragraph on this subject contains in itself the means of detecting its error. It maintains that Colonel Lee, on receipt of the letter seen by his correspondent, left his command and hastened up to head-quarters, to prevail on the General to relinquish his design of quitting the country. We are aware that Colonel Lee also asserts, that he left the army and moved rapidly to head-quarters, probably for the same purpose. On what day did Colonel Lee leave his command? It is indispensable to the narrative, that it should have been after intelligence of the battle of the 28th; and this is fully proved to have been received on the 28th, for, Colonel Lee's letter of that day acknowledging the receipt of that intelligence is now before us. It must, also, have been before he sat down before Fort Motte, which was on the 5th or 6th of May, for from that time until the fall of the post, he remained steadily before it. And previous to its fall, General Greene had moved down to M'Cord's Ferry, with his cavalry, and communicated with Colonel Lee from the latter place. Colonel Lee's letters of the 6th, 8th and 10th from Motte's, decidedly prove his presence during the siege, nor is it affirmed, as I understand, that it was during the siege, that his visit to this commanding officer took place. It must have been, if at all, between the 28th and the 6th, during the movement of Marion from Salem to Fort Motte. But the letters of himself, or of Marion, or of Greene, or of both, are before us of every day during that interval, to prove he never was absent from his command. On the 3d, Major Eaton joined them at Benbow's Ferry. On the 4th, they crossed Santee, intending to advance on Watson, and fight him; on the 5th, they marched up to Fort Watson; and after that, there was not an hour in which Colonel Lee could have absented himself.

It would seem, from the language of Colonel Lee, that the order issued to him to join the main army, was in consequence of the General's dissatisfaction with the course he had pursued, and not in pursuance of the alleged design to withdraw from the State. But the only two letters that contain a syllable on the subject of his joining the main army, are those of the 1st and 4th of May. By the first of these, he is ordered to join the main army, only in the event of Lord Cornwallis' approach, or of Colonel Tarleton's arrival. This found him at Benbow's Ferry, and to it, under date of the 2d of May, he replies, "be assured that no prospects and no difficulties shall prevent my joining you, on the first notice of his Lordship's approach, or of the arrival of the cavalry." And in that of the 4th, General Greene writes to him—"I got intelligence last evening, that Lord Cornwallis was on his march towards Cross-Creek, and that he moves with his usual rapidity. It is supposed he is coming towards Camden, however, it is possible he may be pushing for our stores on the upper route. But in either case, it will be necessary for us to collect our force as soon as we can; therefore, am to request that you begin your march immediately, and bring the field-piece and all the force detached from this army with you." This letter found Colonel Lee sitting down before Fort Motte: to it, under date of the 6th, he replies, "We will wait one or two days, if you do not order otherwise." On the same day, it appears, General Greene countermanded this order in a letter to General Marion, and dispatched Major Hyrne to Colonel Lee, to make some confidential inquiries of a delicate and private nature, respecting the talents and qualities of certain individuals, who had come under his eye while serving with Marion, with a view to establishing the military corps afterwards raised in South-Carolina. A mission, which it is presumed, would have been wholly superceded by a previous, recent, personal interview.

From the foregoing facts, it is obvious, that Colonel Lee never was absent from his command under Marion, from the time of the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, until General Greene joined him before Fort Motte. That he never received but the one order to join the main army, and that was founded altogether on the intelligence of the approach of Lord Cornwallis. But this surely furnishes no ground for the assertion, that Greene "heretofore soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumter, now deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of his favorite regiment" "became for a while discontented with his advance to the South;" or to attribute his ordering Colonel Lee to join him, to that cause. Such an order was the necessary consequence of the approach of Cornwallis, and as soon as that intelligence was found incorrect, the order was countermanded. The approach of Lord Cornwallis, so far from rendering Greene discontented with his advance to the South, was the very event which he anticipated and wished to bring about. His retreat before him was indispensable, as he had not succeeded in his *coup de main* against Camden; and to retreat and leave Lee's command behind him, would have been equally hazardous to himself and to that detachment.

But we have evidence conclusive to show, that Greene never was dissatisfied with his movement to the South, and never contemplated a retreat from before Camden, in consequence of the affair of Hobkirk's Hill.

No one can peruse Colonel Lee's letter from the *Swamps of Black River*, without perceiving that the letter to which it is an answer, and which must have been the letter alluded to in the "*Anecdotes*," contained no complaints against the movements to the South. Would General Greene have complimented Lee upon that measure, whilst writing under the influence of mortification, and anticipated disgrace? Or would Lee have said of it, "you do me too much honor in attributing it to me," and "hitherto every thing has succeeded to a wish?" Or would contemporaneous orders to prosecute the same operation, which actually issued from head-quarters before intelligence reached Lee of the affair of Hobkirk's Hill, have accompanied such a letter, or emanated from a man who was meditating retreat? Yet such orders actually had been issued on the 27th, and Major Eaton was then on his march to join Marion for the purpose.

There is another remark which this letter suggests on this subject. It appears that Greene had complimented Lee by a comparison with Sumter. But would such an idea have occurred to him had he been at the time, as Colonel Lee asserts, "soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumter?" "The truth is, that General Greene's feelings towards that officer at this time, have been wholly misrepresented. Although it cannot be questioned, that if Sumter could have moved down between the Wateree and Broad rivers, contemporaneously with Greene's movement upon Camden, the happiest result must have followed, yet General Greene considered it as a misfortune, not a fault, that he had not done so; and, instead of being "soured" with him, actually viewed with great admiration the vigour of the measures which Sumter was then prosecuting on the Congaree; and hence the compliment tendered to Colonel Lee by this comparison.

On the subject of General Greene's meditating a retreat in consequence of the repulse of the 25th, the evidence is overwhelming to prove the imputation altogether groundless.

In addition to the letter to Marion, given in the text, in which he positively declares otherwise, (and which must have been communicated to Colonel Lee, because it contains an order respecting him,) on the 27th Greene writes to General Washington—"our army is in good spirits, and this little repulse will make no alteration in our general plan of operations." To Steuben he writes—"This repulse, if it may be called such, will make no alterations in our general plan of operations." To Sumter, under date of the 30th, he writes—"I am in hopes the Virginia militia will soon arrive in camp in considerable force, until when we shall lie a little farther distant from Camden, than we have done." And not a line can be found in the correspondence of the day which can be interpreted into a hint at the most remote intention to change his measures.

But there is a force in the evidence of facts at this time which sets at nought a recurrence to mere declarations to show, that he was resolved to maintain his ground and pursue the course he had previously resolved on. He retreated but nine miles from the field of battle; and when he found, on his reaching Rugely's Mills, that Eaton's retrograde movement had brought him back within four miles of that place, and that Lee lay with Marion on Black River, within thirty miles of him, instead of availing himself of these facilities in drawing in his detachments, as he must have done, had he meditated a retreat, they were all ordered, on the 28th, to press across the Santee, fight Watson, and pursue the reduction of the posts. At the same time, wishing to guard against the possibility of an attempt by Lord Rawdon to force him from his ground, Sumter was ordered up from the Congaree, with his brigade, and Colonel Read dispatched to Salisbury to hasten up the Virginia militia, and whatever recruits of the state line he should find there, or on the march to join him. Similar orders were issued at the same time to General Polk, and we have the evidence of Colonel Day to prove that after passing the Wateree, when Watson had succeeded in throwing himself into Camden, and Lord Cornwallis was reported to be advancing, Greene still declared his resolution "to dispute every inch of ground." The conclusion is inevitable.

The passages in the "*Life of Marion*," which we propose to notice, are contained in the 8th page of the Appendix, in the letter of Mr. KEATING SIMONS. Both the author and his correspondent, are too well known to us to admit a surmise that either would publish a syllable without the utmost confidence in its correctness. We, therefore, only propose to show how little human memory is to be relied on, after such a lapse of years.

The letter states, in substance, "that when the enemy were preparing to evacuate Charleston, they had a covering party on James' Island, to protect their wood-cutters, and another on Lamprier's Point, to protect their getting water for their shipping." That Captain Wilnot lost his life

in an attempt upon the party on James' Island, which was ordered to be made by Greene, in compliance with a request of Kosciusko, "to afford him an opportunity of distinguishing himself." That about the same time, Greene wrote to Marion, "that he understood the watering party at Lamprier's Point was so situated, as to afford him an opportunity of attacking it with success." To which the latter replied, "That he had not overlooked the situation of the British at that spot, but he viewed the war in Carolina as over; and, as the enemy were preparing to go away, he had sent a party to protect them from being annoyed by his own men, &c."

Military men will, at once, pronounce upon this reply, "that, however correct it may have been to make it as a man, it was not very well done as a soldier. And most who knew Marion, will readily perceive, that it does not accord with the usual habits of that correct and finished soldier. The scrupulous obedience to orders, which his whole military life exhibits, presents a most edifying example to the future defenders of our country. But, we have, fortunately, his own letters to explain this affair.

Lamprier's Point is formed by Quelch's Creek; and under date of the 28th of October, we find this passage from Marion—"A number of boats, with a strong covering party, at the distillery on Quelch's Creek, five miles from Charleston, are watering their ships. Sir Samuel Hood is off the bar, waiting to convoy the troops. The redoubt at Haddrell's is evacuated and burnt."

It will be recollected, that at the date of this letter, the state had undertaken to supply the army; and the governor frequently complains of difficulties thrown in his way, by the provisions carried fraudulently into town. The country also, in the vicinity of the town, had been repeatedly foraged by parties, penetrating into the adjacent parishes; and this redoubt at Lamprier's, kept open the communication. The governor and council had, before this, adopted the policy of hastening the evacuation of the city, by increasing the distresses of the garrison. They were continually, therefore, pressing the commanding general to cut off their communication with the country; a measure, in which they were not a little supported by the spirited young men, to whom this duty was assigned; and who had now acquired such soldierly feelings, and habits, as for ever impelled them to some new enterprize.

General Greene did give the order mentioned; but, unfortunately, for the point of the anecdote he found Marion "nothing-loth," to comply with it.

"Should there be an opportunity of injuring the enemy at the distillery, by a detachment *"from this army,"* I beg you will send me such intelligence, as to enable me to give you the necessary aid."

This bears date the 30th, and Marion's reply of the next day, is—"The enemy is still watering at Hobcaw, above William's Ferry, and not at the distillery, as I had wrote in my former letter. At that time, they were there, but removed. The situation is too advantageous to them, to attack with any probability of success; strong abatis around them, and under the direct fire of galleys and armed vessels. If those on land should be pushed, they have not more than two hundred yards to their boats, when they can re-embark in a few minutes. The advantage of taking them, was it certain, would not answer the loss; besides, they may send a strong party, and cut off our retreat."

We have also recurred to the correspondence, which preceded the affair in which Wilmot fell; and the reader shall judge, whether the enterprize in which he was joined by Kosciusko, against the wood-cutters, did not originate with himself; and was not undertaken without the privity of the General. It is not in our power to say, that no order was issued to attack the wood-cutters; but, we can say, that there is no such order on the files of the department.

Captain Wilmot's letter to General Greene, bears date, John's Island, 24th October, 1782.—"Colonel Kosciusko" he writes, "joined me in an expedition last evening, against a party of the enemy, who have hunted at Dill's Bluff, on James' Island, several days past, to get wood. Their

number was from fifty to one hundred sailors, covered by a subaltern and twenty men. We waited till late in the morning, and finding they did not come as usual, were forced to return with one prisoner only, who was left on the ground."

It is needless to remark to the reader, that Wilmot survived this joint expedition; and, in truth, he fell three weeks afterwards, in prosecution of a distinct service, and when Kosciusko was not present. He appears to have fallen into an ambuscade, on the morning of the 15th of November, perhaps in crossing James' Island to join Kosciusko, at Wappoo; but, in prosecution of a service expressly committed to his own exertions.

On the 3d of November, orders were issued to him, through Captain Pendleton, in these words—"The general has been informed by the governor, that the trade which has been carried on with the town, has been infinitely injurious to the army, as well as the state, by suffering large quantities of provision to go into town, to supply the enemy. The general, therefore, requests you will stop all boats, without distinction, in future; and do all in your power, to prevent any clandestine commerce with the inhabitants, or the enemy in Charleston."

Wilmot's last letter is dated on the 4th, in which, he says—"I move from John's Island to-morrow, and will return in a day or two." He returned no more!

Thus, it appears, that the order issued to Marion, had nothing of that sanguinary character, which would seem to be attributed to it. That Marion was deterred from executing it, not by humane feeling, but, by military prudence. And, that the life of Wilmot was not sacrificed to the vanity or enterprise of Kosciusko.

Charleston, April 29th, 1822.

ERRATUM EXTRA.

Vol. 2, p. 317, line 36, before "*the present*," insert "*brother of*."

So as to read—brother of the present Chancellor Waties.

Wm. W. Miller

May 16th 1829